CHAPTER VII.

CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. -- A UNION

CONVENTION. -- CONSEQUENCE OF THE SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT. --

INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. -- THE WOMEN IN THE WAR.

The suspension of the writ of _habeas corpus_, by order of the

President, without the sanction of an Act of Congress, which had not

then been given, was one of the memorable events of the war.

On the 4th of May, 1861, Judge Giles, of the United States District

Court of Maryland, issued a writ of _habeas corpus_ to Major Morris,

then in command of Fort McHenry, to discharge a soldier who was under

age. Major Morris refused to obey the writ.

On the 14th of May the General Assembly adjourned, and Mr. Ross

Winans, of Baltimore, a member of the House of Delegates, while

returning to his home, was arrested by General Butler on a charge of

high treason. He was conveyed to Annapolis, and subsequently to Fort

McHenry, and was soon afterwards released.

A case of the highest importance next followed. On the 25th of May,

Mr. John Merryman, of Baltimore County, was arrested by order of

General Keim, of Pennsylvania, and confined in Fort McHenry. The next

day (Sunday, May 26th) his counsel, Messrs. George M. Gill and George

H. Williams, presented a petition for the writ of _habeas corpus_ to

Chief Justice Taney, who issued the writ immediately, directed to

General Cadwallader, then in command in Maryland, ordering him to

produce the body of Merryman in court on the following day (Monday,

May 27th). On that day Colonel Lee, his aide-de-camp, came into court

with a letter from General Cadwallader, directed to the Chief Justice,

stating that Mr. Merryman had been arrested on charges of high

treason, and that he (the General) was authorized by the President of

the United States in such cases to suspend the writ of _habeas corpus_

for the public safety. Judge Taney asked Colonel Lee if he had brought

with him the body of John Merryman. Colonel Lee replied that he had no

instructions except to deliver the letter.

_Chief Justice._--The commanding officer, then, declines to obey

the writ?

_Colonel Lee._--After making that communication my duty is ended,

and I have no further power (rising and retiring).

_Chief Justice._--The Court orders an attachment to issue against

George Cadwallader for disobedience to the high writ of the

Court, returnable at twelve o'clock to-morrow.

The order was accordingly issued as directed.

A startling issue was thus presented. The venerable Chief Justice had

come from Washington to Baltimore for the purpose of issuing a writ of

_habeas corpus_, and the President had thereupon authorized the

commander of the fort to hold the prisoner and disregard the writ.

A more important occasion could hardly have occurred. Where did the

President of the United States acquire such a power? Was it true that

a citizen held his liberty subject to the arbitrary will of any man?

In what part of the Constitution could such a power be found? Why had

it never been discovered before? What precedent existed for such an

act?

Judge Taney was greatly venerated in Baltimore, where he had formerly

lived. The case created a profound sensation.

On the next morning the Chief Justice, leaning on the arm of his

grandson, walked slowly through the crowd which had gathered in front

of the court-house, and the crowd silently and with lifted hats opened

the way for him to pass.

Roger B. Taney was one of the most self-controlled and courageous of

judges. He took his seat with his usual quiet dignity. He called the

case of John Merryman and asked the marshal for his return to the writ

of attachment. The return stated that he had gone to Fort McHenry for

the purpose of serving the writ on General Cadwallader; that he had

sent in his name at the outer gate; that the messenger had returned

with the reply that there was no answer to send; that he was not

permitted to enter the gate, and, therefore, could not serve the writ,

as he was commanded to do.

The Chief Justice then read from his manuscript as follows:

I ordered the attachment of yesterday because upon the face of

the return the detention of the prisoner was unlawful upon two

grounds:

1st. The President, under the Constitution and laws of the United

States, cannot suspend the privilege of the writ of _habeas

corpus_, nor authorize any military officer to do so.

2d. A military officer has no right to arrest and detain a person

not subject to the rules and articles of war, for an offense

against the laws of the United States, except in aid of the

judicial authority and subject to its control; and if the party

is arrested by the military, it is the duty of the officer to

deliver him over immediately to the civil authority, to be dealt

with according to law.

I forbore yesterday to state the provisions of the Constitution

of the United States which make these principles the fundamental

law of the Union, because an oral statement might be

misunderstood in some portions of it, and I shall therefore put

my opinion in writing, and file it in the office of the clerk of

this court, in the course of this week.

The Chief Justice then orally remarked:

In relation to the present return, it is proper to say that of

course the marshal has legally the power to summon the _posse

comitatus_ to seize and bring into court the party named in the

attachment; but it is apparent he will be resisted in the

discharge of that duty by a force notoriously superior to the

_posse_, and, this being the case, such a proceeding can result

in no good, and is useless. I will not, therefore, require the

marshal to perform this duty. If, however, General Cadwallader

were before me, I should impose on him the punishment which it is

my province to inflict--that of fine and imprisonment. I shall

merely say, to-day, that I shall reduce to writing the reasons

under which I have acted, and which have led me to the

conclusions expressed in my opinion, and shall direct the clerk

to forward them with these proceedings to the President, so that

he may discharge his constitutional duty "to take care that the

laws are faithfully executed."

It is due to my readers that they should have an opportunity of

reading this opinion, and it is accordingly inserted in an Appendix.

After the court had adjourned, I went up to the bench and thanked

Judge Taney for thus upholding, in its integrity, the writ of _habeas

corpus_. He replied, "Mr. Brown, I am an old man, a very old man" (he

had completed his eighty-fourth year), "but perhaps I was preserved

for this occasion." I replied, "Sir, I thank God that you were."

He then told me that he knew that his own imprisonment had been a

matter of consultation, but that the danger had passed, and he warned

me, from information he had received, that my time would come.

The charges against Merryman were discovered to be unfounded and he

was soon discharged by military authority.

The nation is now tired of war, and rests in the enjoyment of a

harmony which has not been equalled since the days of James Monroe.

When Judge Taney rendered this decision the Constitution was only

seventy-two years old--twelve years younger than himself. It is now

less than one hundred years old--a short period in a nation's

life--and yet during that period there have been serious

commotions--two foreign wars and a civil war. In the future, as in the

past, offenses will come, and hostile parties and factions will arise,

and the men who wield power will, if they dare, shut up in fort or

prison, without reach of relief, those whom they regard as dangerous

enemies. When that period arrives, then will those who wisely love

their country thank the great Chief Justice, as I did, for his

unflinching defense of _habeas corpus_, the supreme writ of right, and

the corner-stone of personal liberty among all English-speaking

people.

In the Life of Benjamin R. Curtis, Vol. I, p. 240, his biographer

says, speaking of Chief Justice Taney, with reference to the case of

Merryman, "If he had never done anything else that was high, heroic

and important, his noble vindication of the writ of _habeas corpus_

and the dignity and authority of his office against a rash minister of

State, who, in the pride of a fancied executive power, came near to

the commission of a great crime, will command the admiration and

gratitude of every lover of constitutional liberty so long as our

institutions shall endure." The crime referred to was the intended

imprisonment of the Chief Justice.

Although this crime was not committed, a criminal precedent had been

set and was ruthlessly followed. "My lord," said Mr. Seward to Lord

Lyons, "I can touch a bell on my right hand and order the imprisonment

of a citizen of Ohio; I can touch a bell again and order the

imprisonment of a citizen of New York; and no power on earth, except

that of the President, can release them. Can the Queen of England do

so much?" When such a power is wielded by any man, or set of men,

nothing is left to protect the liberty of the citizen.

On the 24th of May, a Union Convention, consisting of fourteen

counties of the State, including the city of Baltimore, and leaving

eight unrepresented, met in the city. The counties not represented

were Washington, Montgomery, Prince George, Charles, St. Mary's,

Dorchester, Somerset, and Worcester. The number of members does not

appear to have been large, but it included the names of gentlemen well

known and highly respected. The Convention adopted Resolutions which

declared, among other things, that the revolution on the part of

eleven States was without excuse or palliation, and that the redress

of actual or supposed wrongs in connection with the slavery question

formed no part of their views or purposes; that the people of this

State were unalterably determined to defend the Government of the

United States, and would support the Government in all legal and

constitutional measures which might be necessary to resist the

revolutionists; that the intimations made by the majority of the

Legislature at its late session--that the people were humiliated or

subjugated by the action of the Government--were gratuitous insults to

that people; that the dignity of the State of Maryland, involved in a

precise, persistent and effective recognition of all her rights,

privileges and immunities under the Constitution of the United States,

will be vindicated at all times and under all circumstances by those

of her sons who are sincere in their fealty to her and the Government

of the Union of which she is part, and to popular constitutional

liberty; that while they concurred with the present Executive of the

United States that the unity and integrity of the National Union must

be preserved, their view of the nature and true principles of the

Constitution, of the powers which it confers, and of the duties which

it enjoins, and the rights which it secures, as it relates to and

affects the question of slavery in many of the essential bearings, is

directly opposed to the views of the Executive; that they are fixed in

their conviction, amongst others, that a just comprehension of the

true principles of the Constitution forbid utterly the formation of

political parties on the foundation of the slavery question, and that

the Union men will oppose to the utmost of their ability all attempts

of the Federal Executive to commingle in any manner its peculiar views

on the slavery question with that of maintaining the just powers of

the Government.

These resolutions are important as showing the stand taken by a large

portion of the Union party of the State in regard to any interference,

as the result of the war or otherwise, by the General Government with

the provisions of the Constitution with regard to slavery.

After the writ of _habeas corpus_ had been thus suspended, martial

law, as a consequence, rapidly became all-powerful, and it continued

in force during the war. That law is by Judge Black, in his argument

before the Supreme Court in the case of _ex parte_ Milligan,[14] shown

to be simply the rule of irresponsible force. Law becomes helpless

before it. _Inter arma silent leges._

[Footnote 14: 4 Wallace Sup. Court R. 2.]

On May 25, 1862, Judge Carmichael, an honored magistrate, while

sitting in his court in Easton, was, by the provost marshal and his

deputies, assisted by a body of military sent from Baltimore, beaten,

and dragged bleeding from the bench, and then imprisoned, because he

had on a previous occasion delivered a charge to the grand jury

directing them to inquire into certain illegal acts and to indict the

offenders. His imprisonment in Forts McHenry, Lafayette, and Delaware,

lasted more than six months. On December 4, 1862, he was

unconditionally released, no trial having been granted him, nor any

charges made against him. On June 28, 1862, Judge Bartol, of the Court

of Appeals of Maryland, was arrested and confined in Fort McHenry. He

was released after a few days, without any charge being preferred

against him, or any explanation given.

Spies and informers abounded. A rigid supervision was established.

Disloyalty, so called, of any kind was a punishable offense. Rebel

colors, the red and white, were prohibited. They were not allowed to

appear in shop-windows or on children's garments, or anywhere that

might offend the Union sentiment. If a newspaper promulgated disloyal

sentiments, the paper was suppressed and the editor imprisoned. If a

clergyman was disloyal in prayer or sermon, or if he failed to utter a

prescribed prayer, he was liable to be treated in the same manner, and

was sometimes so treated. A learned and eloquent Lutheran clergyman

came to me for advice because he had been summoned before the provost

marshal for saying that a nation which incurred a heavy debt in the

prosecution of war laid violent hands on the harvests of the future;

but his offense was condoned, because it appeared that he had referred

to the "Thirty Years' War" and had made no direct reference to the

debt of the United States, and perhaps for a better reason--that he

had strong Republican friends among his congregation.

If horses and fodder, fences and timber, or houses and land, were

taken for the use of the Army, the owner was not entitled to

compensation unless he could prove that he was a loyal man; and the

proof was required to be furnished through some well-known loyal

person, who, of course, was usually paid for his services. Very soon

no one was allowed to vote unless he was a loyal man, and soldiers at

the polls assisted in settling the question of loyalty.

Nearly all who approved of the war regarded these things as an

inevitable military necessity; but those who disapproved deeply

resented them as unwarrantable violations of sacred constitutional

rights. The consequence was that friendships were dissolved, the ties

of blood severed, and an invisible but well-understood line divided

the people. The bitterness and even the common mention of these acts

have long since ceased, but the tradition survives and still continues

to be a factor, silent, but not without influence, in the politics of

the State.

History repeats itself. There were deeds done on both sides which

bring to mind the wars of England and Scotland and the border strife

between those countries. There were flittings to and fro, and

adventures and hairbreadth escapes innumerable. Soldiers returned to

visit their homes at the risk of their necks. Contraband of every

description, and letters and newspapers, found their way across the

border. The military lines were long and tortuous, and vulnerable

points were not hard to find, and trusty carriers were ready to go

anywhere for the love of adventure or the love of gain.

The women were as deeply interested as the men, and were less

apprehensive of personal consequences. In different parts of the city,

not excepting its stateliest square, where stands the marble column

from which the father of his country looked down, sadly as it were, on

a divided people, there might have been found, by the initiated,

groups of women who, with swift and skillful fingers, were fashioning

and making garments strangely various in shape and kind--some for

Northern prisons where captives were confined, some for destitute

homes beyond the Southern border, in which only women and children

were left, and some for Southern camps where ragged soldiers were

waiting to be clad. The work was carried on not without its risks;

but little cared the workers for that. Perhaps the sensation of danger

itself, and a spirit of resistance to an authority which they refused

to recognize, gave zest to their toil; nor did they always think it

necessary to inform the good man of the house in which they were

assembled either of their presence or of what was going on beneath his

roof.

The women who stood by the cause of the Union were not compelled to

hide their charitable deeds from the light of day. No need for them to

feed and clothe the soldiers of the Union, whose wants were amply

supplied by a bountiful Government; but with untiring zeal they

visited the military hospitals on missions of mercy, and when the

bloody fields of Antietam and Gettysburg were fought, both they and

their Southern sisters hastened, though not with a common purpose, to

the aid of the wounded and dying, the victims of civil strife and

children of a common country.

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