It is strange that so little attention has been paid to
these primitive beliefs as important factors in determining
the social position of women. It is too generally assumed
that because woman is physically weaker than man it is her
weakness that has determined her subordination. Both the
advocates and the opponents of 'Woman's Rights' appear to
have reached a common agreement on this point. During some
of the debates in the House of Commons, for example, it was
openly stated by prominent politicians, as an axiom of
political philosophy, that all laws rest upon a basis of
force, and if men say they will not obey woman-made laws
there is no power that can compel them to do so. On the
other side, women, while appealing to what they properly
call higher considerations, themselves dwell upon the
physical weakness of woman as the reason for her
subordination in the past. Both parties are helped in their
arguments by the facile division of social history into two
periods, an earlier one in which club law plays the chief
part, and a later period when mental and moral qualities
assume a dominating position. The consequence is, runs the
argument, that each sex has to battle with the dead weight
of tradition and custom. The woman is oppressed by the
tradition of subordination to the male; the man is inspired
by that of dominance over the female.
It is when we ask for evidence of this that we see how
flimsy the case is. Social phenomena in either civilised or
uncivilised society furnishes no proof that institutions
and customs rest upon a basis of physical force. The
rulership of a tribe often rests with the old men of a
tribe; with some tribes the women are consulted, and
invariably custom and tradition plays a powerful part. The
notion that the primitive chief is the primitive strong man
of the tribe is as baseless as the belief in an original
social contract, and owes its existence to the same kind of
fanciful speculation. As Frazer says, "it is one of those
facile theories which the arm-chair philosopher concocts
with his feet on the fender without taking the trouble to
consult the facts." The primitive chief may be a strong
man. The tribal council or chief may use force or rely upon
physical force to enforce certain decrees, just as the
modern king or parliament may call on the help of policeman
or soldier, but this no more proves that their rule is
based upon force than Mr. Asquith's premiership proves his
physical superiority to the rest of the Cabinet.
All political life, and to a smaller degree all social life, involves
the direction of force, but neither appeal to force for an ultimate
justification, nor do social institutions originate in an act of force.
It is one of the commonplaces of historical study that when an
institution is actually forced upon a people it very quickly becomes
inoperative. Other things equal, one group of people may overcome
another group because of physical superiority, but the conquest over,
the question as to which group shall really rule, or which set of
institutions shall survive, is settled on quite different grounds. The
history of almost any country will give examples of the absorption of
the conqueror by the conquered, and the bringing of imported
institutions into line with native life and feeling. Fundamentally the
relations binding people together into a society are not physical, but
psychological. Society rests upon the foundations of a common mental
life--upon sympathy, beliefs, the desire for companionship, etc. As
Professor J. M. Baldwin puts it, the fundamental social facts are not
_things_, but _thoughts_.[92] As a member of a social group man is born
into an environment that is essentially psychological, and his attitude
not only towards his fellow human beings, but towards nature in general,
is determined by the psychological contents of the society to which he
belongs.
Now if the relation of one man to another is not determined by physical
superiority and inferiority, if the relations of classes within a
society are not determined in this manner, why should it be assumed that
as a sex woman's position is fixed by this means? It seems more
reasonable to assume that some other principle than that of club law, a
principle set in operation very early in the history of civilisation,
fixed the main lines upon which the relations of the sexes were to
develop, however much other forces helped its operation. I believe this
desired factor is to be found in the superstitious notions savages
develop concerning the nature and function of woman, and which society
only very slowly outgrows. For, as Frazer says: "The continuity of human
development has been such that most, if not all, of the great
institutions which still form the framework of a civilised society have
their roots in savagery, and have been handed down to us in these later
days through countless generations, assuming new outward forms in the
process of transmission, but remaining in their inmost core
substantially unchanged."
In considering the play of primitive ideas as determining the lines of
human evolution several things must be kept clearly in mind. One is that
the course of biological development has made woman, as a sex, dependent
upon man, as a sex, for protection and support. This is true quite apart
from economic considerations or from those arising from the relative
physical strength of the sexes. The prime function of woman,
biologically, is that of motherhood. She is, so to speak, mother in a
much more important and more pervasive sense than man is father. In the
case of woman, her functions are of necessity subordinated to this one.
With man this is not the case. It is with the woman that the nutrition
of the child rests before birth, and a large portion of her strength is
expended in the discharge of this function. The same is true for some
period immediately after birth. Again to use a biological illustration,
during the period of child-bearing and child-rearing the relation of the
man to the woman may be likened to that which exists between the germ
cells and the somatic cells. As the latter is the medium of protection
and the conveyer of nutrition in relation to the former, so it falls to
the male to protect and in some degree to provide for the woman as
child-bearer. It would not, of course, be impossible for woman to
provide for herself, but it would detract so considerably from social
efficiency that any group in which it was done would soon disappear. It
is the nature and supreme function of woman that makes her dependent
upon man. And even though the dreams of some were realised, and society
as a whole cared for woman in the discharge of this function, the issue
would not be changed. It would mean that instead of a woman being
dependent upon one man she would be dependent upon all men. Nor are the
substantial facts of the situation changed by anyone pointing out that
all women do not and cannot under ordinary circumstances become wives
and mothers. Human nature will always develop on the lines of the normal
functions of men and women, and there can be no question in this case as
to what these are.
I have used the word 'dependence,' but this does not, of necessity,
involve either subordination or subjection. It may provide the condition
of either or of both, but the dependence of the woman on the man is, as
I have said, biologically inescapable. Her subjection is quite another
question. Dependence may be mutual. One class of society may be
dependent upon another class, but the two may move on a perfect level of
equality. And with uncivilised peoples the evidence goes to prove that,
while the spheres of the sexes are more clearly differentiated than with
us, this difference is seldom if ever expressed in terms of superior and
inferior. Savages would say, as civilised people still say, there are
many things that it is wrong for a woman to do, and they would add there
are also things that a man must not do. They would be as shocked at
woman doing certain things as some people among ourselves were when
women first began to speak at public meetings. Their disapproval would
not rest on the ground that these things were 'unwomanly', nor upon any
question of weakness or strength, of inferiority or superiority, but for
another and, to the savage, very urgent reason.
One can very easily exaggerate the extent of the subjection of women
among uncivilised people. As a matter of fact, it usually is
exaggerated. Not all travellers are capable of accurate observation, and
very many are led astray by what are really superficial aspects of
savage life. They are so impressed by the contemplation of a state of
affairs different from our own that they mistake mere lines of
demarcation for a moral valuation. Many travellers, for example,
observing that women are strictly forbidden to do this or that, conclude
that the woman has no rights as against the man. As in nearly all these
cases the man is as strictly forbidden to encroach on the woman's
sphere, one might as reasonably reverse the statement and dwell upon
male subjection. As a matter of fact, both furnish examples of the
all-powerful principle of 'taboo.' Some things are taboo to the man,
others to the woman. And the key to the problem lies in the nature and
origin of these taboos. But taboo does not extinguish rights; it
confirms them. Under its operation, far from its being the truth that
women are without status or rights or power, her position and rights are
clearly marked, generally recognised, and quickly enforced. Some
examples of this may be noted.
A Kaffir woman when ill-treated possesses the right of asylum with her
parents, and remains there until the husband makes atonement. The same
thing holds of the West African Fulahs. In the Marquesas a woman is
prohibited the use of canoes; on the other hand, men are prohibited
frequenting certain places belonging to the women. In Nicaragua no man
may enter the woman's market-place under penalty of a beating. With most
of the North-American tribes a woman has supreme power inside the lodge.
The husband possesses no power of interference. In most cases the
husband cannot give away anything belonging to the lodge without first
getting the consent of his wife. With the Nootkas, women are consulted
on all matters of business. Livingstone relates his surprise on finding
that a native would not accompany him on a journey because he could not
get his wife's consent. He found this to be one of the customs of the
tribe to which the man belonged. Among the Kandhs of India nothing
public is done without consulting the women. In the Pellew Islands the
head of the family can do nothing of importance without consulting the
oldest female relative. Among the Hottentots women have supreme rule in
the house. If a man oversteps the line, his female relatives inflict a
fine, which is paid to the wife. With the Bechuanas the mother of the
chief is present at all councils, and he can hardly decide anything
without her consent. These are only a few of the cases that might be
cited, but they are sufficient to show that the common view of women
among savages as without recognised status, or power, needs very serious
qualification. Of course, ill-treatment of women does occur with
uncivilised as with civilised people, and she may suffer from the
expression of brutal passion or superior strength, but an examination of
the facts justifies Starcke's opinion that "we are not justified in
assuming that the savage feels a contempt for women in virtue of her
sex."
In primitive life, in short, the dominant idea is not that of
superiority in relation to woman, but that of difference. She is
different from man, and this difference involves consequences of the
gravest character, and against which due precautions must be taken.
Superiority and inferiority are much later conceptions; they belong to a
comparatively civilised period, and their development offers an
admirable example of the way in which customs based on sheer
superstitions become transformed into a social prejudice, with the
consequent creation of numerous excuses for their perpetuation. What
that initial prejudice is--a prejudice so powerful that it largely
determines the future status of woman--has already been pointed out. Her
place in society is marked out in uncivilised times by the powerful
superstitions connected with sexual functions. Not that she is
weaker--although that is, of course, plain--nor that she is inferior, a
thought which scarcely exists with uncivilised peoples, but that she is
dangerous, particularly so during her functional crises and in
childbirth. And being dangerous, because charged with a supernatural
influence inimical to others, she is excluded from certain occupations,
and contact with her has to be carefully regulated. I agree with Mr.
Andrew Lang that in the regulations concerning women amongst uncivilised
people we have another illustration of the far-reaching principle of
taboo (_Social Origins and Primal Law_, p. 239) she suffers because of
her sex, and because of the superstitious dread to which her sex nature
gives birth.
Of course, at a later stage other considerations begin to operate.
Where, for example, as amongst the Kaffirs, women are not permitted to
touch cattle because of this assumed spiritual infection, and where a
man's wealth is measured by the cattle he possesses, it is easy to see
that this would constitute a force preventing the political and social
equality of the sexes. The pursuits from which women were primarily
excluded for purely religious reasons would in course of time come to be
looked upon as man's inalienable possessions. And here her physical
weakness would play its part; for she could not take, as man could
withhold, by force. Even when the primitive point of view is discarded,
the social prejudices engendered by it long remains. And social
prejudices, as we all know, are the hardest of all things to destroy.
A final consideration needs to be stated. This is that the customs
determined by the views of woman (above outlined) fall into line, in a
rough-and-ready fashion, with the biological tendency to consecrate the
female to the function of motherhood and conserve her energies to that
end, leaving other kinds of work to the male. It would be an obvious
advantage to a tribe in which woman, relieved from the necessity of
physical struggle for food and defence, was able to attend to children
and the more peaceful side of family life. Children would not only
benefit thereby, but the home with all its civilising, humanising
influences would develop more rapidly. Assuming variations in tribal
life in this direction, there is no question as to which tribe that
would stand the better chance of survival. The development of life has
proceeded here as elsewhere by differentiation and specialisation; and
while the tasks demanding the more sustained physical exertions were
left to man, and to the performance of which his sexual nature offered
no impediment, woman became more and more specialised for maternity and
domestic occupations. This, I hasten to add, is not at all intended as a
plea for denying to women the right to participate in the wider social
life of the species. I am trying to explain a social phase, and neither
justifying nor condemning its perpetuation.