THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
It has been my singular ill fortune that I have been compelled
to differ from the Republican Party, and from a good many
of my political associates, upon many important matters.
It has been my singular good fortune that, so far, they have
all come to my way of thinking, as have the majority of the
American people, in regard to every one, with perhaps one
exception. That is the dealing of the American people with
the people of the Philippine Islands, by the Treaty with Spain.
The war that followed it crushed the Republic that the Philippine
people had set up for themselves, deprived them of their independence,
and established there, by American power, a Government in
which the people have no part, against their will. No man,
I think, will seriously question that that action was contrary
to the Declaration of Independence, the fundamental principles
declared in many State constitutions, the principles avowed
by the founders of the Republic and by our statesmen of all
parties down to a time long after the death of Lincoln.
If the question were, whether I am myself right, or whether
my friends and companions in the Republican Party be right,
I should submit to their better judgment. But I feel quite
confident, though of that no man can be certain, that if the
judgment of the American people, even in this generation,
could be taken on that question alone, I should find myself
in the majority. If it be not so, the issue is between the
opinion of the American people for more than a century, and
the opinion that the American people has expressed for one
or two Presidential terms.
Surely I do not need to argue the question; at any rate, I
will not here undertake to argue the question, that our dealing
with the Philippine people is a violation of the principles
to which our people adhered from 1776 to 1893. If the maintenance
of slavery were inconsistent with them, it was admitted that
in that particular we were violating them, or were unable
from circumstances to carry them into effect. Mr. Jefferson
thought so himself.
But the accomplishment by this Republic of its purpose to
subjugate the Philippine people to its will, under the claim
that it, and not they, had the right to judge of their fitness
for self-government, is a rejection of the old American doctrine
as applicable to any race we may judge to be our inferior.
This doctrine will be applied hereafter, unless it be abandoned,
to the Negro at home. Senator Tillman of South Carolina well
said, and no gentleman in the Senate contradicted him: "Republican
leaders do not longer dare to call into question the justice
or the necessity of limiting Negro suffrage in the South."
The same gentleman said at another time: "I want to call your
attention to the remarkable change that has come over the
spirit of the dream of the Republicans. Your slogans of the
past--brotherhood of man and fatherhood of God--have gone
glimmering down through the ages. The brotherhood of man
exists no longer." These statements of Mr. Tillman have never
been challenged, and never can be.
I do not mean here to renew the almost interminable debate.
I will only make a very brief statement of my position:
The discussion began with the acquisition of Hawaii. Ever
since I came to the Senate I had carefully studied the matter
of the acquisition of Hawaii. I had become thoroughly satisfied
that it would be a great advantage to the people of the United
States, as well as for the people of Hawaii.
Hawaii is 2,100 miles from our Pacific coast. Yet if a line
be drawn from the point of our territory nearest Asia to the
Southern boundary of California, that line being the chord
of which our Pacific coast is the bow, Hawaii will fall this
side of it. Held by a great Nation with whom we were at war,
it would be a most formidable and valuable base of supplies.
We had sustained a peculiar relation to it. American missionaries
had redeemed the people from barbarism and Paganism. Many
of them, and their descendants, had remained in the Islands.
The native Hawaiians were a perishing race. They had gone
down from 300,000 to 30,000 within one hundred years.
The Japanese wanted it. The Portugese wanted it. Other nations
wanted it. But the Hawaiians seemed neither to know nor care
whether they wanted it or no. They were a perishing people.
Their only hope and desire and expectation was that in the
Providence of God they might lead a quiet, undisturbed life,
fishing, bathing, supplied with tropical fruits, and be let
alone.
We had always insisted that our relation to them was peculiar;
that they could not be permitted to fall under the dominion
of another power, even by their own consent. That had been
declared by our Department of State under Administrations
of all parties, including Mr. Webster, Mr. Seward, and Mr.
Bayard. They were utterly helpless. As their Queen has lately
declared: "The best thing for them that could have happened
was to belong to the United States."
By the Constitution of Hawaii, the Government had been authorized
to make a treaty of annexation with this country. It was
said that that Constitution was the result of usurpation which
would not have come to pass but for American aid, and the
presence of one of our men-of-war. But that Government had
been maintained for six or seven years. Four of them were
while Mr. Cleveland was President, who it was well known would
be in full sympathy with an attempt to restore the old Government.
So if the people had been against it, the Government under
that Constitution could not have lasted an hour.
President Harrison had negotiated a treaty of annexation,
against which no considerable remonstrance or opposition
was uttered. My approval of it was then, I suppose, well
known. Certainly no friend of mine, and nobody in Massachusetts,
so far as I know, in the least objected or remonstrated against
it. The treaty was withdrawn from the consideration of the
Senate by President Cleveland.
Another was negotiated soon after President McKinley came
in. Meantime, however, the controversy with Spain had assumed
formidable proportions, and the craze for an extension of
our Empire had begun its course. Many Republican leaders
were advocating the acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands, not
for the reasons I have just stated, but on the avowed ground
that it was necessary we should own them as a point of vantage
for acquiring dominion in the East. It was said that China
was about to be divided among the great Western powers, and
that we must have our share. I saw when the time approached
for action of the McKinley Treaty that the question could
not be separated, at least in debate, from the question of
entering upon a career of conquest of Empire in the Far East.
Under these circumstances the question of duty came to me:
Will you adhere to the purpose long formed, and vote for the
acquisition of Hawaii solely on its own merit? Or, will you
vote against it, for fear that the bad and mischievous reasons
that are given for it is so many quarters, will have a pernicious
tendency only to be counteracted by the defeat of the treaty
itself?
I hesitated long. President McKinley sent for me to come
to the White House, as was his not infrequent habit. He said
he wanted to consult me upon the question whether it would
be wise for him to have a personal interview with Senator
Morrill of Vermont. He had been told that Mr. Morrill was
opposed to the Treaty. The President said: "I do not quite
like to try to influence the action of an old gentleman like
Mr. Morrill, so excellent, and of such great experience. It
seems to me that it might be thought presumptuous, if I were
to do so. But it is very important to us to have his vote,
if we can." The President added something implying that he
understood that I was in favor of the Treaty.
I said, "I ought to say, Mr. President, in all candor, that
I feel very doubtful whether I can support it myself." President
McKinley said: "Well, I don't know what I shall do. We cannot
let those Islands go to Japan. Japan has her eye on them.
Her people are crowding in there. I am satisfied they do
not go there voluntarily, as ordinary immigrants, but that
Japan is pressing them in there, in order to get possession
before anybody can interfere. If something be not done, there
will be before long another Revolution, and Japan will get
control. Some little time ago the Hawaiian Government observed
that when the immigrants from a large steamer went ashore
they marched with a military step, indicating that they were
a body of trained soldiers. Thereupon Hawaii prohibited the
further coming in of Japanese. Japan claimed that was in
violation of their treaty, and sent a ship of war to Hawaii.
I was obliged to notify Japan that no compulsory measures
upon Hawaii, in behalf of the Japan Government, would be tolerated
by this country. So she desisted. But the matters are still
in a very dangerous position, and Japan is doubtless awaiting
her opportunity."
I told President McKinley that I favored then, as I always
had, the acquisition of Hawaii. But I did not like the spirit
with which it was being advocated both in the Senate and
out of it. I instanced several very distinguished gentlemen
indeed, one a man of very high authority in the Senate in
matters relating to foreign affairs, who were urging publicly
and privately the Hawaiian Treaty on the ground that we must
have Hawaii in order to help us get our share of China. President
McKinley disclaimed any such purpose. He expressed his earnest
and emphatic dissent from the opinions imputed to several
leading Republicans, whom he named.
I never, at any time during the discussion of the Philippine
question, expressed a more emphatic disapproval of the acquisition
of dependencies or Oriental Empire by military strength, than
he expressed on that occasion. I am justified in putting
this on record, not only because I am confirmed by several
gentlemen in public life, who had interviews with him, but
because he made in substance the same declaration in public.
He declared, speaking of this very matter of acquiring sovereignty
over Spanish territory by conquest:
"Forcible annexation, according to our American code of morals,
would be criminal aggression."
He said at another time:
"Human rights and constitutional privileges must not be forgotten
in the race for wealth and commercial supremacy. The Government
of the people must be by the people and not by a few of the
people. It must rest upon the free consent of the governed
and all of the governed. Power, it must be remembered, which
is secured by oppression or usurpation or by any form of injustice
is soon dethroned. We have no right in law or morals to usurp
that which belongs to another, whether it is property or power."
I suppose he was then speaking of our duty as to any people
whom we might liberate from Spain, as the results of the Spanish
War. He unquestionably meant that we had no right, in law
or morals, to usurp the right of self-government which belonged
to the Cubans, or to the Philippine people.
Yet I have no doubt whatever that in the attitude that he
took later he was actuated by a serious and lofty purpose
to do right. I think he was led on from one step to another
by what he deemed the necessity of the present occasion. I
dare say that he was influenced, as any other man who was
not more than human would have been influenced, by the apparently
earnest desire of the American people, as he understood it,
as it was conveyed to him on his Western journey. But I believe
every step he took he thought necessary at the time. I further
believe, although I may not be able to convince other men,
and no man will know until the secret history of that time
shall be made known, that if he had lived, before his Administration
was over, he would have placed the Republic again on the principles
from which it seems to me we departed--the great doctrine
of Jefferson, the great doctrine of the Declaration of Independence,
that there can be no just Government by one people over another
without its consent, and that the International law declared
by the Republic is that all Governments must depend for their
just powers upon the consent of the governed. This was insisted
on by our Fathers as the doctrine of International law, to
be acted upon by the infant Republic for itself. In this
I am confirmed by the testimony of Mr. Secretary Long, who
was in President McKinley's most intimate counsels.
The Treaty negotiated by President McKinley with Hawaii was
not acted upon. It was concluded to substitute a joint resolution,
for which there was a precedent in the case of the acquisition
of Texas. I voted for the joint resolution, as did Senator
Hale of Maine, and several Democratic Senators, who were earnestly
opposed to what is known as the policy of Imperialism.
I left the President, after the conversation above related,
without giving him any assurance as to my action. But I
determined on full reflection, to support the acquisition of
Hawaii, in accordance with my long-settled purpose, and at
the same time to make a clear and emphatic statement of my
unalterable opposition to acquiring dependencies in the East,
if we did not expect, when the proper time came, to admit
them to the Union as States. This I did to the best of my
power. I was invited to give an address before a college
in Pennsylvania, where I took occasion to make an emphatic
declaration of the doctrine on which I meant to act.
Afterward, July 5, 1898, I made a speech in the Senate, on
the joint resolution for the acquisition of Hawaii, in which
I said that I had entertained grave doubts in regard to that
measure; that I had approached the subject with greater hesitation
and anxiety than I had ever felt in regard to any other matter
during the whole of my public life.
I went on to say:
"The trouble I have found with the Hawaiian business is this:
Not in the character of the population of the Sandwich Island,
not in their distance from our shores, not in the doubt that
we have an honest right to deal with the existing government
there in such a matter. I have found my trouble in the nature
and character of the argument by which, in the beginning and
ever since, a great many friends of annexation have sought
to support it . . . .
"If this be the first step in the acquisition of dominion
over barbarous archipelagoes in distant seas; if we are to
enter into competition with the great powers of Europe in
the plundering of China, in the division of Africa; if we
are to quit our own to stand on foreign lands; if our commerce
is hereafter to be forced upon unwilling peoples at the cannon's
mouth; if we are ourselves to be governed in part by peoples
to whom the Declaration of Independence is a stranger; or,
worse still, if we are to govern subjects and vassal States,
trampling as we do it on our own great Charter which recognizes
alike the liberty and the dignity of individual manhood, then
let us resist this thing in the beginning, and let us resist
it to the death.
"I do not agree with those gentlemen who think we would wrest
the Philippine Islands from Spain and take charge of them
ourselves. I do not think we should acquire Cuba, as the
result of the existing war, to be annexed to the United States."
I reinforced this protest as well I could. But I went on
to state the reasons which had actuated me in favoring the
measure, and that my unconquerable repugnance to the acquisition
of territory to be held in dependency did not apply to that
case.
I cited the Teller resolution, and declared that it bound
the American people in honor, and that its principle applied
to all Spanish territory. I maintained that there was nothing
in the acquisition of Hawaii inconsistent with this doctrine.
I think so still.
I was bitterly reproached by some worthy persons, who I suppose
will always find matter for bitter reproach in everything
said or done on public matters. They charged me with speaking
one way and voting another. But I am content to leave the
case on its merits, and on the record.
The war went on. The feeling of the country was deeply excited.
President McKinley made his famous Western journey. He was
greeted by enthusiastic throngs. The feeling in that part
of the country in favor of a permanent dominion over the Philippine
Islands was uttered by excited crowds, whom he addressed from
the platform and the railroad cars as he passed thorough the
country. But the sober, conservative feeling, which seldom
finds utterance in such assemblies, did not make itself heard.
The President returned to Washington, undoubtedly in the honest
belief that the country demanded that he acquire the Philippine
Islands, and that Congress should govern them.
I have never attributed publicly, or in my own heart, to
President McKinley any but the most conscientious desire
to do his duty in what, as the case seems to me, was an entire
change of purpose. Many military and naval officers, from
whose reports he had to get his facts almost wholly, insisted
that the Philippine people were unfit for self-government.
After the unhappy conflict of arms the solution of the problem
seemed to be to compel the Philippine people to unconditional
submission. It would not be just or fair that I should undertake
to state the reasons which controlled the President in adopting
the conclusions to which I did not myself agree. I am merely
telling my own part in the transaction.
When I got back to Washington, at the beginning of the session
in December, 1898, I had occasion to see the President almost
immediately. His purpose was to make a Treaty by which, without
the assent of their inhabitants, we should acquire the Philippine
Islands. We were to hold and govern in subjection the people
of the Philippine Islands. That was pretty well understood.
The national power of Spain was destroyed. It was clear
that she must submit to whatever terms we should impose.
The President had chosen, as Commissioners to negotiate the
Treaty, five gentlemen, three of whom, Senators Cushman K.
Davis, and William P. Frye and Whitelaw Reid, the accomplished
editor of the New York _Tribune,_ former Minister to France,
were well known to be zealous for acquiring territory in the
East. Mr. Frye was said to have declared in a speech not
long before he went abroad that he was in favor of keeping
everything we could lay our hands on. I suppose that was,
however, intended as a bit of jocose extravagance, which that
most excellent gentleman did not mean to have taken too seriously.
Mr. Day, the Secretary of State, and Senator Gray of Delaware,
were understood to be utterly opposed to the policy of expansion
or Imperialism.
I do not know about Mr. Day. But it appeared, when three
years afterward the correspondence between the Commissioners
and the Department of State became public, that Mr. Day expressed
no objection to the acquisition of Luzon, but objected to
a peremptory demand for the whole Philippine Island group,
thereby--to use his language--"leaving us open to the imputation
of following agreement to negotiate with demand for whole
subject matter of discussion ourselves."
The public impression as to Senator Gray is confirmed by the
following remonstrance, which appears in the same correspondence:
PEACE COMMISSIONERS TO MR. HAY
[Telegram]
PARIS, October 25, 1898.
The undersigned cannot agree that it is wise to take Philippine
Islands in whole or in part. To do so would be to reverse
accepted continental policy of the country, declared and acted
upon throughout our history. Propinquity governs the case
of Cuba and Porto Rico. Policy proposed introduces us into
European politics and the entangling alliances against which
Washington and all American statemen have protested. It will
make necessary a navy equal to largest of powers; a greatly
increased military establishment; immense sums for fortifications
and harbors; multiply occasions for dangerous complications
with foreign nations, and increase burdens of taxation. Will
receive in compensation no outlet for American labor in labor
market already overcrowded and cheap; no area for homes for
American citizens; climate and social conditions demoralizing
to character of American youth; new and disturbing questions
introduced into our politics; church question menacing. On
whole, instead of indemnity--injury.
The undersigned cannot agree that any obligation incurred
to insurgents is paramount to our own manifest interests.
Attacked Manila as part of legitimate war against Spain.
If we had captured Cadiz and Carlists had helped us, would
not owe duty to stay by them at the conclusion of war. On
the contrary, interests and duty would require us to abandon
both Manila and Cadiz. No place for colonial administration
or government of subject people in American system. So much
from standpoint of interest; but even conceding all benefits
claimed for annexation, we thereby abandon the infinitely
greater benefit to accrue from acting the part of a great,
powerful, and Christian nation; we exchange the moral grandeur
and strength to be gained by keeping our word to nations of
the world and by exhibiting a magnanimity and moderation in
the hour of victory that becomes the advanced civilization
we claim, for doubtful material advantages and shameful stepping
down from high moral position boastfully assumed. We should
set example in these respects, not follow in the selfish and
vulgar greed for territory which Europe has inherited from
mediaeval times. Our declaration of war upon Spain was accompanied
by a solemn and deliberate definition of our purpose. Now
that we have achieved all and more than our object, let us
simply keep our word. Third article of the protocol leaves
everything concerning the control of the Philippine Islands
to negotiation between the parties.
It is absurd now to say that we will not negotiate but will
appropriate the whole subject-matter of negotiation. At
the very least let us adhere to the President' instructions
and if conditions require the keeping of Luzon forego the
material advantages claimed in annexing other islands. Above
all let us not make a mockery of the injunction contained
in those instructions, where, after stating that we took
up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity and
in the fulfillment of high public and moral obligations, and
that we had no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of
conquest, the President among other things eloquently says:
"It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace
should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it
in facing war. It should be as scrupulous and magnanimous
in the concluding settlement as it was just and humane in
its original action."
This and more, of which I earnestly ask a reperusal, binds
my conscience and governs my action.
GEORGE GRAY.
WEDNESDAY, 12.30, night.
Senator Gray afterward signed the Treaty, defended it in
debate, and voted for its ratification. He vigorously defended
his vote on the floor of the Senate, chiefly by the argument
that when he learned that it was the purpose of the United
States to expel Spain from the Philippine Islands, he concluded
it was our duty to remain there for the protection of the
people against foreign rapacity and against domestic anarchy.
He claimed that he had been influenced in coming to this conclusion
very considerably by the fact that I was reported to have
said that under no circumstances would we give back the Philippine
people to Spain. That was true. I believed then, and believe
now, that it was our duty to deliver them from Spain, to protect
them against her, or against the cupidity of any other nation
until her people could have tried fully the experiment of self-
government, in which I have little doubt they would have
succeeded.
When I saw President McKinley early in December, 1898, he
was, I suppose, committed to the policy to which he adhered.
He greeted me with the delightful and affectionate cordiality
which I always found in him. He took me by the hand, and
said: "How are you feeling this winter, Mr. Senator?" I
was determined there should be no misunderstanding. I replied
at once: "Pretty pugnacious, I confess, Mr. President."
The tears came into his eyes, and he said, grasping my hand
again: "I shall always love you, whatever you do."
I found we differed widely on this great subject. I denounced
with all the vigor of which I was capable the Treaty, and
the conduct of the war in the Philippine Islands, in the Senate,
on the platform, in many public letters, and in articles in
magazines and newspapers. But President McKinley never abated
one jot of his cordiality toward me. I did not, of course,
undertake to press upon him my advice in matters affecting
the Philippine Islands, about which we differed so much. But
he continued to seek it, and to take it in all other matters
as constantly as ever before.
In order that it may not be supposed that I deceived myself
in regard to President McKinley's kindly regard, I may perhaps
be pardoned for saying that his close friend, Senator Hanna,
has more than once assured me that McKinley's love for me
was never abated, and for citing a sentence from an article
by Charles Emory Smith, his trusted counsellor and able and
accomplished Postmaster-General, in this Cabinet. Mr. Smith
says:
"Senator Hoar was the earnest foe and critic of President
McKinley's policy. But President McKinley had the warmest
regard and consideration for him. Nothing, indeed, in public
life was sweeter than the sentiment of these different and
differing men toward each other. President McKinley was anxious
to commission Senator Hoar as Minister to England, and proffered
him the place. It was without any desire to remove him from
the arena of contention--apprehension of such a reflection
restrained the proffer for a time--though the contention had
not then been fully developed."
After President McKinley's death I expressed the public sorrow
and my own in an address to a vast audience of the people
of my own city of Worcester, in Mechanics' Hall; and again,
at the request of the Republican State Committee, at the Republican
State Convention shortly afterward.
I have reason to know that both the addresses gave pleasure
to many of the lamented President's closest and warmest friends
throughout the country. I was afterward invited by the City
Government of Worcester to deliver a historical eulogy on
President McKinley before them. That office, it seemed to
me, I ought to decline. It was not because I was behind any
other man in admiration or personal affection for that lofty
and beautiful character. But I thought that address, which
was not only to utter the voice of public sorrow, but to give
a careful and discriminating sketch of the public life of
its subject, ought to be delivered by some person who agreed
with him in regard to the most important action of his life.
I could not well pass over the Philippine question. I could
not well speak of it without stating my own opinion. I could
not undertake to state President McKinley's opinion, conduct
or policy, without expressing my disapproval of it, and if
I did not do that, I could not state it without being thought
by those who heartily approved it, not to have stated it justly
and fairly.
I had repeatedly declared, during the preceding two years,
both before and since his death, my highest admiration for
the intellectual and moral qualities of my beloved friend,
and my belief that he would have a very high place in history
among the best and ablest men of the country.
But I thought the story of the important part of his life
should be told from his point of view, and not from mine;
that the reasons which governed him should be stated by a
person sure to appreciate them fully. If a great Catholic
Prelate were to die, his eulogy should not be pronounced
by a Protestant. When Dr. Channing died, we did not select
a Calvinist minister to pronounce his funeral sermon. When
Charles Sumner died Mr. Schurz and Mr. Curtis, not some old
Whig, and not some earnest supporter of General Grant, pronounced
the eulogy. I suppose nobody would have dreamed of asking
a Free Trader to pronounce the eulogy on President McKinley
if he had died soon after the beginning of his first term.
So I declined the office. The City did not ask anybody else
to fill my place, or perform the task.
I will not now renew the debate about our treatment of the
people of the Philippine Islands. My opinion has not at all
changed. I think that under the lead of Mabini and Aguinaldo
and their associates, but for our interference, a Republic
would have been established in Luzon, which would have compared
well with the best of the Republican Governments between the
United States and Cape Horn. For years and for generations,
and perhaps for centuries, there would have been turbulence,
disorder and revolution. But in her own way Destiny would
have evolved for them a force of civic rule best adapted to
their need. If we had treated them as we did Cuba, we should
have been saved the public shame of violating not only our
own pledges, but the rule of conduct which we had declared
to be self-evident truth in the beginning of our history.
We should have been saved the humiliation of witnessing the
subjection by Great Britain of the Boers in South Africa,
without a murmur of disapproval, and without an expression
of one word of sympathy for the heroic victims.
My term as Senator expired on the fourth of March, 1901.
The election of Senator for the following term came in January
of that year. I differed sharply from my colleague, Mr. Lodge,
in this whole matter. But the people of Massachusetts, with
the generous and liberal temper which ever distinguished that
noble Commonwealth, desired that their Senators should act
upon their own judgment, without any constraint.
A resolution was introduced at the session of the Legislature
of 1899 by Mr. Mellen, Democratic member from Worcester, thanking
me for my speech in opposition to the Spanish Treaty, endorsing
the doctrine of that speech, and condemning the subjugation
of the Philippine people by force of arms.
Charles G. Washburn, Republican member from Worcester, introduced
a resolution commending my speech, and declaring it to be
"A speech of the loftiest patriotism and eloquent interpretation
of the high conception of human freedom which the fathers
sought to preserve for all time in the Declaration of Independence
and in the Constitution of the United States."
These resolution, if adopted, would, by implication, condemn
the well-known opinion and action of my colleague. They were
encountered by several others, none of which referred to either
Senator, but expressed approval of the Spanish Treaty. One
of them, however, presented in the House by Mr. Mills of
Newburyport, declared that the Treaty ought to be ratified,
and then the United States should fulfil to Porto Rico and
the Philippine Islands the pledge of self-government and independence
made to Cuba. Very wisely all these resolutions were referred
to the Committee on Federal Relations, who reported this as
a compromise:
RESOLUTION REPORTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL
RELATIONS, OF THE LEGISLATURE, MARCH 29, 1899
_Resolved,_ by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in General Court assembled,
that Massachusetts, ever loyal in sympathy and support of
the General Government, continues her unabated confidence
in her Senators, and with a just pride in the eloquent and
memorable words they have uttered, leaves them untrammeled
in the exercise of an independent and patriotic judgment upon
the momentous questions presented for their consideration.
The whole matter was then dropped. But the Legislature,
and the generous people of Massachusetts whom they represented,
acted upon the spirit of the Committee's Resolution. I was
reelected without opposition. I had every Republican vote,
and many Democratic votes, of the Legislature. My affectionate
and cordial relations with my brilliant and accomplished colleague
have never suffered an instant's interruption.
I think I am entitled to record, however, that this result
was not accomplished by any abatement of my opposition to
the policy of the Administration as to the Philippine Islands.
I made a great many speeches within a few weeks of the Presidential
election in 1900. The members of the Senate and House, of
the Massachusetts Legislature, who were to choose a Senator,
were to be chosen at the same time. I expressed my unchanged
and earnest opposition of disapproval to the whole business
at length.
In speaking of the habit of appealing to the love of the
flag in behalf of this policy of conquest, I said that there
was but one symbol more sacred than the American flag. That
was the bread and wine which represented the body and blood
of the Saviour of mankind; adding, that a man who would use
an appeal to the flag in aid of the subjugation of an unwilling
people, would be capable of using the sacramental wine for
a debauch.
The week before the election of Senator came on a bill for
the reorganization of the Army was before the Senate. That
contained a provision for increasing the Army to a hundred
thousand men, allowing the President, however, to reduce it
to seventy thousand, and to raise it again if necessary,
so it would in his discretion be elastic, within those limitations.
Mr. Bacon, of Georgia, who seemed to be the leader of the
Democrats on that measure, inquired of the Republicans who
were managing the bill, how many men they needed and what
time would be required to put down the insurrection in the
Philippine Islands. Senator Bacon said that they would give
them the hundred thousand men, or any force they might demand
for one or two or three or five years, or for any required
time. But they were unwilling to give the President the power
of expanding and contracting the army in time of peace. This
was in full Senate.
I followed with a statement that I had no objection to giving
the President this discretion, and did not disapprove the
bill on that account. I thought the size of the Army in
time of peace should be left largely to the opinion of the
experts, especially General Miles, the famous soldier at the
head of our Army, who thought the regular Army should consist
of one hundred for every thousand of our population. That
would be about eighty thousand then, and before long would
require a hundred thousand men. But I said I was opposed
to raising soldiers to carry on the war in the Philippine
Islands. The only way to stop it that I knew was to refuse
to vote for the Army Bill. I voted against it solely on that
account.
I meant that if the Legislature of Massachusetts were to
reelect me, no man should ever have it to say that I had
bought my reelection by silence on this question, or concealed
my opinion, however extreme it might be, until after election.
After my election I delivered an address before the two Houses
of the Legislature, at their request, and was received with
a most cordial enthusiasm.
Yet I think that if any leading Republican who had differed
from me on this question, especially Governor Long, of whose
brilliant administration of the Navy the people of the Commonwealth
were so proud, had pressed his candidacy for the office in
opposition to me, as has been the custom in like cases in
other States, it is not unlikely that he would have been elected.
I have no doubt I should have found Governor Roger Wolcott
a formidable competitor, if he had lived and been willing.
Governor Wolcott had made a statement in public, quietly and
briefly, as was his wont, expressing his sympathy with me
when the question of the Treaty was under debate. Somewhat
later he made a statement in the same way, expressing his
opinion that the Administration should be supported. Both
these declarations were in general terms. They were not inconsistent
with each other. But death arrested the honorable and useful
career of Roger Wolcott when he was still in the prime of
life, in the strength of his noble manhood, a strength which
seemed rapidly enlarging and growing as if in early youth.
I have not doubt that the subjugation of the Philippine Islands,
the acquisition of a dependency to be held in subjection by
the United States, the overthrow of the great doctrine that
Governments rest on the consent of the governed; that all
the painful consequences which have attended the war for the
subjugation of that distant people, would have been avoided
if the Democratic opposition had been hearty and sincere.
The same spirit that defeated the Election bill in spite of
the majority in its favor, would have easily accomplished
that result. The Democratic Party, as a party, never meant
business in this matter. I do not deny that many Democrats--
I dare say a majority of the Democrats--were as earnestly
and seriously opposed to the acquisition of the Philippine
Islands as I was myself. But they never wielded their party
strength in opposition to it. I said to one eminent Democratic
leader early in the year 1900: "There is one way in which
you can put an end to this whole business. If you can elect
a Democratic House it will have power under the Constitution
to determine the use to which the Army shall be put. In that
way you compelled President Hayes to refrain from further
support by military force of the Republican State Governments
in the South." He answered: "Mr. Hoar, we shall never do
anything as radical as that."
When Senator Bacon made the offer to the majority of the Senate
to agree to give them all the military power they desired
for the suppression of the resistance in the Philippines
for as long a time as they should think it necessary, the
entire Democratic Party in the Senate was in their seats,
and there was no expression of dissent.
I think the Democratic Party feared the fate of the Federalists
who opposed the War of 1812, and of the Democrats who opposed
the War for the Union in 1861. This of course in the nature
of things is but conjecture.
Seventeen of the followers of Mr. Bryan voted for the Treaty.
The Treaty would have been defeated, not only lacking the
needful two thirds, but by a majority of the Senate but for
the votes of Democrats and Populists.
Senators Morgan and Pettus of Alabama, Senator McLaurin of
South Carolina, Senator McEnery of Louisiana, were avowed
supporters of the Treaty from the beginning.
Mr. Bryan in the height of the contest came to Washington
for the express purpose of urging upon his followers that
it was best to support the Treaty, end the War, and let the
question of what should be done with our conquest be settled
in the coming campaign. He urged upon them, as I was told
by several Democrats at the time who did not take his advice,
that the Democratic Party could not hope to win a victory
on the financial questions at stake after they had been beaten
on them in a time of adversity; and that they must have this
issue for the coming campaign. He was besought by his wiser
political associates to go away and leave the Senate to settle
the matter. But he remained.
After that it became impossible, not only to defeat the Treaty,
but to defeat the policy which had inspired it. The Treaty
pledged that the Philippine Islands should be governed by
Congress. It undertook obligations which require for their
fulfillment, at least ten years' control of the Islands.
It put the people of the Philippine Islands in the attitude
of abandoning the Republic they had formed, and of acknowledging
not only our supremacy but that they were neither entitled
or fit to govern themselves or to carry on the war which had
unfortunately broken out. I do not mean to imply that, as
I have said, a large number of the Democratic Party both in
public life and out of it, were not sincere and zealous in
their opposition to this wretched business. But next to a
very few men who controlled the policy of the Republican Party
in this matter, Mr. Bryan and his followers who voted in the
Senate for the Treaty are responsible for the results.
I have been blamed, as I have said already, because, with
my opinions, I did not join the Democratic Party and help
to elect Mr. Bryan. I disagreed with him and his party as
to every other issue then pending before the American people.
So differing from him, I found nothing in his attitude or
that of his party, to induce me to support him, or even to
inspire my confidence in their settlement of the question of
Imperialism or expansion.
In my opinion, if he had been elected, he would have accepted
the result, have put the blame for it on his predecessor
in office, and matters would have gone on very much as they
have under Republican control.
I have been told by many Senators who voted for the Treaty,
that they regretted that vote more than any other act of their
lives. Enough Senators have said this to me in person, not
only to have defeated the Treaty, but if they had so voted,
to have defeated it by a majority. A very eminent Republican
Senator told me that more than twenty Senators, who voted
for the Treaty, had given the same assurance to him. But
they are very unwilling to make the declaration public. Several
gentlemen, however, have publicly expressed their regret for
their vote, as is well known, enough to have changed the result.
When I think of my party, whose glory and whose service to
Liberty are the pride of my life, crushing out this people
in their effort to establish a Republic, and hear people
talk about _giving_ them good Government, and that they are
better off than they ever were under Spain, I feel very much
as if I had learned that my father, or some other honored
ancestor, had been a slave-trader in his time, and had boasted
that he had introduced a new and easier kind of hand-cuffs
or fetters to be worn by the slaves during the horrors of
the middle passage.
I do not believe that there is a respectable or intelligent
Filipino to-day, unless possibly some Macabebe scout, who
would not get rid of the Government of the United States
at once, if he could. Buencamino is said to be one of the
ablest of their public men. He has been quoted as friendly
to us, and is so. There is no doubt that he has so expressed
himself. He has been appointed a member of the Taft Government,
and has had committed to him the responsible and important
duty of deciding the appointments to the offices which are
to be filled by the native Filipinos, under the existing establishment.
It is said by both sides that he is crafty and selfish and
ambitious, and that he likes to be on the side that is the
strongest. How that may be, I do not know. But he will not
even pretend to accept the rule of the United States willingly.
He appeared as a witness before a Committee of the House of
Representatives, when in this country in 1902. He was asked
whether his people approved the policy of the Democratic Party.
He answered emphatically: "No. They do not wish to have the
United States abandon them to the ambition or cupidity of
foreign Governments." But he added: "Every Filipino is in
favor of the policy advocated by Senator Hoar." "What!" said
his inquirer, with great surprise, "Do you mean to say that
every Filipino agrees with Senator Hoar in his views?" "Yes,"
replied the man, with great emphasis; "every Filipino agrees
with Senator Hoar."
I mentioned this one day in conversation with President Roosevelt.
He told me that Buencamino had said exactly the same thing
to him.
General Miles told me on his return from his journey round
the world that he saw many leaders of the Philippine people;
that they spoke of me with great regard and attachment.
June 17, 1902, an eminent Hindoo scholar, published a long
article in the _Japan Times,_ in which he said:
"The speech of Mr. Hoar, though an address to his own countrymen,
is a message of hope to the whole world which sank with despondency
at the sight of Republican America behaving like a cruel,
tyrannical and rapacious Empire in the Philippines and particularly
to the broken-hearted people of Asia who are beginning to
lose all confidence in the humanity of the white races. Or
is it that they have lost it already? Hence all papers in
Asia should reprint his speech, translate it, and distribute
it broadcast. Let it be brought home to the Asiatic people
so that they may work and worship their champion and his forefathers.
Thanks to the awakening in America, thanks to the forces that
are at work to chase out the degenerating, demoralizing passion
for territorial aggrandizement from the noble American mind
and save it for itself and the world at large from the cancer
of Imperialism."
I am afraid I am committing an offence against good taste
in repeating such laudations. But it must be remembered
that a public man who has to encounter so much bitter reviling
and objurgation, is fairly entitled to have a little extravagance
on the other side that the balance may be even. I would rather
have the gratitude of the poor people of the Philippine Islands,
amid their sorrow, and have it true that what I may say or
do has brought a ray of hope into the gloomy caverns in which
the oppressed peoples of Asia dwell, than to receive a Ducal
Coronet from every Monarch in Europe, or command the applause
of listening Senators and read my history in a Nation's eyes.
At first there can seem nothing more absurd than the suggestion
of my Asiatic friend that the people of Asia should worship
their champion and his ancestors. But on second thought,
it is fair to say that while no human being can be entitled
to be worshipped by any other, yet that we got our love of
Liberty from our ancestors, or at any rate that is where I
got mine, and that they are entitled to all the credit.