GOVERNMENT—LAWS, &c.
THE History of the Fashionable World is a sort of undertaking, which, to
be accurately executed, would require abundantly more leisure and
diligence than I could afford to bestow upon it: and I very much doubt,
whether, after all, one reader out of a hundred would be at the pains of
perusing it. The fact is, that the members of this community are not
sufficiently substantial to form historical pictures. Their employments
are not of a nature to make their memory an object with mankind. Hence,
though they make a splendid appearance in a ball-room, they appear to
little advantage in a record; and, like the dancing figures in a
magic-lantern, they seem to have answered the end of their being, when
they have afforded an evening’s amusement. For these and other reasons
which might be assigned, I shall content myself with giving a brief
account of their Polity and Laws; referring those of my readers who are
desirous of further information upon their history, to Novels and
Romances, and to such Chronicles of antiquity, as have preserved the
memorials of obsolete and superannuated manners.
It is a task of no ordinary difficulty to convey any tolerable idea of
this people, in their aggregate or national capacity. Consisting, as
they do, of various and detached societies, they are yet considered to
possess a sort of federal relation among each other; and to unite into an
imaginary whole, under the collective denomination of the Fashionable
World. It is under this aggregate character that they take their rank in
society; and the appellation which denotes their community, is recognised
by the tradesmen who advertise for their custom, and the politicians who
discourse of their affairs. A very handsome proportion of the daily
newspapers is devoted to their service; and intelligence from their
drawing-rooms is reported with as much regularity as that which is
derived from the first cabinets in Europe. Indeed, the minuteness with
which their routs and dances, their dresses and dainties, the expressions
they utter, the company they keep, and the excesses they commit, are
detailed, is at once an evidence that these people are considered to have
a corporate existence; and that no little consequence is attached to
their proceedings. I wish, with all my heart, that they thought a little
more of this; they would then scarcely run into such extravagancies, as
make them, on too many occasions, objects of ridicule to one part of
society, and dangerous examples to the other.
Their _Population_ is more fluctuating and uncertain than that of any
people upon the face of the earth. There are among them certain tribes,
or families, distinguished by different descendable titles, who are said
to claim a sort of prescriptive right to the name of Fashionables. In
these the federal appellation continues hereditary; and it is an axiom
among the body, that people of _Quality_ (for this is the term by which
they designate the titled gentry) can never be out of Fashion.
This is, it must be observed, their _own_ representation of the matter;
and I am inclined to suspect that there is no little management at the
bottom of it. There is something, no doubt, very splendid in the idea of
including all the families of rank within the limits of Fashion; and it
is a mark of no contemptible policy, to have constructed an axiom which
so effectually cuts off their retreat. But surely, it would be but
decent to allow the gentry of the realm to have a voice in the business.
There _have been_ times, in which many of our Nobles would have thought
themselves dishonoured by being presumed of course to sustain a
Fashionable character. I cannot but think, that if the modern nobility
were fairly consulted, several of them would _still_ be found to
entertain the same opinion; and that persons of the first distinction in
the country would be among that number.
However that be, these dignified families are, according to Fashionable
computation, almost the only standing members of the community; and, if
these be excepted, all the rest of their body is mutable in the extreme.
There is a perpetual reciprocation of numbers between them and the
society in which they reside. Scarcely an hour passes without some
interchange. The gossip of every day announces that some have migrated
from the region of Fashion, and that others have made their appearance
within it for the first time. The causes which produce these variations,
and the reasons by which they are defended, are in some instances too
mysterious, and in others too frivolous, to become subjects of recital.
In general it may be affirmed, that though persons become Fashionable
_with_ the concurrence of their will, they cease to be such _against_ it.
For, if a few accidental converts to plain sense and sober piety be
excepted, the greater part of those who retire have been superseded; and
resign their places, only because they cannot any longer retain them.
However that be, the fluctuation thus occasioned in the numbers and
characters of those who compose this Fashionable Community, diversifies
its complexion daily; and renders a precise account of its population and
totality utterly impossible.
The form of government subsisting among this people, so far as it can be
traced out, is Oligarchical, and the spirit of it is absolute and
despotical. The few in whose hands the supreme authority resides, do not
consist of any regular or definite number, nor are they confined to any
particular sex. In general, they are composed of persons out of both
sexes, who, while they exercise a separate influence in things relating
to the sexes respectively, possess also a common jurisdiction in matters
of universal concern.
The governing few are not invested with their authority by any
formalities of law; nor do they obtain their station by any specific
qualifications. The magistracy which they hold, appears to be neither
hereditary nor elective, but contingent. The term of their continuance
in power is also as indefinite and capricious, as the right by which they
acquire it. One thing, however, is certain, that as a moral reputation
has no influence in recommending them to the stations they fill, so the
forfeiture of it in no degree weakens the stability, or abridges the
duration of their power. That a government of this independent
description should exist in the heart of the British empire, an _imperium
in imperio_, will appear scarcely credible to my reader. He may,
however, rely upon it, that the fact is as I have stated it; and if he
should express his wonder, that such contempt of the sovereign authority
as it eventually leads to, has not been properly resisted, he will only
do what thousands have done before him.
But to return:—The laws by which the government of Fashion is
administered, like the common law of England, are unwritten; and derive
their force, as that does, from usage and prescription. The only code of
any note among this people, is that which they distinguish by the
collective appellation of the LAW of HONOUR. This extraordinary code has
been defined to be—“a system of rules constructed by people of Fashion,
and calculated to facilitate their intercourse with one another.” {29}
Now if this definition be a just one, (and I presume it is, from the high
authority by which it is given,) it will afford us no indifferent help,
towards unfolding the mysteries of Fashionable jurisprudence.
It seems, then, that the _Law of Honour_, by which people of Fashion are
said to be governed, is wholly and exclusively designed to make them
acceptable to each other. Now, not to mention other things, persons in a
Fashionable sphere cannot be strictly agreeable to each other, unless
they are well dressed; nor can that intercourse which they chiefly value,
be pleasantly maintained, without splendid equipages, choice wines, and
sumptuous entertainments. As, therefore, the necessity of the case
requires such accommodations, the _Law of Honour_, to say the least, does
not look very nicely into the means by which they may have been procured.
Hence it follows, by the fairest inference, that a man of Fashion is not
at all the less respectable in his own circle, merely because he is what
the rest of the world calls unjust. For, whatever may be the law
elsewhere, a man of Fashion can owe nothing to his inferiors: and his
character will therefore suffer no stain, though he should have broken
his word a thousand times with the reptile that made his clothes, built
his carriage, or furnished his table.
This law is also distinguished by many other features of toleration,
which well account for the respect and influence that it possesses in the
Fashionable World. By a spirit of accommodation, of which there is no
other example, it overlooks, if it does not even encourage, a variety of
actions, which in the mouth of a moralist would be absolute vices; and
which, to say the truth, are scarcely deserving of a much better name.
Thus, a man may debauch his tenant’s daughter, seduce the wife of his
friend, and be faithless, and even brutal to his own, and yet be esteemed
a man of honour, (which is the same as a man of Fashion,) and have a
right to make any man fight him who says he is not. In like manner, a
man may blaspheme God, and encourage his children and servants to do the
same; he may neglect the interests, and squander the property, of his
family; he may be a tyrant in his house, and a bully in the streets; he
may lie a-bed all day, and drink and game all night; and yet be a most
dutiful subject of the _Law of Honour_, and a shining character in the
society of Fashion.
There is, I own, much convenience in all this, and some consistency.
Persons who live only for this world, should have a proportionable
latitude allowed them for the employment of their animal propensities;
and the law which provides for the regulation of their conduct, should
have a special reference to this consideration. Supposing, therefore,
that people of Fashion ought to exist, they must have such a law as that
which they possess. So that, taking the Law of Honour in this connexion,
I cannot but think it a master-piece of political contrivance.
At the same time, I cannot agree with those who have been led to consider
this table of Fashionable jurisprudence as deserving a place in the
temple of Morality. Into this error a celebrated writer appears to have
fallen, in his Treatise of Moral Philosophy. For, having defined
morality to be “that science which teaches men their duty, and the
reasons of it,” he proceeds to cite the _Law of Honour_ as one of the
three rules by which men are governed. That respectable writer has,
indeed, admitted that this law is _defective_, because it does not
provide for the duties to God and to inferiors; he has also proclaimed
that it is _bad_, by stating, that it allows of fornication, adultery,
drunkenness, prodigality, duelling, &c. Still, however, he has rather
left us to infer, that it ought wholly to be rejected, than absolutely
told us so. By classing it with the law of the land and the Scriptures,
he has (undesignedly no doubt) prevented its utter condemnation; and
afforded ground for considering it as a moral rule, to which men owe a
qualified obedience.
Having specified the sort of practices which the _Law of Honour_ allows,
I shall take some brief notice of the duties which it exacts. The
principal of these, and that upon which its tone and spirit are most
peremptory, is the _resentment of injuries_. Now it must be observed,
that the term _injury_, in the use of people of Fashion, is of a very
wide and comprehensive signification. It not only means such an act of
outrage as amounts to a manifest and palpable wrong, but extends to every
dubious point of conduct, from which a Fashionable sophist could find
scope to infer an injurious intention. Thus a sister seduced, and then
abandoned, and a word or a look not satisfactorily explained, are all
equally injuries; and constitute, in the spirit of this code, so many
obligations to the most lively and implacable resentment. It may be,
that the offended person is of a peaceable disposition, and would rather
endure a moderate injury than revenge it; or he may have too much respect
for the laws of the parent state, to require or accept redress in any
other than the legal way; or he may know, that the offending party is a
man disposed to seek a quarrel, and that he desires nothing so much as to
provoke the innocent person, whom he has purposely insulted, to claim
satisfaction; or, lastly, it may be, that the supposed injury is founded
wholly on mistake, and that the reputed aggressor will not believe or own
himself to have offended, and will therefore make no atonement. In all
these cases, personal resentment might as well be waved; but this the Law
of Honour positively forbids: and he who should conscientiously decline
to pursue a personal quarrel, upon these, or even higher motives, might
be a better father, a better husband, a better subject, and a better
Christian, for so doing; but he would certainly be a worse man of honour.
It is worthy of remark, that these reputed injuries are sometimes so
minute and transitory, or so remote and obscure, that, if every thing
depended upon the aggressor and the aggrieved, they would either remain
wholly undiscovered, or, at least, be speedily forgotten. But each of
these consequences is not unfrequently defeated by the officious industry
of some kind-hearted being, who, though he loves his friend too well to
let him be insulted, can govern his feelings well enough to stand by and
see him murdered. This is, certainly, a refinement upon the theory of
friendship, which may be fairly set down among the most extraordinary
achievements of the _Law of Honour_. Indeed, this bloody code has many
such refinements. For, proceeding, as it does, upon principles of its
own invention, it must necessarily clash with many antecedent
obligations. These, however, it contrives, by the help of a little
sophistry, so to supersede, that neither affinity nor attachment may
impede the progress of honourable revenge: and hence we see, in
compliance with its rigid edicts, the warmest friends sacrifice to
resentment with as little reserve as the bitterest enemies; and that,
perhaps, to settle a tavern dispute, or to avenge a play-house quarrel!
Having said so much of the principal duty enjoined by the Law of Honour,
I shall offer a few observations upon the sort of punishment which it
inflicts. I trust I shall be excused, if, in treating this part of my
subject, I employ the term _punishment_ in a sense not strictly similar
to that in which it is ordinarily used. The fact is, that this singular
law makes the parties both judges in their own cause, and executioners of
their own sentence. The universal award against every convicted offender
is, that he shall fight a duel with the offended party. So that, if that
may be set down as punishment, which is ultimate in a controversy, and
which is exacted as a satisfaction to the law; death, or exposure to it,
is the lowest punishment which honour inflicts upon the least offender;
and the highest which it enforces upon the greatest.
And this is, I confess, a political incongruity, which I have not a
little difficulty in reconciling with the good sense of many who have
undertaken to defend it. The law of England has often been blamed (and I
think with justice) as unreasonably sanguinary. In answer to this charge
it has been said, that, though nearly two hundred offences of almost as
many degrees of guilt, are made equally punishable with death; yet
justice is administered with so much discretion and mercy, that the
penalty is inflicted only on a few. Feeble as this excuse is, for a law
that deals in blood, it would be well for the law of Honour if it
admitted of such a palliation. But the truth is, that in the latter case
there is nothing to abate the demand for blood—the prosecution of every
difference is both summary and vindictive: there is no tribunal to
enquire into the original matter of the quarrel; no judicature to
determine the real merits of the controversy: if the judgment be
erroneous, there is no court of equity to reverse the verdict; if
rigorous, there is no arm of mercy to withdraw the victim from suffering.
It must be evident from this view which has been presented of the law,
that, as an injury may be created by the most trivial incident, so
punishment may be inflicted with the most preposterous and unequal
retribution. I cannot better illustrate the frivolous foundation upon
which an injury may be erected, than by adverting to an occurrence of
very recent date, and of sufficient notoriety in the Fashionable World.
Two men of Fashion, incensed against each other by an accidental quarrel
between their respective dogs, dropped, in their warmth, certain
expressions which rendered them amenable to the bloody code: duel was
declared indispensable: and in less than twelve hours, one of the two was
dispatched into eternity, and the other narrowly escaped the same fate.
{42}
The inequality of the retribution is, indeed, an inevitable consequence
of that article of the code which compels men of Fashion, without
distinction, to decide their differences by fighting a duel. It results
from this promiscuous injunction, that the peaceable man must fight the
quarrelsome; that the heir of a noble family must meet the ruined
esquire; and that the man who has never drawn a trigger in his life, must
encounter the Fashionable ruffian, who has all his life been doing little
else. This inequality is further manifest, from the different
circumstances and connexions of life under which the combatants may be
found. The son of many hopes may be matched against the worthless
prodigal; the virtuous parent against the unprincipled seducer; and the
man of industry, usefulness, and beneficence, against the miscreant who
only lives to pamper his lusts, and to corrupt his fellow-creatures.
Nothing has here been said of the indiscriminate manner in which judgment
is executed. The innocent and the guilty must both be involved in the
same awful contingency; each must put his life to hazard: and the
probability is, that, if one of the two should fall, it will be the man
whose conduct least entitled him to punishment, and whose life was most
worth preserving.
I forbear to enter further into the system of Fashionable government, or
to meddle with the inferior points of legislation. What has been said of
the Law of Honour, will apply, with little variation, to every other
institution of minor concern. To facilitate polite intercourse, and to
exclude, as much as may be, duties to God and inferiors, is a
considerable object in every regulation; and it is but justice to this
people to say, that, in this respect, they are at once consistent and
successful.