SECTION III.--_Of the true state of Nature, which is the state of

civil society; and consequently of the Divine origin of Power_.

1. The State is deemed by Aristotle (_Politics_, III., ix., 14): "the

union of septs and villages in a complete and self-sufficient life."

The first and most elementary community is the _family_, [Greek:

oikia]. A knot of families associating together, claiming

blood-relationship and descent, real or fictitious, from a common

ancestor, whose name they bear, constitute a [Greek: genos], called in

Ireland a _sept_, in Scotland a _clan_, nameless in England. When the

sept come to cluster their habitations, or encampments, in one or more

spots, and to admit strangers in blood to dwell among them, these

hamlets, or camps, gradually reach the magnitude of a _village_. When

a number of these _villages_, belonging to different _septs_, come to

be contiguous to one another, this mere juxtaposition does not make of

them a State. Nor does interchange of commodities, nor intermarriage,

nor an offensive and defensive alliance: these are the mutual

relations of a _confederacy_, [Greek: xymmaxia], but all these and

more are needed for a State, [Greek: polis]. To be a State, it is

requisite that these septs and villages should agree to regulate the

conduct of their individual members by a _common standard of social

virtue_, sufficient for their well-being as one community. This common

standard is fixed by common consent, or by the decision of some power

competent to act for all and to punish delinquents. The name of this

common standard is _law_. (_Ethics_, c. vii., n. 1, p. 126.) The

community thus formed leads a life _complete and self-sufficient_, not

being a member of another, but a body by itself,--not part of any

ulterior community, but complete in the fulness of social good and

social authority.

2. Among the ancient Greeks and Italians, and to some extent also in

mediæval Italy and Germany, the city or municipality, with the small

country district attached, was the State. With us the nation is the

State; and accordingly we say _my country_ where the Greek said _my

city_. Bearing this difference in mind, as also the fact that the

_sept_ is not known amongst us except to antiquarians, and likewise

that the _village_ with us coincides with the _parish_, and that there

are town as well as country parishes,--upon these modern data we may

amend Aristotle's definition thus: _The State is the union of parishes

and municipalities in a perfect and self-sufficient community_.

3. The City State is well illustrated in the following narrative of

Thucydides (ii., 15):

"In the time of Cecrops and the early kings as far as Theseus, Attica

was always divided among several independent cities, with their own

town-halls and magistrates; and when there was no alarm of an enemy,

the inhabitants did not resort for common deliberation to the King,

but severally managed their own affairs and took their own counsel,

and some of them even went to war. But when Theseus came to the

throne, he abolished the council-chambers and magistracies of the

other cities, and centralised all the people in what is now the city

[of Athens], where he appointed their one council-chamber and

town-hall; and while they continued to occupy their own properties as

before, he forced them to recognise this as their one city and State."

Attica before Theseus was a _confederacy_, [Greek: xymmaxia], not a

State, [Greek: polis].

4. A _citizen_ is defined: "one who has access to a share in

deliberative and judicial functions." (Ar., _Pol_. III., i., 12.) It

is not necessary that he actually should share these functions, but

the way to them should lie open to him: he should be a person

qualified to share in them. There are various degrees of citizenship.

Under a parliamentary government, we distinguish the member of

parliament, the elector, and him who will be an elector as soon as he

gets a house of his own; and again, the judge, and him who is liable

to serve on juries. In an absolute monarchy there are no _citizens_,

only _subjects_.

5. "The distribution of power in the State, and especially of the

sovereign power, is called the _polity_" ([Greek: politeia], Ar.,

_Pol_., III., vi., 1),--a word immortalised by the judicious Hooker,

and happily recovered recently to the English language. The _polity_

then is the distribution of the sovereignty. The person, singular or

collective, in whose hands the full sovereignty rests, is called the

_ruler_. Be it observed that what we call _the ruler_ is never one

man, except in absolute monarchy. By the theory of the British

Constitution, the _ruler_ is King, Lords, and Commons, together.

6. _Nature requires that men generally live in society, domestic and

civil, so that the individual be of the family, and families form

associations, which again conspire to form one perfect community,

which is the State_. The requirement of nature may be gathered from

the universal practice of mankind. "If it (the word _savage_) means

people without a settled form of government, without laws and without

a religion, then, go where you like, you will not find such a race."

(Max Müller, in _Nineteenth Century_, Jan. 1885, p. 114.) The same may

be gathered from a consideration of what the State is, and of the ends

which it serves. The State, as we have seen (n. 2), is a union of

septs and villages, or of parishes and municipalities. The individual

is born and nurtured in the family, and ordinarily becomes in time the

parent of a new family. Families must combine to form septs by blood,

or villages (or parishes) by locality. Municipalities we may leave

aside, for a municipality is a potential State. But we must consider

the sept, village, or parish, which is the community intermediate

between family and State. Among the cogent reasons which require

families to enter into this association, we may mention friendship,

intermarriage, the interchange of services and commodities, the

cultivation of the arts, the preservation of traditions and

inventions.

7. But it is further necessary that these septs, villages, or

parishes, should band together and combine to form a higher community,

self-sufficient and perfect,--for the determining of rights which

Natural Law leaves undetermined,--for the punishing of disturbers of

the peace, if need be, even with death,--for defence against a common

enemy,--for a union of counsels and resources to the execution of

magnificent works. This self-sufficient and perfect community, which

is not part of any higher community, is the State.

8. We may observe that the whole reason for the being of the State is

not mutual need, nor the repression of violence. Main reasons these

are, no doubt, but not the whole main reason. Even if men had no need

of one another for the supply of their animal wants, they would still

desire to converse for the satisfaction of their intellectual

curiosity and their social affections. And even if we had all remained

as void of guile, and as full of light and love, as our first parents

were at their creation, we should still have needed the erection of

States. In a State there are not only criminal but civil courts, where

it is not wicked men alone who come to be litigants. From sundry

passages of Scripture it would appear that even angels may disagree as

to what is best and proper: angelic men certainly may and do. It is a

mistake to look upon civil government, with its apparatus of laws and

judgments, simply as a necessary evil, and remedy of the perverseness

of mankind. On the contrary, were all men virtuous, States would still

be formed, towering in magnificence above the States known to history,

as the cedars of Lebanon above the scanty growths of a fell-side in

our north country.

9. _There can be no State without a power to guide and govern it_. It

has indeed become the fashion to repeat, as the latest discovery in

politics, that what a State needs is not government but

administration. This saying comes of a theory, to be examined

presently, that sovereign power abides permanently with the people at

large, and that the sole function of princes, cabinets, and

parliaments, is to provide means of giving effect to the popular will.

This however is not quite a repudiation of government, but a peculiar

view as to the seat and centre of government. Those who hold it,

vigorously maintain the right of the Many to govern, control, and

command the Few. The need of some governing authority in a State can

be denied by none but an Anarchist, a gentleman who lives two doors

beyond Rousseau on the side of unreason.

10. _Every State is autonomous, self-governing, independent_. Either

the whole people taken collectively must rule the same whole taken

distributively, or a part must rule the rest. The ruler is either the

whole commonwealth, or more frequently a part of the commonwealth. An

autocrat is part of the State which he governs. Sovereignty whole and

entire is intrinsic to the State. A community that is to any extent

governed from without, like British India or London, is not a State,

but part of a State, for it is not a _perfect community_.

11. We have it therefore that _man is a social animal_. Naturally he

is a member of a family. Nature requires that families should coalesce

into higher communities, which again naturally converge and culminate

in the State. Nature further requires that in every State there should

be an authority to govern. But authority to govern and duty to obey

are correlatives. Nature therefore requires submission to the

governing authority in the State. In other words, Nature abhors

anarchy as being the destruction of civil society, and as cutting the

ground from under the feet of civilised man. The genuine _state of

nature_, that state and condition, which nature allows and approves as

proper for the evolution of the human faculties, is the state of man

in civil society. That is lost where there is no judge in the land.

12. There are men full of a sentimental deference to authority and

professions of obedience, who yet will not obey any of the authorities

that actually are over them. These are disobedient men. He is an

anarchist in practice, who meditates treason and rebellion against the

"powers that be" actually over him in the State wherein he lives. To

obey no actual power is to obey no power, as to wear no actual clothes

is to go naked. To keep up the comparison,--as a man may change his

clothes upon occasion, and thus go through a brief interval of

unclothedness without injury to health or violation of decency,

notwithstanding the requirement of nature to wear clothes: so it may

be or it may not be consonant with the exigency of our nature at times

to subvert by insurrection the existing government in order to the

substitution of a new authority; that does not concern us here. We are

stating the general rule under ordinary circumstances. The submission

to civil authority, which nature requires of us, must be paid in the

coin of obedience to the actual established "powers that be."

13. Any one who understands how morality comes from God (_Ethics_, c.

vi., s. ii. nn. 6-9, 13, pp. 119-125), can have no difficulty in

seeing how civil power is of God also. The one point covers the other.

We need no mention of God to show that disobedience, lying, and the

seven deadly sins, are bad things for human nature, things to be

avoided even if they were not forbidden. All the things that God

forbids are against the good of man. Their being evil is

distinguishable from their being prohibited, and antecedent to it. Now

as drunkenness and unchastity are evil for man, so too is anarchy. The

one remedy for anarchy is civil government. Even if there were no God,

it would be still imperatively necessary, as we have seen, for mankind

to erect political institutions, and to abide by the laws and

ordinances of constitutional power. But there would be no _formal

obligation_ of submission to these laws and ordinances; and resistance

to this power would be no more than _philosophic sin_. (_Ethics_, c.

vi., s. ii., n. 6, p. 119.) What makes anarchy truly sinful and wrong

is the prohibition of it contained in the Eternal Law, that law

whereby God commands every creature, and particularly every man, to

act in accordance with his own proper being and nature taken as a

whole, and to avoid what is repugnant to the same. (_Ethics_, c. vi.,

s. ii., n. 9, p. 120.)

Therefore, as man is naturally social, and anarchy is the dissolution

of society, God forbids anarchy, and enjoins obedience to the civil

power, under pain of sin and damnation. "They that resist, purchase to

themselves damnation" (Rom. xiii. 2): where the theological student,

having the Greek text before him, will observe that the same phrase is

used as in 1 Cor. xi. 29 of the unworthy communicant, as though it

were the like sin to rend our Lord's mystical Body by civil discord as

to profane His natural Body by sacrilege. But to enjoin obedience and

to bestow authority are the obverse and reverse of one and the same

act. God therefore gives the civil ruler power and authority to

command. This is the meaning of St. Paul's teaching that there is no

power but from God, and that the powers that be are ordained of God.

(Rom. xiii. 1.)

14. The argument is summed up in these seven consequent propositions:

(a) Civil society is necessary to human nature.

(b) Civil power is necessary to civil society.

(c) Civil power is naught without civil obedience.

(d) Civil obedience is necessary to human nature.

(e) God commands whatever is necessary to human nature.

(f) God commands obedience to the civil power.

(g) God commissions the civil power to rule.

15. If any one asks how the State and the civil power is of God any

otherwise than the railway company with its power, or even the fever

with its virulence, a moment's reflection will reveal the answer in

the facts, that railway communication, however convenient, is not an

essential feature of human life, as the State is: while diseases are

not requirements in order to good, but incidental defects and evils of

nature, permitted by God. Why God leaves man to cope with such evils,

is not the question here.

_Readings_.--Ar., _Pol_., I., ii.; III., i.; III., ix.: nn. 5-15.

Moral Philosophy: Ethics, Deontology and Natural Law · 第 3 / 12 章