The newcomer in China in observing and judging events usually makes
the mistake of attaching too much significance to current happenings.
Occurrences take place which in the western world would portend
important changes--and nothing important results. It is not easy to
loosen the habit of years; and so the visitor assumes that an event
which is striking to the point of sensationalism must surely be part
of a train of events having a definite trend; some deep-laid plan must
be behind it. It takes a degree of intellectual patience added to time
and experience to make one realize that even when there is a rhythm in
events the tempo is so retarded that one must wait a long time to
judge what is really going on. Most political events are like daily
changes in the weather, fluctuations back and forth which may
seriously affect individuals but which taken one by one tell little
about the movement of the seasons. Even the occurrences which are due
to human intention are usually sporadic and casual, and the observer
errs by reading into them too much plot, too comprehensive a scheme,
too farsighted a plan. The aim behind the event is likely to be only
some immediate advantage, some direct increase of power, the overthrow
of a rival, the grasping at greater wealth by an isolated act, without
any consecutive or systematic looking ahead.
Foreigners are not the only ones who have erred, however, in judging
the Chinese political situation of the last few years. Beginning two
years ago, one heard experienced Chinese with political affiliations
saying that it was impossible for things to go on as they were for
more than three months longer. Some decisive change must occur. Yet
outwardly the situation has remained much the same not only for three
months but for two years, the exception being the overthrow of the
Anfu faction a year ago. And this occurrence hardly marked a definite
turn in events, as it was, to a considerable extent, only a shifting
of power from the hands of one set of tuchuns to another set.
Nevertheless at the risk of becoming a victim of the fallacy which I
have been setting forth, I will hazard the remark that the last few
months _have_ revealed a definite and enduring trend--that through the
diurnal fluctuations of the strife for personal power and wealth a
seasonal political change in society is now showing itself. Certain
lines of cleavage seem to show themselves, so that through the welter
of striking, picturesque, sensational but meaningless events, a
definite pattern is revealed.
This pattern is indicated by the title of this chapter--a movement
toward the development of a federal form of government. In calling the
movement one toward federalism, there is, however, more of a jump into
the remote future than circumstances justify. It would be more
accurate, as well as more modest, to say that there is a well defined
and seemingly permanent trend toward provincial autonomy and local
self-government accompanied by a hope and a vague plan that in the
future the more or less independent units will recombine into the
United or Federated States of China. Some who look far into the future
anticipate three stages; the first being the completion of the present
secessionist movement; the second the formation of northern and
southern confederations respectively; the third a reunion into a
single state.
To go into the detailed evidence for the existence of a definite and
lasting movement of this sort would presume too much on the reader's
knowledge of Chinese geography and his acquaintance with specific
recent events. I shall confine myself to quite general features of the
situation. The first feature is the new phase which has been assumed
by the long historic antagonism of the north and the south. Roughly
speaking, the revolution which established the republic and overthrew
the Manchus represented a victory for the south. But the
transformation during the last five years of the nominal republic into
a corrupt oligarchy of satraps or military governors or feudal lords
has represented a victory for the north. It is a significant fact,
symbolically at least, that the most powerful remaining tuchun or
military governor in China--in some respects the only powerful one who
has survived the vicissitudes of the last few years--namely Chang Tso
Lin, is the uncrowned king of the three Manchurian provinces. The
so-called civil war of the north and south is not, however, to be
understood as a conflict of republicanism located in the south and
militarism in the north. Such a notion is directly contrary to facts.
The "civil war" till six or eight months ago was mainly a conflict of
military governors and factions, part of that struggle for personal
power and wealth which has been going on all over China.
But recently events have taken a different course. In four of the
southern provinces, tuchuns who seemed all powerful have toppled over,
and the provinces have proclaimed or tacitly assumed their
independence of both the Peking and the former military Canton
governments--the province in which Canton situated being one of the
four. I happened to be in Hunan, the first of the southerly provinces
to get comparative independence, last fall, not long after the
overthrow of the vicious despot who had ruled the province with the
aid of northern troops. For a week a series of meetings were held in
Changsha, the capital of the province. The burden of every speech was
"Hunan for the Hunanese." The slogan embodies the spirit of two powers
each aiming at becoming the central authority; it is a conflict of the
principle of provincial autonomy, represented by the politically more
mature south, with that of militaristic centralization, represented by
Peking.
As I write, in early September (1921), the immediate issue is obscured
by the fight which Wu Pei Fu is waging with the Hunanese who with
nominal independence are in aim and interest allied with the south.
If, as is likely, Wu Pei Fu wins, he may take one of two courses. He
may use his added power to turn against Chang Tso Lin and the northern
militarists which will bring him into virtual alliance with the
southerners and establish him as the antagonist of the federal
principle. This is the course which his earlier record would call for.
Or he may yield to the usual official lust for power and money and try
once more the Yuan Shi Kai policy of military centralization with
himself as head, after trying out conclusions with Chang Tso Lin as
his rival. This is the course which the past record of military
leaders indicates. But even if Wu Pei Fu follows precedent and goes
bad, he will only hasten his own final end. This is not prophecy. It
is only a statement of what has uniformly happened in China just at
the moment a military leader seemed to have complete power in his
grasp. In other words, a victory for Wu Pei Fu may either accelerate
or may retard the development of provincial autonomy according to the
course he pursues. It cannot permanently prevent or deflect it.
The basic factor that makes one sure that this trend toward local
autonomy is a reality and not merely one of those meaningless
shiftings of power which confuse the observer, is that it is in accord
with Chinese temperament, tradition and circumstance. Feudalism is
past and gone two thousand years ago, and at no period since has China
possessed a working centralized government. The absolute empires which
have come and gone in the last two millenniums existed by virtue of
non-interference and a religious aura. The latter can never be
restored; and every episode of the republic demonstrates that China
with its vast and diversified territories, its population of between
three hundred and fifty and four hundred million, its multitude of
languages and lack of communications, its enormous local attachments
sanctified by the family system and ancestral worship, cannot be
managed from a single and remote centre. China rests upon a network of
local and voluntary associations cemented by custom. This fact has
given it its unparallelled stability and its power to progress even
under the disturbed political conditions of the past ten years. I
sometimes think that Americans with their own traditional contempt for
politics and their spontaneous reliance upon self-help and local
organization are the ones who are naturally fitted to understand
China's course. The Japanese with their ingrained reliance upon the
state have continually misjudged and misacted. The British understand
better than we do the significance of local self-government; but they
are misled by their reverence for politics so that they cannot readily
find or see government when it does not take political form.
It is not too much to say that one great cause for the overthrow of
the Manchus was the fact that because of the pressure of international
relations they attempted to force, especially in fiscal matters, a
centralization upon the provinces wholly foreign to the spirit of the
people. This created hostility where before there had been
indifference. China may possibly not emerge from her troubles a
unified nation, any more than a much smaller and less populous Europe
emerged from the break-up of the Holy Roman Empire, a single state.
Indeed one often wonders, not that China is divided, but that she is
not much more broken up than she is. But one thing is certain.
Whatever progress China finally succeeds in making will come from a
variety of local centres, not from Peking or Canton. It will be
effected by means of associations and organizations which even though
they assume a political form are not primarily political in nature.
Criticisms are passed, especially by foreigners, upon the present
trend of events. The criticisms are more than plausible. It is evident
that the present weakness of China is due to her divided condition.
Hence it is natural to argue that the present movement being one of
secession and general disintegration will increase the weakness of the
country. It is also evident that many of China's troubles are due to
the absence of any efficient administrative system; it is reasonable
to argue that China cannot get even railways and universal education
without a strong and stable central government. There is no doubt
about the facts. It is not surprising that many friends of China
deeply deplore the present tendency while some regard it as the final
accomplishment of the long predicted breakup of China. But remedies
for China's ills based upon ignoring history, psychology and actual
conditions are so utopian that it is not worth while to argue whether
or not they are theoretically desirable. The remedy of China's
troubles by a strong, centralized government is on a par with curing
disease by the expulsion of a devil. The evil of sectionalism is real,
but since it is real it cannot be dealt with by trying a method which
implies its non-existence. If the devil is really there, he will not
be exorcized by a formula. If the trouble is internal, not due to an
external demon, the disease can be cured only by using the factors of
health and vigor which the patient already possesses. And in China
while these factors of recuperation and growth are numerous, they all
exist in connection with local organizations and voluntary
associations. The increasing volume of the cry that the "tuchuns must
go" comes from the provincial and local interests which have been
insulted and violated by a nominally centralized but actually chaotic
situation. After this negative work is completed, the constructive
rebuilding of China can proceed only by utilizing local interests and
abilities. In China the movement will be the opposite of that which
occurred in Japan. It will be from the periphery to the centre.
Another objection to the present tendency has force especially from
the foreign standpoint. As already stated, the efforts of the Manchu
dynasty in its latter days to enhance central power were due to
international pressure. Foreign nations treated Peking as if it were a
capital like London, Paris or Berlin, and in its efforts to meet
foreign demands it had to try to become such a centre. The result was
disaster. But foreign nations still want to have a single centre which
may be held responsible. And subconsciously, if not consciously, this
desire is responsible for much of the objection of foreign nationals
to the local autonomy movement. They well know that it is going to
take a long time to realize the ideal of federation, and meantime
where and what is to be the agency responsible for diplomatic
relations, the enforcing of indemnities and the securing of
concessions?
In one respect the secessionist tendency is dangerous to China herself
as well as inconvenient to the powers. It will readily stimulate the
desire and ability of foreign nations to interfere in China's domestic
affairs. There will be many centres at which to carry on intrigues and
from which to get concessions instead of one or two. There is also
danger that one foreign nation may line up with one group of
provinces, and another foreign nation with another group, so that
international friction will increase. Even now some Japanese sources
and even such an independent liberal paper as Robert Young's Japan
Chronicle are starting or reporting the rumor that the Cantonese
experiment is supported by subsidies supplied by American capitalists
in the hope of economic concessions. The rumor was invented for a
sinister purpose. But it illustrates the sort of situation that may
come into existence if there are several political centres in China
and one foreign nation backs one and another nation, another.
The danger is real enough. But it cannot be dealt with by attempting
the impossible--namely checking the movement toward local autonomy,
even though disintegration may temporarily accompany it. The danger
only emphasizes the fundamental fact of the whole Chinese situation;
that its essence is time. The evils and troubles of China are real
enough, and there is no blinking the fact that they are largely of her
own making, due to corruption, inefficiency and absence of popular
education. But no one who knows the common people doubts that they
will win through if they are given time. And in the concrete this
means that they be left politically alone to work out their own
destiny. There will doubtless be proposals at the Pacific Conference
to place China under some kind of international tutelage. This chapter
and the events connected with the tendency which it reports will be
cited as showing this need. Some of the schemes will spring from
motives that are hostile to China. Some will be benevolently conceived
in a desire to save China from herself and shorten her period of chaos
and confusion. But the hope of the world's peace, as well as of
China's freedom, lies in adhering to a policy of Hands Off. Give China
a chance. Give her time. The danger lies in being in a hurry, in
impatience, possibly in the desire of America to show that we are a
power in international affairs and that we too have a positive foreign
policy. And a benevolent policy of supporting China from without,
instead of promoting her aspirations from within, may in the end do
China about as much harm as a policy conceived in malevolence.
July, 1921.