TALES OF THE CONFEDERATE CRUISERS
THE MOST INSTRUCTIVE CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES--WORK ACCOMPLISHED BY AN ENERGETIC SEAMAN IN A SHIP HIS
BROTHER OFFICERS CONDEMNED--BRILLIANT WORK OF THE _FLORIDA_
UNDER JOHN NEWLAND MAFFIT--BAD MARKSMANSHIP AND A WORSE LOOKOUT
OFF MOBILE--A CASE OF VIOLATED NEUTRALITY--SEMMES AND THE
_ALABAMA_--THE BATTLE WITH THE _KEARSARGE_--WHAT KIND OF A MAN
IS IT THAT FIGHTS HIS SHIP TILL SHE SINKS UNDER HIM?--AMERICAN
COMMERCE DESTROYED--THE BRITISH WITHOUT A RIVAL ON THE SEA, AT
LAST, AND AT VERY SMALL COST.
The most instructive chapter in the history of the United States is
that relating to the deeds of the cruisers in the Confederate navy;
for, though few in number, they proved to the world that the over-sea
commerce of a nation at war could be swept away entirely by means so
inexpensive and of such little power as to be absolutely insignificant.
Consider the first Confederate cruiser worth mention--the _Sumter_. She
was a small coaster lying at New Orleans. Her cabins for passengers
were on deck, and her coal-carrying capacity was equal to but five
days at sea, and her hull was so frail that she was condemned by
a board of able Confederate officers who examined her. But Raphael
Semmes eagerly took hold of her. He cleared away the cabin hamper on
deck, overhauled her sails and rigging, mounted an eight-inch pivot
and some thirty-two-pounders from the Norfolk Navy Yard, and then did
one other thing to her worth especial mention: “The engine which was
partly above the water line was protected by a system of woodwork and
iron bars.” So says Semmes’ “Memoirs”; and that is important because
he said the captain of the _Kearsarge_, having used chains for armor,
was unchivalrous. He began work on April 22, 1861. On June 3d he put
her in commission under the name of _Sumter_. Thereafter some time was
spent in drilling the crew, and then he dropped down to the head of
the Passes to wait opportunity to get to sea. Very naturally he was
astonished to find that the _Brooklyn_, the only blockading steamer,
was lying out at sea instead of anchoring at the head of the Passes. He
was also astonished that he was not attacked by the _Brooklyn_ during
the nine days that he lay there, and the reader is likely to share his
feeling. And then came Sunday, June 30th. While the men on the _Sumter_
prepared themselves for the usual man-o’-war inspection, a report that
the _Brooklyn_ was off on a chase was received.
[Illustration: Raphael Semmes.
_From a photograph owned by Mr. C. B. Hall._]
Instantly preparations began for a run to sea. It was a hopeless
attempt in the eyes of one of her lieutenants, for he had been on the
_Brooklyn_, and thought her the faster ship; but Semmes was a daredevil
who would “make a spoon or spoil a horn.” As they approached the bar
the _Brooklyn_ was seen coming, and she was but four miles away when
the _Sumter_ crossed the bar. But she did not overhaul the _Sumter_.
There was a fresh breeze, and both ships made sail. The _Sumter_ had
large fore and aft sails, which enabled her, when they were set, to
lie closer to the wind than the _Brooklyn_ could do, and the _Sumter_
fairly ran her out of sight.
As the pilot left the _Sumter_ at the bar he said to Semmes: “Now,
Captain, you are all clear; give her h-ll and let her go,” and that
is just what Semmes did after “this bold and dashing adventure,” as
Porter calls it. Going to the south coast of Cuba, he fell in with
his first prize, a ship called the _Golden Rocket_, “from the Black
Republican State of Maine.” A gun--the first fired by any Confederate
naval officer afloat--brought her to, with the American flag flying.
She was found to be in ballast, and was, of course, burned. Her flag
was marked with her name and the date of capture, and stowed in a bag,
where many others came to keep it company, for Semmes saved all the
flags he captured, and when the _Alabama_ was at last shot from under
his feet he says: “I committed to the keeping of the guardian spirits
of that famous battle ground a great many bags full of ‘old flags,’ to
be stowed away in the caves of the sea as mementoes that a nation once
lived whose naval officers loved liberty more than the false memorial
of it, and who were capable, when it became ‘Hate’s polluted rag,’ of
tearing it down.”
Within three days Semmes captured five American vessels, three of
which he determined to carry into a Cuban port. On the fourth day,
being then off Cienfuegos, he saw three more come out, and by hoisting
false colors he disguised his ship so that they all proceeded on their
courses until a marine league or more from the coast, when they were
captured, and all taken into port. Semmes hoped that he should be
able to sell them as prizes, but the Cuban authorities, after proper
consideration, refused to allow this to be done.
In explanation of the refusal it should be said that when England
declared in favor of granting the South belligerent rights, orders
were issued that “required every ship-of-war or privateer of either
belligerent which should enter British waters to depart within
twenty-four hours afterwards, except in case of stress of weather, or
of her requiring provisions, or things necessary for the subsistence
of her crew, or repairs. In either of these cases she was to put to
sea as soon after the expiration of the twenty-four hours as possible,
taking in no supplies beyond what might be necessary for immediate use,
and no more coal than would carry her to the nearest port of her own
country, or some nearer destination. Nor, after coaling once in British
waters, was she to be suffered to coal again within three months unless
by special permission.” These orders were very annoying to the North,
because when made, the Confederates had not a single ship of any kind
afloat. It was simply excluding United States warships from what had
once been friendly ports. On the other hand, the determination that no
prizes should be sold in British ports was a hardship upon the South,
because it prevented the Southern cruisers, that were eventually sent
afloat, disposing of their prizes. Because of it the South did not
sell a single prize, for the other nations followed England’s lead in
this matter. But, on the whole, it must be said that while England’s
attitude toward the cruisers of the two belligerents was, by the letter
of the law, that of strict neutrality, the operation of this neutrality
was a much greater hardship to the North than to the South, considered
as national governments. The crews of the Confederate cruisers failed
to get any prize money, but they could “sink, burn, and destroy _ad
lib_.” They were about as great a menace to American commerce as if
they had been getting prize money. There is now no disputing the
oft-repeated assertion that England managed to maintain a neutrality
that should help the South and hurt the North as much as was possible
without causing open war with the United States.
Having failed to get his prizes sold in Cuba, because Spain had
followed England in refusing to allow such sales in her ports, Semmes
took another prize, the _Abby Bradford_, to Puerto Cabello, Venezuela,
hoping to find a market there. He says of this attempt:
“All these small South American towns are, more or less, dependent
upon American trade. The New England States and New York supply them
with their domestic cottons, flour, bacon, and notions; sell them all
their worthless old muskets, and damaged ammunition, and now and then,
smuggle out a small craft to them, for naval purposes. The American
Consul, who is also a merchant, represents not only those ‘grand moral
ideas,’ that characterize our Northern people, but Sand’s sarsaparilla,
and Smith’s wooden clocks. He is, _par excellence_, the big dog of
the village. The big dog was present on the present occasion, looking
portentous and savage, and when he ope’d his mouth, all the little dogs
were silent. Of course, the poor _Sumter_, anchored away off in the
bay, could have no chance before so august an assemblage.”
The _Abby Bradford_ was ordered to New Orleans, but the _Powhatan_,
Capt. D. D. Porter, captured her.
The _Sumter_ was at Puerto Cabello on July 26th. She had taken nine
prizes cruising in the island region of the Caribbean Sea. To follow
her in all the details of her voyage would be monotonous. The reader
can find the story in full, even to the number of ladies who showered
their favors upon the Confederate captain, for Semmes was so proud of
all of his conquests as to omit none. She was usually under sail, but
used coal in chasing, and was able to renew her supply at Trinidad as
well as other ports.
Meantime Semmes had been carrying a considerable number of merchant
seamen to abide the fate of the crew of the _Savannah_ (privateer) who
were held for trial in New York on a charge of piracy. Semmes informed
these merchant seamen that he should hang them if the _Savannah’s_ crew
were executed, and he says himself he should have done so, but does not
tell by what process of reasoning he concluded it would be right to
retaliate on men not engaged in warring against the Confederacy.
From Trinidad the _Sumter_ went down the Brazil coast to Maranham, and
thence to a point near the equator, where homeward-bound American ships
from South America crossed, and then back to the Caribbean Sea islands,
where, eventually, at St. Pierre, she was blockaded by the _Iroquois_.
The _Iroquois_’ captain made a mistake. He arranged with an American
shipmaster in the harbor to hoist signals, in case the _Sumter_ sailed
at night, to tell what course she was steering from the open roadstead.
The signals were duly hoisted as Semmes started away south, but Semmes
saw and understood them, and after running a mile or two with the
_Iroquois_ making all steam to head him off, he turned around and ran
away to the north and escaped.
The _Sumter_ now went to Spain, stopping at Cadiz, where she was not
cordially received, and from there went to Gibraltar, where, as Semmes
says, “the army and navy of Great Britain were with us almost to a
man,” while “the Yankee officers of the several Federal ships of war,
which by this time had arrived, were kept at arm’s length. No other
than the customary official courtesies were extended to them. We
certainly did not meet any of them at the club.”
However, if the _Sumter’s_ officers had a good time ashore, they were
unable to have one afloat, for the “several Federal ships” that had
arrived effectually blockaded her. The work she did and the fate of the
ship are thus summed up by Semmes:
“She cruised six months, leaving out the time during which she was
blockaded in Gibraltar. She captured eighteen ships, as follows: the
_Golden Rocket_, _Cuba_, _Machias_, _Ben. Dunning_, _Albert Adams_,
_Naiad_, _Louisa Kilham_, _West Wind_, _Abby Bradford_, _Joseph
Maxwell_, _Joseph Parke_, _D. Trowbridge_, _Montmorency_, _Arcade_,
_Vigilant_, _Eben Dodge_, _Neapolitan_, and _Investigator_. It is
impossible to estimate the damage done to the enemy’s commerce. The
property actually destroyed formed a very small proportion of it. The
fact alone of the _Sumter_ being upon the seas, during these six
months, gave such an alarm to neutral and belligerent shippers, that
the enemy’s carrying-trade began to be paralyzed, and already his ships
were being laid up, or sold under neutral flags--some of these sales
being _bona fide_, and others fraudulent. In addition to this, the
enemy kept five or six of his best ships of war constantly in pursuit
of her, which necessarily weakened his blockade, for which, at this
time, he was much pressed for ships. The expense to my Government of
running the ship was next to nothing, being only $28,000, or about the
price of one of the least valuable of her prizes. The _Sumter_ was sold
in the course of a month or two after being laid up, and being put
under the English flag as a merchant-ship, made one voyage to the coast
of the Confederate States, as a blockade-runner, entering the port of
Charleston. Her new owner changed her name to that of _Gibraltar_. She
was lost afterward in the North Sea.”
The next cruiser to be considered was named the _Florida_. She was
built at Liverpool under the name of _Oreto_. The American officials
learned, while she was building, that she was of the same model and
scantling as the best British gunboats of that day. She had ports for
four guns. On February 18, 1862, complaint was made to the British
government by the American representative charging that she was
building for use as a Confederate cruiser, whereat “orders were given
that she be vigilantly watched.” On March 3d she was registered in the
name of a member of a Sicilian firm, then in Liverpool, and cleared
for “Palermo, the Mediterranean and Jamaica” in ballast. She sailed on
March 22d with a crew of fifty men, but she went directly to Nassau, in
the Bahamas. When there she appeared as a merchant ship consigned by
Fraser, Trenholm & Co., of Liverpool, notorious as Confederate agents,
to their Nassau house. Here, on complaint of the United States consul,
she was libelled, and there was a farce of a trial in the Nassau
court. Of course she was released. It was proved that she had taken on
munitions of war, but these had been sent ashore again, and to the mind
of the court she was a genuine British merchantman. Meantime her crew
asked the British authorities to discharge them, alleging as a reason
for the request that they had been deceived when they shipped in her.
She had been represented as a merchantman, they said, but it was plain
she was a man-o’-war, and they did not want to fight. On this plea they
were at once discharged.
On August 2d she cleared for Havana, shipped twenty-two men of the
blockade-running class, went to a desolate island called Green Key,
and met a vessel that had brought out a first-class English armament of
two seven-inch rifles and six six-inch guns. Her new commander was John
Newland Maffitt, formerly of the American navy, and one who, because
of his good qualities, did not lose his friends there when he forsook
the flag. Maffitt was so pressed for men that he worked as a common
sailor himself to transfer the arms. In fact, every man on board worked
so hard that when one man came down with yellow fever the others took
it. The ship reached Cardenas, in spite of losses from the fever. While
still ill with the fever, Maffitt was compelled by the authorities to
go to Havana.
Finding he should never get a crew there, he decided on the desperate
expedient of running over to Mobile and braving the blockade, although
he had barely enough men to man the stoke-hole.
The blockaders were sighted on September 4, 1862, and Maffitt, with
just one man on deck to steer, hoisted the British flag, and headed
directly for the blockaders.
At that time Commander George H. Preble was in charge of the station,
and he had the _Oneida_ and _Winona_ under him. Seeing a boat exactly
like a British gunboat, and under British colors, and knowing that
British gun-boats were frequently sent alongshore to see whether the
ports were really blockaded, Preble was deceived. He called his men to
quarters and approached the stranger, but did not seem to have been
suspicious when he saw that she was running at full speed and had no
men on deck. He hailed her when near enough, and got no reply. Then
he fired, in rather slow succession, three shots across her bow. As
she still kept on he opened on her with a broadside, and the _Winona_
joined in.
The _Florida_ was but 300 yards away, and yet so wretched was the
American marksmanship, that the broadsides cut the rigging and tore
away the upper part of her bulwarks. One shell did, indeed, pass
through and through the _Florida_ near the water-line, to explode
beyond her, but it did her no material damage. She passed in clear.
The remarks which all the writers on the subject make about the narrow
margin of luck in the time fuse of that one shell are not adapted to
increase one’s respect for the ability of the gunners. It is a fact,
as already noted, that the gunners of the war of 1861 were not to be
compared in skill with those of 1812. And this is a subject that cannot
be impressed deeply enough on the minds of American readers. For we may
shout “Tirez! Tirez toujour!” as the Frenchman did, till we are blind,
and still suffer defeat unless we can hit the target when we fire.
As between John N. Maffitt, sitting alone on deck because unable to
stand--alone save for the man at the wheel--while his ship made that
desperate dash for home, and the Union forces wasting their ammunition
on the salt-sea air, one cannot hesitate long in bestowing his sympathy
even if Maffitt was an enemy of the flag. It was a most heroic deed
on one side and a sorry exhibit of incompetence on the other. On the
other hand, when Preble was dismissed the punishment was unjust, for
he had done his duty as he saw it. He had given his men all the target
practice that the regulations provided. The fault was not in the man,
but in the naval regulations that are careful to provide that every man
blacks his shoes daily and limit the target practice of the gunners to,
say, ten shots a year.
When Maffitt had recruited his health and a good crew, he found the
blockading squadron increased, among other ships, by the _Cuyler_,
Capt. Francis Winslow, that, because of her speed, was sent there
especially to take him should he run out. But little that worried
Maffitt. At 2 o’clock on the morning of January 16, 1863, he was ready,
and out he went.
[Illustration: The _Florida_ Running the Blockade at Mobile.
_After a painting by R. S. Floyd._]
The lookout on the _Cuyler_ saw him coming when he was a long way
from the bar, and notified the officer of the deck. Now, there was
a regulation on the _Cuyler_ which forbade the officer of the deck
slipping the cable until Captain Winslow was on deck to order it done.
By this regulation just a half hour’s time was lost. So the _Florida_
was away, passing between the _Susquehanna_ and the _Cuyler_ at a
distance of 300 yards while the _Cuyler_ was still at anchor. The
_Cuyler_ did get under way at last, and chased the _Florida_ until the
next night, when the _Florida_ changed her course and escaped.
The _Oneida’s_ crew saw the signal announcing the coming of the
_Florida_, and beat to quarters, but remained at anchor, although she
was one of the swifter vessels present. And she remained at anchor
until 3.50 o’clock, when, to quote her log, “having seen no vessel run
out, beat the retreat.” Porter calls this affair “the greatest example
of blundering committed throughout the war.” Certainly the captains of
the _Cuyler_ and the _Oneida_ were not fit for their commands.
Maffitt went to Nassau, where the British population went delirious
with joy over his success, and sold him coal to last three months,
instead of enough to last to the nearest Confederate port, as the
government orders had provided. Then Maffitt went cruising between
New York and Brazil. In the course of five months he took seventeen
prizes, and then went to Brest, France, where the ship was thoroughly
overhauled.
Meantime Maffitt fitted one of his prizes, the _Clarence_, with light
guns, and sent her cruising under Lieut. Charles W. Read. Read was as
brave and dashing as Maffitt. Between the 6th and 10th of May, 1863,
he took five prizes, shifting his flag to the fifth, the _Tacony_,
and burning the _Clarence_. Then he took ten prizes, including the
_Archer_, to which he made another shift. With the _Archer_ he came
to off Portland, Maine, and with small boats rowed in and cut out the
revenue cutter _Caleb Cushing_. The _Archer_ was a sailing ship. Read
burned the _Cushing_, but steamers overhauled him next day and he was
captured.
At Brest, Maffitt was relieved by Capt. Charles M. Morris, who took the
_Florida_ to Bahia, where Capt. Napoleon Collins, in the _Wachusett_,
found her. Morris thought he was safe, and with half his crew went
ashore. Collins rammed the _Florida_, fired a few shots into her, and
took her to the United States. That carrying her home was a very grave
mistake will soon appear; for a more open violation of a neutral port
was never recorded, and if a naval officer feels justified in such an
act he should not try to get prize money out of it, but make an end
of his capture as soon as possible.
[Illustration: “A Prize Disposed and one Proposed.”
(The _Florida_ in chase, having burnt the _Star of Peace_.)
_After a painting by R. S. Floyd._]
In considering violations of neutral ports, one may say that in
practice the neutral port of a weak power has always been violated
whenever there was any occasion for it. Moreover, since respect for a
neutral port is a matter of courtesy only, we may be sure that whenever
wars shall occur in future, weak neutral ports will be violated as they
have been in the past. It is a question of policy in each case, and
the captain of the aggressive ship must decide for himself whether the
circumstances warrant the insult to the weak power.
As to this particular case, it is the sentiment of the people of
the United States, if the writer knows that sentiment, that Captain
Collins was entirely justified in capturing the _Florida_, especially
as the Brazil authorities had permitted Semmes, of the _Alabama_, to
use Fernando de Noronha as headquarters, so to speak, while cruising
against American commerce. Indeed, Semmes took an American ship, the
_Louisa Hatch_, into the port at that island, coaled his ship from her,
and then towed her outside and burned her. While lying there, too, he
saw two American vessels in the offing, went out and burned them, and
came back again within a few hours to hobnob with the Governor. The
mouth of Brazil was stopped. If Collins had sunk the _Florida_ in
port or burned her outside, it would have been proper for the United
States government to set off the _Alabama’s_ case against that of the
_Wachusett_, and leave it to arbitration to decide which government
should pay damages. But the most interesting feature of this case is
found in the attitude of the British writers on the subject. When one
recalls how the _Essex_ was captured at Valparaiso after Porter’s too
generous treatment of Hillyar, and how the _Armstrong_ was attacked in
the Azores, and how the _Levant_ was taken at Porto Praya, one might
suppose that the British would be rather lenient with their cousins
across the sea, especially as blood is thicker than water; but we find
in a work printed in 1896, called “Ironclads in Action,” by H. W.
Wilson, a work that deals with ironclads as late as 1895, the capture
of the _Florida_ is denounced (page 151, vol. 1) as “disgraceful.”
The writer really goes out of his way to do this, for neither the
_Wachusett_ nor the _Florida_ was an ironclad in any sense. Moreover,
he asserts that “the _Florida’s_ officers were very badly treated,”
which is simply a false statement.
Nevertheless, there was one disgraceful feature of the _Florida_
affair. When Brazil demanded the restoration of the ship with her crew
on board in the harbor of Bahia, the United States agreed to give her
up, and Collins, who had captured her, was ordered to take her back as
a punishment for his violation of international law. But the _Florida_
never left the waters of the United States as a warship. She was lying
at Hampton Roads when the order was issued--lying “just at the spot
where the _Cumberland_ was sunk in very deep water. An engineer was
placed on board in charge with two men to assist him in looking after
the water cocks; but, strangely enough, although the _Florida_ was to
all appearances water tight when she reached Newport News, she sank
that night at 2 o’clock in ten fathoms.” “When the sinking of the
vessel was reported to Admiral Porter (he was there fitting for the
Fort Fisher expedition) he merely said ‘Better so’; while the Secretary
of State and Secretary of the Navy never asked any questions.”
Those quotations are from Admiral Porter’s “Naval History of the Civil
War,” and they are not unlikely to give the reader a choking sensation,
for they show that the sinking of the _Florida_ was the work of a
sneak--that the “two men,” when “looking after the water cocks,” opened
them under orders. The humiliating story is inserted here because the
shame of it should serve to prevent the necessity of ever writing
another of the kind.
The story of the _Alabama_ is longer but not more interesting than
that of the _Florida_. She was built by the Lairds and was known as
_No. 290_, because she was the 290th ship the firm had built. The
British government had full information that she was building for a
Confederate cruiser under the supervision of Commander James D. Bullock
of the Confederate navy, and, later, that Bullock was shipping men
(British subjects) for her, promising petty offices to this and that
capable man. The reader who wants to go into the details of this matter
will find plenty of them in an Englishman’s work on the “Neutrality of
Great Britain during the American Civil War,” by Mountague Bernard, of
Oxford University. It furnishes, curiously enough, abundant proof that
England escaped with a light penalty when in court in the matter of the
“_Alabama_ claims.”
The _Alabama_ was a perfect cruiser for her day--long, lean, and shoal
of draft. She was 230 feet long, only thirty-two wide, and she drew
but fifteen feet of water. She had the rig of a barkentine, with long
lower masts to give her plenty of fore and aft sail so that she could
lie closer to the wind than any ordinary square-rigged ship. She had
also a steam power able to drive her ten knots an hour, and her screw
propeller could be detached and hoisted out of water whenever it was
desirable to work with sails only. She carried eight guns, of which
one was a hundred-pounder Blakely rifle, mounted on a pivot forward;
one an eight-inch smooth-bore on a pivot aft, and six were thirty-twos
in broadside.
Semmes, for his activity in the _Sumter_, was ordered to the new
cruiser. He gathered his officers and crew at Liverpool, and shipping
the outfit of all kinds in the merchant ship _Bahama_, he, with all
hands, took passage in her. The cruiser, that was still known only
as _No. 290_, was allowed to go on a trial trip. Although the ship
was plainly a cruiser, and although men had testified under oath that
they had shipped in her as a Confederate cruiser, the law officer of
the customs authority decided that the evidence was insufficient,
and she did not return from that trial trip. She met the _Bahama_ at
Terceira, a Portuguese island, and there, a marine league from land,
on Sunday, August 24, 1862, _No. 290_ became the _Alabama_, and Semmes
her captain, in the usual form. She was without any doubt a Confederate
man-of-war. The people who still persist in calling her a pirate craft
are probably unaware that if she had really been a pirate the United
States would never have presented any claims against Great Britain for
the damages she did to American commerce. And as for Semmes, he is
entitled, in his official capacity as her captain, to as courteous
treatment at the hands of historians as any captains that ever went
afloat. Of his personal character it need only be said that he has
written it into his “Memoirs.”
To his “Memoirs,” also, the reader may be referred for details of
the burning of the hosts of American merchantmen that he captured.
From Terceira the _Alabama_ made a cruise against the whalers off the
Azores, and thence went to Martinique, where the American warship
_San Jacinto_ found her. But Semmes escaped on the night of October
20, 1862. His first prize of consequence after this adventure was the
_Ariel_ of the Panama line. She was expected to bring a million or so
in gold, but in this Semmes was disappointed.
From the place where the _Ariel_ was captured Semmes went to Galveston
to intercept the transports of the Banks expedition, of which he had
read in captured papers. As he approached Galveston, on the afternoon
of January 11, 1863, the _Hatteras_, a merchant steamer fitted with
guns, was sent off to inspect him. Semmes pretended to run, and so
drew the _Hatteras_ away from the other blockaders, and then at 7 P.M.
(it was dark of course) lay to for her. When the _Hatteras_ ranged up
and hailed, Semmes said his ship was “Her Britannic Majesty’s ship
_Vixen_.” Capt. H. C. Blake, of the _Hatteras_, said he would send
a boat, but when the boat had been lowered Semmes shouted, “We are
the Confederate steamer _Alabama_,” and fired a broadside. Semmes
was not at any time more than 100 yards away, and the _Hatteras_, a
paddle-wheel steamer, was soon riddled. Blake tried to get alongside
the _Alabama_ to board, but could not do it, of course, and the
_Hatteras_ was soon rapidly sinking. A lee gun was fired and help
called for. The living were all taken off by the _Alabama’s_ crew, save
the boat’s crew that had started to board the _Alabama_.
[Illustration: Raphael Semmes and his _Alabama_ Officers.
_From a photograph owned by C. B. Hall._]
The _Hatteras_ carried two short thirty-twos and two small rifles--a
twenty-pounder and a thirty-pounder--that she was able to bring to
bear. The prisoners were landed at Jamaica.
From this point Semmes went to the coast of Brazil, and then off to
the point near the equator where homeward-bound American Indiamen
cross the line. It was on the Brazil coast, in April, 1863, that he
gave the Americans good excuse, by his violations of neutral waters,
for the taking of the _Florida_. In July he went to the Cape of Good
Hope, and at Cape Town was even more heartily welcomed than he had been
at Gibraltar when in the _Sumter_. Here is the way he describes his
reception:
“During my entire stay, my table was loaded with flowers, and the most
luscious grapes, and other fruits, sent off to me every morning, by
the ladies of the Cape, sometimes with, and sometimes without, a name.
Something has been said before about the capacity of the heart of a
sailor. My own was carried by storm on the present occasion. I simply
surrendered at discretion, and whilst Kell was explaining the virtues
of his guns to his male visitors, and answering the many questions that
were put to him about our cruisers and captures, I found it as much as
I could do, to write autographs, and answer the pretty little perfumed
billets that came off to me. Dear ladies of the Cape of Good Hope!”
Perhaps while we are about it, it may be worth while to make one more
quotation to show the full extent of the gallantry of which Semmes
makes boast in every chapter. It will be found on page 620 of the
“Memoirs,” where he describes the Brazilian people, but no part of the
original is italicized:
“The effete Portuguese race has been ingrafted upon a stupid, stolid,
Indian stock, in that country. The freed negro is, besides, the equal
of the white man, and as there seems to be no repugnance, on the part
of the white race--so called--to mix with the black race, and with the
Indian, amalgamation will go on in that country, until a mongrel set of
curs will cover the whole land. This might be _a suitable field enough
for the New England school-ma’am_, and carpet-bagger, but no Southern
gentleman should think of mixing his blood or casting his lot with such
a race of people.”
At Cape Town Semmes was troubled a little by “the stereotyped American
consul; half diplomat, half demagogue.” The American consuls were in
chase wherever he entered a port, but the truth is that they were
rarely able to do more than accumulate facts that were eventually
handed in along with the bill for damages when the _Alabama_ claims
got into court in 1871.
Before reaching Cape Town a prize was turned into a cruiser, and she
was of some little consequence in the Cape waters, but did nothing as
compared with what the dashing Read accomplished on the American coast.
From the Cape of Good Hope Semmes went to the East Indies, where he
found a harvest of prizes, came back to the Cape, and eventually went
to Europe; and late at night, on the 10th of June, 1864, the _Alabama_
reached Cherbourg, France, which was her last port, for there the
_Kearsarge_, Capt. John A. Winslow, caught her.
[Illustration: John A. Winslow.
_From a photograph._]
It is to the credit of Captain Semmes that he had no wish to escape the
Federal ship, though he says that had he known that the _Kearsarge_
had been armored by placing iron cables on her sides opposite her
machinery he should not have done so. Ship for ship and crew for crew,
the _Alabama_ was inferior to the _Kearsarge_ by a greater extent than
has usually been told in history. In size they were practically the
same--1,031 tons for the _Kearsarge_ and 1,016 for the _Alabama_, but
the _Kearsarge_ was the swifter ship of the two. The _Alabama_ carried
eight guns, and she fired 328 pounds of metal at a broadside. The
_Kearsarge_ carried seven guns, and fired 366 pounds at a broadside;
but these figures do not fully tell the superiority of the guns of the
_Kearsarge_, for her two pivots were eleven-inch Dahlgrens, a style of
gun that, at the range of this battle, and in a fight between unarmored
ships, were far superior to the 100-pounder Blakely and the eight-inch
(sixty-four-pounder) smooth-bore on the _Alabama_. And, then, in the
crews the _Kearsarge_ carried 163 men, chiefly Americans, to the
_Alabama’s_ 149, almost exclusively Europeans. The officers of the
_Alabama_ were about the only ones who had any sentiment in the fight;
the men before the mast were at best filibusters--as ragged a crew
(mentally) as that of the _Bonhomme Richard_. That they should have
made any fight at all was due to the training received from men who had
been reared under the old flag. Another great difference was in the
powder, for that on the _Alabama_ was very old and bad.
The _Alabama_ remained in Cherbourg until Sunday, June 19, 1864, when
soon after 9 o’clock Semmes headed her out of the harbor. The French
ironclad _Couronne_ went along to see that the fight took place three
sea miles from shore, and a steam yacht, the _Deerhound_, followed to
give her owner and his family a chance to see a sea battle. The shores
were soon covered with equally eager if less fortunate spectators,
trains being run from Paris to bring people to the fight. And the
sympathy of nearly all the spectators was with the Confederate ship.
Captain Winslow steamed off shore until seven miles from land, and
then at 10.50 o’clock turned and drove the _Kearsarge_ straight at the
Confederate cruiser. At 10.57, when the ships were yet 1,800 yards
apart, the _Alabama_ yawed enough to open fire with a broadside. It
was aimed rather worse, perhaps, than that which the _Oneida_ fired
into the _Florida_ off Mobile, for the shot flew over the _Kearsarge_.
Two more broadsides were fired from the _Alabama_ as the _Kearsarge_
approached head on, but when the _Kearsarge_, at a range of 900 yards,
was seen to be heading to run across the _Alabama’s_ stern, the
_Alabama_ started off in a way that set the two ships running “in a
circle against the sun”--starboard side to starboard side, gradually
approaching nearer and nearer, while the current swept them slowly down
the coast.
[Illustration: Engagement between the U. S. S. _Kearsarge_ and the
_Alabama_ off Cherbourg, on Sunday, June 19, 1864.
_From a French lithograph._]
As this circling was started the _Kearsarge_ opened fire. Word was
sent to every gunner to “make every shot count,” and they obeyed. The
gunnery of the _Kearsarge_ was the best shown during the Civil War. The
_Alabama_ fired rapidly--she hurled 370 shot in sixty-five minutes,
of which only twenty-eight struck the _Kearsarge_. Of these, two were
turned by the chain armor, but had they penetrated they would have had
no serious effect. One shell penetrated the stern post, but failed to
explode. Had it exploded, the _Kearsarge_ would have had difficulty in
steering--perhaps she would have been made helpless; but the battle was
then so far done that the _Alabama_ would, at best, have been able to
escape.
The _Kearsarge_ fired only 173 shot, but so many of these struck home
that before the end of an hour the _Alabama_ was sinking.
Hoisting trysail and jib, Semmes headed for the shore, hoping to escape
with the aid of his sails, but it was too late. The _Kearsarge_ ran
across her bow to deliver a raking broadside, and then the _Alabama_
hauled down her flag. A little later a white flag was displayed, and
then it was seen that the _Alabama_ was rapidly settling in the water.
A boat put off from her to ask for assistance. The _Kearsarge_ sent
two boats to rescue the crew, and the steam yacht _Deerhound_ came up
to help also. Semmes seeing at last that she must sink, threw his
sword into the sea and leaped overboard, and while he swam for life the
_Alabama’s_ stern sank under the sea, the bow was lifted high out of
water, and down she went, with her bowsprit disappearing last of all.
There was some diplomatic trouble over the escape of a lot of the
_Alabama’s_ crew, including Semmes, on the _Deerhound_. The reader
will, perhaps, be able to determine the rights of the _Deerhound_ in
this case by putting himself mentally in her owner’s place. Suppose
Ireland should secede from Great Britain and an Irish cruiser should be
sunk in the presence of a Yankee yacht. Would the Yankee yacht-owner
deliver up the Irishmen’s crew to the triumphant British warship?
Certainly, if the Yankee yacht-owner was a politician, he would not do
so.
[Illustration: The _Kearsarge_ Sinking the _Alabama_.
_From an engraving._]
And, then, there were the virulent attacks on Semmes for swimming to
the _Deerhound_ instead of swimming to the _Kearsarge_. What would the
reader have done? What would that other “pirate,” John Paul Jones, have
done in a case like that?
It is now thirty-seven years since the _Alabama_ sank in the green
waves off Cherbourg. Those of us who were old enough to read the
newspaper extras that were issued when the account of it was
telegraphed home are old enough to know better than to call Semmes
a pirate.
[Illustration: Action between the _Kearsarge_ and the _Alabama_.
(Rescue of the crew of the _Alabama_ by the _Deerhound_.)
_From an engraving of the painting by Chappel._]
Semmes having escaped to England, was counted a hero there, and a
fine sword was given to him to replace the one he threw into the sea.
Let the prejudiced shipowner who lost money through the work of this
sea rover candidly ask himself what kind of a sea captain it is who,
knowing his force is inferior, sails boldly out to meet a watchful
enemy, and then fights till his ship is shot from under his feet.
Raphael Semmes earned the right off Cherbourg to have his name
inscribed in the list of the sea heroes of America.
The total number of prizes made by the _Alabama_ was sixty-nine, of
which fifty-three were destroyed, two had their cargoes only destroyed,
and eleven were bonded. The _Florida_ took thirty-seven, of which
twenty-eight were destroyed. While the number taken was but a small
percentage of the American merchant fleet, the effect of the captures
was to raise insurance rates, frighten shippers as well as shipowners,
and so prevent the employment of the ships at sea. The carrying trade
utterly abandoned American ships.
[Illustration: Whitworth Rifle Captured from the _Shenandoah_.]
There were a few other Confederate cruisers, the _Shenandoah_ being
the most important, although she did nothing but destroy the American
whaling and sealing fleet on the northwest coast. Her total number
of captures was thirty-six. What the cruisers did altogether might be
told in a list of the American ships destroyed, but it is better to
express the facts by saying that they literally swept the American
flag from the sea. England was obliged to pay $15,000,000 for the aid
she gave the Confederates in this work. As has been said, “she got off
cheap.” What she failed to do when she sent shiploads of war material
to help the Barbary pirates who were attacking American commerce, she
accomplished entirely when she allowed the Confederate warships to fit
out in her ports. She destroyed the only competitor on the high seas of
whom she had any fear. Does any one doubt that she did it deliberately?
From 1864 until this day in 1897 the maritime supremacy of Great
Britain has been undisputed. She paid $15,000,000 in damages, and every
year has collected in profits on the American carrying trade which she
then secured--who shall say how many times $15,000,000 her profits
on the American carrying trade are? Perhaps if the reader will learn
the answer to this question, he may make up his mind what the American
people ought to do about it.
[Illustration:
_Florida._
_Shenandoah._
_Alabama._
Three Famous Confederate Cruisers.
_From a painting by M. J. Burns._]