grows from the egg _in utero_, just as a dog or a monkey does; the
facts are before us and can be scrutinised in detail. We may ask of
those who refuse to admit the gradual and natural development of man’s
consciousness in the ancestral series, passing from ape-like forms into
indubitable man, “How do you propose to divide the series presented by
every individual man in his growth from the egg? At what particular phase
in the embryonic series is the soul with its potential consciousness
implanted? Is it in the egg? in the fœtus of this month or of that? in
the new-born infant? or at five years of age?” This, it is notorious,
is a point upon which Churches have never been able to agree; and it is
equally notorious that the unbroken series exists—that the egg becomes
the fœtus, the fœtus the child, and the child the man. On the other
hand we have the historical series—the series, the existence of which
is inferred by Darwin and his adherents. This is a series leading from
simple egg-like organisms to ape-like creatures, and from these to man.
Will those who cannot answer our previous inquiries undertake to assert
dogmatically in the present case at what point in the historical series
there is a break or division? At what step are we to be asked to suppose
that the order of nature was stopped, and a non-natural soul introduced?
The philosopher or theologian of this or that school may arbitrarily draw
an imaginary line here or there in either series, and the evolutionist
will not raise a finger to stop him. As long as truth in the statement of
fact, and logic in the inference from observed fact are respected, there
need be no hostility between evolutionist and theologian. The theologian
is content in the case of individual development from the egg to admit
the facts of individual evolution, and to make assumptions which lie
altogether outside the region of scientific inquiry. So, too, it would
seem only reasonable that he should deal with the historical series,
and frankly accept the natural evolution of man from lower animals,
declaring dogmatically, if he so please, but not as an inference of the
same order as are the inferences of science, that something called the
soul arrived at any point in the series which he may think suitable. At
the same time, it would appear to be sufficient, even for the purposes of
the theologian, to hold that whatever the two above-mentioned series of
living things contain or imply, they do so as the result of a natural and
uniform process of development, that there has been one “miracle” once
and for all time. It should not be a ground of offence to any school of
thinkers, that Darwinism, whilst leaving them free scope, cannot be made
actually contributory to the support of their particular tenets.
The difficulties which the theologian has to meet when he is called upon
to give some account of the origin and nature of the soul, certainly
cannot be said to have been increased by the establishment of the
Darwinian theory. For from the earliest days of the Church, ingenious
speculation has been lavished on the subject. As to the origin of
the individual soul, Tertullian tells us as follows:—_De Anima_, ch.
xix.—“Anima velut surculus quidam ex matrice Adami in propaginem deducta,
et genitalibus semine foveis commodata. Pullulabit tam intellectu quam et
sensu.”
Whilst St. Augustine says:—“Harum autem sententiarum quatuor de anima,
utrum de propagine veniant, an in singulis quibusque nascentibus
mox fiant, an in corpora nascentium jam alicubi existentes vel
mittantur divinitus, vel sua sponte labantur, _nullam temere affirmari
oporteret_: aut enim nondum ista quæstio a divinorum librorum catholicis
tractatoribus, pro merito suæ obscuritatis et perplexitatis, evoluta
atque illustrata est; aut si jam factum est, nondum in manus nostras
hujuscemodi litteræ provenerunt.”
C.
A very important form of degeneration, not touched on in the text,
is that exhibited in the Mexican axolotl, where the larval form of a
Salamander develops generative organs, and is arrested in its further
progress to the adult parental form. It is not possible to class this
with the other phenomena which I have enumerated as Degeneration, since
there is no modification of an adult structure, but simple arrest, and
retention of the larval structure in all its completeness. I should call
the phenomenon exhibited by axolotl “arrest” or “super-larvation” rather
than degeneration.
The result of super-larvation is in so far similar to that of those
changes to which it is desirable to restrict the term “degeneration,”
that it may be classed under “simplificative evolution” as opposed to
“elaborative evolution.” That there is a very real difference between
super-larvation and degeneration may best be seen by taking a case of
each process and instituting a comparison. Axolotl proceeds regularly
on its course of development from the egg, but instead of passing from
the aquatic gilled condition to the terrestrial gill-less adult form of
the Salamander, it remains arrested in the earlier condition, develops
its reproductive organs, and propagates itself. There is no loss or
atrophy in this case, but simply a dead stop in a progressive course.
On the other hand, as we have seen, the Ascidian loses, by a process of
atrophy and destruction, a powerful locomotive organ, a highly-developed
eye, a relatively large nervous system. The former may be compared to
a permanent childishness, the latter to the second childhood, which is
really atrophy and decay. It is highly probable that super-larvation
has taken place at various epochs and in various groups of the animal
kingdom, just as it does in axolotl, and yet we cannot hope for evidence
fitted to establish its occurrence in any one case, where it is no
longer possible by exceptional conditions to recover (as in the case of
axolotl, which can experimentally be made to advance to the Salamander
phase by proper treatment), the discarded, more developed adult form.
By super-larvation it would be possible for an embryonic form developed
in relation to special embryonic conditions and not recapitulative of
an ancestry, to become the adult form of the race, and thus to give to
the subsequent evolution of that race a totally and otherwise improbable
direction.
It seems also exceedingly probable that “super-larvation” does not occur
only as in axolotl through premature maturation of the reproductive
organs, but the phenomenon _may_ develop itself more slowly by a gradual
creeping forward, as it were, of larval features. Just as the adaptations
acquired in, and having relation to, later life tend to show themselves
in an early period of the development of the individual and out of
due season; so do characters acquired by the early embryo, and having
relation only to this early period of life tend to remain as permanent
structures, and by their invasion to perturb the adult organization. Such
perturbation may tend _either_ to simplification or elaboration.
D.
The term (degeneration of language) includes two very distinct things;
the one is degeneration of grammatical form, the other degeneration
of the language as an instrument of thought. The former is a far
commoner phenomenon than the latter, and, in fact, whilst actually
degenerating so far as grammatical complexity is concerned, a language
may be at the same time becoming more and more serviceable, or more and
more perfect as an organ having a particular function. The decay of
useless inflexions and the consequent simplification of language may
be compared to the specialization of the one toe of the primitively
five-toed foot of the horse, whilst the four others which existed
in archaic horses are, one by one, atrophied. Taken by itself, this
phenomenon may possibly be described as degeneration, but inasmuch as
the whole horse is not degenerate but, on the contrary, specialized and
elaborated, it is advisable to widely distinguish such local atrophy
from general degeneration. In the same way language cannot, in relation
to this question, be treated as a thing by itself—it must be regarded
as a possession of the human organism, and the simplification of its
structure merely means in most cases its more complete adaptation to the
requirements of the organism.
True degeneration of language is therefore only found as part and parcel
of a more general degeneration of mental activity. To some extent the
conclusion that this or that language, as compared with its earlier
condition, exhibits evidence of such degeneration, must be matter of
taste and open to discussion. For instance, the English of Johnson may
be regarded as degenerate when compared with that of Shakspeare. There
is less probability of a difference of opinion as to the degeneracy of
modern Greek as compared with “classical” Greek; or of some of the modern
languages of Hindustan as compared with Sanskrit, and I am informed that
the same kind of degeneration is exhibited by modern Irish as compared
with old Irish. Degeneration, in the proper sense of the word, so far as
it applies to language, would seem to mean simply a decay or diversion
of literary taste and of literary production in the race to which such
language may be appropriate.
LONDON: R. CLAY, SONS, AND TAYLOR, BREAD STREET HILL, E.C.