PAX HUMANA
I
The trouble with the ordinary or garden variety of pacifist is that he
has a merely negative idea of peace.
The true idea of peace is positive, constructive, forward-looking. It is
not content with a mere cessation of hostilities at any particular
period of the world's history. It aims at the establishment of reason
and justice as the rule of the world's life. It proposes to find the
basis of this establishment in the freely expressed will of the peoples
of the world.
The men and women who do the world's work are the sovereigns who must
guarantee this real peace of the world.
That is what we are fighting for. Not pax Romana, nor pax Germanica, nor
pax Britannica, but pax Humana--a peace which will bring a positive
benefit to all the tribes of humanity.
Since the choice by the Imperial German Government, in August, 1914, of
war as the means of settling international disputes, the Allies have
been fighting against that choice and its bloody consequences. Every one
of them--Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia--had pleaded for
arbitration, conference, consultation, to avert this fearful conflict of
arms. But it was in vain.
The United States of America, forced by the flagrant violation of its
neutral rights to take an active part in the war, and led by its vital
sympathies to the side of the Allies, committed by honor and conscience
to the duty of fighting for a real peace of mankind, must carry on this
war until its humane and democratic object is attained. To do less than
that would be to renounce our place as a great nation, to deny our faith
as Americans, and to expose our country to incalculable peril and
disaster.
But now that all the nations of the earth have begun to realize the
horror of this abominable German war, and to desire its ending, it is
necessary for us, in conjunction with our friends of peaceful and
democratic purpose, to consider, first, the conditions under which peace
may be discussed with the Imperial German Government, and, second, the
terms on which a peace may possibly be concluded.
II
THE CONDITIONS OF A PEACE CONFERENCE
We should distinguish clearly between the conditions which must be
fulfilled before we can honorably enter into any talk of peace with our
adversary, the begetter and beginner of this war; and the terms which
the Allies and the United States and the other nations at war with
Germany would put forward in such a conversation as a just and durable
basis for the establishment of peace.
This distinction is essential. The conditions are antecedent and
indispensable. Until they are fulfilled we cannot talk with the enemy,
except in the language which he has chosen and forced upon us--the stern
tongue of battle by land and sea.
Germany grandiloquently claims to be the first to propose a
peace-conference as a substitute for the horrors of war. (See the
Kaiser's note of December 12, 1916. [Footnote 9])
[Footnote 9: This note contains not the slightest reference to the
nature of the suggested peace. Its tone conforms to the orders which the
Kaiser issued to his army on the same day: "Under the influence of the
victory which you have gained by your bravery, I and the monarchs of the
three states in alliance with me have made an offer of peace to the
enemy. It is uncertain whether the object at which this offer is aimed
will be reached. You will have meanwhile, with God's help, to continue
to resist and defeat the enemy." It was not a proposal of peace. It was
a proclamation of victory--German victory--and an invitation to
surrender.]
She forgets the many proposals for such a conference which were made to
her in the fateful month of July, 1914, by Servia, France, Great
Britain, Italy, and Russia--all of which she contemptuously brushed
aside in her scornful will to war. She forgets the offenses against
international law and against the plain precepts of humanity which she
has committed since that time and which have earned for her the
indignation and mistrust of mankind. She forgets that her so-called
proposal for a peace conference contained no suggestion of the terms of
peace which she was willing to discuss. She forgets that such a proposal
is a mere hypocritical mockery. No sane person, no intelligent nation,
would enter into a conference without knowledge of the things to be
considered.
This last point lies at the base of President Wilson's note of December
18, 1916, suggesting that the belligerent powers, on both sides, should
"avow their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be
concluded and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a
guarantee against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in
the future." This note, I believe, was sent to all the American
Ambassadors and Ministers in Europe, with instructions to communicate it
to the Governments to which they were accredited, whether belligerent or
neutral.
Here is a point at which I can throw a little new light upon the
situation. I handed the note, as I was ordered to do, to the Dutch
Minister, without comment or recommendation. Almost immediately the
German-subsidized press in Holland began to assail the Dutch Government
for refusing to support President Wilson's note. It seemed to me that
this was a falsehood, unjust to Holland, injurious to our Government,
which had not asked for support. Therefore I made the following
statement to the press on January 9, 1917:
"The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs is absolutely correct in saying
that I handed him President Wilson's note of December 18 without any
request or suggestion that the Netherlands Government should support it.
I did so because I was so instructed by my Government. I was told to
transmit the President's note simply as a matter of information. No
request was added. The reason for this is because America understands
the delicate and difficult position of the Netherlands Government, in
the midst of the present war, and will not urge nor even ask it to do
anything which it does not judge to be wise and prudent and helpful. I
have done my best to promote this right understanding of the position of
Holland in the United States, and I shall continue to do so. I have no
knowledge of any instructions from Washington in regard to the manner of
delivering the President's note in Spain.
"What I cannot understand is the general misunderstanding of that note.
It expressly declared that it was not an offer of mediation nor a
proposal of peace. It was simply a suggestion that the belligerents on
both sides should state the terms on which they would be willing to
consider and discuss peace. The Entente Powers have already done this
with some clearness, and will probably soon do so even more clearly. The
Central Powers have politely, even affectionately, but very practically,
declined the President's invitation to state their terms. There is the
deadlock on peace talk at present. When both sides are equally frank the
world can judge whether the peace which all just men desire is near or
far away."
The accuracy and propriety of this statement have never been questioned
by the Department of State. On the contrary, it was practically affirmed
by the President in his address to the Senate on January 22, 1917, when
he said:
"On the 18th of December last I addressed an identic note to the
Governments of the nations now at war, requesting them to state, more
definitely than they had yet been stated by either group of
belligerents, the terms upon which they would deem it possible to make
peace. I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of all neutral
nations like our own, many of whose most vital interests the war puts in
constant jeopardy.
"The Central Powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were
ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace.
"The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely and have stated,
in general terms indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply
details, the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation which they
deem to be indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement." Here,
then, we come within sight of the first of the conditions which are
absolutely precedent, at least so far as America is concerned, to any
discussion of peace.
1. Germany must answer President Wilson's note of December 18, 1916. She
must state her terms of peace, maximum or minimum, frankly and
unequivocally.
Germany asserts that she is waging a defensive war. She must tell the
world what she is defending. That she has never been willing to do.
Germany asserts that she is victorious thus far. She must say what she
thinks her "victories" mean, and what they entitle her to claim and
keep.
In brief, Germany must lay her cards on the table. If she wants
peace--and certainly she needs it,--she must be willing to say what she
means by it.
2. The second condition precedent to any discussion of peace terms with
Germany has been clearly defined by President Wilson in his reply to the
note issued by His Holiness Pope Benedict.
That reply was thoroughly sympathetic and conciliatory. Among its frank
and strong paragraphs there was one which must be particularly noted:
"We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee
of anything that is to endure unless explicitly supported by such
conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people
themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in
accepting. Without such guarantees treaties of settlement, agreements
for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force,
territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with
the German Government, no man, no nation, could now depend on."
Understand--this is not a flat refusal to treat with the House of
Hohenzollern in any circumstances, which the more rabid and less
thoughtful newspapers of England have urged. It is merely a statement
that the rulers of Germany must have behind them a sufficient and
explicit mandate and guarantee of the people of Germany before we can
trust them.
We do not presume to interfere in the internal affairs of the German
Empire. The people of that empire have a right to say how they shall be
ruled. If they like the Hohenzollerns, good!
All that we ask is some clear, democratic guarantee of the German people
behind the word of its chosen Government.
Does this mean a complete reformation of the German Empire, which in
effect now consists of twenty-two hereditary kings, princes, dukes, and
grand dukes, with the Kaiser at the head? Does it mean a constitutional
remoulding of the empire?
That would be a long process. The people of Germany are well
disciplined. There is small prospect of a revolution in that country
unless war compels it.
What is it that we are pledged by President Wilson's statement to insist
upon as a precondition of any peace conference with Germany? Simply
this--that behind the word of the Kaiser there must be the word of the
German people.
That word must be given in advance and in a way which will satisfy both
the Allies and the United States. It is for the German people to find
the way.
We cannot honorably talk peace with Germany until that way is found.
3. The third condition antecedent to a conference on peace is the
renunciation and abandonment of the German submarine warfare upon
merchant shipping.
On this point I do not speak with any kind of authority or official
sanction. What I say is based, indeed, upon words uttered with the
highest authority. But the conclusion drawn from them is merely my own
judgment and has no force beyond that of the reasoning that has led me
to it.
The American position in regard to this submarine warfare--its
illegality, its inhumanity--has been clearly and eloquently defined by
our Government again and again.
"The Government of the United States has been apprised that the Imperial
German Government considered themselves to be obliged, by the
extraordinary circumstances of the present war and the measures adopted
by their adversaries in seeking to cut Germany off from all commerce, to
adopt methods of retaliation which go much beyond the ordinary methods
of warfare at sea, in the proclamation of a war zone from which they
have warned neutral ships to keep away. This Government has already
taken occasion to inform the Imperial German Government that it cannot
admit the adoption of such measures or such a warning of danger to
operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights of American
shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as
passengers on merchant ships of belligerent neutrality; and that it must
hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for any
infringement of those rights, intentional or incidental. It does not
understand the Imperial German Government to question those rights. It
assumes, on the contrary, that the Imperial German Government accept, as
of course, the rule that the lives of non-combatants, whether they be
of neutral citizenship or citizens of one of the nations at war, cannot
lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction
of an unarmed merchantman, and recognize also, as all other nations do,
the obligation to take the usual precaution of visit and search to
ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent
nationality or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral
flag." (The Secretary of State, Washington, D. C., to the German
Minister for Foreign Affairs, May 13, 1915.)
"The fact that more than one hundred American citizens were among those
who perished" (reference to the sinking of the Lusitania) "made it the
duty of the Government of the United States to speak of these things and
once more, with solemn emphasis, to call the attention of the Imperial
German Government to the grave responsibility which the Government of
the United States conceives that it has incurred in this tragic
occurrence, and to the indisputable principle upon which that
responsibility rests. The Government of the United States is contending
for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of
commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the
rights of humanity, which every government honors itself in respecting
and which no government is justified in resigning on behalf of those
under its care and authority." (The Secretary of State, Washington, D.
C., to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, June 9, 1915.)
"If a belligerent cannot retaliate against an enemy without injuring the
lives of neutrals as well as their property, humanity, as well as
justice and a due regard for the dignity of neutral powers, should
dictate that the practice be discontinued. If persisted in it would in
such circumstances constitute an unpardonable offense against the
sovereignty of the neutral nation affected. . . . The rights of neutrals
in time of war are based upon principle, not upon expediency, and the
principles are immutable. It is the duty and obligation of belligerents
to find a way to adapt the new circumstances to them." (The Secretary of
State, Washington, D. C., to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs,
July 21, 1915.)
"The law of nations in these matters, upon which the Government of the
United States based that protest" (i.e., against the German declaration
of February, 1915, declaring the danger zone around Great Britain and
Ireland) "is not of recent origin or founded upon merely arbitrary
principles set up by convention. It is based, on the contrary, upon
manifest principles of humanity and has long been established with the
approval and by the express assent of all civilized nations. . . . It
has become painfully evident to it (the Government of the United States)
that the position which it took at the very outset is inevitable,
namely--the use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's commerce
is, of necessity, because of the very character of the vessels employed
and the very methods of attack which their employment of course
involves, utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, the
long-established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals, and the sacred
immunities of non-combatants." (The Secretary of State, Washington, D.
C., to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, April 18, 1916.)
"But we cannot forget that we are in some sort and by the force of
circumstances the responsible spokesmen of the rights of humanity, and
that we cannot remain silent while those rights seem in process of being
swept away in the maelstrom of this terrible war. We owe it to a due
regard for our own rights as a nation, to our sense of duty as a
representative of the rights of neutrals the world over, and to a just
conception of the rights of mankind to take this stand now with the
utmost solemnity and firmness." (President Wilson's Address to Congress,
April 19, 1916.)
"The present German warfare against commerce is a warfare against
mankind. It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk,
American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to
learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations
have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has
been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation
must decide for itself how it will meet it." (President Wilson's Message
to Congress, April 2, 1917.)
The United States cannot go back on these words. They are fundamental in
our position. I do not know whether the Allies have formally indorsed
them or not. But that makes no difference. It seems to me that for
America, with her traditional, unalterable devotion to the doctrine of
Mare Liberum, as Grotius stated it, there can be no peace conference
with a Government which is in active and flagrant violation of that
principle.
I think that for us at least--we do not venture to speak for the Allies,
though we believe they sympathize with our point of view--there can be
no peace parley with Germany until she renounces and abandons her
atrocious method of submarine warfare on merchant shipping.
Here, then, are the three conditions which ought to be fulfilled before
we can honorably enter a conference on peace with the Imperial German
Government. The first is a legitimate inference from the statements of
the President. The second has been positively laid down by the
President. The third is drawn, purely on my own responsibility, from his
words.
First, Germany should frankly declare the aims with which she began this
war, and the purposes with which she continues it on the territories
which she has invaded.
Second, Germany must offer adequate guarantees that in any peace
negotiations her rulers shall speak only and absolutely with the voice
of the people behind them--in other words, with a democratic, not an
autocratic, sanction.
Third, Germany ought to give a pledge of good faith by the abandonment
of her illegal and inhuman submarine warfare on the merchant shipping of
the world.
Is it likely that the predatory Potsdam gang will be willing to accept
these three conditions soon?
I frankly confess that I do not know. Germany is in sore straits. That I
know from personal observation. But I know also that she is
magnificently organized, trained, and disciplined for obedience to the
imperial will. She will carry her fight for world empire to the last
limit.
When that limit is reached, when the German people know that the attempt
of their rulers to dominate the world by war has failed, then it will be
time to talk with them about the terms of peace.
III
THE TERMS OF PEACE
This is a long subject; and for that reason I mean to make it a short
chapter.
1. A discussion of peace terms with our enemy, the Imperial German
Government, is neither desirable nor safe under the present conditions.
Until that Government is disabused of the delusion that it has won, is
winning, or will win a substantial victory in this war, it is not likely
to say anything sane or reasonable about peace. A pax Germanica is what
it is willing to discuss.
But that is just what we do not want. To enter such a discussion now
would be both futile and perilous.
It would probably postpone the coming of that real pax humana for which
the Allies have already made such great sacrifices, and for which we
have pledged ourselves to fight at their side.
But meantime it is wise and right and useful to let the German people
know, by such means as we can find, that we have not entered this war in
the spirit of revenge or conquest, and that their annihilation or
enslavement is not among the ends which we contemplate.
An admirable opportunity to give this humane and prudent assurance was
offered by the Pope's proposal of a Peace Conference (August, 1917).
President Wilson, with characteristic acuteness and candor, made good
use of this opportunity. While declining the proposal clearly and
firmly, as impossible under the present conditions, he added the
following statement of the peace purposes of the United States--a
statement which approaches a definition by the process of exclusion:
"Punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of
selfish and exclusive economic leagues, we deem inexpedient, and in the
end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of
all for an enduring peace, that must be based upon justice and fairness
and the common rights of mankind." (President Wilson's Note to His
Holiness the Pope, August 27, 1917.)
Thus far (and in my judgment no farther) we may go in an indirect,
third-personal discussion of the terms of peace with our enemy.
2. On the other hand, a full discussion of the terms of peace with our
friends, the allied nations, will be most profitable--indeed, it is
absolutely necessary.
The sooner it comes--the more frank, thorough, and confidential it
is--the better!
The Allies, as President Wilson said in the address already quoted
(January 22, 1917), have stated their terms of peace "with sufficient
definiteness to imply details."
These terms have been summed up again and again in three general words:
RESTITUTION,
REPARATION,
GUARANTEES FOR THE FUTURE.
It is for us to discuss the details which are implied in these terms,
not with our enemy, but with our friends who have borne the brunt of
this German war against peace.
Nothing which would make their sacrifice vain could ever satisfy the
heart and conscience of the United States.
We cannot honorably accept a peace which would leave Belgium,
Luxembourg, Servia, Montenegro, Roumania crushed and helpless in the
hands of their captors.
We cannot honorably accept a peace which would leave our sister-republic
France hopelessly exposed to the same kind of an assault which Germany
made upon her in 1870 and in 1914.
We cannot honorably accept a peace which would leave Great Britain
crippled and powerless to work with us in the maintenance of the freedom
of the sea.
We cannot honorably accept a peace which would leave the Italian demand
for unity unsatisfied, and the new Russian Republic helpless before its
foes. Such, it seems to me, are the principles which must guide and
govern us in the coming conference with our friends about the terms of
peace.
In regard to the right of the peoples of the world, small or great, to
determine their own form of government and their own action, we are
fully committed. This principle is fundamental to our existence as a
nation. President Wilson has reaffirmed it again and again, never more
clearly or significantly than in his address to the Senate on January
22, 1917.
"And there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of rights among
organized nations. No peace can last which does not recognize and accept
the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the
consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand
people about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property.
"I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a single
example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a
united, independent, and autonomous Poland, and that henceforth
inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social
development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto
under the power of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to
their own."
This "example" must be interpreted in its full bearing upon all the
questions which are likely to come up in the conference in regard to the
terms of peace.
There is one more fixed point in the terms of a peace which the United
States and the Allies can accept with honor. That is the formation,
after this war is ended, of a compact, an alliance, a league, a
union--call it what you will--of free democratic nations, pledged to use
their combined forces, diplomatic, economic, and military, against the
beginning of war by any nation which has not previously submitted its
cause to international inquiry, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial
hearing.
Here, again, experience enables me to throw a little new light upon the
situation. In November, 1914, on my way home to America for surgical
treatment, I had the privilege of conveying a personal, unofficial
message to Washington from the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir
Edward (now Viscount) Grey. Remember, at this time America was neutral,
and the "League to Enforce Peace" had not been formed.
This was the substance of the message: "The presence and influence of
America in the council of peace after the war will be most welcome to us
provided we can be assured of two things: First, that America stands for
the restoration of all that Germany has seized in Belgium and France.
Second, that America will enter and support, by force if necessary, a
league of nations pledged to resist and punish any war begun without
previous submission of the cause to international investigation and
judgment."
This was the message that I took to Washington in 1914. Since that time
the "League to Enforce Peace" has been organized in America (June 17,
1915). In my opinion it would be better named the "League to Defend
Peace." But the name makes little difference. It is the principle, the
idea, that counts.
This idea has been publicly approved by the leading spokesmen of all the
allied nations, and notably by President Wilson in his speech at the
League banquet, May 27, 1916, and in his address to the Senate, January
22, 1917, in which he said:
"Mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the
belligerents themselves. Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It
will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of
the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any
nation now engaged in any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no
nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it.
If the peace presently to be made is to endure it must be a peace made
secure by the organized major force of mankind."
Consider for a moment what such an organization would mean.
It would mean, first of all, the strongest possible condemnation of the
attitude and action of Germany and her assistants in plotting, choosing,
beginning, and forcing the present war upon the world.
It is precisely because she disdained and refused to submit the
Austro-Servian quarrel, and her own secret plans and purposes to
investigation, conference, judicial inquiry, that her blood-guiltiness
is most flagrant, and her criminal assault upon the world's peace cries
to Heaven for punishment.
Moreover, such an organization of free democratic states would mean a
practical step toward a new era of international relations. It would
amount, in effect, to what Premier Ribot, in his recent address at the
anniversary of the battle of the Marne, called "a league of common
defense." It would be a new kind of treaty of alliance--open, not
secret--made by peoples, not by monarchs--an alliance against wars of
aggression and conquest--an alliance against all wars whose beginners
are unwilling to submit their cause to the common judgment of mankind.
Such an open treaty of defense would practically condemn and cancel all
secret treaties for offensive war as treasonable conspiracies against
the commonwealth of the world.
But would the organization of such a league of nations to defend peace
make war henceforward impossible?
No sane man, who knows the ignorance, the imperfection, the passionate
frailty of human nature entertains such a wild dream or makes such an
extravagant claim.
All that the league can hope to do is to make an aggressive war, such as
Germany thrust upon the world in 1914, more difficult and more
dangerous. All that it purposes is to set up a new safeguard of peace,
based upon justice, and supported by the common faith, the collective
force, and the mutual trust of democratic peoples.
That is one of the things--yes, I think it is the most important
thing--for which we are now fighting with the Allies against Germany and
her assistants:
PEACE WITH POWER.
These pages have been written as a voluntary contribution to the cause
of our country in this righteous war against war. I should have been
happier if my active service at the front could have been accepted. But
since my age made that impossible I have tried, and shall go on trying,
to do what I can in other ways to help our fight for real peace.
I close this bit of work with the noble lines of Tennyson:
"I would that wars should cease,
I would the globe from end to end
Might sow and reap in peace,
And some new Spirit o'erbear the old,
Or Trade refrain the Powers
From war with kindly links of gold,
Or Love with wreaths of flowers.
Slav, Teuton, Kelt, I count them all
My friends and brother souls,
With all the peoples, great and small,
That wheel between the poles.
But since our mortal shadow, Ill,
To waste this earth began--
Perchance from some abuse of Will
In worlds before the man
Involving ours--he needs must fight
To make true peace his own,
He needs must combat might with might,
Or Might would rule alone."