DIRECTIONS ABOUT VOWS AND PARTICULAR COVENANTS WITH GOD.
_Tit. 1. Directions for the Right Making such Vows and Covenants._
[Sidenote: What a vow is.]
_Direct._ I. Understand the nature of a vow, and the use to which it
is appointed.
A vow is a promise made to God. 1. It is not a bare assertion or
negation. 2. It is not a mere pollicitation, or expression of the
purpose or resolution of the mind: for he that saith or meaneth no
more than, I am purposed or resolved to do this, may upon sufficient
reason do the contrary; for he may change his mind and resolution,
without any untruth or injury to any. 3. It is not a mere devoting of
a thing to God for the present by actual resignation. For the present
actual delivery of a thing to sacred uses is no promise for the
future: though we usually join them both together, yet _devovere_ may
be separated from _vovere_. 4. It must be therefore a promise, which
is, a voluntary obliging ones self to another _de futuro_ for some
good. 5. It is therefore implied that it be the act of a rational
creature, and of one that in that act hath some competent use of
reason, and not of a fool, or idiot, or mad-man, or a child that hath
not reason for such an act, no nor of a brain-sick or melancholy
person, who (though he be _cætera sanus_) is either delirant in that
business, or is irresistibly borne down and necessitated by his
disease to vow against the sober, deliberate conclusion of his reason
at other times, having at the time of vowing, reason enough to strive
against the act, but not self-government enough to restrain a
passionate, melancholy vow. 6. Whereas some casuists make deliberation
necessary, it must be understood that to the being of a vow so much
deliberation is requisite as may make it a rational human act, it must
be an act of reason; but for any further deliberation, it is necessary
only to the well-being, and not to the being of a vow, and without it
it is a rash vow, but not no vow.[47] 7. When we say, it must be a
voluntary act, the meaning is not that it must be totally and
absolutely voluntary, without any fear or threatening to induce us to
it; but only that it be really voluntary, that is, an act of choice,
by a free agent, that considering all things doth choose so to do. He
that hath a sword set to his breast, and doth swear or vow to save his
life, doth do it voluntarily, as choosing rather to do it than to die.
Man having free-will, may choose rather to die, than vow, if he think
best: his will may be moved by fear, but cannot be forced by any one,
or any means whatsoever. 8. When I say that a vow is a promise, I
imply that the matter of it is necessarily some real or supposed good;
to be good, or to do good, or not to do evil. Evil may be the matter
of an oath, but it is not properly a vow, if the matter be not
supposed good. 9. It is a promise made to God, that we are now
speaking of; whether the name of a vow belong to a promise made only
to man, is a question _de nomine_, which we need not stop at.
[Sidenote: The sorts of vows.]
A vow is either a simple promise to God, or a promise bound with an
oath or imprecation. Some would appropriate the name of a vow to this
last sort only, (when men swear they will do this or that,) which
indeed is the most formidable sort of vowing; but the true nature of a
vow is found also in a simple self-obliging promise.
[Sidenote: The use of vows.]
The true reason and use of vows is but for the more certain and
effectual performance of our duties: not to make new laws, and duties,
and religions for us, but to drive on the backward, lingering soul to
do its duty, and to break over difficulties and delays: that by
strengthening our bonds, and setting the danger before our eyes, we
may be excited to escape it.
[Sidenote: The obligation of vows.]
It is a great question, whether our own vows can add any new
obligation to that which before lay upon us from the command of God.
Amesius saith, (Cas. Consc. lib. iv. c. 16.) _Non additur proprie in
istis nova obligatio, neque augetur in se prior: sed magis agnoscitur
et recipitur a nobis: passive in istis æque fuimus antea obligati: sed
activa recognitione arctius nobis applicatur a nobismetipsis._ Others
commonly speak of an additional obligation; and indeed there is a
double obligation added by a vow, to that which God before had laid on
us, to the matter of that vow. Premising this distinction between
_obligatio imponentis_, a governing obligation, (which is the effect
of governing right or authority,) and _obligatio consentientis_, a
self-obliging by voluntary consent, (which is the effect of that
dominion which a rational free agent hath over his own actions,) I
say, 1. He that voweth doth oblige himself, who before was obliged by
God only; and that a man hath a power to oblige himself, is discerned
by the light of nature, and is the ground of the law of nations, and
of human converse: and though this is no divine obligation, yet it is
not therefore none at all. 2. But moreover he that voweth doth induce
upon himself a new divine obligation, by making himself the subject of
it. For example; God hath said, "Honour the Lord with thy substance:"
this command obligeth me to obey it whether I vow it or not. The same
God hath said, "Pay thy vows to the Most High," Psal. l. 14; and,
"When thou vowest a vow to God, defer not to pay it," Eccles. v. 4.
This layeth no obligation on me till I vow; but when I have vowed it
doth: so that now I am under a double divine obligation, (one to the
matter of the duty, and another to keep my vow,) and under a
self-obligation of my own vow: whence also a greater penalty will be
due if I now offend, than else would have been.
Hence you may see what to think of the common determination of
casuists concerning vows materially sinful, when they say, a man is
not obliged to keep them. It is only thus far true, that God obligeth
him not to do that particular thing which he voweth, for God had
before forbidden it, and he changeth not his laws upon man's rash
vowings; but yet there is a self-obligation which he laid upon himself
to do it: and this self-obligation to a sinful act, was itself a sin,
and to be repented of, and not performed; but it bringeth the person
under a double obligation to penalty, as a perjured person, even God's
obligation who bindeth the perjured to penalty, and the obligation of
his own consent to the punishment, if there was any oath or
imprecation in the vow. If it were true that such a person had brought
himself under no obligation at all, then he could not be properly
called perjured, nor punished as perjured; but he that sweareth and
voweth to do evil, (as the Jews to kill Paul,) though he ought not to
do the thing, (because God forbiddeth it,) yet he is a perjured person
for breaking his vow, and deserveth the penalty, not only of a rash
vower, but of one perjured. Thus error may make a man sinful and
miserable, though it cannot warrant him to sin.
_Direct._ II. Try well the matter of your vows, and venture not on
them till you are sure that they are not things forbidden: things
sinful or doubtful are not fit matter for a vow: in asserting,
subscribing, and witnessing, you should take care, that you know
assuredly that the matter be true, and venture not upon that which may
prove false; much more should you take care that you venture not
doubtingly in vows and oaths. They are matters to be handled with
dread and tenderness, and not to be played with, and rashly ventured
on, as if it were but the speaking of a common word: "Be not rash with
thy mouth, and let not thy heart be hasty to utter any thing before
God," Eccles. v. 2. It is a grievous snare that men are oft brought
into by ignorant and rash vows;[48] as the case of Jephthah, and
Herod, and many another tell us for our warning: an error in such
cases is much more safely and cheaply discerned before, than
afterwards. To have a rash vow or perjury to repent of, is to set a
bone in joint, or pull a thorn out of your very eye; and who would
choose such pain and smart? "Suffer not thy mouth to cause thy flesh
to sin; neither say thou before the angel that it was an error:
wherefore should God be angry at thy voice, and destroy the work of
thy hands," Eccles. v. 6. "It is a snare to the man who devoureth that
which is holy, and after vows to make inquiry," Prov. xx. 25. Be
careful and deliberate to prevent such snares.
_Direct._ III. Vow not in a passion: stay till the storm be over:
whether it be anger or desire, or whatever the passion be, delay and
deliberate before you vow; for when passion is up, the judgment is
upon great disadvantage. In your passion you are apt to be most
peremptory and confident when you are most deceived: if it be your
duty to vow, it will be your duty to-morrow when you are calm. If you
say, that duty must not be delayed, and that you must do it while the
Spirit moveth you: I answer, Was it not as much a duty before your
passion was kindled as now? It is no sinful delaying of so great a
duty, to stay till you have well proved whether it be of God. If it be
the Spirit of Christ that moveth you to it, he will be willing that
you deliberate and try it by that word which the same Spirit hath
indited to be your rule. God's Spirit worketh principally upon the
judgment and the will, by settled convictions, which will endure a
rational trial: it is liker to be your own spirit which worketh
principally on the passion, and will not endure the trial, nor come
into the light, John iii. 18, 19; Isa. viii. 20.
_Direct._ IV. Make not a vow of things indifferent and unnecessary: if
they be not good, in a true, comparing, practical judgment, which
considereth all accidents and circumstances, they are no fit matter
for a vow. Some say, things indifferent are the fittest matter both
for vows and human laws; but either they speak improperly or untruly,
and therefore dangerously at the best. If an idle word be a sin, then
an idle action is not a thing to be vowed, because it is not a thing
to be done, being as truly a sin as an idle word: and that which is
wholly indifferent is idle; for if it be good for any thing, it is
not wholly indifferent; and because it is antecedently useless, it is
consequently sinful to be done.
_Object._ I. But those that say things indifferent may be vowed, mean
not, things useless or unprofitable to any good end; but only those
things that are good and useful, but not commanded: such as are the
matter of God's counsels, and tend to man's perfection, as to vow
chastity, poverty, and absolute obedience.
_Answ._ There are no such things as are morally good, and not
commanded: this is the fiction of men that have a mind to accuse God's
laws and government of imperfection, and think sinful man can do
better than he is commanded, when none but Christ ever did so
well.[49]
_Quest._ I. What is moral goodness in any creature and subject, but a
conformity to his ruler's will expressed in his law? And if this
conformity be its very form and being, it cannot be that any thing
should be morally good that is not commanded.
_Quest._ II. Doth not the law of God command us to love him with all
our heart, and soul, and strength, and accordingly to serve him? And
is it possible to give him more than all; or can God come after and
counsel us to give him more than is possible?
_Quest._ III. Doth not the law of nature oblige us to serve God to the
utmost of our power? He that denieth it, is become unnatural, and must
deny God to be God, or deny himself to be his rational creature: for
nothing is more clear in nature, than that the creature who is
nothing, and hath nothing but from God, and is absolutely his own,
doth owe him all that he is able to do.
_Quest._ IV. Doth not Christ determine the case to his disciples, Luke
xvii. 10?
A middle between good and evil in morality is a contradiction: there
is no such thing; for good and evil are the whole of morality: without
these species there is no morality.
_Object._ II. It seems then you hold that there is nothing
indifferent, which is a paradox.
[Sidenote: Whether any things be indifferent?]
_Answ._ No such matter: there are thousands and millions of things
that are indifferent; but they are things natural only, and not things
moral. They are indifferent as to moral good and evil, because they
are neither; but they are not _indifferentia moralia_: the
indifferency is a negation of any morality in them _in genere_, as
well as of both the species of morality.[50] Whatsoever participateth
not of virtue or vice, and is not eligible or refusable by a moral
agent as such, hath no morality in it. There may be two words so equal
as it may be indifferent which you speak; and two eggs so equal, as
that it may be indifferent which you eat; but that is no more than to
say, the choosing of one before the other is not _actus moralis_:
there is no matter of morality in the choice.
_Object._ III. But if there may be things natural that are
indifferent, why not things moral?
_Answ._ As goodness is convertible with entity, there is no natural
being but is good: as goodness signifieth commodity, there is nothing
but is profitable or hurtful, and that is good to one that is hurtful
to another: but if it were not so, yet such goodness or badness is but
accidental to natural being; but moral goodness and badness is the
whole essence of morality.
_Object._ IV. But doth not the apostle say, "He that marrieth doth
well, and he that marrieth not doth better?" Therefore all is not sin
which is not best.
[Sidenote: Whether marrying be indifferent?]
_Answ._ The question put to the apostle to decide, was about marrying
or not marrying, as it belonged to all christians in general, and not
as it belonged to this or that individual person by some special
reason differently from others. And so in respect to the church in
general, the apostle determineth that there is no law binding them to
marry, or not to marry: for a law that is made for many must be suited
to what is common to those many. Now marriage being good for one and
not for another, is not made the matter of a common law, nor is it fit
to be so, and so far is left indifferent: but because that to most it
was rather a hinderance to good in those times of the church, than a
help, therefore for the present necessity, the apostle calleth
marrying "doing well," because it was not against any universal law,
and it was a state that was suitable to some; but he calls not
marrying "doing better," because it was then more ordinarily suited to
the ends of christianity. Now God maketh not a distinct law for every
individual person in the church; but one universal law for all: and
this being a thing variable according to the various cases of
individual persons, was unfit to be particularly determined by a
universal law. But if the question had been only of any one individual
person, then the decision would have been thus: though marrying is a
thing not directly commanded or forbidden, yet to some it is helpful
as to moral ends, to some it is hurtful, and to some it is so equal or
indifferent, that it is neither discernibly helpful nor hurtful; now
by the general laws or rules of Scripture to them that _consideratis
considerandis_ it is discernibly helpful, it is not indifferent, but a
duty; to them that it is discernibly hurtful, it is not indifferent,
but a sin; to them that it is neither discernibly helpful or hurtful
as to moral ends, it is indifferent, as being neither duty nor sin;
for it is not a thing of moral choice or nature at all. But the light
of nature telleth us that God hath not left it indifferent to men to
hinder themselves or to help themselves as to moral ends; else why
pray we, "Lead us not into temptation?" And marriage is so great a
help to some, and so great a hurt to others, that no man can say that
it is morally indifferent to all men in the world: and therefore that
being none of the apostle's meaning, it followeth that his meaning is
as aforesaid.
_Object._ V. But there are many things indifferent in themselves,
though not as clothed with all their accidents and circumstances: and
these actions being good in their accidents, may be the matter of a
vow.
_Answ._ True, but those actions are commanded duties, and not things
indifferent as so circumstantiated. It is very few actions in the
world that are made simply duties or sins, in their simple nature
without their circumstances and accidents: the commonest matter of all
God's laws, is actions or dispositions which are good or evil in their
circumstances and accidents. Therefore I conclude, things wholly
indifferent are not to be vowed.
_Direct._ V. It is not every duty that is the matter of a lawful vow.
Else you might have as many vows as duties: every good thought, and
word, and deed might have a vow. And then every sin which you commit
would be accompanied and aggravated with the guilt of perjury. And no
wise man would run his soul into such a snare. _Object._ But do we
not in baptism vow obedience to God? And doth not obedience contain
every particular duty? _Answ._ We vow sincere obedience, but not
perfect obedience. We do not vow that we will never sin, nor neglect a
duty (nor ought we to do so). So that as sincere obedience respecteth
every known duty as that which we shall practise in the bent of our
lives, but not in perfect constancy or degree, so far our vow in
baptism hath respect to all known duties, but no further.
_Direct._ VI. To make a vow lawful, besides the goodness of the thing
which we vow, there must be a rational, discernible probability, that
the act of vowing it will do more good than hurt; and this to a wise,
foreseeing judgment. For this vowing is not an ordinary worship to be
offered to God (except the baptismal vow, renewed in the Lord's supper
and at other seasons); but it is left as an extraordinary means, for
certain ends, which cannot by ordinary means be attained: and
therefore we must discern the season, by discerning the necessity or
usefulness of it. Swearing is a part of the service of God, but not of
his daily worship, nor frequently and rashly to be used, by any that
would not be held guilty of taking the name of God in vain: and so it
is in the case of vowing. Therefore he that will make a lawful vow,
must see beforehand, what is the probable benefit of it, and what is
the probable hurt or danger: and without this foresight it must be
rash, and cannot be lawful. And therefore no one can make a lawful
vow, but wise, foreseeing persons, and those that advise with such,
and are guided by them, if they be not such themselves; unless in a
case where God hath prescribed by his own determining commands (as in
the covenant of christianity). Therefore to one man the same vow may
be a sin, that to another may be a duty; because one may have more
reason for it, or necessity of it, and less danger by it, than
another. One man may foresee that vowing (in case where there is no
necessity) may insnare him either in perplexing doubts, or terrors,
which will make all his life after more irregular or uncomfortable.
Another man may discern that he is liable to no such danger.[51]
_Direct._ VII. No man should pretend danger or scruple against his
renewing the vow of christianity, or any one essential part of it;
viz. To take God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost for my God, and
Saviour, and Sanctifier, my Owner, Governor, and Father; renouncing
the devil, the world, and the flesh. Because there is an absolute
necessity, _præcepti et medii_, of performing this, and he that doth
it not shall certainly be damned; and therefore no worse matter can
stand up against it: he that denieth it, giveth up himself
despairingly to damnation. Yet I have heard many say, I dare not
promise to turn to God, and live a holy life, lest I break this
promise, and be worse than before. But dost thou not know, that it
must be both made and kept, if thou wilt be saved? Wilt thou choose to
be damned, for fear of worse? There is but one remedy for thy soul,
and all the hope of thy salvation lieth upon that alone. And wilt thou
refuse that one, for fear lest thou cast it up and die? when thou
shalt certainly die unless thou both take it, and keep it, and digest
it.
_Direct._ VIII. About particular sins and duties, deliberate
resolutions are the ordinary means of governing our lives; and vows
must not be used where these will do the work without them. For
extraordinary means must not be used, when ordinary will serve the
turn. Nor must you needlessly draw a double guilt upon yourselves in
case of sinning. And in mutable or doubtful cases, a resolution may be
changed, when a vow cannot. Try therefore what deliberate resolutions
will do, with the help of other ordinary means, before you go any
further.
_Direct._ IX. When ordinary resolutions and other helps will not serve
the turn, to engage the will to the forbearance of a known sin, or the
performance of a known duty, but temptations are so strong as to bear
down all, then it is seasonable to bind ourselves by a solemn vow, so
it be cautelously and deliberately done, and no greater danger like to
follow. In such a case of necessity, 1. You must deliberate on the
benefits and need. 2. You must foresee all the assaults that you are
like to have to tempt you to perjury, that they come not unexpected.
3. You must join the use of all other means for the keeping of your
vows.
_Direct._ X. Make not a law and religion to yourselves by your
voluntary vows, which God never made you by his authority; nor bind
yourselves for futurity to all that is a duty at present, where it is
possible that the change of things may change your duty. God is our
King and Governor, and not we ourselves: it is not we, but he, that
must give laws to us. We have work enough to do of his appointing; we
need not make more to ourselves, as if he had not given us enough.
Vows are not to make us new duties or religions, but to further us in
the obedience of that which our Lord hath imposed on us. It is a
self-condemning sin of foolish will-worshippers, to be busy in laying
more burdens on themselves, when they know they cannot do so much as
God requireth of them. Yea, some of them murmur at God's laws as too
strict, and at the observers of them as too precise, (though they come
far short of what is their duty,) and yet will be cutting out more
work for themselves.
And it is not enough that what you vow be your duty at the present,
but you must bind yourselves to it by vows no longer than it shall
remain your duty. It may be your duty at the present to live a single
life; but if you will vow therefore that you will never marry, you may
bind yourselves to that which may prove your sin: you know not what
alterations may befall you in your body or estate, that may invite you
to it. Are you sure that no change shall make it necessary to you? Or
will you presume to bind God himself by your vows, that he shall make
no such alteration? Or if you were never so confident of your own
unchangeableness, you know not what fond and violent affections
another may be possessed with, which may make an alteration in your
duty. At the present it may be your duty to live retiredly, and avoid
magistracy and public employments: but you may not vow it therefore
for continuance; for you know not but God may make such alterations,
as may make it so great and plain a duty, as without flat impiety or
cruelty, you cannot refuse. Perhaps at the present it may be your duty
to give half your yearly revenues to charitable and pious uses: but
you must not therefore vow it for continuance (without some special
cause to warrant it); for perhaps the next year it may be your duty to
give but a fourth or a tenth part, or none at all, according as the
providence of God shall dispose of your estate and you. Perhaps God
may impose a clear necessity on you, of using your estate some other
way.
_Direct._ XI. If you be under government, you may not lawfully vow
without your governors' consent, to do any thing which you may not
lawfully do without their consent, in case you had not vowed it. For
that were, 1. Actually to disobey them at the present, by making a vow
without the direction and consent of your governors. 2. And thereby to
bind yourselves to disobey them for the future, by doing that without
them, which you should not do without them. But if it be a thing that
you may do, or must do, though your governors forbid you, then you may
vow it though they forbid you (if you have a call from the necessity
of the vow).
_Direct._ XII. If oaths be commanded us by usurpers that have no
authority to impose them, we must not take them in formal obedience to
their commands. For that were to own their usurpation and encourage
them in their sin. If we owe them no obedience in any thing, we must
not obey them in so great a thing: or if they have some authority over
us in other matters, but none in this, (as a constable hath no power
to give an oath,) we must not obey them in the point where they have
no authority. But yet it is possible that there may be other reasons
that may make it our duty to do it, though not as an act of formal
obedience: as I may take an oath when a thief or murderer requireth
it, not to obey him, but to save my life. And if any man command me to
do that which God commandeth me, I must do it, because God commandeth
it.
_Direct._ XIII. If a lawful magistrate impose an oath or vow upon you,
before you take it you must consult with God, and know that it is not
against his will. God must be first obeyed in all things; but
especially in matters of so great moment, as vows and promises.
_Quest._ I. What if I be in doubt whether the oath or promise imposed
be lawful? must I take it, or not? If I take an oath which I judge
unlawful or false, I am a perjured or profane despiser of God: and if
a man must refuse all oaths or promises, which the magistrate
commandeth, if he do but doubt whether they be lawful, then government
and justice will be injured, while every man that hath ignorance
enough to make him dubious, shall refuse all oaths and promises of
allegiance, or for witness to the truth.
_Answ._ I. I shall tell you what others say first in the case of
doubting. Dr. Sanderson saith, Prælect. iii. sect. 10, p. 74, 75,
_Tertius casus est cum quis juramento pollicetur se facturum aliquid
in se fortassis licitum, quod tamen ipse putat esse illicitum. Ut
siquis ante hæc tempora admittendus ad beneficium (ut vocant)
ecclesiasticum, promisisset in publicis sacris observare omnes ritus
legibus ecclesiasticis imperatos; vestem scilicet lineam, crucis
signum ad sacrum fontem, ingeniculationem in percipiendis symbolis in
sacra cœna, et id genus alios; quos ipse tamen ex aliquo levi
prejudicio putaret esse superstitiosos et papisticos: quæritur in hoc
casu quæ sit obligatio? Pro Resp. dico tria: Dico_ 1. _Non posse tale
juramentum durante tali errore sine gravi peccato suscipi. Peccat enim
graviter qui contra conscientiam peccat, etsi erroneam. Judicium enim
intellectus cum sit unicuique proxima agendi regula; voluntas, si
judicium illud non sequatur, deficiens a regula sua, necesse est ut in
obliquum feratur. Tritum est illud, Qui facit contra conscientiam
ædificat ad gehennam. Sane qui jurat in id quod putat esse illicitum,
nihilominus juraturus esset, si esset revera illicitum: atque ita res
illa, ut ut alii licita, est tamen ipsi illicita: sententiam ferente
apostolo, Rom._ xiv. 14, _&c._ _Dico_ 2. _Tale juramentum non
obligare, &c._---- That is, The third case is, when a man promiseth
by oath that he will do a thing which in itself perhaps is lawful, but
he thinketh to be unlawful: as if one before these times being to be
admitted to an ecclesiastical benefice, (as they call it,) had
promised, that in public worship he would observe all the rites
commanded in the ecclesiastic laws, to wit, the surplice, the sign of
the cross at the sacred font, kneeling in the receiving of the symbols
in the holy supper, and others the like; which yet out of some light
prejudice, he thought to be superstitious and papistical. The question
is, what obligation there is in this case? For answer I say three
things: 1. I say that an oath, while such an error lasteth, cannot be
taken without grievous sin; for he grievously sinneth, who sinneth
against his conscience, although it be erroneous. For when the
judgment of the intellect is to every man the nearest rule of action,
it must be that the will is carried into obliquity, if it follow not
that judgment, as swerving from its rule. It is a common saying, He
that doth against his conscience, buildeth unto hell: verily he that
sweareth to that which he thinketh to be unlawful, would nevertheless
swear if it were indeed unlawful. And so the thing, though lawful to
another, is to him unlawful, the apostle passing the sentence, Rom.
xiv. 14, &c. 2. I say, that such an oath bindeth not, &c.---- Of the
obligation I shall speak anon;[52] but of the oath or promise, I think
the truth lieth here as followeth.
1. The question _de esse_ must first be resolved, before the question
of knowing or opinion. Either the thing is really lawful which is
doubted of, or denied, or it is not. If it be not, then it is a sin to
swear or promise to it; and here there is no case of error. But if it
be really lawful, and the vowing of it lawful, then the obligations
that lie upon this man are these, and in this order: (1.) To have a
humble suspicion of his own understanding. (2.) To search, and learn,
and use all means to discern it to be what it is. (3.) In the use of
these means to acknowledge the truth. (4.) And then to promise and
obey accordingly. Now this being his duty, and the order of his duty,
you cannot say that he is not obliged to any one part of it, though he
be obliged to do it all in this order, and therefore not to do the
last first, without the former: for though you question an hundred
times, What shall he do as long as he cannot see the truth? the law of
God is still the same; and his error doth not disoblige him: _Nemini
debetur commodum ex sua culpa_. So many of these acts as he omitteth,
so much he sinneth. It is his sin if he obey not the magistrate; and
it is his sin that he misjudgeth of the thing; and his sin that he
doth not follow the use of the means till he be informed. So that his
erring conscience entangleth him in a necessity of sinning; but
disobligeth him not at all from his obedience. 2. But yet this is
certain, that in such a case, he that will swear because man biddeth
him, when he taketh it to be false, is a perjured, profane despiser of
God; but he that forbeareth to swear for fear of sinning against God,
is guilty only of a pardonable, involuntary weakness.
_Direct._ XIV. Take heed lest the secret prevalency of carnal ends or
interest, and of fleshly wisdom, do bias your judgment, and make you
stretch your consciences to take those vows or promises, which
otherwise you would judge unlawful, and refuse. Never good cometh by
following the reasonings and interest of the flesh, even in smaller
matters; much less in cases of such great importance. Men think it
fitteth them at the present, and doth the business which they feel
most urgent; but it payeth them home with troubles and perplexities
at the last: it is but like a draught of cold water in a fever. You
have some present char to do, or some strait to pass through, in which
you think that such an oath, or promise, or profession would much
accommodate you; and therefore you venture on it, perhaps to your
perdition. It is a foolish course to cure the parts (yea, the more
ignoble parts) with the neglect and detriment of the whole: it is but
like those that cure the itch by anointing themselves with
quicksilver; which doth the char for them, and sendeth them after to
their graves, or casteth them into some far worse disease. Remember
how deceitful a thing the heart is, and how subtly such poison of
carnal ends will insinuate itself. Oh how many thousands hath this
undone! that before they are aware, have their wills first charmed and
inclined to the forbidden thing, and fain would have it to be lawful;
and then have brought themselves to believe it lawful, and so to
commit the sin; and next to defend it, and next to become the
champions of Satan, to fight his battles, and vilify and abuse them,
that by holy wisdom and tenderness have kept themselves from the
deceit.
_Tit. 2. Directions against Perjury and Perfidiousness: Land for
keeping Vows and Oaths._
_Direct._ I. Be sure that you have just apprehension of the greatness
of the sin of perjury.[53] Were it seen of men in its proper shape, it
would more affright them from it than a sight of the devil himself
would do. I shall show it you in part in these particulars.
[Sidenote: The heinousness of perjury.]
1. It containeth a lie, and hath all the malignity in it which I
before showed to be in lying, with much more. 2. Perjury is a denial
or contempt of God. He that appealeth to his judgment by an oath, and
doth this in falsehood,[54] doth show that either he believeth not
that there is a God,[55] or that he believeth not that he is the
righteous Governor of the world, who will justly determine all the
causes that belong to his tribunal. The perjured person doth as it
were bid defiance to God, and setteth him at nought, as one that is
not able to be avenged on him. 3. Perjury is a calling for the
vengeance of God against yourselves. You invite God to plague you, as
if you bid him do his worst: you appeal to him for judgment in your
guilt, and you shall find that he will not hold you guiltless.
Imprecations against yourselves are implied in your oaths: he that
sweareth doth say in effect, Let God judge and punish me as a perjured
wretch, if I speak not the truth. And it is a dreadful thing to fall
into the hands of the living God, for vengeance is his and he will
recompence, Heb. x. 30, 31: and when he judgeth the wicked, "he is a
consuming fire," Heb. xii. 29. 4. Perjury and perfidiousness are sins
that leave the conscience no ease of an extenuation or excuse; but it
is so heinous a villany, that it is the seed of self-tormenting
desperation. Some sins conscience can make shift a while to hide, by
saying, It is a controversy; and, Many wise men are of another mind;
but perjury is a sin which heathens and infidels bear as free a
testimony against (in their way) as christians do. Some sins are
shifted off by saying, They are little ones. But[56] christians and
heathens are agreed that perjury is a sin almost as great as the devil
can teach his servants to commit. Saith Plutarch,[57] He that
deceiveth his enemy by an oath, doth confess thereby, that he feareth
his enemy, and despiseth God. Saith Cicero, The penalty of perjury is
destruction from God, and shame from man. Saith Q. Curtius,
Perfidiousness is a crime which no merits can mitigate. Read Cicero de
Offic. lib. iii. Saith Aristotle, He that will extenuate an oath, must
say, that those villanous wretches that think God seeth not, do think
also to go away with their perjury unpunished. In a word, the heathens
commonly take the revenge of perjury to belong in so special a manner
to the gods, that they conclude that man, and usually his posterity,
to be destinated to ruin, that is perjured and perfidious: insomuch
that it is written[58] of Agesilaus and many others, that when their
enemies were perjured, and broke their covenants, they took it for a
sign of victory, and the best prognostic of their success against
them. Plutarch recordeth this story of Clemens, that having made a
truce for seven days with the Argives, he set upon them, and killed
and took many of them in the night; and when he was charged with
perfidiousness, answered, I made not a truce with them for seven
nights, but for seven days. But the women fetched arms out of the
temples of the gods, and repulsed him with shame, and he ran mad, and
with his sword did mangle his own body, and died in a most hideous
manner. When conscience is awakened to see such a sin as perjury, no
wonder if such run mad, or hang themselves; as perfidious Ahithophel
and Judas did. No doubt but everlasting horror and desperation will be
the end of such, if true conversion do not prevent it. 5. It is a sin
that ruineth families and societies,[59] like fire that being kindled
in the thatch, never stoppeth till it have consumed all the house.
Though "the curse of the Lord is in the house of the wicked, but he
blesseth the habitation of the just," Prov. iii. 33; yet among all the
wicked, there are few so commonly marked out with their families to
shame and ruin, as the perjured. Whatever nation is stigmatized with a
_fides Punica vel Græca_, with the brand of perjury, it is not only
their greatest infamy, but, like "Lord, have mercy on us" written on
your doors, a sign of a destroying plague within.[60] Saith Silius,
Non illi domus aut conjux aut vita manebit
Unquam expers luctus, lachrymæque: aget æquore semper
Ac tellure premens; aget ægrum nocte dieque;
Despecta ac violata fides--
Saith Claudian,
In prolem dilatarunt perjuria patris,
Et pœnam merito filius ore luit.--
So Tibullus,
Ah miser: et siquis primo perjuria celat,
Sera tamen tacitus pœna venit pedibus.
Saith Pausanias, The fraud that is committed by perjury, falleth upon
posterity. 6. Perjury and perfidiousness are virtually treason,
rebellion, and murder against kings and magistrates, and no more to
be favoured in a kingdom, by a king that loveth his life and safety,
than the plague in a city, or poison to the body. _Tristissimum et
domesticum regibus omnibus pharmacum, liberorum, amicorum et exercitus
perfidia_, saith Appian. What security have princes of their crowns,
or lives, where oaths and covenants seem not obligatory? There is then
nothing left but fear of punishment to restrain the violence of any
one that would do them mischief; and craft or strength will easily
break the bonds of fear. He that would dissolve the bond of oaths, and
teach men to make light of perjury, is no more to be endured in a
kingdom, than he that openly inviteth the subjects to kill their king,
or rise up in rebellion against him. If he that breaketh the least of
God's commands, and teacheth men so to do, shall be called least in
the kingdom of God, Matt. v. 19, then surely he that breaketh the
great commands by the most odious sin of perjury, and teacheth men so
to do, should neither be great, nor any thing, in the kingdoms of men.
7. Perjury is the poison of all societies, and of friendship, and of
human converse, and turneth all into a state of enmity, or hostility,
and teacheth all men to live together like foes. He that is not to be
believed when he sweareth, is never to be believed: and when oaths and
covenants signify nothing, and no man can believe another, what are
they but as so many foes to one another? How can there be any
relations of governors and subjects? of husband and wife? of master
and servants? or how can there be any trading or commerce, when there
is no trust? Perjury dissolveth all societies by loosening all the
bonds of association. Well might Dionys. Halic. lib. iii. say, The
perfidious are far worse than open enemies, and worthy of far greater
punishment. For a man may more easily avoid the ambushments of foes,
and repel their assaults, than escape the perfidiousness of seeming
friends. Saith Val. Max. lib. ix. c. 6, Perfidiousness is a hidden and
insnaring mischief; whose effectual force is in lying and deceiving:
its fruit consisteth in some horrid villany; which is ripe and sure
when it hath compassed cruelty with wicked hands; bringing as great
mischief to mankind, as fidelity bringeth good and safety. He that
teacheth the doctrine of perjury and perfidiousness, doth bid every
man shift for himself, and trust no more his friend or neighbour, but
all take heed of one another, as so many serpents or wild beasts.
Lions and bears may better be suffered to live loose among men, than
those that teach men to make light of oaths. 8. Thus also it
destroyeth personal love, and teacheth all men to be haters of each
other: for it can be no better when men become such hateful creatures
to each other, as not at all to be credited or sociably conversed
with. 9. Perjury and perfidiousness do proclaim men deplorate; and
stigmatize them with this character, that they are persons that will
stick at the committing of no kind of villany in the world, further
than their fleshly interest hindereth them. No charity bindeth a man
to think that he will make conscience of murder, rebellion, deceit,
adultery, or any imaginable wickedness, who maketh no conscience of
perjury and perfidiousness. Such a person alloweth you to judge that
if the temptation serve, he will do any thing that the devil bids
him: and that he is virtually a compound of all iniquity, and
prepared for every evil work. 10. Lastly, as perjury doth thus
dissolve societies, and turn mankind into enmity with each other, so
it would make the misery uncurable, by making even penitents
incredible. Who will believe him, even while he professeth to repent,
that hath showed that when he sweareth he is not to be believed? He
that dare forswear himself, dare lie when he pretendeth repentance for
his perjury. It must be some deeds that are more credible than words
and oaths, that must recover the credit of such a man's professions.
If perjury have violated any relations, it leaveth the breach almost
uncurable, because no professions of repentance or future fidelity can
be trusted. Thus I have partly showed you the malignity of perjury and
covenant-breaking.
_Direct._ II. Be sure that you make no vow or covenant which God hath
forbidden you to keep. It is rash vowing and swearing which is the
common cause of perjury. You should, at the making of your vow, have
seen into the bottom of it, and foreseen all the evils that might
follow it, and the temptations which were like to draw you into
perjury. He is virtually perjured as soon as he hath sworn, who
sweareth to do that which he must not do; the preventive means are
here the best.
_Direct._ III. Be sure you take no oath or vow which you are not
sincerely resolved to perform.[61] They that swear or vow with a
secret reserve, that rather than they will be ruined by keeping it,
they will break it, are habitually and reputatively perjured persons,
even before they break it; besides that, they show a base,
hypocritical, profligate conscience, that can deliberately commit so
great a sin.
_Direct._ IV. See that all fleshly, worldly interest be fully subdued
to the interest of your souls, and to the will of God. He that at the
heart sets more by his body than his soul, and loveth his worldly
prosperity above God, will lie, or swear, or forswear, or do any thing
to save that carnal interest which he most valueth. He that is carnal
and worldly at the heart, is false at the heart; the religion of such
a hypocrite will give place to his temporal safety or commodity, and
will carry him no further than the way is fair. It is no wonder that a
proud man, or a worldling, will renounce both God and his true
felicity for the world, seeing indeed he taketh it for his god and his
felicity; even as a believer will renounce the world for God.[62]
_Direct._ V. Beware of inordinate fear of man, and of a distrustful
withdrawing of your heart from God. Else you will be carried to comply
with the will of man before the will of God, and to avoid the wrath of
man before the wrath of God. Read and fear that heavy curse, Jer.
xvii. 5, 6. God is unchangeable, and hath commanded you so far to
imitate him, as "If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an oath to
bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word; he shall do
according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth," Numb. xxx. 2. But
man is mutable, and so is his interest and his affairs; and therefore
if you are the servants of men, you must swear one year, and forswear
it, or swear the contrary, the next: when their interest requireth it,
you must not be thought worthy to live among men, if you will not
promise or swear as they command you; and when their interest
altereth and requireth the contrary, you must hold all those bonds to
be but straws, and break them for their ends.
_Direct._ VI. Be sure that you lose not the fear of God, and the
tenderness of your consciences. When these are lost, your
understanding, and sense, and life are lost; and you will not stick at
the greatest wickedness; nor know when you have done it, what you did.
If faith see not God continually present, and foresee not the great
approaching day, perjury or any villany will seem tolerable, for
worldly ends: for when you look but to men's present case, you will
see that "the righteous and the wise, and their works, are in the
hands of God; no man knoweth love or hatred by all that is before
them. All things come alike to all; there is one event to the
righteous, and to the wicked; to the good, and to the clean, and to
the unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not:
as is the good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth, as he that
feareth an oath," Eccles. ix. 1, 2. But in the end, men "shall discern
between the righteous and the wicked," Mal. iii. 18. Therefore it is
the believing foresight of the end, that by preserving the fear of God
and tenderness of conscience, must save you from this, and all other
heinous sin.
_Direct._ VII. Be not bold and rash about such dreadful things as
vows. Run not as fearlessly upon them as if you were but going to your
dinner; the wrath of God is not to be jested with. _Usque ad aras_,
was the bounds even of a heathen's kindness to his friend. Meddle with
oaths with the greatest fear, and caution, and circumspection. It is
terrible here to find that you were mistaken, through any temerity, or
negligence, or secret seduction of a carnal interest.
_Direct._ VIII. Especially be very fearful of owning any public
doctrine, or doing any public act, which tendeth to harden others in
their perjury, or to encourage multitudes to commit the sin.[63] To be
forsworn yourselves is a dreadful case; but to teach whole nations or
churches to forswear themselves, or to plead for it, or justify it as
a lawful thing, is much more dreadful. And though you teach not or own
not perjury under the name of perjury, yet if first you will make
plain perjury to seem no perjury, that so you may justify it, it is
still a most inhuman, horrid act. God knoweth I insult not over the
papists, with a delight to make any christians odious! but with grief
I remember how lamentably they have abused our holy profession, while
not only their great doctors, but their approved general council at
the Lateran under Pope Innocent the Third, in the third canon hath
decreed that the pope may depose temporal lords from their dominions,
and give them unto others, and discharge their vassals from their
allegiance and fidelity, if they be heretics, or will not exterminate
heretics (even such as the holy men there condemned were, in the
pope's account). To declare to many christian nations, that it is
lawful to break their oaths and promises to their lawful lords and
rulers, or their vows to God, and to undertake, by defending or owning
this, to justify all those nations that shall be guilty of this
perjury and perfidiousness, oh what a horrid crime is this! what a
shame even unto human nature! and how great a wrong to the christian
name!
_Direct._ IX. Understand and remember these following rules, to
acquaint you how far a vow is obligatory: which I shall give you for
the most part out of Dr. Sanderson, because his decisions of these
cases are now of best esteem.
_Rule_ I. The general rule laid down Numb. xxx. 2, 3, doth make a vow,
as such, to be obligatory, though the party should have a secret
equivocation or intent, that though he speak the words to deceive
another, yet he will not oblige himself. Such a reserve not to oblige
himself hindereth not the obligation, but proveth him a perfidious
hypocrite. Dr. Sanderson, p. 23, _Juramentum omne ex sua natura est
obligatorium: ita ut si quis juret non intendens se obligare,
nihilominus tamen suscipiendo juramentum ipso facto obligetur_: that
is, If he so far understand what he doth, as that his words may bear
the definition of an oath or vow; otherwise if he speak the words of
an oath in a strange language, thinking they signify something else,
or if he speak in his sleep, or deliration, or distraction, it is no
oath, and so not obligatory.
_Rule_ II. Those conditions are to be taken as intended in all oaths,
(whether expressed or no,) which the very nature of the thing doth
necessarily imply[64] (unless any be so brutish as to express the
contrary). And these are all reducible to two heads: 1. A natural,
and, 2. A moral impossibility. 1. Whoever sweareth to do any thing, or
give any thing, is supposed to mean, If I live; and if I be not
disabled in my body, faculties, estate; if God make it not impossible
to be, &c. For no man can be supposed to mean, I will do it whether
God will or not, and whether I live or not, and whether I be able or
not. 2. Whoever voweth or sweareth to do any thing, must be understood
to mean it, If no change of providence make it a sin; or if I find
not, contrary to my present supposition, that God forbiddeth it. For
no man that is a christian is to be supposed to mean when he voweth, I
will do this, though God forbid it, or though it prove to be a sin;
especially when men therefore vow it, because they take it to be a
duty. Now as that which is sinful is morally impossible, so there are
divers ways by which a thing may appear or become sinful to us. (1.)
When we find it forbidden directly in the word of God, which at first
we understood not. (2.) When the change of things doth make that a
sin, which before was a duty; of which may be given an hundred
instances; as when the change of a man's estate, of his opportunities,
of his liberty, of his parts and abilities, of objects, of customs, of
the laws of civil governors, doth change the very matter of his duty.
_Quest._ But will every change disoblige us? If not, what change must
it be? seeing casuists use to put it as a condition in general, _rebus
sic stantibus_. _Answ._ No: it is not every change of things that
disobligeth us from the bonds of a vow. For then vows were of no
considerable signification. But, 1. If the very matter that was vowed,
or about which the vow was, do cease, _cessante materia, cessat
obligatio_:[65] as if I promise to teach a pupil, I am disobliged when
he is dead. If I promise to pay so much money in gold, and the king
should forbid gold and change his coin, I am not obliged to it. 2.
_Cessante termino vel correlato, cessat obligatio_: If the party die
to whom I am bound, my personal obligation ceaseth. And so the
conjugal bond ceaseth at death, and civil bonds by civil death. 3.
_Cessante fine, cessat obligatio_: If the use and end wholly cease, my
obligation, which was only to that use and end, ceaseth. As if a
physician promise to give physic for nothing for the cure of the
plague, to all the poor of the city; when the plague ceaseth, his end,
and so his obligation, ceaseth. 4. _Cessante persona naturali relata,
cessat obligatio personalis_: When the natural person dieth, the
obligation ceaseth. I cannot be obliged to do that when I am dead,
which is proper to the living. The subject of the obligation ceasing,
the accidents must cease. 5. _Cessante relatione vel persona civili,
cessat obligatio talis, qua talis_: The obligation which lay on a
person in any relation merely as such, doth cease when that relation
ceaseth. A king is not bound to govern or protect his subjects if they
traitorously depose him, or if he cast them off, and take another
kingdom (as when Henry III. of France left the kingdom of Poland): nor
are subjects bound to allegiance and obedience to him that is not
indeed their king. A judge, or justice, or constable, or tutor, is no
longer bound by his oath to do the offices of these relations, than he
continueth in the relation. A divorced wife is not bound by her
conjugal vow to her husband as before, nor masters and servants, when
their relations cease; nor a soldier to his general by his military
sacrament, when the army is disbanded, or he is cashiered or
dismissed.
_Rule_ III. No vows or promises of our own can dissolve the obligation
laid upon us by the law of God. For we have no co-ordinate, much less
superior authority over ourselves; our self-obligations are but for
the furthering of our obedience.
_Rule_ IV. Therefore no vows can disoblige a man from any present
duty, nor justify him in the committing of any sin. Vows are to engage
us to God, and not against him: if the matter which we vow be evil, it
is a sin to vow it, and a sin to do it upon pretence of a vow. Sin is
no acceptable sacrifice to God.
_Rule_ V. If I vow that I will do some duty better, I am not thereby
disobliged from doing it at all, when I am disabled from doing it
better.[66] Suppose a magistrate, seeing much amiss in church and
commonwealth, doth vow a reformation, and vow against the abuses which
he findeth; if now the people's obstinacy and rebellion disable him to
perform that vow, it doth not follow that he must lay down his
sceptre, and cease to govern them at all, because he cannot do it as
he ought, if he were free. So if the pastors of any church do vow the
reformation of church abuses, in their places, if they be hindered by
their rulers, or by the people, it doth not follow that they must lay
down their callings, and not worship God publicly at all, because they
cannot do it as they would, and ought if they were free; as long as
they may worship him without committing any sin. God's first
obligation on me is to worship him, and the second for the manner, to
do it as near his order as I can: now if I cannot avoid the
imperfections of worship, though I vowed it, I must not therefore
avoid the worship itself (as long as corruptions destroy not the very
nature of it, and I am put myself upon no actual sin). For I was bound
to worship God before my vows, and in order of nature before my
obligation _de modo_: and my vow was made with an implied condition,
that the thing were possible and lawful: and when that ceaseth to be
possible or lawful which I vowed, I must, nevertheless, do that which
still remaineth possible and lawful. To give over God's solemn worship
with the church, is no reformation. To prefer no worship before
imperfect worship, is a greater deformation and corruption, than to
prefer imperfect worship before that which is more perfect. And to
prefer a worship imperfect in the manner, before no church worship at
all, is a greater reformation than to prefer a more perfect manner of
worship before a more imperfect and defective. To worship God decently
and in order, supposeth that he must be worshipped; and he that doth
not worship at all, doth not worship him decently. If a physician vow
that he will administer a certain effectual antidote to all his
patients that have the plague, and that he will not administer a
certain less effectual preparation, which some apothecaries, through
covetousness or carelessness, had brought into common use, to the
injury of the sick; his vow is to be interpreted with these
exceptions: I will do it if I can, without dishonesty or a greater
mischief: I will not administer the sophisticated antidote when I can
have better: I vow this for my patients' benefit, and not for their
destruction. Therefore if the sophisticated antidote is much better
than none, and may save men's lives, and the patients grow wilful and
will take no other, or authority forbid the use of any other, the
physician is neither bound to forsake his calling rather than use it,
nor to neglect the life of his patients (if their lives indeed lie
upon his care, and they may not be in some good hopes without him, and
the good of many require him not to neglect a few). But he must do
what he can, when he cannot do what he would, and only show that he
consenteth not to the sophistication.
_Rule_ VI. Though he that voweth a lawful thing, must be understood to
mean, if it continue possible and lawful; yet if he himself be the
culpable cause that afterwards it becometh impossible or unlawful, he
violateth his vow. He that voweth to give so much to the poor, and
after prodigally wasteth it, and hath it not to give, doth break his
vow; which he doth not if fire or thieves deprive him of it against
his will. He that voweth to preach the gospel, if he cut out his own
tongue, or culpably procure another to imprison, silence, or hinder
him, doth break his vow; which he did not if the hinderance were
involuntary and insuperable: consent doth make the impedition his own
act.
_Rule_ VII. In the taking and keeping of oaths and vows we must deal
simply and openly without equivocation and deceit.[67] Psal. xxiv.
3-5, "Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord? or who shall stand
in his holy place? He that hath clean hands, and a pure heart; who
hath not lifted up his soul unto vanity, nor sworn deceitfully. He
shall receive the blessing from the Lord, and righteousness from the
God of his salvation."
_Rule_ VIII. He that juggleth or stretcheth his conscience by
fraudulent shifts and interpretations afterwards, is as bad as he that
dissembleth in the taking of the oath. To break it by deceit, is as
bad as to take it in deceit. Psal. xv. 1, 4, "Lord, who shall abide in
thy tabernacle--he that sweareth to his own hurt and changeth not."
Saith Dr. Sanderson,[68] _Ista mihi aut non cogitare_, &c. "It seemeth
to me that the greater part of the men of these times either think
not of these things, or at least not seriously; who fear not, at large
and in express words, without going about, to swear to all that,
whatever it be, which is proposed to them by those that have power to
hurt them: yea, and they take themselves for the only wise men, and
not without some disdain deride the simplicity and needless fear of
those, that lest they hurt their consciences forsooth, do seek a knot
in a rush, and oppose the forms prescribed by those that have power to
prescribe them. And in the mean time they securely free themselves
from all crime and fear of perjury, and think they have looked well to
themselves and their consciences, if either when they swear, like
Jesuits, they can defend themselves by the help of some tacit
equivocation, or mental reservation, or subtle interpretation which is
strained and utterly alien from the words; or else after they have
sworn can find some thing to slip through, some cunning evasion, as a
wise remedy, by which they may so elude their oath, as that keeping
the words, the sense may by some sophism be eluded, and all the force
of it utterly enervated. The ancient christians knew not this
divinity, nor the sounder heathens this moral philosophy. For
otherwise saith Augustine, They are perjured, who keeping the words,
deceive the expectation of those they swear to: and otherwise saith
Cicero," &c. He goeth on to confirm it at large by argument.
_Rule_ IX. An oath is to be taken and interpreted strictly. Sanderson
saith,[69] _Juramenti obligatio est stricti juris_; that is, _non ut
excludat juris interpretationem æquitate temperatam; sed ut excludat
juris interpretationem gratia corruptam_: "not as excluding an
equitable interpretation, but as excluding an interpretation corrupted
by partiality:" that it be a just interpretation, between the extremes
of rigid, and favourable or partial; and in doubtful cases it is safer
to follow the strict, than the benign or favourable sense. It is
dangerous stretching and venturing too far in matters of so sacred a
nature, and of such great importance as vows and oaths.
_Rule_ X. In the exposition of such doubtful oaths and vows, 1. We
must specially watch against self-interest or commodity, that it
corrupt not our understandings. 2. And we must not take our oaths or
any part of them in such a sense, as a pious, prudent stander-by that
is impartial, and no whit interested in the business, cannot easily
find in the words themselves.[70]
_Rule_ XI. In doubtful cases the greatest danger must be most
carefully avoided, and the safer side preferred: but the danger of the
soul by perjury is the greatest, and therefore no bodily danger should
so carefully be avoided: and therefore an oath that in the common and
obvious sense seemeth unlawful should not be taken, unless there be
very full evidence that it hath another sense. Sand. p. 46, _Nititur
autem_, &c. This reason leaneth on that general and most useful rule,
that in doubtful cases we must follow the safer side: but it is safer
not to swear, where the words of the oath proposed, do seem according
to the common and obvious sense of the words to contain in them
something unlawful; than by a loose interpretation so to lenify them
for our own ends, that we may the more securely swear them. For it is
plain that such an oath may be refused without the peril of perjury;
but not that it can be taken without some danger or fear. The same
rule must guide us also in keeping vows.
_Rule_ XII. It is ordinarily resolved that imposed oaths must be kept
according to the sense of the imposer. See Sanders. p. 191, 192. But I
conceive that assertion must be more exactly opened and bounded. 1.
Where justice requireth that we have respect to the will or right of
the imposer, there the oath imposed must be taken in his sense; but
whether it must be kept in his sense is further to be considered. 2.
When I have done my best to understand the sense of the imposer in
taking the oath, and yet mistake it, and so take it (without fraud) in
another sense, the question then is somewhat hard, whether I must keep
it in the sense I took it in, or in his sense, which then I understood
not. If I must not keep it in my own sense, which I took it in, then
it would follow that I must keep another oath, and not that which I
took: for it is the sense that is the oath. And I never obliged myself
to any thing, but according to my own sense: and yet on the other
side, if every man may take oaths in their private sense, then oaths
will not attain their ends, nor be any security to the imposers.
In this case you must carefully distinguish between the formal
obligation of the oath or vow as such, and the obligation of justice
to my neighbour which is a consequent of my vow. And for the former I
conceive (with submission) that an oath or vow cannot bind me,
formally as such, in any sense but my own in which _bona fide_ I took
it. Because formally an oath cannot bind me which I never took: but I
never took that which I never meant, nor thought of; if you so define
an oath as to take in the sense, which is the soul of it.