REASONS FOR TREATING POLITICAL ECONOMY AS A SCIENCE.

In the following Lecture I shall consider whether Political Economy may

be better treated as a science or as an art.

If Political Economy is to be treated as a science, it may be defined

as “the science which states the laws regulating the production and

distribution of wealth, so far as they depend on the action of the

human mind.”

If it be treated as an art, it may be defined as “the art which points

out the institutions and habits most conducive to the production and

accumulation of wealth.” Or if the teacher venture to take a wider

view, as “the art which points out the institutions and habits most

conducive to that production, accumulation, and distribution of wealth,

which is most favourable to the happiness of mankind.”

According to the law which I have already mentioned, as regulating

the progress of knowledge, Political Economy, when, in the 17th

century, it first attracted notice as a subject of separate study,

was treated as an art. At that time human happiness was considered

as dependent chiefly on wealth, and wealth, as I have previously

remarked, was supposed to consist of gold and silver. The object which

the political economist proposed to himself and to his reader, was

the accumulation within his own country of the utmost possible amount

of the precious metals. The questions which now agitate society, as

to the distribution of wealth, were unregarded. All that was aimed

at, was its acquisition and retention in a metallic form. As respects

the countries possessing native deposits of the precious metals, the

means of effecting this were supposed to be obvious and easy. They had

only to promote the extraction of silver from mines, and that of gold

from auriferous sands, and to prohibit the exportation of either. This

was the policy of Spain and Portugal. The countries not possessing a

native supply, could obtain it only by what was called a favourable

balance of trade, that is to say, by exporting to a value exceeding

that of their imports, and receiving the difference in money. And

the money so acquired, they were taught to retain, by prohibiting

its exportation. The prevailing opinion shows itself in the preamble

of the 5 Rich. II. stat. 1. cap. 2., one among the many statutes and

proclamations by which this prohibition was for centuries enforced.

“For the great mischief which this realm suffereth, and long hath done,

for that gold and silver are carried out of the realm, so that, in

effect, there is none thereof left, which thing, if it should longer be

suffered, would shortly be the destruction of the same realm, which

God prohibit;” and the statute proceeds to forbid such exportation on

pain of forfeiture. The merchants, however, who were necessarily the

first to test the effects of this prohibition, found it inconvenient.

Some trades, particularly those with the East, could be carried on

only by the constant exportation of gold or silver, and in all others

it was occasionally useful. They did not venture to attack the theory

that the prosperity of a country depends on its accumulation of money.

Few of them, probably, doubted its truth. But they maintained that the

means by which the legislature endeavoured to promote this excellent

result, in fact defeated it. “Allow us,” they said, “to send out

silver to Asia, and we will bring back silks and calicos, not for our

own consumption, which of course would be a loss, but to sell on the

Continent for more silver than they cost, and we shall add annually to

the national treasure.” This was assented to, and after more than four

centuries of prohibition, the export of bullion was allowed by the 15

Car. II. cap. 17. “Forasmuch,” says the act, “as several considerable

foreign trades cannot be conveniently driven without the species of

money and bullion, and that it is found, by experience, that the

species of money and bullion are carried in greatest abundance, as to

a common market, to such places as give free liberty of exporting the

same, _and the better to keep in and increase the current coins of this

kingdom_, be it enacted, that it shall be lawful to export all sorts of

foreign coin and bullion, first entering the same at the custom-house.”

The art of Political Economy now became more complex. Its object,

indeed, was a very simple one, merely to increase the current coin of

the country; but this was to be effected, not by restraining every

trade which carried out bullion, but only those which carried out more

than they brought in. But how were such trades to be detected? A test

was supposed to be applied, by ascertaining whether their imports

were intended for home consumption, or for re-exportation. In the

former case, the trade, whether profitable or not to the merchant, was

obviously mischievous to the country.

In the second case the trade, if profitable to the merchant, must also

benefit the country, as it would receive more money than it sent out.

“It is not,” says Sir James Stewart[B], “by the importation of foreign

commodities, and by the exportation of gold and silver, that a nation

becomes poor; it is by consuming those commodities when imported. The

moment the consumption begins, the balance turns. Nations which trade

to India by sending out gold and silver for a return of superfluities

of a most consumable nature, the consumption of which they prohibit at

home, do not spend their own specie, but that of their neighbours, who

purchase the returns of it for their own consumption. Consequently a

nation may become immensely rich by the constant exportation of specie

and importation of consumable commodities. But she would do well to

beware not to resemble the milliner who took it into her head to wear

the fine laces which she used to make up for her customers. While a

favourable balance is preserved upon foreign trade, a nation grows

richer daily; and when one nation grows richer, others must be growing

poorer.”

[B] An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy, book

ii. ch. xxix. pp. 418, 419, and 422.

Sir James Stewart’s work was published in 1767, and as he says that it

was the work of eighteen years, it must have been written between that

year and the year 1749. Though he calls Political Economy a science,

he treats it as an art, and has the merit of having first given to it

limits clearly separating it from the other moral and political arts.

“Its object is,” he says, “to secure a certain fund of subsistence for

all the inhabitants, to obviate every circumstance which may render

it precarious, to provide every thing necessary for supplying the

wants of the society, and to employ the inhabitants in such a manner

as naturally to create reciprocal relations and dependencies between

them, so as to make their several interests lead them to supply one

another with their reciprocal wants.”[C] This agrees with my second

proposal, namely, to define Political Economy as “the art which points

out the institutions and habits most conducive to the production and

accumulation of wealth.” As incidental to the art, he was forced to

examine the science, and a considerable portion of his work consists of

inquiries into the laws which regulate the production and distribution

of wealth. The extracts which I have read, show that he did not escape

the prevalent errors of his times. And these errors were so grave, as

to render the practical portion of his treatise not merely useless

for its intended purposes, but positively injurious. A legislator

following his precepts, would waste the wealth of the richest country,

and destroy the diligence of the most industrious. But the scientific

part of the work, particularly the chapters on population, and on the

influence of taxation on wages, contains truths of great importance,

which were unknown to his contemporaries, and cannot be said to be

generally recognised even now.

[C] Book I. Introduction.

Among the contemporaries of Stewart were the French Economists, or,

as they have lately been called, the Physiocrats, forming the school

founded by Quesnay. With the exception, however, of Turgot, they wrote

on the whole art of government. Their works, indeed, contain treatises

on Political Economy according to my third proposed definition, that

is to say, “on the institutions and habits most conducive to that

production, accumulation, and distribution of wealth, which is most

favourable to the happiness of mankind;” but they contain much more.

Quesnay and his followers lived in a country subject to political

institutions, of which many were mischievous, more were imperfect,

and all were unsettled. That the existing system of government was

bad, every one acknowledged. The economists believed that they had

discovered why it was bad. They believed that they had discovered that

agriculture is the only source of wealth, and rent the only legitimate

source of public revenue. And they proposed, therefore, to substitute

for the innumerable taxes on importation, on exportation, on transit,

on production, on sale, on consumption, and on the person of man, which

then formed the fiscal system of France, a single tax on the rent of

land. So far their precepts were founded on the science of Political

Economy. But when they proposed the separation of legislative and

judicial functions, and required the whole legislative power to center

in an absolute hereditary monarch, they drew their premises from other

branches of mental science. I have said that Turgot was an exception;

and it is remarkable, that the only man among the disciples of Quesnay

who was actually practising Political Economy as an art, is the only

one who treated its principles as a science. His “Réflexions sur la

Formation, et la Distribution des Richesses,” published in 1771, is

a purely scientific treatise. It contains not a word of precept; and

might have been written by an ascetic, who believed wealth to be an

evil.

We now come to Adam Smith, the founder of modern Political Economy,

whether it be treated as a science or as an art. He considered it as an

art. “Political Economy,” he says, in the introduction to the fourth

book, “proposes two distinct objects: first, to provide a plentiful

revenue or subsistence for the people, or, more properly, to enable

them to provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and,

secondly, to supply the state or common weal with a revenue sufficient

for the public service. It proposes to enrich both the people and

the sovereign.” The principal purpose of his work was to show the

erroneousness of the means by which political economists had proposed

to attain these two great objects. And in the then state of knowledge,

this could be done only by proving that many of them mistook the nature

of wealth, and all of them the laws according to which it is produced

and distributed. The scientific portion of his work is merely an

introduction to that which is practical.

Of the five books into which the work is divided, it occupies only the

first and second. The third is an historical sketch of the progress of

national opulence. The fourth, the longest in the whole work, considers

the direct interferences by which governments have attempted to lead or

force their subjects to become rich; and decides, “that every system

which endeavours, either by extraordinary encouragements, to draw

towards a particular species of industry a greater share of the capital

of the society than would naturally go to it, or, by extraordinary

restraints, to force from a particular species of industry some share

of the capital which would otherwise be employed in it, is in reality

subversive of the great purpose which it means to promote. It retards,

instead of accelerating, the progress of the society towards real

wealth and greatness; and diminishes, instead of increasing, the real

value of the annual produce of its land and labour.”

“All systems,” he adds, “either of preference or of restraint,

therefore, being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple

system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord.

According to that system, the sovereign has only three duties to

attend to: first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence

and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of

protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the

injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of

establishing an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty

of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public

institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual,

or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain.”

The fifth book, which points out the means by which the duties of the

sovereign may best be performed, and the necessary public revenue

provided, is, in fact, a treatise on the art of government. It treats

of the subsidiary arts of war, of jurisprudence, and of education. It

considers the advantages and disadvantages of religious endowments,

and even the details of the opposed systems of patronage and popular

election, and of equality and inequality of benefices. It considers at

great length the modes and effects of taxation and of public loans, and

concludes by an elaborate plan for diminishing the taxation of Great

Britain, by requiring all the British dependencies, of which Ireland

and North America then formed part, to contribute directly to the

imperial treasury.

I have often doubted whether we ought not to wish that Adam Smith had

published his fifth book as a separate treatise with an appropriate

title. It is by far the most amusing and the easiest portion of the

“Wealth of Nations,” and must have attracted many readers whom the

abstractions of the first and second books, if they had formed a

separate work, would have repelled. On the other hand, the including

by so great an authority, in one treatise, and under one name, many

subjects belonging to different arts, has certainly contributed to the

indistinct views as to the nature and subjects of Political Economy,

which appear still to prevail.

The English writers who have succeeded Adam Smith, have generally set

out by defining Political Economy as a science, and proceeded to treat

it as an art.

Thus Mr. M‘Culloch states, as the proper subjects of Political Economy,

“the laws which regulate the production, accumulation, distribution,

and consumption of the articles or products possessing exchangeable

value.” Political Economy, then, is a science. But he goes on to say,

that “the object of Political Economy is to point out the means by

which the industry of man may be rendered most productive of wealth,

the circumstances most favourable to its accumulation, and the mode in

which it may be most advantageously consumed.” So defined, Political

Economy is an art,--a branch, in fact the principal branch, of the art

of government.

Mr. James Mill says that he has in view merely to ascertain the laws

of production, distribution, and consumption. His treatise, therefore,

ought to be merely scientific. But when he says that Political Economy

ought to be to the state what domestic economy is to the family, and

that its object is to ascertain the means of multiplying the objects

of desire, and to frame a system of rules for applying them with the

greatest advantage to that end, he turns it into an art.

Mr. Ricardo is, however, an exception. His great work is little less

scientific than that of Turgot. His abstinence from precept, and even

from illustrations drawn from real life, is the more remarkable, as

the subject of his treatise is distribution, the most practical branch

of Political Economy, and taxation, the most practical branch of

distribution.

The modern economists of France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and America, so

far as I am acquainted with their works, all treat Political Economy as

an art.

Many of them complain of what they call the abstractions of the English

school, and others accuse it of narrow views, and of an exclusive

attention to wealth; criticisms which must arise from an opinion that

Political Economy is a branch of the art of government, and that its

business is to influence the conduct of a statesman, rather than to

extend the knowledge of a philosopher.

It appears, from this hasty sketch, that the term Political Economy has

not yet acquired a definite meaning, and that, whichever of the three

definitions I adopt, I shall be free from the accusation of having

unduly extended or narrowed the field of inquiry which the statute

founding this professorship has laid open to me.

There is much in favour of the third definition, that which defines

Political Economy as the art which teaches what production, distribution,

accumulation, and consumption of wealth is most conducive to the

happiness of mankind, and what are the habits and institutions most

favourable to that production, distribution, accumulation, and

consumption.

It raises the political economist to a commanding eminence. The most

extensive, though perhaps not the most important, portion of human

nature, lies within his horizon.

The possession of wealth is the great object of human desire, its

production is the great purpose of human exertion. The modes and the

degree in which it is distributed, accumulated, and consumed, occasion

the principal differences between nations. The philosopher who could

teach such an art, would stand at the head of the benefactors of

mankind.

But the subject is too vast for a single treatise, or indeed for a

single mind. This will be evident if we consider the extent of one

of its subordinate branches, the limits to be assigned to posthumous

power. On the death of a proprietor, ought his property to revert to

the state, as it does in Turkey, or to go to his children, as it does

in France, or to be subject to his disposition by deed or by will? If

it be subjected to his disposition, ought he to have merely the power

of appointing his immediate successors, or of entailing it for one

generation, or for two, or for ever? Is it advisable that he should

have the power, not only of appointing a successor to his property,

but of directing how that successor shall employ it? And ought such a

power to be unlimited, or to be confined to certain purposes, or within

a certain period? Ought the laws of succession and of testamentary

power to be the same as respects land and movables, or to differ

totally, or in any, or what, particulars? Ought these questions to be

resolved differently in an old country and in a colony, in a monarchy,

in an aristocracy, and in a republic? If Political Economy be a branch

of the art of government, these inquiries form a branch, though a very

small one, of Political Economy.

But there is scarcely any one of them which it would not require a

long treatise to answer satisfactorily. How many, for instance, are

the considerations which must be attended to in a discussion as to the

propriety of enabling individuals to found permanent institutions for

the purposes of religion, of education, and of charity, and as to the

period for which they ought to be allowed to govern them from the grave?

It is almost impossible to overrate the importance of the art of

government. With the exception, perhaps, of morality, it is the most

useful of the mental arts; but, with no exception whatever, it is the

most extensive. Too much attention cannot be given to it; but that

attention should be subdivided. Too many minds cannot be employed on

it, but each should select a single province; and the narrower the

province, of course the more completely is it likely to be mastered.

My second definition, that which defines Political Economy as the art

which teaches what are the institutions and habits most favourable to

the production and accumulation of wealth, is not liable to similar

objections. It opens a field of inquiry, positively indeed wide, but

comparatively narrow. The object proposed by the political economist is

no longer human happiness, but the attainment of one of the means of

human happiness, wealth.

To recur to my former illustrations, he must, as in the former case,

inquire whether, according to the principles of Political Economy,

individuals ought to be enabled to direct how the property which

they have acquired in life shall be employed after their deaths, in

providing religious teaching, and to what extent, and for what periods,

their posthumous legislation ought to be enforced; but he must stop far

short of the point to which his inquiries, if he had adopted the former

definition, would have extended. He must confine himself to the effect

of such institutions on the production and accumulation of wealth.

He has now no business to inquire whether endowments imply articles

of faith, and articles of faith produce indifference or hypocrisy;

whether the servility of a hierarchy be compensated by its loyalty, or

the turbulence of sectarianism by its independence of thought. He has

no longer to compare the moral and religious influence of an endowed,

with that of an unendowed clergy. He does not inquire whether the

morality of the one is likely to be ascetic, and that of the other

latitudinarian; whether the one will have more influence over the bulk

of the people, and the other over the educated classes; whether the

one is likely to produce numerous contending sects, animated by zeal,

but inflamed by intolerance, and the other an unreflecting apathetic

conformity. These are matters beyond his jurisdiction. But he assumes,

on the general principles of human nature, that every civilised society

requires teachers of religion, and that these teachers must be paid

for their services. He shows, on the principles of Political Economy,

that in every such society there are revenues derived from land or

from capital, which are consumed by a class not forced to take an

active part in producing them, and enjoying, therefore, a leisure which

they are tempted to waste in indolence or in frivolous occupation.

He shows that to dedicate a portion of these revenues to the payment

of the teachers of religion, is merely to substitute for a certain

number of lay landlords, or lay fundholders, bound to the performance

of no public duty, ecclesiastical fundholders, or ecclesiastical

landlords, rendering, in return for their incomes, services which,

under what is called the voluntary system, must be purchased by those

who require them. He shows that such a dedication must diminish the

number of idle persons, and therefore increase the productive activity

of the community and diminish the subjects of necessary expenditure,

and therefore increase its disposable income; and he infers that the

wealth of a society may be augmented by allowing such endowments to

be created. He may go on to show that such endowments may cease to be

favourable to wealth, if the founder’s legislative power be unlimited,

since the doctrines of which he has ordered the dissemination may have

been originally unpopular, or may become so as knowledge advances.

The political economist, therefore, may recommend that all such

institutions be subjected to the control of the legislature, in order

to prevent endowments from being wasted by providing teachers for

whom there are no congregations, and that they be also subjected to

periodical revision, in order to accommodate the supply of instruction

to the demand.

He may proceed to consider the different forms of endowments, by

tithes, by land, by rent-charges, and by the investment of money. He

may show how the first is an obstacle to all improvement, and the

second to improvement by the landlord; how the third diminishes with

the progress of wealth, and the fourth may perish with the fund on

which it is secured. And he may propose remedies for these different

inconveniences. If he go further than this, he wanders from the art of

wealth into the art of government.

I have introduced this rather long illustration, not only as an example

of the different modes in which the _art_ of Political Economy must be

treated, according to the definition with which the teacher sets out,

but also as a specimen of the extent and variety of the details into

which he must enter, even if he adopt the less extensive definition.

But this is not all. I have already remarked that all the practical

arts draw their principles from sciences. If, however, the teacher

of an art were to attempt to teach also the different sciences on

which it is founded, his treatise would want unity of subject, and be

inconveniently long. He generally, therefore, assumes his scientific

principles as established, and refers to them as well known. The

teacher of the art of medicine merely alludes to the facts which form

the sciences of anatomy and chemistry; the teacher of rhetoric assumes

that his pupil is acquainted with the science of logic and with that

of grammar. Many of the sciences and of the arts which are subservient

to the art of Political Economy, may be thus treated. The political

economist, for instance, assumes that protection from domestic or

foreign violence or fraud, is essential to any considerable production

or accumulation of wealth, and he considers the means by which the

expense of providing this protection may be best supported; but he does

not inquire what are the necessary legal and military institutions.

He leaves these to be pointed out by the arts of war and of penal and

civil jurisprudence, and by the sciences on which those arts depend.

There is one science, however, to which this treatment cannot as yet be

applied, and it is the science most intimately connected with the art

of Political Economy, that is to say, the science which states the laws

regulating the production, accumulation, and distribution of wealth,

or, in other words, the science (as distinguished from the art) of

Political Economy itself. The time I trust will come, perhaps within

the lives of some of us, when the outline of this science will be

clearly made out and generally recognised, when its nomenclature will

be fixed, and its principles form a part of elementary instruction.

A teacher of the art of Political Economy will then be able to refer

to the principles of the science as familiar and admitted truths. I

scarcely need repeat how far this is from being the case at present.

Without doubt, many of the laws of the science have been discovered,

and a few of them are generally acknowledged; and some of its terms

have been defined, and the definitions accepted. Still, however,

there remains, as I remarked in the first Lecture, much to explore

and much to explain. We are still far from the bounds of what is to

be known, and further still from any general agreement as to what is

known. Every writer, therefore, on the art of Political Economy, is

forced to prefix, or to interweave among his precepts, his own views

of the science, and thus to add to the practical portion of his work a

scientific portion of perhaps equal length. It appears to me, that the

five years during which this professorship is tenable, is too short a

period for so vast an undertaking. I propose, therefore, to take as my

subject, not the art, but the much narrower province, the science; and

to explain, in the following Lectures, the general laws which regulate

the production, accumulation, and distribution of wealth, leaving it to

writers with more leisure to point out what are the institutions most

favourable to its production and accumulation, and to speculators of

still wider views to say what production, accumulation, distribution,

and consumption are most favourable to human happiness.

But though I follow substantially the example of Turgot and Ricardo,

I do not propose to follow it implicitly. Though I profess to teach

only the theory of wealth, I do not refuse the right to consider

its practical application. There is, indeed, something imposing and

almost seductive in a work of pure science, especially if it be a

science connected with human affairs. We admire the impartiality of

the philosopher who discusses matters that agitate nations without

mixing in the strife, or noticing the use that may be made of the

truths which he scatters. And we admit, with comparative readiness,

conclusions which do not appear to have been influenced by passion, the

great disturber of observation and of reasoning. This was one of the

great causes of the popularity of Ricardo. He was the first English

writer who produced Political Economy in a purely scientific form. He

is usually a logical reasoner, so that his conclusions can seldom be

denied if his premises are conceded, and his premises must usually be

conceded, for they are usually hypothetical. Men were delighted to find

what appeared to be firm footing, in a new and apparently unstable

science, and readily gave their assent to theories which did not

obviously lead to practice. But though it be desirable that from time

to time a writer should arise able and willing to treat the science in

this severe and abstract manner, his treatise will be more serviceable

to masters than to students. To those who are already familiar with the

subject, to those who have already perceived how deeply mankind are

interested in obtaining correct views as to the laws which regulate the

production and distribution of wealth, a naked statement of those laws,

though it should not possess the elegance of Turgot, or the originality

of Ricardo, must still be useful, and even agreeable. A mere student

would find it repulsive. He ought to be attracted to Political Economy

by seeing from time to time its practical application. He should be

taught that he is studying a science composed of principles which no

statesman, no legislator, no magistrate, no member even of a board

of guardians can safely disregard. And this will be best effected

by putting before him examples of the good which has been done by

adhering to those principles, and of the evil which has punished their

neglect. These examples, therefore, I shall think myself at liberty

to give. I shall think myself justified, for instance, in showing how

the natural distribution of wealth may be affected by the institution

of poor-laws. And I shall not confine myself to their effects upon

wealth. I shall consider how far a well-framed poor-law may promote the

moral as well as the material welfare of the labouring classes, and an

ill-administered poor-law may produce moral, intellectual, and physical

degradation. But these discussions must be considered as episodes. They

form no part of the science which I profess. I shall enter into them,

not as a political economist, but as a statesman or a moralist; and

I shall expect from those who do me the honour of listening to them,

not the full conviction which follows scientific reasoning, but the

qualified assent which is given to the precepts of an art.

In the next Lecture I shall consider whether the science of Political

Economy may be more conveniently based on positive or on hypothetical

principles.

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