We saw, in the preceding lecture, how the most primitive form of

political association known to have existed is that of the _clan_, or

group of families held together by ties of descent from a common

ancestor. We saw how the change from a nomadic to a stationary mode of

life, attendant upon the adoption of agricultural pursuits, converted

the clan into a _mark_ or village-community, something like those which

exist to-day in Russia. The political progress of primitive society

seems to have consisted largely in the coalescence of these small groups

into larger groups. The first series of compound groups resulting from

the coalescence of adjacent marks is that which was known in nearly all

Teutonic lands as the _hundred_, in Athens as the [Greek: _phratria_] or

_brotherhood_, in Rome as the _curia_. Yet alongside of the Roman group

called the _curia_ there is a group whose name, the _century_, exactly

translates the name of the Teutonic group; and, as Mr. Freeman says, it

is difficult to believe that the Roman _century_ did not at the outset

in some way correspond to the Teutonic _hundred_ as a stage in political

organization. But both these terms, as we know them in history, are

survivals from some prehistoric state of things; and whether they were

originally applied to a hundred of houses, or of families, or of

warriors, we do not know.[8] M. Geffroy, in his interesting essay on the

Germania of Tacitus, suggests that the term _canton_ may have a similar

origin.[9] The outlines of these primitive groups are, however, more

obscure than those of the more primitive mark, because in most cases

they have been either crossed and effaced or at any rate diminished in

importance by the more highly compounded groups which came next in order

of formation. Next above the _hundred_, in order of composition, comes

the group known in ancient Italy as the_pagus_, in Attika perhaps as the

_deme_, in Germany and at first in England as the _gau_ or _ga_, at a

later date in England as the _shire_. Whatever its name, this group

answers to the _tribe_ regarded as settled upon a certain determinate

territory. Just as in the earlier nomadic life the aggregation of clans

makes ultimately the tribe, so in the more advanced agricultural life of

our Aryan ancestors the aggregation of marks or village-communities

makes ultimately the _gau_ or _shire_. Properly speaking, the name

_shire_ is descriptive of division and not of aggregation; but this term

came into use in England after the historic order of formation had been

forgotten, and when the _shire_ was looked upon as a _piece_ of some

larger whole, such as the kingdom of Mercia or Wessex. Historically,

however, the _shire_ was not made, like the _departments_ of modern

France, by the division of the kingdom for administrative purposes, but

the kingdom was made by the union of shires that were previously

autonomous. In the primitive process of aggregation, the _shire_ or

_gau_, governed by its _witenagemote_ or "meeting of wise men," and by

its chief magistrate who was called _ealdorman_ in time of peace and

_heretoga_, "army-leader," _dux_, or _duke_, in time of war,--the

_shire_, I say, in this form, is the largest and most complex political

body we find previous to the formation of kingdoms and nations. But in

saying this, we have already passed beyond the point at which we can

include in the same general formula the process of political development

in Teutonic countries on the one hand and in Greece and Rome on the

other. Up as far as the formation of the tribe, territorially regarded,

the parallelism is preserved; but at this point there begins an

all-important divergence. In the looser and more diffused society of the

rural Teutons, the tribe is spread over a shire, and the aggregation of

shires makes a kingdom, embracing cities, towns, and rural districts

held together by similar bonds of relationship to the central governing

power. But in the society of the old Greeks and Italians, the

aggregation of tribes, crowded together on fortified hill-tops, makes

the _Ancient City_,--a very different thing, indeed, from the modern

city of later-Roman or Teutonic foundation. Let us consider, for a

moment, the difference.

Sir Henry Maine tells us that in Hindustan nearly all the great towns

and cities have arisen either from the simple expansion or from the

expansion and coalescence of primitive village-communities; and such as

have not arisen in this way, including some of the greatest of Indian

cities, have grown up about the intrenched camps of the Mogul

emperors.[10] The case has been just the same in modern Europe. Some

famous cities of England and Germany--such as Chester and Lincoln,

Strasburg and Maintz,--grew up about the camps of the Roman legions. But

in general the Teutonic city has been formed by the expansion and

coalescence of thickly-peopled townships and hundreds. In the United

States nearly all cities have come from the growth and expansion of

villages, with such occasional cases of coalescence as that of Boston

with Roxbury and Charlestown. Now and then a city has been laid out as a

city _ab initio_, with full consciousness of its purpose, as a man would

build a house; and this was the case not merely with Martin Chuzzlewit's

"Eden," but with the city of Washington, the seat of our federal

government. But, to go back to the early ages of England--the country

which best exhibits the normal development of Teutonic institutions--the

point which I wish especially to emphasize is this: _in no case does the

city appear as equivalent to the dwelling-place of a tribe or of a

confederation of tribes_. In no case does citizenship, or burghership,

appear to rest upon the basis of a real or assumed community of descent

from a single real or mythical progenitor. In the primitive mark, as we

have seen, the bond which kept the community together and constituted it

a political unit was the bond of blood-relationship, real or assumed;

but this was not the case with the city or borough. The city did not

correspond with the tribe, as the mark corresponded with the clan. The

aggregation of clans into tribes corresponded with the aggregation of

marks, not into _cities_ but into _shires_. The multitude of compound

political units, by the further compounding of which a nation was to be

formed, did not consist of cities but of shires. The city was simply a

point in the shire distinguished by greater density of population. The

relations sustained by the thinly-peopled rural townships and hundreds

to the general government of the shire were co-ordinate with the

relations sustained to the same government by those thickly-peopled

townships and hundreds which upon their coalescence were known as cities

or boroughs. Of course I am speaking now in a broad and general way, and

without reference to such special privileges or immunities as cities and

boroughs frequently obtained by royal charter in feudal times. Such

special privileges--as for instance the exemption of boroughs from the

ordinary sessions of the county court, under Henry I.[11]--were in their

nature grants from an external source, and were in nowise inherent in

the position or mode of origin of the Teutonic city. And they were,

moreover, posterior in date to that embryonic period of national growth

of which I am now speaking. They do not affect in any way the

correctness of my general statement, which is sufficiently illustrated

by the fact that the oldest shire-motes, or county-assemblies, were

attended by representatives from all the townships and hundreds in the

shire, whether such townships and hundreds formed parts of boroughs

or not.

Very different from this was the embryonic growth of political society

in ancient Greece and Italy. There the aggregation of clans into tribes

and confederations of tribes resulted directly, as we have seen, in the

City. There burghership, with its political and social rights and

duties, had its theoretical basis in descent from a common ancestor, or

from a small group of closely-related common ancestors. The group of

fellow-citizens was associated through its related groups of ancestral

household-deities, and through religious rites performed in common to

which it would have been sacrilege to have admitted a stranger. Thus the

Ancient City was a religious as well as a political body, and in either

character it was complete in itself and it was sovereign. Thus in

ancient Greece and Italy the primitive clan-assembly or township-meeting

did not grow by aggregation into the assembly of the shire, but it

developed into the _comitia_ or _ecclesia_ of the city. The chief

magistrate was not the _ealdorman_ of early English history, but the

_rex_ or _basileus_ who combined in himself the functions of king,

general, and priest. Thus, too, there was a severance, politically,

between city and country such as the Teutonic world has never known. The

rural districts surrounding a city might be subject to it, but could

neither share its franchise nor claim a co-ordinate franchise with it.

Athens, indeed, at an early period, went so far as to incorporate with

itself Eleusis and Marathon and the other rural towns of Attika. In this

one respect Athens transgressed the bounds of ancient civic

organization, and no doubt it gained greatly in power thereby. But

generally in the Hellenic world the rural population in the

neighbourhood of a great city were mere [Greek: _perioikoi_], or

"dwellers in the vicinity"; the inhabitants of the city who had moved

thither from some other city, both they and their descendants, were mere

[Greek: metoikoi], or "dwellers in the place"; and neither the one class

nor the other could acquire the rights and privileges of citizenship. A

revolution, indeed, went on at Athens, from the time of Solon to the

time of Kleisthenes, which essentially modified the old tribal divisions

and admitted to the franchise all such families resident from time

immemorial as did not belong to the tribes of eupatrids by whom the city

was founded. But this change once accomplished, the civic exclusiveness

of Athens remained very much what it was before. The popular assembly

was enlarged, and public harmony was secured; but Athenian burghership

still remained a privilege which could not be acquired by the native of

any other city. Similar revolutions, with a similarly limited purpose

and result, occurred at Sparta, Elis, and other Greek cities. At Rome,

by a like revolution, the plebeians of the Capitoline and Aventine

acquired parallel rights of citizenship with the patricians of the

original city on the Palatine; but this revolution, as we shall

presently see, had different results, leading ultimately to the

overthrow of the city-system throughout the ancient world.

The deep-seated difference between the Teutonic political system based

on the shire and the Græco-Roman system based on the city is now, I

think, sufficiently apparent. Now from this fundamental difference have

come two consequences of enormous importance,--consequences of which it

is hardly too much to say that, taken together, they furnish the key to

the whole history of European civilization as regarded purely from a

political point of view.

The first of these consequences had no doubt a very humble origin in the

mere difference between the shire and the city in territorial extent and

in density of population. When people live near together it is easy for

them to attend a town-meeting, and the assembly by which public business

is transacted is likely to remain a _primary assembly_, in the true

sense of the term. But when people are dispersed over a wide tract of

country, the primary assembly inevitably shrinks up into an assembly of

such persons as can best afford the time and trouble of attending it, or

who have the strongest interest in going, or are most likely to be

listened to after they get there. Distance and difficulty, and in early

times danger too, keep many people away. And though a shire is not a

wide tract of country for most purposes, and according to modern ideas,

it was nevertheless quite wide enough in former times to bring about the

result I have mentioned. In the times before the Norman conquest, if not

before the completed union of England under Edgar, the shire-mote or

county assembly, though in theory still a folk-mote or primary assembly,

had shrunk into what was virtually a witenagemote or assembly of the

most important persons in the county. But the several townships, in

order to keep their fair share of control over county affairs, and not

wishing to leave the matter to chance, sent to the meetings each its

_representatives_ in the persons of the town-reeve and four "discreet

men." I believe it has not been determined at what precise time this

step was taken, but it no doubt long antedates the Norman conquest. It

is mentioned by Professor Stubbs as being already, in the reign of Henry

III., a custom of immemorial antiquity.[12] It was one of the greatest

steps ever taken in the political history of mankind. In these four

discreet men we have the forerunners of the two burghers from each town

who were summoned by Earl Simon to the famous parliament of 1265, as

well as of the two knights from each shire whom the king had summoned

eleven years before. In these four discreet men sent to speak for their

township in the old county assembly, we have the germ of institutions

that have ripened into the House of Commons and into the legislatures of

modern kingdoms and republics. In the system of representation thus

inaugurated lay the future possibility of such gigantic political

aggregates as the United States of America.

In the ancient city, on the other hand, the extreme compactness of the

political structure made representation unnecessary and prevented it

from being thought of in circumstances where it might have proved of

immense value. In an aristocratic Greek city, like Sparta, all the

members of the ruling class met together and voted in the assembly; in a

democratic city, like Athens, all the free citizens met and voted; in

each case the assembly was primary and not representative. The only

exception, in all Greek antiquity, is one which emphatically proves the

rule. The Amphiktyonic Council, an institution of prehistoric origin,

concerned mainly with religious affairs pertaining to the worship of the

Delphic Apollo, furnished a precedent for a representative, and indeed

for a federal, assembly. Delegates from various Greek tribes and cities

attended it. The fact that with such a suggestive precedent before their

eyes the Greeks never once hit upon the device of representation, even

in their attempts at framing federal unions, shows how thoroughly their

whole political training had operated to exclude such a conception from

their minds.

The second great consequence of the Graeco-Roman city-system was linked

in many ways with this absence of the representative principle. In

Greece the formation of political aggregates higher and more extensive

than the city was, until a late date, rendered impossible. The good and

bad sides of this peculiar phase of civilization have been often enough

commented on by historians. On the one hand the democratic assembly of

such an imperial city as Athens furnished a school of political training

superior to anything else that the world has ever seen. It was something

like what the New England town-meeting would be if it were continually

required to adjust complicated questions of international polity, if it

were carried on in the very centre or point of confluence of all

contemporary streams of culture, and if it were in the habit every few

days of listening to statesmen and orators like Hamilton or Webster,

jurists like Marshall, generals like Sherman, poets like Lowell,

historians like Parkman. Nothing in all history has approached the

high-wrought intensity and brilliancy of the political life of Athens.

On the other hand, the smallness of the independent city, as a political

aggregate, made it of little or no use in diminishing the liability to

perpetual warfare which is the curse of all primitive communities. In a

group of independent cities, such as made up the Hellenic world, the

tendency to warfare is almost as strong, and the occasions for warfare

are almost as frequent, as in a congeries of mutually hostile tribes of

barbarians. There is something almost lurid in the sharpness of contrast

with which the wonderful height of humanity attained by Hellas is set

off against the fierce barbarism which characterized the relations of

its cities to one another. It may be laid down as a general rule that in

an early state of society, where the political aggregations are small,

warfare is universal and cruel. From the intensity of the jealousies and

rivalries between adjacent self-governing groups of men, nothing short

of chronic warfare can result, until some principle of union is evolved

by which disputes can be settled in accordance with general principles

admitted by all. Among peoples that have never risen above the tribal

stage of aggregation, such as the American Indians, war is the normal

condition of things, and there is nothing fit to be called

_peace_,--there are only truces of brief and uncertain duration. Were it

not for this there would be somewhat less to be said in favour of great

states and kingdoms. As modern life grows more and more complicated and

interdependent, the Great State subserves innumerable useful purposes;

but in the history of civilization its first service, both in order of

time and in order of importance, consists in the diminution of the

quantity of warfare and in the narrowing of its sphere. For within the

territorial limits of any great and permanent state, the tendency is for

warfare to become the exception and peace the rule. In this direction

the political careers of the Greek cities assisted the progress of

civilization but little.

Under the conditions of Graeco-Roman civic life there were but two

practicable methods of forming a great state and diminishing the

quantity of warfare. The one method was _conquest with incorporation_,

the other method was _federation_. Either one city might conquer all

the others and endow their citizens with its own franchise, or all the

cities might give up part of their sovereignty to a federal body which

should have power to keep the peace, and should represent the civilized

world of the time in its relations with outlying barbaric peoples. Of

these two methods, obviously the latter is much the more effective, but

it presupposes for its successful adoption a higher general state of

civilization than the former. Neither method was adopted by the Greeks

in their day of greatness. The Spartan method of extending its power was

conquest without incorporation: when Sparta conquered another Greek

city, she sent a _harmost_ to govern it like a tyrant; in other words

she virtually enslaved the subject city. The efforts of Athens tended

more in the direction of a peaceful federalism. In the great Delian

confederacy which developed into the maritime empire of Athens, the

Ægean cities were treated as allies rather than subjects. As regards

their local affairs they were in no way interfered with, and could they

have been represented in some kind of a federal council at Athens, the

course of Grecian history might have been wonderfully altered. As it

was, they were all deprived of one essential element of

sovereignty,--the power of controlling their own military forces. Some

of them, as Chios and Mitylene, furnished troops at the demand of

Athens; others maintained no troops, but paid a fixed tribute to Athens

in return for her protection. In either case they felt shorn of part of

their dignity, though otherwise they had nothing to complain of; and

during the Peloponnesian war Athens had to reckon with their tendency to

revolt as well as with her Dorian enemies. Such a confederation was

naturally doomed to speedy overthrow.

In the century following the death of Alexander, in the closing age of

Hellenic independence, the federal idea appears in a much more advanced

stage of elaboration, though in a part of Greece which had been held of

little account in the great days of Athens and Sparta. Between the

Achaian federation, framed in 274 B.C., and the United States of

America, there are some interesting points of resemblance which have

been elaborately discussed by Mr. Freeman, in his "History of Federal

Government." About the same time the Aetolian League came into

prominence in the north. Both these leagues were instances of true

federal government, and were not mere confederations; that is, the

central government acted directly upon all the citizens and not merely

upon the local governments. Each of these leagues had for its chief

executive officer a General elected for one year, with powers similar to

those of an American President. In each the supreme assembly was a

primary assembly at which every citizen from every city of the league

had a right to be present, to speak, and to vote; but as a natural

consequence these assemblies shrank into comparatively aristocratic

bodies. In Ætolia, which was a group of mountain cantons similar to

Switzerland, the federal union was more complete than in Achaia, which

was a group of cities. In Achaia cases occurred in which a single city

was allowed to deal separately with foreign powers. Here, as in earlier

Greek history, the instinct of autonomy was too powerful to admit of

complete federation. Yet the career of the Achaian League was not an

inglorious one. For nearly a century and a half it gave the Peloponnesos

a larger measure of orderly government than the country had ever known

before, without infringing upon local liberties. It defied successfully

the threats and assaults of Macedonia, and yielded at last only to the

all-conquering might of Rome.

Thus in so far as Greece contributed anything towards the formation of

great and pacific political aggregates, she did it through attempts at

_federation_. But in so low a state of political development as that

which prevailed throughout the Mediterranean world in pre-Christian

times, the more barbarous method of _conquest with incorporation_ was

more likely to be successful on a great scale. This was well illustrated

in the history of Rome,--a civic community of the same generic type with

Sparta and Athens, but presenting specific differences of the highest

importance. The beginnings of Rome, unfortunately, are prehistoric. I

have often thought that if some beneficent fairy could grant us the

power of somewhere raising the veil of oblivion which enshrouds the

earliest ages of Aryan dominion in Europe, there is no place from which

the historian should be more glad to see it lifted than from Rome in the

centuries which saw the formation of the city, and which preceded the

expulsion of the kings. Even the legends, which were uncritically

accepted from the days of Livy to those of our grandfathers, are

provokingly silent upon the very points as to which we would fain get at

least a hint. This much is plain, however, that in the embryonic stage

of the Roman commonwealth some obscure processes of fusion or

commingling went on. The tribal population of Rome was more

heterogeneous than that of the great cities of Greece, and its earliest

municipal religion seems to have been an assemblage of various tribal

religions that had points of contact with other tribal religions

throughout large portions of the Græco-Italic world. As M. de Coulanges

observes,[13] Rome was almost the only city of antiquity which was not

kept apart from other cities by its religion. There was hardly a people

in Greece or Italy which it was restrained from admitting to

participation in its municipal rites.

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