So with all other primary issues. There is surely no country in the

world in which the marriage relation is discussed more copiously than in

the United States, and yet there is no country in which its essentials

are more diligently avoided. Some years ago, seeking to let some

sagacity into the prevailing exchange of platitudes, one of us wrote a

book upon the subject, grounding it upon the obvious doctrine that women

have much more to gain by marriage than men, and that the majority of

men are aware of it, and would never marry at all if it were not for

women's relentless effort to bring them to it. This banality the writer

supported, by dint of great painstaking, in a somewhat novel way. That

is to say, he put upon himself the limitation of employing no theory,

statement of fact or argument in the book that was not already embodied

in a common proverb in some civilized language. Now and then it was a

bit hard to find the proverb, but in most cases it was very easy, and in

some cases he found, not one, but dozens. Well, this laborious

_pastiche_ of the obvious made such a sensation that it sold better than

any other book that the author had ever written--and the reviews

unanimously described it, either with praise or with blame, as an

extraordinary collection of heresies, most of them almost too acrid to

be bruited about. In other words, this mass of platitudes took Americans

by surprise, and somehow shocked them. What was commonplace to even the

peasants of the European Continent was so unfamiliar to even the

literate minority over here that the book acquired a sort of sinister

repute, and the writer himself came to be discussed as a fellow with the

habit of arising in decorous society and indelicately blowing his nose.

There is, of course, something of the same shrinking from the elemental

facts of life in England; it seems to run with the Anglo-Saxon. This

accounts for the shuddering attitude of the English to such

platitude-monging foreigners as George Bernard Shaw, the Scotsman

disguised as an Irishman, and G. K. Chesterton, who shows all the

physical and mental stigmata of a Bavarian. Shaw's plays, which once had

all England by the ears, were set down as compendiums of the

self-evident by the French, a realistic and plain-spoken people, and

were sniffed at in Germany by all save the middle classes, who

correspond to the _intelligentsia_ of Anglo-Saxondom. But in America,

even more than in England, they were viewed as genuinely satanic. We

shall never forget, indeed, the tremulous manner in which American

audiences first listened to the feeble rattling of the palpable in such

pieces as "Man and Superman" and "You Never Can Tell." It was precisely

the manner of an old maid devouring "What Every Girl of Forty-Five

Should Know" behind the door. As for Chesterton, his banal arguments in

favour of alcohol shocked the country so greatly that his previous high

services to religious superstition were forgotten, and today he is

seldom mentioned by respectable Americans.

V

It is necessary to repeat that we rehearse all these facts, not in

indignation, nor indeed in any spirit of carping whatever, but in

perfect serenity and simply as descriptive sociologists. This attitude

of mind is but little comprehended in America, where the emotions

dominate all human reactions, and even such dismal sciences as

paleontology, pathology and comparative philology are gaudily coloured

by patriotic and other passions. The typical American learned man

suffers horribly from the national disease; he is eternally afraid of

something. If it is not that some cheese-monger among his trustees will

have him cashiered for receiving a picture post-card from Prof. Dr.

Scott Nearing, it is that some sweating and scoundrelly German or

Frenchman will discover and denounce his cribs, and if it is not that

the foreigner will have at him, it is that he will be robbed of his step

from associate to full professor by some rival whose wife is more

amiable to the president of the university, or who is himself more

popular with the college athletes. Thus surrounded by fears, he

translates them, by a familiar psychological process, into indignations.

He announces what he has to say in terms of raucous dudgeon, as a negro,

having to go past a medical college at night, intones some bellicose

gospel-hymn. He is, in brief, vociferously correct. During the late

war, at a time of unusual suspicions and hence of unusual hazards, this

eagerness to prove orthodoxy by choler was copiously on exhibition. Thus

one of the leading American zooelogists printed a work in which, after

starting off by denouncing the German naming of new species as ignorant,

dishonest and against God, he gradually worked himself up to the

doctrine that any American who put a tooth into a slab of _Rinderbrust

mit Meerrettig_, or peeped at _Simplicissimus_ with the blinds down, or

bought his children German-made jumping-jacks, was a traitor to the

Constitution and a secret agent of the Wilhelmstrasse. And thus there

were American pathologists and bacteriologists who denounced Prof. Dr.

Paul Ehrlich as little better than a quack hired by the Krupps to poison

Americans, and who displayed their pious horror of the late Prof. Dr.

Robert Koch by omitting all acknowledgment of obligation to him from

their monographs. And finally there was the posse of "two thousand

American Historians" assembled by Mr. Creel to instruct the plain people

in the new theory of American history, whereby the Revolution was

represented as a lamentable row in an otherwise happy family,

deliberately instigated by German intrigue--a posse which reached its

greatest height of correct indignation in its approval of the celebrated

Sisson documents, to the obscene delight of the British authors thereof.

As we say, we are devoid of all such lofty passions, and hence must

present our observations in the flat, unimaginative, unemotional manner

of a dentist pulling a tooth. It would not be going too far, in fact, to

call us emotional idiots. What ails us is a constitutional suspicion

that the other fellow, after all, may be right, or, in any event, partly

right. In the present case we by no means reprehend the avoidance of

issues that we have described; we merely record it. The fact is that it

has certain very obvious uses, and is probably inevitable in a

democratic society. It is commonly argued that free speech is necessary

to the prosperity of a democracy, but in this doctrine we take no stock.

On the contrary, there are plain reasons for holding that free speech is

more dangerous to a democracy than to any other form of government, and

no doubt these reasons, if only unconsciously, were at the bottom of the

extraordinary body of repressive legislation put upon the books during

the late war. The essential thing about a democracy is that the men at

the head of the state are wholly dependent, for a continuance of their

power, upon the good opinion of the popular majority. While they are

actually in office, true enough, they are theoretically almost

completely irresponsible, but their terms of office are usually so short

that they must give constant thought to the imminent canvassing of their

acts, and this threat of being judged and turned out commonly greatly

conditions their exercise of their power, even while they hold it to the

full. Of late, indeed, there has actually arisen the doctrine that they

are responsible at all times and must respond to every shift in public

sentiment, regardless of their own inclinations, and there has even

grown up the custom of subjecting them to formal discipline, as by what

is called the recall. The net result is that a public officer under a

democracy is bound to regard the popular will during the whole of his

term in office, and cannot hope to carry out any intelligible plan of

his own if the mob has been set against it.

Now, the trouble with this scheme is that the mob reaches its

conclusions, not by logical steps but by emotional steps, and that its

information upon all save a very small minority of the questions

publicly at issue is always scant and inaccurate. It is thus constantly

liable to inflammation by adroit demagogues, or rabble-rousers, and

inasmuch as these rabble-rousers are animated as a sole motive by the

hope of turning out the existing officers of state and getting the

offices for themselves, the man in office must inevitably regard them as

his enemies and the doctrines they preach as subversive of good

government. This view is not altogether selfish. There is, in fact,

sound logic in it, for it is a peculiarity of the mob mind that it

always takes in most hospitably what is intrinsically most idiotic--that

between two antagonistic leaders it always follows the one who is

longest on vague and brilliant words and shortest on sense. Thus the man

in office, if he would be free to carry on his duties in anything

approaching freedom and comfort, must adopt measures against that

tendency to run amuck.

Three devices at once present themselves. One is to take steps against

the rabble-rousers by seeking to make it appear that they are traitors,

and so arousing the mob against them--in brief, to deny them their

constitutional right to free speech under colour of criminal statutes.

The second is to combine this plan with that of flooding the country

with official news by a corps of press-agents, chautauquans and other

such professors of deception. The third is to meet the rabble-rousers on

their own ground, matching their appeals to the emotions with appeals

even more powerful, and out-doing their vague and soothing words with

words even more vague and soothing. All three plans have been in

operation since the first days of the republic; the early Federalists

employed the first two with such assiduity that the mob of that time

finally revolted. All three have been brought to the highest conceivable

point of perfection by Dr. Wilson, a man whose resolute fidelity to his

moral ideas is matched only by his magnificent skill at playing upon

every prejudice and weakness of the plain people.

But men of such exalted and varied gifts are not common. The average

head of a democratic state is not _ipso facto_ the best rabble-rouser

within that state, but merely one of the best. He may be able, on fair

terms, to meet any individual rival, but it is rare for him to be able

to meet the whole pack, or even any considerable group. To relieve him

from that difficulty, and so prevent the incessant running amuck of the

populace, it is necessary to handicap all the remaining rabble-rousers,

and this is most effectively done by limitations upon free speech which

originate as statutes and gradually take on the form and potency of

national customs. Such limitations arose in the United States by

precisely that process. They began in the first years of the republic as

definite laws. Some of those laws were afterward abandoned, but what was

fundamentally sound in them remained in force as custom.

It must be obvious that even Dr. Wilson, despite his tremendous gift for

the third of the devices that we have named, would have been in sore

case during his second administration if it had not been for his

employment of the other two. Imagine the United States during the Summer

of 1917 with absolute free speech the order of the day! The mails would

have been flooded with Socialist and pacifist documents, every

street-corner would have had its screaming soap-box orator, the

newspapers would have shaken the very heavens with colossal alarms, and

conscientious objection would have taken on the proportions of a

national frenzy. In the face of such an avalanche of fears and

balderdash, there would have been no work at all for the German

propagandists; in fact, it is likely that a great many of them, under

suspicion on account of their relative moderation, would have been

lynched as agents of the American munitions patriots. For the mob, it

must be remembered, infallibly inclines, not to the side of the soundest

logic and loftiest purpose, but to the side of the loudest noise, and

without the artificial aid of a large and complex organization of

press-agents and the power to jail any especially effective opponent

forthwith, even a President of the United States would be unable to bawl

down the whole fraternity. That it is matter of the utmost importance,

in time of war, to avoid any such internal reign of terror must be

obvious to even the most fanatical advocate of free speech. There must

be, in such emergencies, a resolute pursuit of coherent policies, and

that would be obviously impossible with the populace turning

distractedly to one bogus messiah after another, and always seeking to

force its latest craze upon the government. Thus, while one may

perchance drop a tear or two upon the Socialists jailed by a sort of

lynch law for trying to exercise their plain constitutional rights, and

upon the pacifists tarred and feathered by mobs led by government

agents, and upon the conscientious objectors starved and clubbed to

death in military dungeons, it must still be plain that such barbarous

penalties were essentially necessary. The victims, in the main, were

half-wits suffering from the martyr complex; it was their admitted

desire to sacrifice themselves for the Larger Good. This desire was

gratified--not in the way they hoped for, of course, but nevertheless in

a way that must have given any impartial observer a feeling of profound,

if discreditable, satisfaction.

What a republic has to fear especially is the rabble-rouser who

advocates giving an objective reality to the gaudy theories which lie at

the foundations of the prevailing scheme of government. He is far more

dangerous than a genuine revolutionist, for the latter comes with ideas

that are actually new, or, at all events, new to the mob, and so he has

to overcome its congenital hostility to novelty. But the reformer who,

under a democracy, bases his case upon the principles upon which

democracy is founded has an easy road, for the populace is familiar

with those principles and eager to see them put into practical effect.

The late Cecil Chesterton, in his penetrating "History of the United

States," showed how Andrew Jackson came to power by that route. Jackson,

he said, was simply a man so naive that he accepted the lofty doctrines

of the Declaration of Independence without any critical questioning

whatever, and "really acted as if they were true." The appearance of

such a man, he goes on, was "appalling" to the political aristocrats of

1825. They themselves, of course, enunciated those doctrines daily and

based their whole politics upon them--but not to the point of really

executing them. So when Jackson came down from the mountains with the

same sonorous words upon his lips, but with the addition of a solemn

promise to carry them out--when he thus descended upon them, he stole

their thunder and spiked their guns, and after a brief struggle

he had disposed of them. The Socialists, free-speech fanatics,

anti-conscriptionists, anti-militarists and other such democratic

maximalists of 1917 and 1918 were, in essence, nothing but a new and

formidable horde of Jacksons. Their case rested upon principles held to

be true by all good Americans, and constantly reaffirmed by the highest

officers of state. It was thus extremely likely that, if they were

permitted to woo the public ear, they would quickly amass a majority of

suffrages, and so get the conduct of things into their own hands. So it

became necessary, in order that the great enterprises then under way

might be pushed to a successful issue, that all these marplots be

silenced, and it was accordingly done. This proceeding, of course, was

theoretically violative of their common rights, and hence theoretically

un-American. All the theory, in fact, was on the side of the victims.

But war time is no time for theories, and a man with war powers in his

hands is not one to parley with them.

As we have said, the menace presented by such unintelligent literalists

is probably a good deal more dangerous to a democracy than to a

government of any other form. Under an aristocracy, for example, such as

prevailed, in one form or another, in England, Germany, Italy and France

before the war, it is possible to give doctrinaires a relatively free

rein, for even if they succeed in converting the mob to their whim-wham,

there remain insuperable impediments to its adoption and execution as

law. In England, as every one knows, the impediment was a ruling caste

highly skilled in the governmental function and generally trusted by a

majority of the populace--a ruling caste firmly intrenched in the House

of Lords and scarcely less powerful in the House of Commons. In France

it was a bureaucracy so securely protected by law and custom that

nothing short of a political cataclysm could shake it. In Germany and

Italy it was an aristocracy buttressed by laws cunningly designed to

nullify the numerical superiority of the mob, and by a monarchical

theory that set up a heavy counterweight to public opinion.

In the face of such adroit checks and balances it is a matter of

relative indifference whether the mob blows scalding hot or freezing

cold. Whatever the extravagance of its crazes, there remains effective

machinery for holding them in check until they spend themselves, which

is usually soon enough. Thus the English government, though

theoretically as much opposed to anarchists as the American government,

gave them cheerful asylum before the war and permitted them to preach

their lamentable notions almost without check, whereas in America they

early aroused great fears and were presently put under such

disabilities that their propaganda became almost impossible. Even in

France, where they had many converts and were frequently in eruption,

there was far more hospitality in the Germany of Bismarck's day, the

Socialists, after a brief and aberrant attempt to suppress them, were

allowed to run free, despite the fact that their doctrine was quite as

abhorrent to German official doctrine as anarchism was to American

official doctrine. The German ruling caste of those days was sheltered

behind laws and customs which enabled it to pull the teeth of Socialism,

even in the face of enormous Socialist majorities. But under a democracy

it is difficult, and often downright impossible, to oppose the popular

craze of the moment with any effect, and so there must be artificial

means of disciplining the jake-fetchers who seek to set such enthusiasms

in motion. The shivering fear of Bolshevism, visible of late among the

capitalists of America, is based upon a real danger. These capitalists

have passed through the burning fires of Rooseveltian trust-busting and

Bryanistic populism, and they know very well that half a dozen Lenines

and Trotskis, turned loose upon the plain people, would quickly recruit

a majority of them for a holy war upon capital, and that they have the

political power to make such a holy war devastating.

The amateur of popular psychology may wonder why it is that the mob, in

the face of the repressions constantly practised in the United States,

does not occasionally rise in revolt, and so get back its right to be

wooed and ravished by all sorts of mountebanks. Theoretically it has

that right, and what is more, it has the means of regaining it; nothing

could resist it if it made absolute free speech an issue in a national

campaign and voted for the candidate advocating it. But something is

overlooked here, and that is the fact that the mob has no liking for

free speech _per se_. Some of the grounds of its animosity we have

rehearsed. Others are not far to seek. One of them lies in the mob's

chronic suspicion of all advocates of ideas, born of its distaste for

ideas themselves. The mob-man cannot imagine himself throwing up his job

and deserting his home, his lodge and his speakeasy to carry a new

gospel to his fellows, and so he is inclined to examine the motives of

any other man who does so. The one motive that is intelligible to him is

the desire for profit, and he commonly concludes at once that this is

what moves the propagandist before him. His reasoning is defective, but

his conclusion is usually not far from wrong. In point of fact, idealism

is not a passion in America, but a trade; all the salient idealists make

a living at it, and some of them, for example, Dr. Bryan and the Rev.

Dr. Sunday, are commonly believed to have amassed large fortunes. For an

American to advocate a cause without any hope of private usufruct is

almost unheard of; it would be difficult to find such a man who was not

plainly insane. The most eloquent and impassioned of American idealists

are candidates for public office; on the lower levels idealism is no

more than a hand-maiden of business, like advertising or belonging to

the Men and Religion Forward Movement.

Another and very important cause of the proletarian's failure to whoop

for free speech is to be found in his barbarous delight in persecution,

regardless of the merits of the cause. The spectacle of a man exercising

the right of free speech yields, intrinsically, no joy, for there is

seldom anything dramatic about it. But the spectacle of a man being

mobbed, jailed, beaten and perhaps murdered for trying to exercise it is

a good show like any other good show, and the populace is thus not only

eager to witness it but even willing to help it along. It is therefore

quite easy to set the mob upon, say, the Bolsheviki, despite the fact

that the Bolsheviki have the professed aim of doing the mob an

incomparable service. During the late high jinks of the Postoffice and

the Department of Justice, popular opinion was always on the side of the

raiding parties. It applauded every descent upon a Socialist or pacifist

meeting, not because it was very hotly in favour of war--in fact, it was

lukewarm about war, and resisted all efforts to heat it up until

overwhelming swarms of yokel-yankers were turned upon it--but because it

was in favour of a safe and stimulating form of rough-house, with the

police helping instead of hindering. It never stopped to inquire about

the merits of the matter. All it asked for was a melodramatic raid,

followed by a noisy trial of the accused in the newspapers, and the

daily publication of sensational (and usually bogus) evidence about the

discovery of compromising literature in his wife's stockings, including

records of his receipt of $100,000 from von Bernstorff, Carranza or some

other transient hobgoblin. The celebrated O'Leary trial was typical.

After months of blood-curdling charges in the press, it turned out when

the accused got before a court that the evidence against him, on which

it was sought to convict him of a capital offence, was so feeble that it

would have scarcely sufficed to convict him of an ordinary misdemeanor,

and that most of this feeble testimony was palpably perjured.

Nevertheless, public opinion was nearly unanimously against him from

first to last, and the jury which acquitted him was almost apologetic

about its inability to give the populace the crowning happiness of a

state hanging.

Under cover of the war, of course, the business of providing such shows

prospered extraordinarily, but it is very active even in time of peace.

The surest way to get on in politics in America is to play the leading

part in a prosecution which attracts public notice. The list of

statesmen who have risen in that fashion includes the names of many of

the highest dignity, _e.g._, Hughes, Folk, Whitman, Heney, Baker and

Palmer. Every district attorney in America prays nightly that God will

deliver into his hands some Thaw, or Becker, or O'Leary, that he may get

upon the front pages and so become a governor, a United States senator,

or a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. The late

crusade against W. R. Hearst, which appeared to the public as a great

patriotic movement, was actually chiefly managed by a subordinate

prosecuting officer who hoped to get high office out of it.

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