CHAPTER VIII.

HOW IS ORGANIC EVOLUTION CAUSED?

§ 143. Already it has been necessary to speak of the causes of organic

evolution in general terms; and now we are prepared for considering them

specifically. The task before us is to affiliate the leading facts of

organic evolution, on those same first principles conformed to by evolution

at large.

Before attempting this, however, it will be instructive to glance at the

causes of organic evolution which have been from time to time alleged.

§ 144. The theory that plants and animals of all kinds were gradually

evolved, seems to have been at first accompanied only by the vaguest

conception of cause--or rather, by no conception of cause properly so

called, but only by the blank form of a conception. One of the earliest who

in modern times (1735) contended that organisms are indefinitely

modifiable, and that through their modifications they have become adapted

to various modes of existence, was De Maillet. But though De Maillet

supposed all living beings to have arisen by a natural, continuous process,

he does not appear to have had any definite idea of that which determines

this process. In 1794, in his _Zoonomia_, Dr. Erasmus Darwin gave reasons

(sundry of them valid ones) for believing that organized beings of every

kind, have descended from one, or a few, primordial germs; and along with

some observable causes of modification, which he points out as aiding the

developmental process, he apparently ascribes it, in part, to a tendency

given to such germ or germs when created. He suggests the possibility "that

all warm-blooded animals have arisen from one living filament, which THE

GREAT FIRST CAUSE endued with animality, with the power of acquiring new

parts, attended with new propensities, directed by irritations, sensations,

volitions, and associations; and thus possessing the faculty of continuing

to improve by its own inherent activity." In this passage we see the idea

to be, that evolution is pre-determined by some intrinsic proclivity. "It

is curious," says Mr. Charles Darwin, "how largely my grandfather, Dr.

Erasmus Darwin, anticipated the erroneous grounds of opinion, and the views

of Lamarck." One of the anticipations was this ascription of development to

some inherent tendency. To the "plan général de la nature, et sa marche

uniforme dans ses opérations," Lamarck attributes "la progression évidente

qui existe dans la composition de l'organisation des animaux;" and "la

_gradation_ régulière qu'ils devroient offrir dans la composition de leur

organisation," he thinks is rendered irregular by secondary causes.

Essentially the same in kind, though somewhat different in form, is the

conception put forth in the _Vestiges of Creation_; the author of which

contends "that the several series of animated beings, from the simplest and

oldest up to the highest and most recent, are, under the providence of God,

the results, _first_, of an impulse which has been imparted to the forms of

life, advancing them, in definite times, by generation, through grades of

organization terminating in the highest dicotyledons and vertebrata;" and

that the progression resulting from these impulses, is modified by certain

other causes. The broad contrasts between lower and higher forms of life,

are regarded by him as implying an innate aptitude to give birth to forms

of more perfect structures. The last to re-enunciate this doctrine has been

Prof. Owen; who asserts "the axiom of the continuous operation of creative

power, or of the ordained becoming of living things." Though these words do

not suggest a very definite idea, yet they indicate the belief that organic

progress is a result of some in-dwelling tendency to develop,

supernaturally impressed on living matter at the outset--some ever-acting

constructive force which, independently of other forces, moulds organisms

into higher and higher forms.

In whatever way it is formulated, or by whatever language it is obscured,

this ascription of organic evolution to some aptitude naturally possessed

by organisms, or miraculously imposed on them, is unphilosophical. It is

one of those explanations which explain nothing--a shaping of ignorance

into the semblance of knowledge. The cause assigned is not a true

cause--not a cause assimilable to known causes--not a cause that can be

anywhere shown to produce analogous effects. It is a cause unrepresentable

in thought: one of those illegitimate symbolic conceptions which cannot by

any mental process be elaborated into a real conception. In brief, this

assumption of a persistent formative power inherent in organisms, and

making them unfold into higher types, is an assumption no more tenable than

the assumption of special creations: of which, indeed, it is but a

modification; differing only by the fusion of separate unknown processes

into a continuous unknown process.

§ 145. Besides this intrinsic tendency to progress which Dr. Darwin

ascribes to animals, he says they have a capacity for being modified by

processes which their own desires initiate. He speaks of powers as "excited

into action by the necessities of the creatures which possess them, and on

which their existence depends;" and more specifically he says that "from

their first rudiment or primordium, to the termination of their lives, all

animals undergo perpetual transformations; which are in part produced by

their own exertions, in consequence of their desires and aversions, of

their pleasures and their pains, or of irritations, or of associations; and

many of these acquired forms or properties are transmitted to their

posterity." While it embodies a belief for which much may be said, this

passage involves the assumption that desires and aversions, existing before

experiences of the actions to which they are related, were the originators

of the actions, and therefore of the structural modifications caused by

them. In his _Philosophie Zoologique_, Lamarck much more specifically

asserts "le _sentiment intérieur_," to be in all creatures that have

developed nervous systems, an independent cause of those changes of form

which are due to the exercise of organs: distinguishing it from that simple

_irritability_ possessed by inferior animals, which cannot produce what we

call a desire or emotion; and holding that these last, along with all "qui

manquent de système nerveux, ne vivent qu'à l'aide des excitations qu'ils

reçoivent de l'extérieur." Afterwards he says--"je reconnus que la nature,

obligée d'abord d'emprunter des milieux environnants la _puissance

excitatrice_ des mouvements vitaux et des actions des animaux imparfaits,

sut, en composant de plus en plus l'organisation animale, transporter cette

puissance dans l'intérieur même de ces êtres, et qu'à la fin, elle parvint

à mettre cette même puissance à la disposition de l'individu." And still

more definitely he contends that if one considers "la _progression_ qui se

montre dans la composition de l'organisation," ... "alors on eût pu

apercevoir comment les _besoins_, d'abord réduits à nullité, et dont le

nombre ensuite s'est accru graduellement, ont amené le penchant aux actions

propres à y satisfaire: comment les actions devenues habituelles et

énergiques, ont occasionné le développement des organes qui les exécutent."

Now though this conception of Lamarck is more precisely stated, and worked

out with much greater elaboration and wider knowledge of the facts, it is

essentially the same as that of Dr. Darwin; and along with the truth it

contains, contains also the same error more distinctly pronounced. Merely

noting that desires or wants, acting directly only on the nervo-muscular

system, can have no immediate influence on very many organs, as the

viscera, or such external appendages as hair and feathers; and observing,

further, that even some parts which belong to the apparatus of external

action, such as the bones of the skull, cannot be made to grow by increase

of function called forth by desire; it will suffice to point out that the

difficulty is not solved, but simply slurred over, when needs or wants are

introduced as independent causes of evolution. True though it is, as Dr.

Darwin and Lamarck contend, that desires, by leading to increased actions

of motor organs, may induce further developments of such organs; and true,

as it probably is, that the modifications hence arising are transmissible

to offspring; yet there remains the unanswered question--Whence do these

desires originate? The transference of the exciting power from the exterior

to the interior, as described by Lamarck, begs the question. How comes

there a wish to perform an action not before performed? Until some

beneficial result has been felt from going through certain movements, what

can suggest the execution of such movements? Every desire consists

primarily of a mental representation of that which is desired, and

secondarily excites a mental representation of the actions by which it is

attained; and any such mental representations of the end and the means,

imply antecedent experience of the end and antecedent use of the means. To

assume that in the course of evolution there from time to time arise new

kinds of actions dictated by new desires, is simply to remove the

difficulty a step back.

§ 146. Changes of external conditions are named, by Dr. Darwin, as causes

of modifications in organisms. Assigning as evidence of original kinship,

that marked similarity of type which exists among animals, he regards their

deviations from one another, as caused by differences in their modes of

life: such deviations being directly adaptive. After enumerating various

appliances for procuring food, he says they all "seem to have been

gradually produced during many generations by the perpetual endeavour of

the creatures to supply the want of food, and to have been delivered to

their posterity with constant improvement of them for the purposes

required." And the creatures possessing these various appliances are

considered as having been rendered unlike by seeking for food in unlike

ways. As illustrating the alterations wrought by changed circumstances, he

names the acquired characters of domestic animals. Lamarck has elaborated

the same view in detail: using for the purpose, with great ingenuity, his

extensive knowledge of the animal kingdom. From a passage in the

_Avertissement_ it would at first sight seem that he looks upon direct

adaptation to new conditions as the chief cause of evolution. He says--"Je

regardai comme certain que le _mouvement des fluides_ dans l'intérieur des

animaux, mouvement qui c'est progressivement accéléré avec la composition

plus grande de l'organisation; et que _l'influence des circonstances_

nouvelles, à mesure que les animaux s'y exposèrent en se répandant dans

tous les lieux habitables, furent les deux causes générales qui ont amené

les différents animaux à l'état où nous les voyons actuellement." But

elsewhere the view he expresses appears decidedly different from this. He

asserts that "dans sa marche, la nature a commencé, et recommence encore

tous les jours, par former les corps organisés les plus simples;" and that

"les premières ébauches de l'animal et du végétal étant formées dans les

lieux et les circonstances convenables, les facultés d'une vie commençante

et d'un mouvement organique établi, ont nécessairement développé peu à peu

les organes, et qu'avec le temps elles les ont diversifies ainsi que les

parties." And then, further on, he puts in italics this proposition:--"_La

progression dans la composition de l'organisation subit, çà et là, dans la

série générale des animaux, des anomalies opérées par l'influence des

circonstances d'habitation, et par celle des habitudes contractées._"

These, and sundry other passages, joined with his general scheme of

classification, make it clear that Lamarck conceived adaptive modification

to be, not the cause of progression, but the cause of irregularities in

progression. The inherent tendency which organisms have to develop into

more perfect forms, would, according to him, result in a uniform series of

forms; but varieties in their conditions work divergences of structure,

which break up the series into groups: groups which he nevertheless places

in uni-serial order, and regards as still substantially composing an

ascending succession.

§ 147. These speculations, crude as they may be considered, show much

sagacity in their respective authors, and have done good service. Without

embodying the truth in definite shapes, they contain adumbrations of it.

Not directly, but by successive approximations, do mankind reach correct

conclusions; and those who first think in the right direction, loose as may

be their reasonings, and wide of the mark as their inferences may be, yield

indispensable aid by framing provisional conceptions and giving a bent to

inquiry.

Contrasted with the dogmas of his age, the idea of De Maillet was a great

advance. Before it can be ascertained how organized beings have been

gradually evolved, there must be reached the conviction that they _have_

been gradually evolved; and this conviction he reached. His wild notions

about the way in which natural causes acted in the production of plants and

animals, must not make us forget the merit of his intuition that animals

and plants _were_ produced by natural causes. In Dr. Darwin's brief

exposition, the belief in a progressive genesis of organisms is joined with

an interpretation having considerable definiteness and coherence. In the

space of ten pages he not only indicates several of the leading classes of

facts which support the hypothesis of development, but he does something

towards suggesting the process of development. His reasonings show an

unconscious mingling of the belief in a supernaturally-impressed tendency

to develop, with the belief in a development arising from the changing

incidence of conditions. Probably had he pursued the inquiry further, this

last belief would have grown at the expense of the first. Lamarck, in

elaborating this general conception, has given greater precision both to

its truth and to its error. Asserting the same imaginary factors and the

same real factors, he has traced out their supposed actions in detail; and

has, in consequence, committed himself to a greater number of untenable

positions. But while, in trying to reconcile the facts with a theory which

is only an adumbration of the truth, he laid himself open to the criticisms

of his contemporaries; he proved himself profounder than his contemporaries

by seeing that natural genesis, however caused, has been going on. If they

were wise in not indorsing a theory which fails to account for a great part

of the facts; they were unwise in ignoring that degree of congruity with

the facts, which shows the theory to contain some fundamental verity.

Leaving out, however, the imaginary factors of evolution which these

speculations allege, and looking only at the one actual factor which Dr.

Darwin and Lamarck assign as accounting for some of the phenomena; it is

manifest, from our present stand-point, that this, so far as it is a cause

of evolution, is a proximate cause and not an ultimate cause. To say that

functionally-produced adaptation to conditions originates either evolution

in general, or the irregularities of evolution, is to raise the further

question--why is there a functionally-produced adaptation to

conditions?--why do use and disuse generate appropriate changes of

structure? Neither this nor any other interpretation of biologic evolution

which rests simply on the basis of biologic induction, is an ultimate

interpretation. The biologic induction must itself be interpreted. Only

when the process of evolution of organisms is affiliated on the process of

evolution in general, can it be truly said to be explained. The thing

required is to show that its various results are corollaries from first

principles. We have to reconcile the facts with the universal laws of the

re-distribution of matter and motion.

The Principles of Biology, Volume 1 (of 2) · 第 8 / 17 章