BLOCKADING THE SOUTHERN PORTS
LINCOLN’S PROCLAMATION--IT WAS SOMETHING OF A TASK TO CLOSE 185
INLETS AND PATROL 11,953 MILES OF SEA-BEACHES, ESPECIALLY
WITH THE FORCE OF SHIPS IN HAND--ONE MERCHANT’S NOTION OF
THE EFFICIENCY OF THIRTY SAILING VESSELS--GATHERING AND
BUILDING BLOCKADERS--INCENTIVES AND FAVORING CIRCUMSTANCES FOR
BLOCKADE-RUNNERS--WHEN PERJURY FAILED AND UNCLE SAM WAS ABLE TO
STRIKE WITHOUT WAITING FOR ACT OF CONGRESS--WHEN BLOCKADE-RUNNERS
CAME TO NEW YORK AND YANKEE SMOKELESS COAL WAS IN DEMAND.
The story of the actual work done by the navy in this last war for the
preservation of the life of the nation begins when a blockade of the
ports of the seceded States was ordered. Two proclamations were issued
to provide for this measure. The first was issued on April 19, 1861,
which, as the reader will remember, was six days after the capture of
Fort Sumter, in Charleston harbor, by the secessionists. It covered
all the ports of the South except those of Virginia and Texas; but
on the 27th of the same month, these two States having also joined
the Confederacy, their ports were included by a second proclamation.
Because, from a naval point of view, that was the most important
proclamation issued by a President of the United States since the War
of 1812, its words shall be given literally.
[Illustration: The Blockaded Coast.
_From “The Navy in the Civil War.”_]
“Now therefore I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States ...
have further deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the
ports within the States aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the
United States and of the Law of Nations in such case provided. For this
purpose a competent force will be posted so as to prevent entrance and
exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. If, therefore, with a view
to violate such blockade, a vessel shall approach or shall attempt to
leave any of the said ports, she will be duly warned by the commander
of one of the blockading vessels, who will endorse on her register
the fact and date of such warning, and if the same vessel shall again
attempt to enter or leave the blockaded port, she will be captured, and
sent to the nearest convenient port for such proceedings against her,
and her cargo as prize, as may be deemed advisable.”
It is worth while considering in advance some of the facts relating
to the task that was thus set for the navy. The coast line invested
extended from Alexandria, Virginia, to the borders of Mexico on the Rio
Grande. The continental line was 3,549 miles long. The coast or shore
line, including bays and similar openings, was 6,789 miles long; and
if to this be added the shore lines of the islands which were included
in the blockade and which were necessarily watched by the blockading
fleet, the entire length of beaches under guard was exactly 11,953
miles.
The South Carolina islands, as described by Jedidiah Morse, “are
surrounded by navigable creeks, between which and the mainland is
a large extent of salt marsh fronting the whole State, not less on
an average than 4 or 5 miles in breadth, intersected with creeks in
various directions, admitting through the whole an inland navigation
between the islands and mainland from the northeast to the southeast
corners of the State. The east sides of these islands are for the most
part clean, hard, sandy beaches, exposed to the wash of the ocean.
Between these islands are the entrances of the rivers from the interior
country, winding through the low salt marshes and delivering their
waters into the sounds, which form capacious harbours of from 3 to 8
miles over, and which communicate with each other by parallel salt
creeks.” And that will apply to the whole coast.
More than that, in this length of shore line were found 185 harbor and
river openings that might be used for the purposes of commerce with
the Confederate States. It is also an important fact that these harbor
openings were, in almost every instance, too shoal for the ordinary
ocean-going cargo ships of that day. If too shoal for a merchantman,
they were so for a man-o’-war, and the more intricate and variable the
channels the better adapted they were to the purposes of a trade that
was to be carried on in spite of the blockade.
To close these 185 harbor openings the government had, on the day
the proclamation was issued, twenty-six steamers and sixteen sailing
ships in commission. But let not the uninformed reader suppose that
such a great fleet as this was at once started off on that duty. There
were in the home squadron but five sailing ships and seven steamers,
while of these a number were at sea _en route_ from nearby foreign to
American ports, and of those actually in the United States harbors
but three--the _Pawnee_, the _Mohawk_, and the _Crusader_--were in
Northern waters. To close 185 harbor openings the Secretary of the Navy
had for the moment just three steamers, the rest of the commissioned
fleet being either in the ports of the Southern States or scattered
the wide world over. And that is to say, there was for the moment no
force adequate to blockade efficiently even the one Southern port of
Charleston.
The navy register showed, however, in addition to the forty-two ships
in commission, twenty-seven that were lying at the navy yards in
ordinary but fit for service. The government had thirty-nine steamers
and thirty-four sailing ships that might be brought together in the
course of a few months to enforce the blockade of the 185 harbors of
the South and keep contraband trade clear of the eleven thousand and
odd miles of Southern sea-beaches.
[Illustration:
Map Showing Position of
UNITED STATES SHIPS OF WAR
In Commission March 4, 1861.
NOTE:--There is no log book for the John Adams (No. 18) for the
year 1861, but it is known that this ship was at Manilla, January
14, 1861, and at Hong Kong, May 1, 1861.
]
It is worth noting here that when the Navy Department was first
considering its lack of ships for the purpose of enforcing the
blockade, a consultation was had with a number of the most eminent
ship-owners of New York. The leader of these eminent ship-owners, after
considering the subject carefully, said to Secretary Welles that thirty
sailing vessels would have to be purchased before an actual blockade of
the ports could be completed. As a matter of fact, over 600 ships were
employed at the end, and even then some blockaders got through.
[Illustration: Gideon Welles.
_From a photograph._]
But it was not alone in a lack of ships that the government was
embarrassed. It was necessary to find officers and crews for the ships
that were not in commission. Hundreds of men were needed to man even
one of the five screw frigates, and yet to man the whole twenty-seven
ships not in commission there were, on March 4, 1861, “only 207 men
in all the ports and receiving ships on the Atlantic coast.” “It is
a striking illustration of the improvidence of naval legislation and
administration that in a country of thirty millions of people only a
couple of hundred were at the disposal of the Navy Department.”
And as for the officers, as has been already shown, when the need of
the nation was greatest, a fifth of them drew swords against the flag
instead of defending it.
To still further hamper the work of the Navy Department, Congress was
very slow to learn that a vast naval force was needed. The fact that
the South had no navy and no merchant marine of its own, seemed, in
the minds of the Congressmen, to make it wholly unnecessary to spend
money on fighting ships. Indeed, a Navy Department has rarely been in a
more distressful condition than was that under Mr. Gideon Welles in the
first six months or so of the administration of President Lincoln.
However, a beginning was made. Perhaps the first step of importance in
fitting the navy for war was the appointment of Mr. Gustavus V. Fox
as assistant to Mr. Welles, for Fox had been a naval lieutenant and
brought a practical knowledge of naval affairs with him when he was
placed in charge of the actual war operations of the ships.
First of all, of course, was the work of getting men by a call for
volunteers. The call was answered by hosts, but never by as great
numbers as were needed. Captains and mates from the Northern ports and
the Great Lakes were the more valuable part of this volunteer force,
but so great was the need of officers that not a few men who had never
been at sea received appointments. The youngsters at the Naval Academy
who had had one year’s instruction, or more, were taken at once into
the service. They were mere boys, but they had learned something of
warships, and some of them made names that will not be easily forgotten.
[Illustration: Gustavus V. Fox.
_From an engraving._]
The next effort after the call for men was to issue a call for ships.
The department strove to buy “everything afloat that could be made of
service,” and where owners would not sell, to charter the ships. At
first the ships were purchased by the department direct or by naval
officers. Altogether, twelve steamers had been purchased and nine
chartered by July 1, 1861; and it is worth recording that, because
greed was a stronger passion than love of country, the prices charged
were outrageously high. Afterwards a business man was appointed to the
task of buying ships, and somewhat better rates were then obtained,
while a board of naval officers inspected the ships to decide on their
fitness and the alterations needed to make them serviceable.
It was a heterogeneous collection, a nautical curiosity shop, that they
got together--deep-water ships, inland-water steamers, ferryboats,
and harbor tugs. The inspecting officers were compelled by stress of
need to accept about everything that would float and carry a gun.
And, singular as it may seem at first thought to those who in these
days ride on them, the double-ended ferryboats made very successful
naval ships. It was the Fulton ferryboat _Somerset_ that captured
the blockade-runner _Circassian_ off Havana--a prize that yielded
$315,371.39 to her captors. Nor was that her only service. Being
well built to stand the hard knocks of their ordinary service, the
ferryboats were easily fitted with heavy guns and served well in
battering down alongshore forts.
By the 1st of December, 1861, the government had purchased 137 vessels,
of which, however, fifty-eight were sailing vessels; and it may as well
be told here as elsewhere that 418 vessels were purchased during the
war, of which 313 were steamers.
Meantime the department started the work of building ships. Congress
authorized seven sloops-of-war, and the department laid down eight, of
which four were built to the lines of the sloops of 1858 in order to
save time; and it is worth noting that the _Kearsarge_ was among the
four. The eight were begun immediately, and six more were laid down
before the end of the year.
Without waiting for an appropriation, the department contracted with
private shipyards for the building of twenty-three heavily armed screw
gunboats. And this contract is worth more space than the mere statement
of the fact, for it draws attention to the importance of the private
shipbuilder as a factor in the sea power of a nation. Even in the War
of 1812, when wooden sailing ships were the sole evidence of sea power,
the private shipbuilder was of essential importance. It was a private
shipbuilder from New York, Mr. Noah Brown, who sent Perry’s victorious
squadron afloat on Lake Erie, and it was the private shipbuilder who
gave the Americans the supremacy that they enjoyed from time to time on
Lake Ontario. Without private yards amply equipped for the construction
of the best warships afloat, no nation can have a sea power adequate
for the protection of its honor and the preservation of peace.
These twenty-three gunboats mounted from four to five guns each, of
which one was an eleven-inch smooth-bore. They were wooden boats, of
course, and they were known as the ninety-day fleet because some of
them were in commission within three months from the signing of the
contract.
[Illustration: Garrett J. Pendergrast.]
The fact that they were so quickly built is also worth considering
in connection with the fact that ships relatively as efficient as
they were could not now be built in less than a year. The day of a
ninety-day fleet passed when steel was substituted for wood.
The first point actually blockaded was Hampton Roads. Flag Officer
G. J. Pendergrast established the blockade there, and issued the
following proclamation on April 30, 1861:
“_To all whom it may concern_:
“I hereby call attention to the Proclamation of his Excellency
Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, under date of
the 27th April, 1861, for an efficient blockade of the ports of
Virginia and North Carolina, and warn all persons interested that I
have a sufficient naval force there for the purpose of carrying out
that Proclamation.
“All vessels passing the Capes of Virginia, coming from a distance
and ignorant of the Proclamation, will be warned off, and those
passing Fortress Monroe will be required to anchor under the guns
of the fort, and subject themselves to an examination.
“United States’ Flagship _Cumberland_, off
“Fortress Monroe, Virginia, April 30, 1861.
(Signed) “G. J. PENDERGRAST,
“_Commanding Home Squadron_.”
This proclamation is worth careful perusal for two reasons: The first
reason is that it contained an untrue statement. Instead of having
“sufficient naval force” “for an efficient blockade of the ports of
Virginia and North Carolina,” he had barely enough for Virginia alone.
Wilmington was a most important harbor of the South; it eventually
became the favorite with blockade-runners, but there was not a ship
ready to close it for many weeks after this proclamation was issued.
More important still is the second reason for reading the proclamation
carefully--the fact that it was issued at the behest of the Navy
Department, and illustrates clearly the department’s idea of a blockade
at that time. It is necessary to say here that, owing to the excitement
of the times, the government was making a very grave error--it was
trying to establish a “paper blockade.” That is to say, there was a
determined effort made to interdict trade where there was no blockade
_de facto_--not a ship, or a rowboat even, stationed to close the port.
And this was a most remarkable undertaking, because the “free trade”
for which the War of 1812 was waged was the freedom to trade in any
belligerent port not actually closed by the presence of a warship.
The government was sacrificing a great principle for the sake of a
temporary advantage.
This was not due to the mistake of a naval officer. It was the
deliberate action of the administration, and it is not unlikely that it
will come back, some time, to plague us when we are the neutral nation
seeking for trade in a belligerent port.
Proof of the fact that the whole Cabinet was involved is found in the
correspondence of Mr. Seward relating to the blockade off Charleston.
The _Niagara_ had arrived home from Japan on April 24th, and was sent
to blockade Charleston as soon as possible, arriving off the bar on
May 11th. She remained there four days only, and then went away in
search of a ship that was said to be bringing arms from Belgium to a
port further south, and there was no warship off that harbor until May
28th (some accounts say the 29th), when the _Minnesota_ came to take
the _Niagara’s_ place. The _Harriet Lane_, a revenue cutter, used as
a warship, did lie off the harbor on the 19th, but for thirteen days
Charleston was entirely uncovered.
On May 22, 1861, Lord Lyons, the British minister at Washington, in the
interest of British ships at Charleston, called the attention of Mr.
Seward to the fact that the _Niagara_ had left Charleston on the 15th
and that the harbor was thereby opened. Replying to this, Mr. Seward
wrote, along with other things, the following:
“The blockade of the port of Charleston has been neither abandoned,
relinquished, nor remitted, as the letter of Her Britannic Majesty’s
Consul would lead you to infer. We are informed that the _Niagara_
was replaced by the steamer _Harriet Lane_, but that, owing to some
accident, the latter vessel failed to reach the station as ordered
until a day or two after the _Niagara_ had left.
“I hasten, however, to express the dissent of this Government from the
position which seems to be assumed by your note, that that temporary
absence impairs the blockade and renders necessary a new notice of
its existence. This Government holds that the blockade took effect at
Charleston on the 11th day of this month, and that it will continually
be in effect until notice of its relinquishment shall be given by
Proclamation of the President of the United States.”
On May 13th the British ship _Perthshire_ appeared off Pensacola,
having heard nothing of the blockade there, but she was told that
Mobile was open. So she went to Mobile, loaded cotton, and sailed on
the 30th, although the port was closed on the 26th by the _Powhatan_.
She was captured at sea on June 9th, by the _Massachusetts_, but
released by the flagship _Niagara_, whose captain “considered the
capture illegal, as, by order of the Department, no neutral vessel not
having on board contraband of war was to be detained or captured unless
attempting to leave or enter a blockaded port after the notification
of blockade had been indorsed on her register,” The owner made a claim
for £200 compensation on account of the detention of his ship, which
had lost twelve days of her voyage; and the claim was allowed and paid
by the government of the United States.
The United States had now to abide by the law that its navy had in
1812 established. The ship of a neutral had a right to enter any
port left open by the government ships, and for several months after
the President’s proclamation nine-tenths of the 185 Southern harbors
remained open.
This matter is of importance because of the right of neutrals in case
the blockade of a port was actually abandoned or raised even for
an hour. The opening of the port made it legally necessary for the
blockaders to begin over again as if no blockade had existed. The
neutral entering an opened port had a right to remain fifteen days, as
the law was applied, after she was officially notified of the blockade,
while neutrals approaching a re-blockaded port had the right to go away
unmolested if they had not been notified, actually or constructively,
that the new blockade existed.
New Orleans was blockaded on May 26, 1861, by the _Brooklyn_, and
Galveston on June 2d by the _South Carolina_. For celerity of movement
in carrying out orders to blockade the different ports no man exceeded
Lieutenant Woodhull, for within forty-eight hours after receiving
orders to charter a steamer he had left Washington, obtained the
_Keystone State_ in the Delaware, carried her to Hampton Roads, and
reported ready for duty.
On the whole, it may be said that on July 1, 1861, the magnitude of
the work of blockading 185 ports and inlets began to be appreciated
by the Navy Department. Moreover, the hesitation and vacillation that
had characterized the early movements of the government were becoming
submerged. The determination of the people of the North to preserve the
American nation intact was growing, under the shame of early reverses
ashore, into a mighty tide that was to be irresistible at the last. A
blockade was established within the time mentioned, in which even the
critical eye of British men-o’-warsmen, sent especially to examine it
in the interests of British commerce, could find no flaw. When, on the
13th of July, Commodore Pendergrast issued another proclamation saying
Virginia and North Carolina were legally closed, he stated the fact,
and from that time on the whole coast was, at worst, under guard, if
not impassable. It was a blockade that was to starve the hosts fighting
against the flag into abandoning their arms and returning once more to
the ballot-box for a redress of grievances.
This is by no means to say that the blockade was absolutely effectual.
Tales of the blockade-runners are to be told further on, but some
of the difficulties in the way of effecting a blockade, even when
ships a-plenty were on the coast, must be considered here. Mention
has already been made of the physical aspects of the coast. No more
difficult coast for a blockade can be found in the world. With this in
mind, let the reader recall the fact that the South in those days was
about the only producer of cotton in the world, and that the sap of
the long-leaved pine was converted into tar and turpentine, which were
produced there in very great quantities. On the other hand, consider
that the South had scarcely anything in the way of factories. The
people there were dependent on commerce for their supplies of even the
most common necessities of life--for household goods, for clothing, and
even for some kinds of food. And as for the arms and supplies needed
for a war, there was one small powder mill, but nothing more in all
the South, unless, indeed, the existence of the Tredegar iron mills at
Richmond might be called a gun and engine factory.
Here, then, were the conditions for commerce: The South was the chief
source of cotton and naval stores, and it was in desperate need of
manufactured articles in a great variety. The blockade stopped all
lawful traffic between it and the rest of the world. The cotton for
the mills of the world was shut off. The mills of France and England
were shut down for want of raw material, and people starved to death in
England because the mills were shut down, and there was no way in which
the unfortunate operators could get money for food. We can afford to
recall this fact when we feel embittered by the attitude of a certain
part of the English people toward us during our struggle for national
life. In Lancashire, England, no less than ten million dollars had been
given away by relief committees to the starving mill hands _within two
years_ after the war began. Moreover, the English government was not
always one-sided, as will appear further on.
The price of cotton rose to a level that now seems fabulous in the
markets of the world. The prices of the goods that the people of the
South were accustomed to import rose as rapidly there, while munitions
of war commanded any price that might be asked by one who could supply
them. Here was a chance for profit such as the world had not seen since
the wars of Napoleon, and greed is the steam that turns the wheels of
commerce.
Just off the Southern coast lay the Bahama Islands, while the Bermudas
were but a day’s sail farther away. It is 674 miles from Bermuda to
Wilmington, and 515 from Nassau to Charleston--three days’ run, or
less, in either case. Here were neutral ports to serve as a basis for
the contraband trade, and thither the contraband traders flocked as the
pirates of old swarmed about Jamaica.
Nassau was a natural resort for the blockade runners, for its people
had been wreckers--had “thanked God for a good wrack”--for time out of
mind. Besides that, it was not only near by the Southern coast, but it
was surrounded by a host of reefs awash, every one of which was neutral
territory, and was surrounded by its marine league of neutral waters,
where a blockade-runner was safe.
As the reader will remember, the blockade-running traffic was chiefly
in the hands of the British, although Yankees were found not unwilling
to turn a contraband dollar with one hand while they flapped the
old flag in the air with the other and shouted over Union victories
vociferously.
At the beginning of the contraband business the vessels were loaded
in England, cleared for Bermuda or Nassau, and sent thence to the
Southern destination, Charleston being the chief port. Any vessel,
even a condemned sailing schooner, was counted good enough; in fact,
worthless vessels were preferred because the loss would be less in case
of failure.
The touch at the neutral port was, of course, a mere device to deceive
the American government officials; but a change was soon made in
that game, for the courts held to the doctrine of the continuity
of a voyage. If the ultimate destination of the ship and cargo was
Charleston, she might be lawfully captured anywhere _en route_ in spite
of the fact that she was cleared for a neutral port when the voyage
began.
[Illustration: A Four-pound Cast-iron Gun Captured from a
Blockade-runner.]
There being no appeal from this decision, the contraband dealers
resorted to shipping goods from England to the neutral port off the
coast, and there unloading the goods. The papers, of course, were made
out in proper form, under oath, giving the neutral port as the ultimate
destination. They showed, for instance, that a house in Nassau was
buying shoes, woollens, guns, gunpowder, swords, etc., sufficient to
supply an army, and it was called legitimate trade. Perjury was as
common in this contraband business as the drinking of wine. In fact,
one cannot help quoting here the words of the favorite “Naval History
of Great Britain”--the words of James where he is writing of American
traders in the days of the “paper blockades” of 1812. He says:
“Every citizen of every town in the United States, to which a creek
leads that can float a canoe, becomes henceforward ‘a merchant’; and
the grower of wheat or tobacco sends his son to a counting-house,
that he may be initiated in the profitable art of falsifying ship’s
papers, and covering belligerent property. Here the young American
learns to bolt custom-house oaths by the dozen, and to condemn a lie
only when clumsily told, or when timorously or inadequately applied.
After a few years of probation, he is sent on board a vessel as mate,
or supercargo; and, in due time, besides fabricating fraudulent papers,
and swearing to their genuineness, he learns (using a homely phrase) to
humbug British officers, and to decoy and make American citizens of
British seamen.”
What Mr. James says of the American people as a whole, can be
truthfully said in substance of the British blockade-runners. They were
an infamous lot, without exception, and ever ready to sacrifice honor
and risk life so long as the number of pieces of gold was large enough.
But this is not meant to apply to the Confederates engaged in running
supplies through the blockaded lines. Their case was entirely
different, for they were legally belligerents, and to obtain supplies
was, from their point of view, a patriotic duty. So it might--so it
usually did happen that a blockade-runner carried one man (the pilot)
whose courage and firmness excite the heartiest approbation of every
unprejudiced mind, while every other member of the crew was at heart a
coward who dared not fight the blockaders in pursuit, and a sneak who
would sell his soul for gold.
However, even the trick of transferring cargo at Nassau did not serve
them long, for “it was held that the ships carrying on this traffic to
neutral ports were confiscable, provided the ultimate destination of
the cargo to a blockaded port was known to the owner.”
[Illustration: An Eighteen-pound Rifle Captured from a Blockade-runner.]
For this “the United States were accused of sacrificing the rights
of neutrals, which they had hitherto upheld, to the interests of
belligerents, and of disregarding great principles for the sake of
momentary advantage.” In fact, however, Lord Stowell had held where a
neutral, when trading between two ports of a belligerent, had landed
the cargo in a neutral port and re-shipped it on another vessel, the
continuity of the voyage was not broken. Cargoes shipped in due form to
Nassau and taken before reaching that port having been declared lawful
prizes in spite of perjury, the contraband traders then adopted the
bold expedient of shipping their goods by regular lines to New York and
there re-shipping them to Nassau and Bermuda; but the moment this trade
attracted attention the New York customs officials were instructed
to refuse clearances to ships “which, whatever their ostensible
destination, were believed to be intended for Southern ports, or whose
cargoes were in imminent danger of falling into the hands of the enemy.”
[Illustration: A Six-pound Gun Captured from a Blockade-runner.]
The Nassau merchants got the British authorities to inquire into this
refusal to clear ships to their port, the ground taken being that an
unjust discrimination was made against them, but after considerable
correspondence the British decided to let Uncle Sam alone in that
matter. The subject is of special interest for the reason that it shows
how strong the American government is in an emergency, even though the
Executive is very often obliged to wait on Congress before making a
move.
[Illustration: A Nassau View--Along the Shore East of the Town.
_From a photograph by Rau._]
So, at last, the contraband traders were obliged to rely entirely on
their ability as sneaks. The goods were sent to Nassau and Bermuda
as before, though, meantime, Havana, Cuba, and Matamoras, Mexico, on
the Rio Grande, were of considerable importance. Cargoes of Southern
products were safe after reaching these ports, if cargoes of contraband
goods _en route_ to them were not. Moreover, there was a change in
the forms of ships used that made these nearby ports absolutely
necessary to the traffic; for soon after the blockading fleets became
efficient the use of condemned ships as blockade-runners was abandoned
and smaller and swifter vessels were adopted. The transition from
these to vessels built especially to run between the islands and the
Confederate ports was easy and was quickly made. The inventive talent
of the traders was worthy of a better cause. Low and slender hulls,
with the most powerful engines and twin screws or feathering paddles,
were adopted. The paint used was of an obscuring color. There was no
spar save that necessary to support a crow’s nest for the lookout.
The one thing that they could not keep from betraying them, at the
last, was the smoke, but at one time they burned anthracite coal, and
they stopped using it only when the American government prohibited
the export of it. As time passed and the strangulation caused by the
blockade became more severe, the skill and ingenuity of the blockaders
increased, so that the traffic never was stopped. There was, at one
time, talk in Richmond of having the Confederate government take the
traffic into its own hands absolutely, because of the demoralization
caused by the illegitimate traders. They brought what they could sell
at the most profit, of course. They brought liquors where medicines
were needed, and silks and fancy slippers in place of the necessities
of life for which the people suffered. It is a pity that the change was
not made, for then one might have considered the blockade-runners with
other feelings than disgust.
[Illustration: Nassau Schooners.
_From a photograph by Rau._]
But if the traffic never ceased absolutely, the constriction of the
blockade was and is now manifest. It was so efficient that one can
scarcely read of the effects produced by it in the South without tears.
One can believe that the blockade was a merciful as well as a just
measure of war in that it shortened the struggle more than any other
measure, and so saved many lives on both sides; but it is a pitiful
fact that those who suffered most from the effects of the blockade were
the women and the little ones. There are many tiny graves in the South
that were dug because the blockade excluded the medicines needed by the
sick.
Lest the reader think the language used here regarding the foreign
blockade-runners is too strong, a story told by one of them, Thomas E.
Taylor (see p. 110, “Running the Blockade”), shall be given. Taylor was
a leader in the business. He ran the first steel ship (the _Banshee_)
built especially for the purpose. Among other vessels under his control
was the _Will-o’-the-Wisp_. She was a wretched ship, and here is what
he says:
“I found her a constant source of delay and expenditure and I decided
to sell her. After having her cobbled up with plenty of putty and
paint, I was fortunate enough to open negotiations with some Jews with
a view to her purchase. Having settled all preliminaries, we arranged
for a trial trip, and after a very sumptuous lunch I proceeded to run
her over a measured mile for the benefit of the would-be purchasers.
I need scarcely mention that we subjected her machinery to the utmost
strain, bottling up steam to a pressure of which our present Board
of Trade, with its motherly care for our lives, would express strong
disapproval. The log line was whisked merrily over the stern of the
_Will-o’-the-Wisp_, with the satisfactory result that she logged 17½
knots. The Jews were delighted, so was I; and the bargain was clinched.”
As to the legal status of a blockade-runner, Taylor says: “The
blockading force is entitled to treat such a ship in all respects as
an enemy, and to use any means recognized in civilized warfare to
drive off, capture or destroy her. A crew so captured may be treated
as prisoners of war, nor is any resistance to capture permitted, and a
single blow or shot in his own defence turns the blockade-runner into
a pirate.” In the same line is what Wilson’s “Iron Clads in Action”
says regarding the fact that the crews of captured blockade-runners “at
least once or twice rose up on the prize crew and recaptured the ship.
It was a big risk--piracy upon the high seas--with the penalty of death
if blood was shed.”
One of the cases wherein the crew recaptured the ship from the prize
crew is described very well in the _Mercantile Marine Magazine_
(London) for June, 1862, p. 177. The story begins: “On Saturday, May 3,
the rooms of the Liverpool Mercantile Marine Association were crowded
almost to suffocation by the merchants and Mercantile Marine officers
of Liverpool, to witness the presentation of a magnificent testimonial
to Captain William Wilson, of the British ship _Emily St. Pierre_,
for his pluck and gallantry in recapturing his ship which had been
seized by the United States cruiser _James Adger_, off Charleston.”
He had been guilty of “piracy upon the high seas,” but 170 Liverpool
merchants united to give him a silver tea and coffee service, the
association named gave him a gold medal, the owners of the ship gave
him 2,000 guineas, and his crew gave him a sextant. The captain, in his
little speech, said that the “token of your kindness” would remind the
British sailor that “his efforts for the right and true will not be
lost sight of nor go unrewarded.” The story is well worth quoting as
showing how men, naturally inclined to “the right and true,” may be led
by the exigencies of trade to applaud and reward even “piracy upon the
high seas.”
The reader should observe here that for a captured crew of one
belligerent to rise against a prize crew of the other belligerent is a
very different matter from this act of “piracy.”
As already said, the blockade-runners were at first chiefly old
sailing ships of various rigs or old steamers, the idea being to risk
as little capital as possible in this illegitimate trade while making
the utmost profit--not an unknown plan in legitimate trade, and never
a wise one. Small schooners were used all through the wars to run the
numerous shoal-water inlets along the coast, but the real interest in
the blockade-runners begins when the Liverpool merchants began to build
steamers especially designed for that purpose--build them without
hindrance on the part of their government.
[Illustration: The Blockade-runner _Teaser_.
_From a photograph made in 1864._]
Taylor, as said, was the first to carry out one of these swift vessels,
and he describes her as follows:
“The new blockade-runner was a paddle boat, built of steel, on
extraordinarily fine lines, 214 feet long and 20 feet beam, and drew
only 8 feet of water. Her masts were mere poles without yards, and
with the least possible rigging. In order to attain greater speed in a
sea-way she was built with a turtle-back deck forward. She was of 217
tons net register, and had an anticipated sea speed of eleven knots,
with a coal consumption of thirty tons a day. Her crew, which included
three engineers and twelve firemen, consisted of thirty-six hands all
told.” And she was a type of the best sort, although they eventually
reached a speed of seventeen knots.
At Nassau “everything aloft was taken down, till nothing was left
standing but the lower masts, with small cross-trees for a lookout man
on the fore, and the boats were lowered to the level of the rails. The
whole ship was then painted a sort of dull white, the precise shade
of which was so nicely ascertained by experience before the end of
the war that a properly dressed runner on a dark night was absolutely
indiscernible at a cable’s length. So particular were captains on this
point that some of them even insisted on their crews wearing white
at night, holding that one black figure on the bridge or on deck was
enough to betray an otherwise invisible vessel.
“The reckless loading, to which high profits and the perquisites
allowed to officers led, is to a landsman inconceivable. That men
should be found willing to put to sea at all in these frail craft
piled like hay wagons is extraordinary enough, but that they should do
so in the face of a vigilant and active blockading force, and do it
successfully, seems rather an invention of romance than a commonplace
occurrence of our own time.”
So prepared, the steamer sneaked away from port, fled from every
sail and every smoke, crossed the Gulf Stream by daylight in order to
determine her position uninfluenced by the current, and struck in on
the coast at night. The light on the blockading flagship was commonly
used to locate the harbor, and when this was seen the runner either ran
away around the end of the squadron and slipped in along the coast or
else plunged boldly through under the guns of the flagship.
The _Banshee_ on her first inward trip received $250 per ton in gold
for freight on war material. She carried out 100 tons of tobacco at
$350 per ton, and 500 bales of cotton, that yielded $250 net per bale.
In January, 1865, Jefferson Davis, “in a message to Congress on
this subject, said that the number of vessels arriving at only two
ports--Charleston and Wilmington--from November the first to December
the sixth, had been forty-three, and that only a very small portion
of those outward bound had been captured; that out of 11,796 bales
of cotton shipped since July the first, 1864, but 1,272 bales had
been lost. And the special report of the Secretary of the Treasury
in relation to the same matter stated that there had been imported
at the ports of Wilmington and Charleston since October 26th, 1864,
8,632,000 pounds of meat, 1,507,000 pounds of lead, 1,933,000 pounds
of saltpetre, 546,000 pairs of shoes, 316,000 pairs of blankets,
520,000 pounds of coffee, 69,000 rifles, 97 packages of revolvers,
2,639 packages of medicines, 43 cannon, with a very large quantity of
other articles. From March 1st, 1864, to January 1st, 1865, the value
of the shipments of cotton on Confederate government account was shown
by the Secretary’s report to have been $5,296,000 in specie, of which
$1,500,000 had been shipped out between July 1st and December 1st, 1864.
“A list of vessels which were running the blockade from Nassau and
other ports, in the period intervening between November, 1861, and
March, 1864, showed that 84 steamers were engaged; of these, 37 were
captured by the enemy, 12 were totally lost, 11 were lost and the
cargoes partially saved, and one foundered at sea.
“They made 363 trips to Nassau and 65 to other parts. Among the highest
number of runs made were those of the _Fanny_, which ran 18 times,
and the _Margaret and Jessie_, which performed the same feat and was
captured. Out of 425 runs from Nassau alone (including 100 schooners),
only 62--about one in seven--were unsuccessful.”
The following estimate of the disbursements and profits of a
blockade-runner is taken from Scharf, as is the quotation above. The
estimate refers to the last part of the war, when the Confederate
government took a half of the cargo space of runners:
One captain, per month $5,000 00
First officer, $600, second do., $250; third do., $170 1,020 00
One boatswain 160 00
One carpenter 160 00
One purser 1,000 00
One steward, $150; three assistants, $80 330 00
One cook, $150; two assistants, $120 270 00
One engineer and three assistants 3,500 00
Twelve firemen and coal-heavers 2,400 00
240 tons of coal at $20 4,800 00
Rations for crew 2,700 00
Oil, tallow, and packing 1,000 00
Stevedores 5,000 00
Pilotage, out and in 3,000 00
Sea insurance 3,500 00
Wear and tear 4,250 00
Incidental expenses 1,000 00
Interest 875 00
Risks, 25 per cent 37,500 00
Provisions for passengers 3,000 00
----------
$80,265 00
Earnings, out and home:
800 bales of cotton for government $40,000 00
800 bales of cotton for owners 40,000 00
Return freight for owners 40,000 00
Return freight for government 40,000 00
Passengers, out and home 12,000 00
----------
$172,000 00
-----------
Leaving a monthly profit of $91,735 00
On the other hand, it should be observed that the Federal ships
captured over 1,000 prizes during the war. One of these, the _Memphis_,
paid $510,914.07 in prize money to her captors, two or three paid over
$400,000, and whole fleets yielded from $100,000 to $300,000. The
_Banshee_, of which Taylor boasts, paid $104,948.48 to the Yankee crews
of the _Fulton_ and _Grand Gulf_. Blockade-running, like privateering
in 1812, paid a few firms handsomely. The Frasers of Charleston
are said to have cleared $20,000,000 in gold, but many others lost
heavily--the Jews who bought the _Will-o’-the-Wisp_, for instance. It
was a thoroughly disreputable business, but so much of the story must
be told, if only to show the character of part of the opposition which
the government faced in the Civil War.