1914-1915
In May, 1914, Selous went to Texel Island, on the coast of Holland,
where he took a few eggs and enjoyed watching the Ruffs, Avocets,
Godwits, Turnstones, and Spoonbills. In June and July he was making
preparations for an expedition with his friend Abel Chapman to the Sudan
and White Nile, with the object of collecting Gazelles and eventually,
if possible, the Giant Eland. The plan was to enter via Port Sudan,
shoot Ibex and Gazelles between that port and Khartoum and then go south
in January, 1915, to Lake No, where Mrs. Gray's Lechwe could be found.
Selous would then leave his friend and go to Wau for the Elands, and
afterwards to the hinterland of the Bahr-el-Ghazal and search for the
various local races of Uganda Kob found there and still imperfectly
known.[66]
Other events of greater importance, however, put an end to this proposed
trip. In August commenced the Great War, in which Selous at first had no
thought of taking part, but as a succession of adverse circumstances
multiplied, he felt that interest and responsibility in the conflict of
nations that true men of whatever rank or station must experience.
Foresight, common sense, and a knowledge of the great power of the
Central Empires soon convinced him that in order to beat them, sooner or
later we should have to enrol every fit man in the United Kingdom. He
was not a man to delay once his mind was made up. The question was only
how and where his services could be of most use. He understood "the
bush" and "bush fighting" better than most men and he resolved to try
and join the forces fighting in East Africa.
Soon he learned that it was probable that his friend Colonel Driscoll
was about to organize a force, perhaps for service in East Africa, or
even for the front in France.
Writing to Abel Chapman on August 12th, 1914, he says:--
"Before seeking enrolment in the Legion of Frontiersmen, I went
to one of the biggest Life Insurance Companies in London and was
examined by their chief medical officer, and I have got a
splendid certificate of health. After saying that he found all
my organs perfectly sound he goes on, 'his heart in particular,
considering the active life he has led, is in excellent
condition. He is also remarkably active and muscular and in my
opinion fit for service anywhere.' I may say that Colonel
Driscoll has not yet got his authority from the Government to
get his men together, though he has enrolled several thousand
and is prepared to come forward at a moment's notice. I fear
that there will be frightful delay, as I have good reason to
believe that none of our troops have yet left England and the
Government will attend to nothing until they have got all their
regular forces to the front. However, if the war goes on for any
time they will want all the men they can get, and I fully expect
that the Legion of Frontiersmen will get to the front sooner or
later, but perhaps not till the Colonial forces arrive in
England."
Writing on August 14th, 1914, he says:--
"I believe this war will be a terrific business, and that we
shall have to send something like a million of men out of the
country before it is over, so that sooner or later I think I
shall get into the fighting line. Freddy will not be old enough
to volunteer until April 21st next, when he will be seventeen,
and I fully expect that he will be wanted. _If I should be
eliminated it would not matter a bit as I have had my day_, but
it would be a pity if so promising a boy got scuppered at the
outset of his life."
All this time he was fretting at official delays, for writing to
Chapman, September 22nd, 1914, he betrays his impatience.
"It passes my understanding why the War Office will not give the
order to Colonel Driscoll to take some of his men, who are all
well disciplined and can shoot, to the front at once.... I am
afraid that Lord Kitchener has no intention of employing
anything in this war but regular troops.... Driscoll offered to
take 1000 men to British East Africa to invade and take German
East Africa,[67] but this offer was also refused."
In October, Colonel Driscoll thought there was no chance of
being employed. "I personally," writes Selous to Chapman,
October 23rd, 1914, "do not think he will ever be employed at
all, so I determined to make an application direct to the War
Office for service at the front with the Army Service Corps, or
as an interpreter, or for any kind of work in which a good
knowledge of French and some German might be useful. I got two
letters of introduction to two members of Parliament who are
working at the War Office and was sympathetically received by
them. I took my health certificate with me. My application for
service was submitted straight to Lord Kitchener, and I have got
his reply from H. J. Tennant, M.P.: 'I spoke to Lord Kitchener
to-day about you and he thought that _your age was prohibitive
against your employment_ here or at the seat of war in Europe.'
Well, I suppose that is the end of it, for I put no faith in
Driscoll's belief that sooner or later his services will be
required, so I suppose that neither you nor I will be allowed to
serve our country in this war. We are looked upon as useless old
buffers."
In November, 1914, he was doing special constable at Pirbright
and was rather depressed that he could get nothing better to do,
and that his boy Freddy would soon have to go into training as a
soldier. He hoped his son would be able to join the Egyptian
Army and have "a good time in the Sudan or the King's African
Rifles. As I can do nothing that really matters, I often feel
that I should like to go right away--say to the Belgian
Congo--hunting and collecting for a year. But until the war is
over, or nearly over, I am afraid I shall not be able to leave
here, as besides being enrolled myself as a special constable, I
have now undertaken to do a lot of work under the 'Defence of
the Realm' Act. I feel it is all unnecessary fuss and bother, as
even if a raid could be made on the East coast of England, no
invasion could take place south of the Thames until the French
are conquered and crushed, and the Germans take possession of
all the Channel ports opposite our south-eastern shores, and
further until our Navy has lost command of the seas. Personally
I don't believe that either of these disasters can ever happen,
so I must do what the Government requires. Anyhow I feel that it
is a waste of energy." (Letter to Chapman, November 11th, 1914.)
In February, 1915, he still had hopes of going to East Africa with
Colonel Driscoll's force, and speaks of the difficulties he had
encountered in obtaining his commission in a letter to my wife.
(February 18th, 1915.)
"I know absolutely nothing about the 'Legion of Frontiersmen' as
far as service is concerned, but Colonel Driscoll has always
promised me that if he was sent abroad, he would take me with
him as 'Intelligence Officer.' After last September, when he
offered to take 1000 or 2000 men to East Africa and his services
were declined by the War Office and the Colonial Office, I tried
to get a job myself with the Army Service Corps in France. I
went to the War Office and saw Mr. Tennant and said that I could
speak French, a good deal of German and make the Flemish people
understand my South African Dutch. Mr. Tennant laid my
application and my very excellent bill of health before Lord
Kitchener, who wrote me the next day simply saying that 'my age
was prohibitive against giving me any employment either here or
at the seat of war in Europe.' After that I gave up all hope of
being able to do anything and settled down as leader of the
special constables of Pirbright, and also did work for the
'Defence of the Realm' Act. In December, however, I got a letter
from Colonel Driscoll saying, 'If I am ordered out--as is very
probable--to East Africa, will you come with me?' I wired at
once to say I would be ready at very short notice, and went to
see him. I found that the War Office had sent for him and asked
him how long it would take him to get together 1000 men for
service in East Africa. He said that the War Office had already
got 3000 men, originally enrolled in the Legion, who when they
found that they could not be employed in a body had enlisted in
the new army. However, he undertook to get 1000 men by the end
of January, and I can vouch that he was working very hard to
accomplish this, when he got a letter from the W. O. (who had
told him to get on with the enlistment of the men) saying that
for the present his services would not be required, as they were
in communication with the Government of India as to getting more
troops for East Africa from there. Everything seemed over again,
but about three weeks ago, I got another letter from Driscoll
saying, 'Are you available for service at once?' The W. O. had
come to him again and asked _him_ to get 1000 men together by
February 10th. I have been helping him since then in getting
notices in the papers, and receiving the names of men willing to
serve in East Africa. Colonel Driscoll wanted and still wants to
take me with him as Intelligence Officer, so I went last Monday
to the War Office and saw Major Guest (who was with
Major-General Lloyd the other day when he inspected Driscoll's
men) and asked him about maps of German East Africa, and Major
Guest then told me that they were not going to give Driscoll an
Intelligence Officer. He told me that Driscoll would just have
to put down the names of his officers and submit them to the W.
O. for acceptance or rejection. As I told Major Guest, this
would mean that my name would certainly be rejected on account
of my age. I then saw Driscoll again, and found him very much
discouraged, as he said that not only had the W. O. refused to
allow either a signalling officer, a transport, or an
intelligence officer[68] on his strength, but they also wanted
to impose some men of their own choosing on him as officers,
whom he does not know, thereby obliging him to dismiss some of
his company officers, who have served with him, and whom he does
know. I think it quite possible that Driscoll may resign, but he
will not do so until he has got the men the War Office want. As
far as I am concerned I now think my chances of going to Africa
with this force are small, although Major Guest told me that
General Lloyd was in favour of letting me go. I know absolutely
nothing about the Legion of Frontiersmen in this country, nor do
I believe that there is the slightest chance of the Germans
landing any force in this country, as long as our Navy remains
in being."
On February 4th, 1915, he went to see Colonel Driscoll, who said
the War Office had stretched the age-limit in his case, that he
would take him to East Africa as Intelligence Officer. "I hope I
shall not prove too old for the job and break down," he writes.
Colonel Driscoll expected to have two or three months' training
and leave for East Africa in April. On March 7th, Mrs. Selous
went to Havre to work in the Y.M.C.A. hut there. Selous then left
for London. "It was thought that I would start for East Africa
with an advance contingent before she left for France," but he
was delayed, waiting for the whole regiment to go together.
Writing to Chapman, March 21st, 1915, he says: "I understand that
we are to start for East Africa next Saturday, or very soon
afterwards. Well, good-bye, old friend. These troublous times
will be over some day and then if we are still both alive and
have any vitality left, we must do that Nile trip."
Selous landed with his battalion at Mombasa on May 4th, 1915. Colonel R.
Meinertzhagen gives a few particulars of the strange assortment of men
comprising the force:--
"The battalion (25th Royal Fusiliers) concentrated at Kajiado
soon after landing at Mombasa, when it was inspected by General
Tighe, then Commanding in East Africa. I accompanied Tighe on
this inspection, and we formed a very high opinion of the
officers and men. They were an unpolished lot but real good
business-like men who meant fighting.
[Illustration: Mt. Kilimanjaro From The North.]
"Selous was then in front of his platoon, looking very serious
and standing strictly to attention. We recognized each other at
once and were soon deep in the question of the validity of the
Nakuru Hartebeest and the breeding of the Harlequin Duck in
Iceland. We both forgot we were on parade, much to the amusement
of Selous' platoon, who still stood rigidly to attention
throughout the discussion.
"Selous' company was indeed a mixed lot and contained men from
the French Foreign Legion, ex-Metropolitan policemen, a general
of the Honduras Army, lighthouse keepers, keepers from the Zoo,
Park Lane plutocrats, music-hall acrobats, but none the less
excellent stuff and devoted to their officers."
After some delays the regiment was sent up by the Uganda railway to the
Victoria Nyanza, where they went by steamer to attack the German forces
on the Western bank of the Great Lake at Bukoba. The following notes are
Selous' own account of these operations.
_Personal Experiences, during the Attack on and Capture of the Town
and Wireless Installation at Bukoba, on the Western side of Lake
Victoria Nyanza._
It was about midnight on June 21st, 1915, or very early on the
morning of June 22nd, that we approached an island in the bay of
Bukoba, which, as the captain of our ship no doubt knew very
well, and as we were to find out on the following day, was only
about half a mile from the town, and the fine wireless
installation close to the Lake shore. We had been going very
slowly and quietly for some time before nearing the island, and
the intention of our commander-in-chief may have been to land
his forces in the dark, without the knowledge of the Germans.
But the guard on the island were wide awake, and either heard or
saw our steamer approaching, as they immediately sent up six
blue lights, one after the other, which illuminated the whole
island, and of course, warned the Germans in Bukoba that a
hostile British force was about to attack the town. They no
doubt thought that this attack would be made in the bay itself,
under cover of the ships' guns, as we found later that all their
trenches and block-houses along the shores of the bay had been
manned. After the flashlights had gone up, and it was evident
that a surprise attack on the town was no longer possible, all
our ships retired in the darkness for some little distance, but
before daylight again approached the coast, at a point some
three miles to the north of Bukoba, from which they were hidden
by a point of land. We all stood to arms on the crowded decks at
4 a.m., and silently waited for daylight. At the first streak of
dawn, about 5.30, the disembarkation of our men (400 of the 25th
Battalion Royal Fusiliers) commenced. My Company, A, was the
first to land, a somewhat slow process, as the heavy row-boats
only travelled very slowly and our ship was further than it
looked from the shore. From within a few yards of the water's
edge to the base of a precipitous slope, some 200 yards distant,
which in places was a sheer cliff, some 300 or 400 feet high,
the ground was covered with bush and large banana-plantations,
amongst which were scattered a few large and comfortable-looking
native huts. Had the Germans only known that we were going to
attempt a landing at this spot and brought a machine-gun to the
top of the cliff, or had they even lined the top of the cliff
with riflemen, they would probably have been able to kill every
man in the closely packed boats, and sunk the latter before they
reached the shore. Luckily they did not know where we were going
to land, until too late, for once on shore, we worked our way as
quickly as possible through the banana-plantations, and gained
the top of the cliff unopposed. We were only just in time,
however, as we were soon engaged with the enemy's forces, which,
having now become aware of our intentions, were rapidly
advancing to meet us. The disembarkation of B, C, and D
Companies (100 men each) of our battalion was now proceeding
rapidly, and the advance towards the town commenced.[69]
It is impossible for me to attempt to give any general idea of
the whole engagement, which lasted for two days, and I can only
tell you some of my own experiences and impressions. We fought
in a long thin skirmishing line, which extended from the sea to
over a mile inland, and slowly and gradually pushed our
opponents back towards Bukoba. On the right of our frontiersmen
were 300 men of the Loyal North Lancashire regiment, and
somewhere--I believe near the sea-shore, though I must confess
that I never saw them--was a contingent of the King's African
Rifles--native African troops, commanded by white officers. Our
whole force was supported by four guns of an Indian Mountain
Battery (the 28th) and four machine-guns. The forces opposed to
us were undoubtedly very inferior to ours numerically, and
consisted, I think, entirely of well-trained and well-armed
native and Arab troops, commanded by German commissioned and
non-commissioned officers, and a number of German civilian
sharpshooters (men who no doubt have done a lot of big game
hunting) armed with sporting rifles, fitted with hair-triggers
and telescopic sights. With these rifles they used soft-nosed
expanding bullets.[70] They had two cannons, I do not know of
what calibre,[71] but of quite a considerable range and two
machine-guns. But in another way our opponents had a very great
advantage over us, as they had the benefit of the most splendid
cover, banana-plantations, patches of thick bush, and bits of
ground strewn with rocks, against which we had to advance in the
open. Many bullets seemed to pass very close to me, whilst
others were much too high. Several times, too, a machine-gun was
turned on my platoon, but the range was quite 2000 yards and my
men were very scattered, and the rocks and stones gave us good
cover between our advances. Presently two of our own
machine-guns came up, and searched the hill-side for the enemy's
gun, firing all along the crest of the hill. I do not know if
they actually put any of the German machine-gun contingent out
of action, but they certainly caused them to withdraw their gun.
In the course of the day I had a rather curious experience. I
was expecting to see the men of C Company on my right, when I
suddenly saw two men dressed in khaki and wearing helmets
amongst the rocks, less than 200 yards away from me on my right.
There were also two or three natives in khaki with them. I said
to Corporal Jenner, who was close to me, "Those must be two of
our men with some of the native carriers," and we stepped out
into the open. We were immediately fired on, but still I could
not bring myself to fire back at them, and thinking that they
were our own men and that seeing us suddenly, where they did not
expect any of our men to be, they had mistaken us for Germans, I
took off my helmet and waved it to them. One of them at once
removed his helmet and waved it back to me. I was just putting
on my helmet again, when the Germans--for they were
Germans--fired at me again, and then dived in amongst the rocks.
Their bullets appeared to whistle very close past me, though
they may not have been as near as they seemed. At one point a
lot of the enemy whom my platoon had gradually forced out of the
rocks had to cross the open valley below, but they were then a
long way off, and though we expended a lot of ammunition on them
I only saw one drop. We also killed one black soldier at close
quarters in the rocks, and I have his rifle, which I shall keep
as a souvenir.
About 5 o'clock our whole force advanced across the open valley
below the ridges we had taken nearly the whole day to clear. To
do this we had to get through a swamp, intersected by a small
river, which was much more than waist deep. Having negotiated
this, we then took possession of two rocks, hills from which we
drove the enemy just before it got dark. I was standing beside a
stone on the top of the first hill, when a bullet struck a small
dead stump just in front of and within a yard of me. Where the
bullet afterwards went I don't know, but it sent a large chunk
of dead wood against my chest, and another against a man just
behind me, which hit him in the groin. He evidently thought he
was hit and fell to the ground with a groan. But he was no more
hit or hurt than I was, and soon recovered his composure. We had
had a very hard day, having had nothing to eat, and not even a
cup of coffee before leaving the ship. Provisions were to have
been sent on shore for us, but if they were, we never got them.
I had a hard biscuit and a lump of cheese in my pocket, but
these were ruined in the swamp. General Stewart and his Staff
joined us in the evening, and one of his staff gave Major Webb,
Lieutenant Hargraves and myself each a small sausage. Colonel
Kitchener (Lord Kitchener's brother) was with General Stewart's
Staff, and he introduced himself to me, and was as nice as
possible. He insisted on giving me a few thin biscuits which I
shared with my two company officers. The day had been intensely
hot and muggy, but the night was clear and there was a good
moon. Colonel Driscoll wanted to go on and take the town by
storm in the night; but General Stewart thought it better to
wait until the morning. Most of our men were, I think, very much
exhausted, but I, I think, was in as good shape as any of them.
I really was not tired at all. We passed a most uncomfortable
night.[72] As soon as the dew began to fall it got very cold, so
cold that we could not sleep at all. We were wet through too up
to our chests. During the night someone set light to some native
huts in the banana-plantation below our hill, so I took
advantage of the blaze and went down there, and stripping stark
naked dried all my things before going up the hill again. Whilst
I was doing this our dead were taken past on stretchers. The
wounded had been taken on to our hospital-ship in the afternoon.
Before dawn on the morning of June 23rd, we all stood to arms
again on the top of the hills we had occupied the previous
evening, and very glad we all were when at last day broke and
the long, cold, dreary, sleepless night was past. We had nothing
to eat, and nothing to drink but the water in our
water-bottles, and again commenced the day's work on empty
stomachs. Soon after daybreak, our signaller brought a message
to Colonel Driscoll from General Stewart, telling him to send an
officer and twenty men through the bush and banana-plantations
below the hill, in order to find out the line taken by the road
(which we could plainly see passing below our hill and entering
the plantations) through the swamps which lay between us and the
town of Bukoba, and then to approach as near the town as
possible in order to ascertain what forces were defending it.
Colonel Driscoll and Major Webb did me the honour to select me
to lead this patrol, and I lost no time in selecting twenty good
men of my own platoon to accompany me. After getting off the
hill we advanced in single file along the road, I leading, and
my men following, with intervals of about six paces between
them. We followed the road, and it was somewhat jumpy work,
passing along the edge of several banana-plantations, and
patches of bush, as they afforded such ideal cover for
sharpshooters of the type we had encountered on the previous
day. However, there were none there, and we presently emerged on
to an open plain covered with grass about two or two and a half
feet high, and saw the road running through it straight in to
the town. All along the road were posts at intervals of fifty
yards or so supporting a telegraph or telephone wire which was
probably connected up with some fort from which we had compelled
the enemy to retire on the previous day.
On emerging into the open beyond the plantations at the foot of
the hill, we were perhaps twelve or fifteen hundred yards from
the wireless installation and the nearest houses. The sea-shore
was perhaps half a mile to our left, and between us and the lake
ran a reedy swamp, which we could see ran to within some 500
yards of the wireless installation and then curved to the right,
the straight road we were on going right across it over a
bridge. I now followed the road across the open ground,
searching both to right and left and straight in front for any
signs of the enemy. But we could see nothing and hear nothing,
and I began to think that possibly Bukoba had been deserted
during the night, and that I and my patrol might walk right
into it unopposed, But as we approached the bridge over the
swamp, I saw the opportunities it offered for an ambush, and so
passed the word down my line of men telling them to leave the
road, and keeping their relative positions, edge off to the
left, in the direction of the swamp. We had hardly commenced
this movement, when we were fired on from somewhere near the
bridge. "Down," I shouted, and my command was obeyed with the
utmost alacrity. The bullets whistled past us, but no one was
hit, and we then crawled through the grass to the swamp, and
then again advanced along its edge until we were within about
600 yards of the wireless installation. Along the swamp we
usually had good cover, but whenever I tried to reconnoitre and
raised myself above the grass to get a good look round I was
fired on, I could not tell exactly from where. Two or three
times a machine-gun was turned on us, but except when trying to
reconnoitre we were pretty safe, and the bullets really whizzed
over us. I expected that our whole battalion would have received
orders to advance on the town shortly after my patrol had shown
that there were no enemy forces on this side of where the road
crossed the swamp. But before this happened the enemy's gun
positions were shelled both by the Indian Mounted Battery on the
hill, and by the guns on our ships, which were now closing in on
the Bay of Bukoba. The Germans returned the fire of the Mountain
Battery most pluckily with two guns mounted on the hill behind
the town, but did not reply to the fire of the ships' guns. This
artillery duel had gone on for some time when about 9 o'clock a
terrific storm burst over the area of the fighting, accompanied
by torrential rain and partial darkness. In a few minutes my men
and I, and all who were exposed to its violence, were soaked to
the skin. The rain, however, was luckily, if not exactly warm,
not cold and gave us no sense of chill.
When the storm was over, the big guns again opened fire. Several
hours had now passed since I left the hill on which our
battalion had passed the night, and I wondered why no general
advance had been made on the town. I did not think that it
would be either wise or right to advance any further with only
twenty men, as I knew there was a machine-gun in front of us,
somewhere near the wireless installation, and it was impossible
to tell what forces were still holding Bukoba and waiting to
open fire from the shelter of the houses on any men advancing
against it. So I sent one of the men with me--a South African
named Budler--and my native boy Ramazani, with a note to Colonel
Driscoll that there was a good line of advance towards Bukoba,
along the edge of the swamp where my men were lying. My men met
Colonel Driscoll and learnt from him that a general advance was
in fact then taking place. C Company soon came up and took up
their position a little beyond me along the reed-bed, and I
learnt that Major Webb with the rest of A Company was advancing
on our right, and then B and D Companies were still further to
the right. The Adjutant, Captain White, then came along and
thought that some of us ought to cross to the further side of
the swamp. This was at once done by the men of C Company, some
of my men with myself as their leader, and Captain White
himself. The stream in the middle of the swamp was quite deep
and we all got wet up to our breasts. Just before we crossed the
swamp Lieutenant Miles of the King's African Rifles came up with
a machine-gun, with which he opened fire on one of the houses
near the wireless installation, from which we thought that a
German machine-gun had been firing at us. This proved to be
right, but unfortunately the German gun got the range of our gun
first, and when three of his men had been wounded, one very
severely, Lieutenant Miles had to withdraw his gun into the
shelter of the hollow formed by the reed-bed. German
sharpshooters, firing from we could not tell exactly where, were
now sending some bullets disagreeably close to us as we lay flat
just beyond the swamp. These bullets, fortunately in no great
number, seemed to ping past us only a few inches above our
bodies. Presently Sergeant-Major Bottomly of C Company came
across the swamp, and lay down alongside of me, or at least
separated from me by just a yard, my black boy Ramazani lying
between us, but a little lower down, so that his head was on a
line with my hips. I just said a word to Bottomly, and then
turned my head away from him again to look in the direction from
which the bullets were coming. Almost immediately my black boy
Ramazani touched me, and said: "Master, soldier hit, dead." I
had never heard a sound, but turning my head I saw poor Bottomly
lying on his back, stone dead, with a bullet through his head. I
noticed a large signet ring on his right hand, as his arm hung
limp across his body. His head and face were nearly covered by
his helmet, but the blood was trickling down over his throat,
and I knew that he must have been shot through the brain and
killed instantaneously.
Our ships had now crept right into the Bay of Bukoba, and as
they fired on the town, or the enemy's gun positions, their
shells came screaming and whistling over us. The machine-guns
were going too with their wicked rattle, and bullets from
snipers' rifles came with an unpleasant sound, sometimes
apparently within a few inches of our bodies, which were just
then pressed as close to the ground as possible. I thought, as I
lay there only a yard away from the blood-stained corpse of poor
Sergeant-Major Bottomly, listening to the peculiar noise of each
kind of projectile as it found its invisible course through the
air above and around me, that I could recall various half-hours
of my life passed amidst much pleasanter surroundings. And yet
what a small and miserable thing this was, after all, in the way
of a battle compared with the titanic combats which have been
taking place in Europe ever since the greatest war in history
commenced last August. I can well understand how the nerves of
any man, however strong, may be shaken to pieces, by the awful
clamour of the giant shells and the concentrated fire of many
machine-guns, and countless numbers of rifles, and the terrible
havoc wrought by these fearful weapons of destruction.
As the advance of the companies of our battalion on the right
seemed to be very slow, and we did not know exactly what
opposition lay in front of us, Colonel Driscoll asked me to call
for three or four volunteers, and crawl forwards in order to
make a reconnaissance. I took four men of my own platoon who
were close to me. We had not proceeded far when a shot was fired
at us from somewhere to our right. This bullet seemed just to
skim over us. We immediately lay flat, and wriggling to the left
got shelter in a slight hollow of the ground. Along this hollow
we advanced to within some three hundred yards of the house
nearest to the wireless installation, when several shots were
fired at us, and we could also hear talking beyond the rising
ground to our left. We could see no sign of the enemy near the
wireless installation, nor anywhere down the main street of the
town, and I think that Bukoba was at that time already deserted,
except for a few sharpshooters who were covering the evacuation,
so I at once crawled back to make my report to Colonel Driscoll.
On our way we passed some of Major Leitch's men (C Company) and
on my reaching Colonel Driscoll and making my report, he asked
me to collect the rest of my own men, and then took one of the
four men with me to guide him to where Major Leitch was, as he
wanted to speak to him. Almost immediately after I had parted
from him, my man, Private Mucklow (from Worcestershire), was
shot dead alongside of Colonel Driscoll, as he had incautiously
stood up. This, I think, was almost if not absolutely the last
shot fired by the enemy, and no opposition whatever was made to
the advance upon, and occupation of the town by our battalion. I
think that both their machine-guns had been put out of action by
shells from the Indian Mounted Battery, but they were carried
away. They abandoned one of their pieces of artillery, however.
We found it with four oxen ready yoked to drag it away, but a
shell from our battery had killed one of the oxen and so in
their hurry the Germans abandoned the gun. The sappers destroyed
most completely the wonderful structure of the wireless
installation, which was something like a small Eiffel Tower, and
nearly if not quite 200 feet high, with immensely strong
concrete foundations. It must have cost a great deal of money to
construct in Germany and then convey over so many thousands of
miles of land and sea to the very heart of Africa all the
component parts of this wonderful example of material
civilization, but I suppose the destruction of this wireless
installation was the chief object of this expedition to Bukoba.
Immediately upon entering the town my company was sent on to the
hill behind it to guard against any attack, and the men of the
Loyal North Lancashire regiment presently worked round along the
ridge of the higher hills beyond, and posted pickets on all
points of vantage. I therefore did not actually witness the
destruction of the wireless installation. Neither I nor my men
had had anything to eat since the previous evening and very
little since the evening before we left the ship, but we got
some bananas in the plantations on the hillsides below us,
though only a few of them were ripe. My men, however, brought me
two fine large ones quite ripe and of a most delicious flavour.
There was a sort of arsenal on the hill we were guarding, and
this was blown up about 5 o'clock, an immense amount of
ammunition being destroyed. The houses of the German residents,
probably Government officials for the most part, were very well
and comfortably built and furnished. The arsenal in the town was
set alight and great quantities of ammunition and some dynamite
destroyed. A good deal of beer and wine and provisions of
various kinds was discovered in Bukoba, but I saw no drunkenness
amongst our men.
Just at sundown the order came from General Stewart that our
battalion was to parade and march to the jetty and re-embark at
once. But at first we had to bury our dead. A great grave was
dug in the sandy soil, between the burning arsenal and the
Governor's house, and in it were laid three deep the bodies of
six Britons, still swathed in their blood-stained clothes, who
had given their lives for King and Country, far, far away from
their native land and all who held them dear. These men had all
been killed outright, but two more who had died of their wounds
after being taken to the hospital-ship were brought ashore and
buried within sound of the murmuring waters of the great inland
lake. Altogether our casualties amounted to twenty; 8 killed and
12 wounded. The re-embarkation of our battalion took a very long
time, and it was not till 2 a.m. on the morning of June 24th
that my company, A, at last got on board. Until then we had been
sitting and lying about on the jetty in our wet clothes, without
food, fire, or warm tea or coffee.
Before midday on the 24th our flotilla started back across the
lake for Kisumu, which we reached on the evening of the 25th.
The authorities had made our men intensely uncomfortable on
board the steamer by putting a lot of mules on the crowded decks
with them. They were able to rest and get food at Kisumu, and
about six o'clock on the evening of the 26th we started by train
for Nairobi. Again the authorities packed our men like sardines
into miserable third-class carriages made for natives. They
could surely have given us two trains and so allowed our tired
men a little space to stretch themselves. We arrived at Nairobi
at 6.30 on the evening of the 27th, and were packed off again at
7 o'clock for Kajiado. One would have thought that as our men
had come out from England to fight for East Africa, and that as
we had just returned from a successful attack on an enemy's
stronghold, and as our time of arrival in Nairobi had been
telegraphed on ahead, that something might have been done by the
townspeople on behalf of our tired and hungry men; or that even
some kind of official welcome might have been accorded them. But
not a bite of food for man or officer was to be had on our
arrival at Nairobi, and not even hot water could be obtained to
make tea with.
Leaving Nairobi on the evening of June 27th, we reached our camp
at Kajiado early the following morning, and our first expedition
against the Germans was at an end.
F. C. SELOUS,
Lieutenant 25th Battalion
Royal Fusiliers.
In a letter to his friend Heatley Noble (July 26th, 1915), Selous, who
was then with his battalion guarding the Uganda railway near Voi, speaks
of the difficulties lying ahead of our people and the efforts, only
partially successful, to hold our territory against the splendidly
organized German forces.
"Since our fight at Bukoba we have made an attack on a German
post in British territory on the road from Voi to Taveta. Our
attack in this case failed, as our information seems to have
been all wrong, and the Germans were found to be more strongly
posted than had been supposed. An Indian Punjabi regiment was
badly cut up, the Colonel killed and the Adjutant wounded and
taken prisoner. The native porters, carrying ammunition and
equipment of all kinds, threw down everything and cleared as
soon as the first shots were fired, and the Germans took
possession of everything, including the dead and wounded. They
buried the Colonel with full military honours, and allowed the
Adjutant to send word that he was being well looked after. There
were several other units engaged in this affair, 500 Rhodesians,
some of the Loyal North Lancs, and three companies of the
K.A.R.; but the casualties in all these contingents were very
small, only the Indian regiment apparently having got up against
the machine-guns. Things are now at a standstill out here, and
when there will be another move it is impossible to say. Botha
had 50,000 men, and equipment of all kinds to conquer the
Germans in South-West Africa, and he did his job splendidly.
Here we have under 2000 white troops, some 2000 African blacks
and a considerable number of Indians, most of them very much
demoralized as they caught it badly at Tanga and Jasin. The
Germans are said to have 4000 or 5000 white men in G.E.A. and
nearly 20,000 very well trained black troops under German
officers.[73] They are, too, splendidly equipped in every way,
and have no end of machine-guns and ammunition. Even if we had a
large army here, we could not move it across country to the
vital points in G.E.A., as the difficulties of transport would
be insurmountable. The only way would be to take Dar-es-Salaam
and Tanga, and then advance methodically up their railways, as
Botha did in S.W. Africa. For this we should require at least
20,000 or 30,000 men, and as we are not likely to get them, in
my opinion we shall be stuck out here until peace is made in
Europe. I hope to God that will be before many months are over,
or all our young men will be killed. I hope and trust your sons
are still alive. I often think of them and of your and Mrs.
Noble's terrible anxiety. There has been a lot of
sickness--fever and dysentery--both amongst the officers and men
of this battalion, but only two deaths--two privates died of
dysentery. I think that I am the only one of our officers who
has not suffered at all from either bad diarrhoea, dysentery or
fever. I have been quite well all the time, and have never been
an hour off duty. Bukoba was rather hard, scarcely any food for
two days and nights, up to our chests in the swamps, and then
lying out in our wet clothes without fire or blanket. I did not
suffer any after-effects at all, I am glad to say, and have now
got into very good condition. The long marches do not tire me at
all, and the men now say that when I fall out no one will be
left standing in the battalion. This is, of course, nonsense,
but as far as standing fatigue, sun, thirst, etc., I think that
I am really better than most of them. Three of our officers have
been found unfit for further service, and there are some others
who are weak constitutionally, and will never be able to stand
any really hard work. So we are very short of officers, and
whether Colonel Driscoll's recommendation in my favour for good
conduct in the field is attended to or not, I shall very likely
get to be a captain before long, as I am the senior subaltern in
the battalion. I don't know my drill very well, but my men, I
hear, say they have great confidence in me, and will go anywhere
with me; but once I am through with this job, no more military
duty for me. I hate all the drill and routine-work, and I shall
be far too old to take part in any other war after this one."
In a letter to me, written from Voi (December 8th, 1915), Selous gives a
short general survey of the operations since he landed.
"MY DEAR JOHNNY,
"Your letter of October 31st reached me here three days ago, and
I was very pleased to get it and to hear all your news. It is
now more than seven months since we landed at Mombasa, on May
4th, and we have had a wearing, trying time ever since. Only one
of our officers has been killed, but there has been much
sickness both in our battalion and the Loyal North Lancs
regiment, which came here from India, and several of our men
have died from dysentery or fever, and several of our officers
have been invalided home. I think that I am the only officer who
has not been in hospital. So far I have not been ill at all and
I have never yet been a day off duty or had a day's leave. I
have never applied for leave, but if I can last out for a few
months longer, and during that time we are able to push the
Germans back over their own frontier, and are then able to force
them to give in, I want to get a couple of months' leave, and go
to Uganda, after those fine water-bucks on the Semliki river. We
were first of all on the high veldt in the game reserve on the
Magadi railway, and there the climate was very fine, but for the
last four months we have been in this comparatively low hot
country, protecting the Voi-Maktau railway, and hunting German
patrols and dynamiting parties, in the most frightful bush. I
was out in command of 30 rifles to the west of the Teita Hills
towards the Tsavo river, and tracked a German dynamiting party
for two days, and at one time was very close to them, but the
bush was simply awful and they got off (without bombing the
Uganda line) by moonlight, when we could no longer follow their
tracks. The day after I got back from this 11 days' patrol, I
was sent out again with 70 rifles and 120 porters to examine the
courses of the Mwatate and Bura rivers, and see how far they
carried water, and if there were any German patrols about. I was
out 7 days on this patrol. These patrols are not all pure joy,
as the heat of the sun is now very great, and heavy rain falls
almost every night. We can carry no tents or any kind of
protection against the weather, and we had three very bad
nights during the two patrols, lying in the soaking rain and mud
all night. Every night heavy thunder-storms break all round
about, but they are very local and we have been lucky in not
getting into the middle of more of them at nights. We often get
soaked in the daytime, but dry again as soon as the storm is
over. This bush-work is very trying, as the German black askaris
are very much better at it than heavily equipped white men, many
of whom have always lived in towns before coming out here. They
are recruited from fighting tribes--mostly Manyamwesi--and are
not only very brave, but very well armed. We have met with some
nasty knocks in this district, but have also ambushed the enemy
now and again, and inflicted heavy punishment on them. A party
of the Lancs were ambushed and badly cut up 6 miles from here
not long ago, losing 2 officers and nearly 20 men killed, and
when Lieutenant Dartnell of ours was killed,[74] the mounted
infantry to which he was attached were ambushed and suffered
severely. On the other hand, the mounted infantry with two
companies of Baluchis not long afterwards waylaid a party of the
enemy, and killed over 30 of them, and one German officer. Only
yesterday, the Boer force from the Uas n'gishu (Belfield's
Scouts) 100 men under Major Arnoldi, went out from Maktau, and
meeting a German force coming towards Maktau from their strongly
fortified position at M'buyuni, 13 miles away, attacked them,
and killed two white Germans and over 20 askaris, and took
prisoners 4 white Germans (2 wounded). The Boers had only one
casualty, which was unfortunately their leader Major Arnoldi. He
was only wounded in the shoulder, but fell from his saddle, and
his foot unfortunately catching in his stirrup had his brains
knocked out against a tree. In all the time I have been out here
I have only taken part in one incident of interest. That was the
journey up to and across the Victoria Nyanza, and the attack
on and capture of Bukoba on the western side of the lake. 400 of
our men took part in this adventure, and it was we men of the
25th Fusiliers who did everything that was done. I was then a
lieutenant in A Company, and led my platoon on the first day,
and conducted a very risky patrol of 20 men early on the second
day, and a reconnaissance later--more risky still--with four men
who volunteered for the job. We had two days' fighting, and, as
I was always in front, I had personally some very narrow
escapes. I may tell you privately, but keep it to yourself, that
Colonel Driscoll was very pleased with my conduct at Bukoba, and
told me that he had recommended me for promotion and something
more, but as I have never heard anything more about it, no
notice was taken, I suppose, of Colonel Driscoll's
recommendation. I should certainly have liked my name to have
been mentioned in despatches. However, it can't be helped, and I
may get another chance. I have got my promotion to captain, but
that came to me in the natural course of events, as a Captain
Williams was invalided home, and I was the senior subaltern. You
may possibly have heard that there have been disasters out here,
but if the whole truth about everything out here is ever known
it will be a revelation to most people. It was certainly an evil
day for British East Africa _when the Indian Government took
over the defence of this country_.[75] With the exception of the
Baluchis and the Cashmiris all the other Indian troops have
failed badly out here, and have proved very inferior to either
our own K.A.R.'s or the German native askaris. The attack on,
and capture of Bukoba by our men is the only success on any
considerable scale yet scored by the British out here. I do not
say it was much, but at any rate we carried out what we were set
to do, and captured the town of Bukoba and destroyed the very
fine wireless installation. We hear that a British general from
France is on his way out here as G.O.C., and that large numbers
of troops are coming here both from South Africa and other
parts. Something is undoubtedly in preparation, but I suppose it
will be another two months before everything is in readiness for
a big advance. And the Germans may move first, as they have four
times as many men as we have, and many more guns and
machine-guns. We are now in a camp built by the North Lancs and
some Indian troops, or rather two camps a mile apart. Sickness
has reduced our battalion to about 700 men, and of these many
are weak and ill, and I don't think we have more than 400 men
who are really strong and capable of marching 20 miles in the
hot sun, with their heavy equipment. Our whole battalion, after
having been continually split up and sent in batches all over
the country, were at last brought all together again here under
Colonel Driscoll; three companies in the one camp and one in the
smaller camp a mile away. But last week the Colonel in command
at Maktau got nervous and ordered Colonel Driscoll to send half
his battalion there. Now we are left in this very large camp
with under 200 rifles--counting all our black scouts--and all
the tailors, cobblers, barbers, commissariat and orderly-room
people. We haven't a gun of any kind, nor even a single
machine-gun, and the camp itself is in a hollow commanded by
higher ground on all sides. We have another 100 or 150 rifles in
the smaller camp a mile away. Well, news came a few days ago
that a large enemy force with several Hotchkiss guns and many
Maxims was advancing on Kisigau, from which an Indian garrison
was driven some time ago. We had another small garrison at
Kisigau of 50 K.A.R.'s. The Germans have again captured the
place after killing or wounding 40 of the garrison. The
remainder made their escape. When the G.O.C. and the other
generals at Nairobi and Voi heard of this advance on Kisigau,
they thought the Germans intended making a determined attack on
the railway line, and sent 1500 troops--Rhodesians, North Lancs,
K.A.R.'s, and Indians--down to Voi to march from Maungu to
Kisigau, leaving Maktau very short of men, though they there
have plenty of guns, a mountain battery and machine-guns, and
the place is very strongly fortified. At the new station
Mashoti, between here and Maktau, only 100 men have been left,
but they have guns and machine-guns, and are in a very well
constructed camp in a very good position. If we are attacked
here by any considerable force with guns and machine-guns we can
do nothing, and shall probably all get scuppered. We were fully
expecting an attack yesterday, last night, or this morning, as
we got a message from Maktau that a large force was approaching.
The last rumour is that 10,000 men are advancing on Maktau. At
the same time, if the Germans are going to do anything worth
while, now is their chance, before the new troops get here. They
know everything about us from their Arab and native spies. Well!
if the Germans know the state of this place and do not attack
it, they will be great fools. The whole position is farcical.
This is a very important point, as if it is taken, the water
supply to Maktau and Mashoti will be cut off, and yet we have
been left with only a few rifles and not a single gun or
machine-gun to defend an immense perimeter. Well! all we can do
is to 'wait and see,' as Mr. Asquith would say. I am afraid that
the war will go on for some time yet, and thousands more of our
men will be killed before it is over. I have two young nephews
at the Front in France now and I think a third has gone to
Serbia with the Motor Transport. My eldest son Freddy will not
be eighteen till next April, but I expect he will be sent out
soon after then, as he is big and strong for his age. If he goes
out and gets killed[76] it will break his mother's heart and
mine too, if I should live to come home, and it will be the same
for you and your wife if you lose Geoff;[77] but I pray God he
will be spared to outlive this terrible war. I suppose the
Germans cannot now possibly win the war; but can the Allies
absolutely crush them before their finances are exhausted? The
war will soon probably be costing us L6,000,000 a day instead of
L5,000,000. How long can we stand that? We seem to have made
some terrible mistakes and miscalculations, especially in the
Dardanelles and the Balkans. However, like everyone else out
here, I suppose I am despondent. Perhaps the heat down here is
depressing. This place has the reputation of being very
unhealthy in the rainy season, and I fear our men will suffer
very much during the next two months. Your naval work must be
very interesting, and you must tell me all about it, if we ever
meet again. I was very sorry to hear that poor Gerald Legge[78]
had been killed. But who is going to be left alive when this war
is over?
"Well! good-bye, old friend, and with very kind regards to Mrs.
Millais and all your family and wishing Geoff the best of good
luck, yours ever,
FRED.
"P.S.--I have not seen Judd yet. He was scouting down on the
German border for some months after the war broke out, but has
been on his farm near Nairobi for the last six months."
[Illustration: A SHOT ON THE PLAINS, BRITISH EAST AFRICA.]
The following letters from Ex-President Roosevelt in reply to letters
from Selous, describing local conditions in B.E. Africa, give some of
his views on Germany prior to the entry of America in the Great War:--
"OYSTER BAY,
"LONG ISLAND, N.Y.,
"_April 2nd_, 1915.
"MY DEAR SELOUS,
"I have received your letter of February 23rd and send this to
Nairobi. I am exceedingly glad you have gone to British East
Africa. I am sorry to say that very reluctantly I have come to
the same conclusion that you have about the purposes and conduct
of Germany. The behaviour of her armies in Belgium and in the
North of France was, I think, the inevitable result of the kind
of doctrine that has been preached by those high in authority in
Germany and which was typified by the Emperor's famous advice to
his troops in China to 'behave like Huns.' A man cannot direct
soldiers to behave like Huns and then escape responsibility for
the swinish horrors that follow. From my book you have already
seen how strongly I have spoken as to the failure of the United
States and other neutrals to do their duty when the Hague
Conventions were violated. You cannot speak any more strongly
than I have spoken.
"One genuine surprise to me was the strength that the Germans
have shown in their colonies.[79] I agree with you that the
attitude of the Boers has been one of the finest tributes
imaginable to the justice with which England has behaved in
South Africa. I have sent your letter to Kermit. It will make
him eager to be beside you under Driscoll. I most earnestly hope
that you won't be used as a transport officer. Tarlton writes me
that he was not allowed to go to the front either. I would a
good deal rather trust Tarlton and you in a fight than most of
the men who are technically entirely fit because of their youth
and physical soundness.
"I have not the heart to write to you about ordinary things
while you are in the midst of this terrible struggle. As I have
said in an article I recently wrote, I do not believe in
neutrality between right and wrong; and I am very sorry that the
United States is not in the struggle. If there were a war, my
four boys would go, although I suppose that the two younger ones
would have to go as enlisted men; and I should ask permission to
raise a division of nine regiments of the same type as the
regiment I commanded in Cuba. They were men in whom your soul
would have delighted. They were much of the stamp of the Hills
of British East Africa--by the way, if you see them give them my
warm regards, as also to Newland and any other friends you meet.
I am delighted to hear about your son.
"With hearty good wishes,
"Faithfully yours,
"THEODORE ROOSEVELT."
"_August 26th_, 1915.
"DEAR SELOUS,
"Your letter of July 11th has just come. I congratulate you with
all my heart. It is simply first-class to have you a fighting
officer in the fighting line, leading your men in the very work
that you are particularly and peculiarly fitted to do. I was
wholly unable to understand Lord Kitchener refusing you a
commission. It seemed to me to be an instance of following the
letter that kills instead of the spirit that gives life. The
Germans have used Von Hindenburg,[80] who was away over the
legal age-limit for generals; and he has been their best
general. There is undoubtedly a certain type of bureaucrat who
would have thought it more important to observe the rule by
keeping him at home than to have secured his leadership in
victory. Of course, I personally believe in universal military
service, and in the most rigorous application of military law
during a war. If I had control in East Africa--or in Great
Britain or the United States, for that matter!--I would make
every man do whatever was best for the nation, whether this
meant that he was to fight or to produce ammunition or to
produce coal, and I would treat the man who sought to make a
profit out of the war or who went on a strike so as to avoid
doing his duty in the war just as summarily as I would treat the
soldier who flinched in a fight.
"I am so pleased that MacMillan is with you and is doing so well
with the commissariat. Give him my heartiest regards. I wish to
heaven Kermit and I were with you, or at least that Kermit[81]
was with you, and that I was helping in the trenches in
Flanders, where I would be of more service.
"I send you herewith two articles I have just written in
reference to what I regard as the frightful misconduct of my own
country. The trouble is that the men at the head of our
Government are doing just exactly what the men at the head of
your Government did up to a year and a quarter ago; and they
treat the words of men like myself precisely as your men treated
Lord Roberts--I do not mean to compare myself to Lord Roberts in
this matter, but the attitude of the governmental authorities
toward him and toward me has been the same.
"That was a first-class little fight at Bukoba. If the Germans
keep sinking boats with our citizens on them, sooner or later I
cannot help thinking our citizens as a whole will themselves
insist on fighting. The professional pacifists have done this
country a damage that cannot be over-stated. If you come through
all right and if, in the event of war, I come through all right,
I shall look forward eagerly to seeing you when the war is over
and asking for more details about what you tell me concerning
the attitude of so many people in British East Africa and in
Nairobi, for I am immensely puzzled over it. Pray present my
warmest regards to MacMillan and my hearty congratulations as
well, and also present my respects and congratulations to
Colonel Driscoll."
Writing at an earlier date (December 4th, 1914), Roosevelt in his usual
vigorous style thus expresses his estimate of German policy:--
"I don't wonder that you feel a little bit concerned about the
war. Moreover, I am not certain that the theory that France and
England are to act as anvil and Russia as hammer will work out.
It looks to me as if, unit for unit, the Russians had shown a
marked inferiority to the Germans, French, and English. They
have enormous numbers and great endurance, and these may become
decisive factors in the end. I do hope that your army will
increase in numbers, however, to the point of being able to
become formidable as an offensive factor.
"I have a great admiration and respect for the Germans. I wish
to heavens that this country would wake up to the hideous
damage, moral and physical, caused by the deification of mere
industrialism, of softness and of self-indulgence. National
acceptance of the need of hard labour, of facing risk, and of
the exercise of foresight is necessary to national greatness. If
I must choose between a policy of blood and iron and one of milk
and water--especially of skimmed milk and dishwater--why I am
for the policy of blood and iron. It is better not only for the
nation, but in the end for the world. But my admiration for the
Germans does not blind me to the fact that for the last fifty
years their development along the lines of policy advocated by
Frederick the Great and Bismarck, and so enthusiastically
championed by Carlyle, has resulted in their becoming a very
grave menace to every nation with which they are brought in
contact. I immensely admire German industrial, social, and
military efficiency; but I abhor the kind of militarism which
has resulted in such cynical contempt for international morality
and such appalling ruthlessness in war. I think it folly for a
man not to admire the German efficiency; and utter weakness for
him not to realize that that efficiency may be used against his
own nation and take steps accordingly. I wish I were in the war
myself!"
The authorities at home at last resolved to take the East African
campaign into their own hands, and in January appointed General Smuts to
the command and gave him adequate forces with which to make an advance
into German East Africa. Selous' letter to me, February 25th, 1916,
brings his narrative up to date.
"MY DEAR JOHNNY,
"After a long interval we got a mail here yesterday, and it
brought me your letter of January 5th. This is the second
letter I have received from you, so I think I must have missed
one, and it may have gone down in the ill-fated 'Persia,' which
had mails for East Africa on board. I have not much news to give
you, nor much time to write it, as we are now just getting ready
for a move forward. After over five months of hard grinding work
in the very hot sun, guarding the line from Voi to near Mombasa,
and from Voi to Maktau, on the way to Taveta, and many patrols
without any kind of shelter all through the heavy rains of
December and January, we were sent up to Kajiado on the Magadi
railway, and then on here about a fortnight ago. We are now
camped just over the German border, and go on to Longido, 18
miles ahead, very shortly. You will have seen in the papers that
General Smith-Dorrien was taken ill in South Africa, and that
General Smuts has taken his place as G.O.C. out here. He will, I
think, commence the offensive against the Germans immediately,
but _if_ the Germans have the forces they are said to have, and
_if_ all their native troops remain loyal to them, we shall have
a devil of a job. I hear that General Smuts, who arrived in the
country a week ago, and has already been to Longido by
motor-car, fully realizes that this affair will be a much more
difficult business than the South-West Africa campaign. There
the Germans had no native troops, and Botha had ten men for
every man the Germans could muster. Then the country in German
S.W. Africa was much easier to work in than this dense tropical
bush, which lends itself at every yard to ambushes and is
everywhere very much in favour of the defending forces. Water is
a great difficulty here, too, and the greater part of German
East Africa between our border and the Dar-es-Salaam, Tanganyika
railway, except round Kilimanjaro and other high mountains,
seems to be very waterless. There is only one permanent water
between Kajiado and this camp, over 50 miles, and the transport
animals have to do a trek of over 30 miles without water.
However, we have this year had no dry season, for since it
commenced to rain in November, it has been raining off and on
ever since, not sufficiently to fill the water-holes, but quite
enough to make things very uncomfortable, and to keep the grass
growing, which I am afraid is all in favour of the Germans, as
it makes good cover for their ambushes everywhere. The German
officers out here seem to be very fine soldiers, and what people
do not realize, their black troops are not only as brave as any
Zulus, but splendidly led and well armed and supported with any
number of machine-guns. No better men could be found in the
whole world, and personally, in this bush-covered, overgrown,
but still hot and waterless country, I would much sooner have to
fight against Germans from the Fatherland than these
well-trained and elusive blacks. If we could only gain some
success a lot of them might desert. But all the successes have
been on their side up to now (except at Bukoba), and they must
be full of confidence. A fortnight ago, just before General
Smuts reached this country, an attack was launched against a
German position not far from Taveta, by three regiments of South
Africans, supported by a regiment of Baluchis and some
Rhodesians. The situation was only saved from complete disaster
by the Baluchis and the Rhodesians. I enclose a reference to the
affair in the Nairobi paper, but it has been very unfortunate,
and is a very bad beginning to the new campaign now opening, as
it will keep the German black troops loyal to their masters, and
fill them with renewed confidence. Smuts' generalship may prove
superior to all the difficulties he will have to contend with,
but I expect he now realizes that he is up against a much more
difficult proposition than he had expected. When we advance from
our most forward base--Longido--we are not to carry any kind of
tents or shelter from the weather, and as the heavy rains now
seem to be setting in (we are having heavy thunder-storms with
soaking rain now every day or night) we are likely to have a
very bad time, and most of us who are still fit will be sure to
go down with fever or dysentery, as the heavy rains may last all
through March, April, May, and June. Well! the future is on the
knees of the gods, and we must take the luck they send us.
Lately we have been practising attacks on positions, advancing
in bush formation under General Sheppard, an awfully nice man,
who I think will command the brigade to which we are attached. I
am now in command of A Company of the 25th Fusiliers, and in all
our manoeuvres A and B Companies have to lead the advance, so I
expect we shall have to do the same when it comes to actually
attacking any German position. When we landed at Mombasa on May
4th last our battalion was nearly 1100 strong and there were 273
men in A Company. Now we have lost more than half our officers,
and have not more than 400 men fit to march and fight. This is
the effect of the climate. In A Company we can muster about 100
fit men, and three officers (myself and two men raised from the
ranks). Well! I hope that this accursed war will be over by next
August, and I think it will, as by that time Germany will surely
be exhausted, as well as some of the Allies. By April, I see it
is stated, that the war will be costing us L6,000,000 a day. How
long can we stand that? What I cannot understand is, where are
our armies of millions of men, and all the stores of munitions
we are making and buying from America. We are said to have now
5,000,000 of men well armed and equipped, and yet we do not
appear to have more than 1,000,000 in France and Flanders, nor
more than 500,000 in Salonika and Egypt together. In Mesopotamia
and East Africa, we have only a few hundreds of British troops,
all the rest being Indians and South Africans. Well! I hope I
shall live through this show, and come home again, as I want to
see my wife again, and watch my boys' careers. I believe that
Freddy will pass out of Sandhurst this month. I was very pleased
to hear that all is so far going well with you and yours. May
your boys be spared to you and their mother whatever happens.
With very kind regards to all of you."
"OLD MOSCHI,
"ON THE SLOPES OF KILIMANJARO,
"_May 2nd_, 1916.
"MY DEAR JOHNNY,
"It is a long time now since I last heard from you, but I trust
that all is still going well with you and yours. On the day
after to-morrow we shall have been a whole solid year out here,
as we landed at Mombasa on May 4th, 1915. Of that year we have
been over six months in the low unhealthy bush-country, doing
heavy marches in the hottest hours of the day, and lying out on
patrols with no shelter or protection whatever from the weather,
all through the heavy rains of December and January last. As I
never had any fever, diarrhoea or dysentery, but was always
well, I did more of this patrol work than any other officer in
our battalion, and it meant long marches too, sometimes
following small parties of Germans trying to blow up the Uganda
railway. In common with all the other white troops serving on
foot out here, our battalion has suffered terribly from the
climate, and is now almost quite used up. The Loyal North Lancs
regiment has been out here eighteen months; but they have had
two strong drafts from home to make good their losses. However,
they have now been sent or are just about to go to Wynberg, near
Cape Town, to recruit, and from there will probably be sent
home. Four of our officers and a lot of our men have also been
sent there. The Rhodesian regiment which first came out here has
also suffered very badly from the climate, and has now been sent
to the escarpment near Nairobi to recruit. The South African
troops which have only just come out here are also suffering a
lot from fever and dysentery, and Van Deventer is said to have
lost about 1400 horses (from horse-sickness) out of the 2000 he
had six weeks ago. The condition of our battalion is simply
lamentable. When we came up from the low country at the end of
February to Kajiado (5800 feet above sea-level) Colonel Driscoll
tried to collect all his men from the various hospitals and
convalescent homes in the country. We had landed at Mombasa on
May 4th, 1915, with 1127 rifles, and we mustered at Kajiado
about 700 on February 1st, 1916; but of these many were no
longer of any use for marching in the hot sun. From Kajiado we
went to Longido, and were incorporated with Colonel Stewart's
Brigade, which had to march right round Kilimanjaro, and meet
General Smuts' much larger force at Moschi. As far as our
Brigade was concerned only 449 of the 691 who had left Kajiado
were found to be fit enough for the heavy marching in front of
us. Starting from Longido late in the morning of March 5th, we
marched 9 miles under a very hot sun to Sheep Hill. There was
there no shelter from the sun, and we passed a very unpleasant
day. We were told to rest and sleep, as we had a long
night-march of 20 miles before us. We marched all night long
except from 12 to 2 a.m., and did not get to the water until
after midday the next day, and the distance registered in
General Stewart's motor-car was 30 miles instead of 20. We had
other very long marches in the very hot sun, in choking clouds
of fine lava-dust, churned up by the heavy transport. The
Germans had prepared to dispute our advance along the main road
from Longido to New Moschi, which passes N'gara Nairobi. But
under the guidance of a Boer settler in German East Africa,
named Pretorius, we left the road soon after leaving Sheep Hill
and travelled across country to Boma N'gombi, 15 miles from New
Moschi (the railway terminus), on the road to Aruscha. The
Germans, whose main forces were trying to hold back Smuts' big
columns advancing on Taveta, apparently had not sufficient
forces to come out and attack General Stewart's column, so we
got through with nothing more than a little sniping. Arrived at
Boma N'gombi, we got into communication with General Smuts
through our wireless, and General Stewart was ordered to send a
picked force by a forced march to join up with one of his forces
at Masai Kraal, and then advance together to New Moschi. About
half of our 449 men (many of whom were now badly knocked up)
were considered fit for this advance and I led 55 men of my A
Company, the 55 fittest men of the 282 of A Company who had
stepped ashore at Mombasa less than a year before. The night we
left Boma N'gombi heavy rain came on and we marched in rain and
mud and pitch darkness for many miles along an old abandoned
waggon-road. Before daylight we joined up with some mounted
scouts, who informed us that the Germans had evacuated New
Moschi and gone off down the railway, and that South African
troops had occupied both New Moschi and Old Moschi (where I am
now writing on the slopes of Kilimanjaro and six miles by road
from New Moschi in the plain below us). The day after we got to
New Moschi, we were sent off with part of General Stewart's
Brigade, under Colonel (now Brigadier-General Sheppard) to
co-operate with the S. African forces against the Germans, who
had retired from Taveta towards the Ruwu river. A night march of
16 miles brought us to Newi Hill on the road to Taveta, and
after a march of a few miles the next afternoon we got in touch
with the E.A.M.R., and shortly afterwards a few German snipers.
We pushed them back and then entrenched as well as we could.
That night they sniped us a bit, but did no harm. The bush was
very thick all round our camp, but it was nearly full moon. We
heard the attack on one of the S.A. Brigades to our left, and
also the heavy German gun (a 4.1 naval gun from the
'Koenigsberg') firing both at this brigade and at Van Deventer's
Brigade, which had advanced down the railway line from New
Moschi to Kahi station. These brigades, I believe, ought to have
got in touch with us, but they did not do so. During March 20th
we improved our trenches and prepared for a night attack, which
in fact started at 8.45 and was kept up till 1 a.m. The black
troops, under German officers, behaved very pluckily, and time
after time answered the bugle call to advance on our camp. Our
Maxims kept them off. Fortunately they had no machine-guns with
them, and though they fired thousands of shots at our camp they
did very little damage, as almost all the bullets went pinging
over us. Soon after 1 a.m. we heard their bugle sounding the
'assemble' and they drew off. In the morning the dead just in
front of our machine-gun commanding the road were collected and
laid out in a row--like pheasants or hares after a drive--but
the bush was not searched for the rest of the dead, as we had to
push on and attack the Germans who were entrenched across the
road a few miles on ahead on the Soko river. They held us off
all day, and we had about 200 casualties, as the South African
Brigades on our right and left which were to have enveloped them
could not or did not come up. The men of our battalion (about 50
of each of our 4 companies) were in reserve, but late in the
afternoon A, C, and D Companies had to go forward to support an
Indian regiment. I was in command of my 50 men of A Company. We
really could do nothing but lie very flat, trying to dig
ourselves in with bayonets and fingers, being under the sweeping
fire of three or four machine-guns. The lie of the ground just
saved us when lying flat, and the bullets just swept over us in
bouquets. We only had 17 casualties, and only 2 men killed dead.
So far our battalion has not had much fighting, but we have gone
through much hardship, fatigue, and exposure. You will wonder
how I have stood it all at my age. But the fact remains that
from May 4th, 1915, to February 6th, 1916, I never took leave or
a day's rest, and was never a single day off duty or away from
my company. From February 6th to the 12th I had to lie up, as I
had jiggers in one of my toes, and the inflammation went to my
groin. Since then I have never been a day away from my company
again up till to-day, and have never put my leg over a horse,
but done all the marching with the men, carrying my rifle, 50 or
60 rounds of ammunition, water-bottle, glasses and haversack
with food--at least 20 lbs. altogether. But the men have usually
had to carry 150 rounds of ammunition. Still, considering that I
shall be sixty-five at the end of this year I have stuck it out
remarkably well, and am one of the very few in the battalion who
has never yet had a day's illness, for inflammation caused by
jiggers cannot be called illness. But now I am beginning to be
troubled with haemorrhoids and another trouble. I have kept this
in check out here for a whole year with astringent ointment, but
during the last month it has got much worse and it may oblige me
to come home on leave for an operation. The wet and damp of the
last month here may have had something to do with the
aggravation of my trouble.
"General Smuts was very lucky. He was just given time to carry
out his operations round Kilimanjaro and drove the Germans down
the line towards Tanga before the rain set in. We have been up
here (about 300 men, of whom 100 have been in hospital and a lot
more ill in camp, as the hospital is full) for nearly a month
and it has rained almost day and night all the time, and we
have lived in a sea of vile sticky mud. One of our officers as
near as possible died of dysentery, but he is now much better.
We--both officers and men--have had nothing but bare army
rations since leaving Longido on March 5th last. However, we are
now leaving this place, and going to M'buyuni, near Maktau, on
the Voi-Taveta Railway, as the railway is now through to New
Moschi--but from Taveta to Moschi it is very uncertain, as the
heavy rains keep washing parts of the line away. The Germans
blew up their naval 4.1 gun at the Ruwu river after firing all
the 70 rounds at our camp and the two S.A. Brigades. They put
the shells very close to our camp but did not hit it, but they
dropped one amongst Van Deventer's men and killed five or six
men and horses. After the fighting at the Soko and round Kahe on
March 20th and 21st, the Germans retired down the Tanga Railway,
and are said to be entrenching at various places. Nothing
further can be done on our side until the rains are over, as all
transport of a railway line is now almost impossible. Horses,
mules, and men are all suffering terribly from the climate, and
diseases of man and beast, and the frightful thick bush will
help the Germans very much if they intend to fight on till the
bitter end. Van Deventer has had a fresh lot of horses sent to
him, and is now near the main German Railway from Dar-es-Salaam
to Lake Tanganyika. The Belgians ought, too, soon to be
co-operating from the Congo. We have just got the terribly bad
news of General Townshend's surrender to the Turks in
Mesopotamia, and the outbreak in Ireland. My son Freddy passed
out of Sandhurst on April 6th and is, I expect, now attached to
the Royal West Surrey regiment. The Commandant at Sandhurst has
written to my wife speaking in very high terms of praise about
him; but, alas, I may never see him alive again if this accursed
war goes on much longer. And you and poor Mrs. Millais must now
be most anxious about your eldest boy too. Well! of course their
country comes first for them and for us, and we must all try and
do our duty, but it will break our wives' hearts if either of
them loses her boy, and it will take all the joy of life out of
us too. Well! I have written you an unconscionably long
letter, but it has hardly ever stopped raining now for more than
an hour or so at a time for two days and nights, and we are
enveloped in thick mist, and there is nothing to do but read and
write. The weather gets worse and worse, that is the rain gets
more incessant. Everything is saturated with moisture, and my
blankets seem quite wet when I get into them at night. It is the
constant unending wet and damp I think that gets to the men's
stomachs and bowels and gives them dysentery. The slopes of
Kilimanjaro may be a health resort in the dry season, but they
are not much of a place to live in during the heavy rains. And
the natives say that the rains will go on until the middle or
end of June. Well! once more good-bye, old fellow, and with very
kind regards to Mrs. Millais and your children, and trusting
that all is well with all of them."
[Illustration: FARU! FARU!]
"_May 4th_, 1916.
"To-day is the anniversary of our landing at Mombasa on May 4th,
1915. Since writing to you two days ago I have seen a good
doctor, as my trouble with piles is getting bad. He says I must
have an operation soon, as if I went on long hard marches now I
might get into a state which would require an immediate
operation or serious consequences to me might happen. He advises
me strongly to go home and have the operation there, as he does
not think there is a really skilful surgeon out here. In all
probability, therefore, as soon as I get to the big camp at
M'buyuni, I shall be again examined, and a board of medical men
will recommend that I shall be given three months' leave of
absence to go home and have this operation, so I may be home
almost as soon as this letter. Really it does not much matter,
as our battalion is played out, used up, and they will probably
not find more than 300 men fit for duty, and these only fit for
garrison-duty on the lines of communication. The forward
movements to the Dar-es-Salaam line will I think be carried out
by Smuts' mounted forces and his 1000 motor bicyclists and
armoured motors, as soon as the rains are over and the country
becomes possible for transport. During the rains I believe the
railway will be pushed on from New Moschi towards the main
German railway line. Well! good-bye again."
In June, 1916, after an examination by a medical board, Selous came home
to undergo an operation which was completely successful. He was only ill
for twelve days and then went to his home for a short rest. In August he
went out again with a draft to East Africa, going via the Cape.
Both at the time Selous served with them and during his short absence,
the sufferings and difficulties of our troops in this bush fighting
under tropical rains and intense heat were such as to try the nerves of
the strongest troops. Colonel Driscoll, who commanded the battalion of
Frontiersmen, gives a vivid picture ("The Weekly Dispatch," July 21st,
1918) of the sufferings endured by the men who were so unfortunate as to
be wounded.
"It's very different when you get down to the plains and the
bush. I don't think any words could describe that. A vast and
almost impenetrable forest so thick that when an aeroplane goes
up the observer sees nothing but a great green carpet below him.
And wild animals, mind you, as well as wild devils to fight; the
sun burning your very flesh; the flies intolerable.
"Imagine a camp at night under these conditions. Round and about
the lions are roaring from hunger. Hyenas prowl in the hope of
snapping up a sentry or leaping in and carrying off a wounded
man. I have known a man with a temperature of 105 Fahrenheit
stagger up in the morning and insist upon continuing the march.
It was the old spirit of my Scouts ever unquenchable.
"The natives--the old natives, as I have said--were always on
our side. What would have happened to us if they had not hated
the German like the devil I cannot tell you. But they followed
us through the bush, often for miles, brought us food and
attached themselves to us as servants, who were quite ready to
carry rifles upon occasion. This was very helpful, for sometimes
at night, when the force was absolutely without provisions, we
had to send men scouting in native villages, and they could
easily have been betrayed. Nothing would have been easier for a
treacherous native than to have sneaked out while two or three
of our men were in his hut and to have warned the nearest camp
of Askaris. It never happened. The loathing of the Blonde Beast
was too universal.
"All this sounds bad enough, but believe me, it gives you but a
poor account of what it cost us to win 'German East.'"
FOOTNOTES:
[66] The Kob of Western Bahr-el-Ghazal has whitish ears and a white area
round the eye, which is not found in the Uganda Kob. It has been named
by Dr. Heller, Vaughan's Kob, from a single specimen.
[67] As a matter of fact his proposition was a heavier one than the
authorities imagined. It took a large army, working hard over a period
of four years, before the Germans were driven out of British and German
East Africa.
[68] This was hardly the fault of the War Office, who had already
organized their local intelligence officers in East Africa.
[69] Note by Col. R. Meinertzhagen, Chief of Intelligence Department:--
"This landing was really a very fine piece of work for troops who had
had no previous experience. The Germans themselves, which we learnt
later, thought that a landing at that particular spot was an impossible
operation, and therefore failed to guard against it. The rapidity with
which the Fusiliers got ashore and up a steep bush-clad escarpment gave
the enemy no time to meet it. This initial success, which was intended
as a covering movement for the main landing, was largely responsible for
the capture of Bukoba."
[70] In two authenticated cases a .600 Rigby cordite rifle and a Holland
.375 were used in each case with sporting ammunition.
[71] 75 millimetres or 3 inch (R. Meinertzhagen).
[72] "I slept under a rock near Selous that night. He was full of
enthusiasm, and we discussed 'birds' till far into the night, getting
drenched through with the dew and badly bitten by mosquitoes" (R.
Meinertzhagen).
[73] On the best authority the Germans had 2500 white troops and 4200
askaris at the beginning of the War. During the War they raised their
black troops and police to from 12,000 to 18,000.
[74] "Dartnell was awarded the V.C. posthumously for gallantry, when
wounded preferring to stop behind with his men, when he could have been
evacuated. The enemy on returning to the scene of the fight where
Dartnell had been left with the wounded, commenced to kill them, and
Dartnell fought to the last, trying to protect his men." (R.
Meinertzhagen, Col.).
[75] The Indian Government were not to blame. They had sent all their
best troops to France and had to keep large reserves in India for
possible contingencies, so that the troops they sent to East Africa were
not of the best quality.
[76] Capt. Freddy Selous, M.C., R.A.F.C., killed in action, January 4th,
1918.
[77] Capt. G. de C. Millais, Bedfordshire Regiment, killed in action,
August 22nd, 1918.
[78] Capt. the Hon. Gerald Legge, second son of the Earl of Dartmouth,
killed in action in Gallipoli, August, 1915; an excellent naturalist and
a great friend of ours.
[79] "The German strength was not so much (at any rate in East Africa)
their numbers, but their efficiency, and the fact that they were
prepared and we were not. They also scored heavily by being able to
draft into their black ranks ten per cent of trained white soldiers who
were settlers and business men in peace time. We had no such asset.
Moreover, the German superiority of machine-guns, 2 to every 100 men,
outweighed our 2 to 800 men!" (R. Meinertzhagen, Col.)
[80] "Hindenburg has been a mere figure-head and idol of the people.
Ludendorff is the brain of the German Army and real conducting head" (R.
Meinertzhagen, Col.).
[81] In 1917, Kermit Roosevelt joined our forces in Mesopotamia. Since
this date Roosevelt's three other sons have joined the American troops,
and two have distinguished themselves as soldiers. Lieut. Quentin
Roosevelt was killed in action in France in July, 1918.