_To the Editor of the Army and Navy Journal_:
I was greatly interested in the communication of Captain Joubert Reitz,
published in your journal March 21, 1903, giving a description of the
block-house system inaugurated by General Kitchener in the Transvaal War.
It was a continuous line of block-houses connected by barbed wire, to
prevent the Boers crossing the railway lines, and virtually corralling
their forces in certain districts until want of food forced them to
surrender. Captain Reitz asserts that the block-house system did more to
end the war than the whole British Army.
In the Civil War our block-house system was just as effective, but in
another direction. We used it for the purpose of protecting our lines of
communication, not as a trocha, or a line connected with wire fencing and
other obstructions, as used by the British and by the Spaniards in the
Cuban War. The British built theirs of bags filled with earth. The
Spaniards erected neat structures of two stories, built of concrete, with
wooden roofs and openings for two lines of fire, one above the other.
These were erected not more than half a mile apart. In the Civil War our
block-houses were usually erected of logs, one and two stories high. The
face of the upper story had an angle of forty-five degrees to the face of
the first story, thus concentrating a direct fire upon an enemy
approaching from any point of the compass. The first block-houses in the
West that I know of were built by my command in July and August, 1862,
when it rebuilt the Mobile & Ohio Railroad from Columbus to Humbolt. There
were many important bridges on this line, and we built block-houses at the
most important ones, and stockades at the others.
In the fall of 1862, when Forrest and Jackson made the noted raids into
West Tennessee, the forces at all these structures that my command had
erected held their positions, and defeated the enemy when attacked, while
at the bridges between Jackson, Tennessee, and Grand Junction, where they
had only earth defenses, the forces were driven away or captured and the
bridges destroyed. The result of this was that General Grant issued an
order commending the action of the detachments that were successful,
stating that wherever they stood success followed, and the enemy suffered
a loss in killed and wounded greater than the garrisons of the
block-houses and stockades. This result also caused General Grant to issue
an order to build block-houses and stockades on the line of the Memphis &
Charleston Railway at all important bridges from Memphis to Corinth, and
they protected this line of communication until it was abandoned.
The block-houses held about a company, but sometimes stockades or earth
intrenchments were added to hold two companies, and our orders were
imperative to all forces occupying them never to leave them or surrender,
no matter how large the attacking force. My first order stated that a
company in a block-house or stockade was equal to a Regiment attacking,
and I do not remember the enemy, in their numerous raids, ever capturing
one that was defended, up to the time I left Corinth in the summer of
1863. After the Battle of Chattanooga, when our Armies were lying along
the line of the railway from Nashville to Decatur and Nashville to
Stevenson, I rebuilt the Nashville & Decatur Railway, on which there were
at least thirty important bridges, at each of which we built strong
block-houses and stockades, and the enemy never captured one of them,
though in two instances they were attacked with a brigade, and often with
two Regiments and batteries. We protected against artillery fire by
throwing up earthworks to the height of the first line of fire, taking the
chance of any damage being done above that. Our orders here were when
Forest, Roddy, and Hannan attacked this line to hold the posts under any
and all circumstances, stating that if they stayed in the block-houses and
stockades nothing could defeat them, and so it proved. Where these forces
struck a Regiment, and captured it in earth-works, they went twelve miles
north to the Sulphur Trestle, a bridge one hundred and twenty-five feet
high, defended by two companies in a block-house and stockade, and were
signally defeated. The Army of the Cumberland protected the line from
Nashville to Stevenson, and on to Chattanooga, with block-houses at all
bridges and important points, and when on the 5th of May, 1864, General
Sherman started on the Atlanta campaign, General Hooker reports on April
23, 1864, that he detailed 1,460 men to occupy block-houses from Nashville
to Chattanooga, and this force held that line of road throughout the
campaign, though many attempts were made to destroy it. During the Atlanta
campaign as we advanced the railway was rebuilt, and all bridges and
stations had block-houses or stockades to protect them.
General Green B. Raum's Brigade was located at some of the most important
structures. General Wheeler, with all of Johnston's Cavalry force and
several batteries, endeavored to destroy this, our only line of
communication for transporting supplies. General Raum's story is so to the
point that I quote it almost entire. He says:
My experiences with block-houses extended from May to November, 1864,
on the Memphis & Charleston railroad, and the Chattanooga & Atlanta
railroad. Block-houses were built along these railroads exclusively
for the protection of bridges. They were built of heavy square
timbers, sometimes with two or three thicknesses of timber, and were
of various sizes. I had a two-story block-house built at Mud Creek,
east of Scottsboro, Ala.; it would easily hold 100 men. These houses
were carefully pierced with loop-holes, so that the garrison could
cover every approach. My garrisons were usually too large for the
block-houses. In these cases I threw up an earth-work, and protected
it with abatis. The Confederate forces soon learned to respect a
block-house. I found it to be an absolute defense against musketry.
During the Atlanta campaign our block-houses were constantly attacked
by raiding parties; small and great trains would be thrown from the
track and burned, and small sections of the track destroyed. About
July 5, 1864, an enterprising Confederate cavalryman with about 300
men made a rapid march up Dirt Town Valley, crossed the Chattanooga
range by a bridle-path, threw a train of fifteen loaded cars off the
track, burned them, and destroyed a small section of the track, but he
did not attempt to destroy the bridge near by at Tilton--it was
defended by a block-house with a capacity for seventy men.
When General Wheeler made his great raid north in August, 1864, he
struck the railroad at various places. He destroyed two miles of track
immediately south of Tilton, Ga., but did not come within range of the
block-house, and did not attempt to destroy the bridge defended by the
block-house. During this raid General Wheeler, without hesitation,
attacked and carried a part of the works at Dalton. During the Atlanta
campaign there was not a bridge destroyed by the Confederates between
Nashville and Atlanta which was protected by a block-house.
After the fall of Atlanta, General Hood moved with his entire army
against the Chattanooga and Atlanta railroad, destroying thirty-seven
miles of track. On October 12 he struck the railroad at Resaca and
Tilton. Tilton was garrisoned by the Seventeenth Iowa.
Lieutenant-Colonel Archer commanding. He had about 350 men--no
artillery. An Army Corps was in his front. Colonel Archer held the
enemy off seven hours, fighting from his rifle-pits and block-house.
At last the Confederate commander placed several batteries in
position, and opened upon the devoted garrison. In a short time the
block-house was rendered untenable, and Colonel Archer was forced to
surrender. This was the first and only success against our block-house
system. On December 4, 1814, Bates's division of Cheatham's Corps
attacked the block-house at the railroad crossing of Overall's Creek,
five miles north of Murfreesborough, Tenn. The enemy used artillery
to reduce the block-house, and although seventy-four shots were fired
at it, no material injury was done; the garrison held out until
relieved by General Milroy from Murfreesborough.
After the Atlanta campaign, in the Department of the Missouri, every
important bridge and town where detachments of troops were stationed was
protected by block-houses and stockades, and during the Indian campaigns
of 1864-5-6 our lines of communication, stage and telegraph, were all held
successfully by small detachments of troops in block-houses and stockades,
and were never captured unless overwhelming forces of the Indians attacked
them, and only then when the defensive works were inferior or not properly
constructed; and, even in cases where detachments left their stations, if
they had remained they would have successfully held them. After I took
command on the plains and issued positive orders for detachments to stay
by their posts and never leave them, not a single detachment that I
remember of was captured in its block-house or stockade. With the small
force we had it would have been impossible to maintain our mail, telegraph
and overland routes successfully, if it had not been for our system of
block-houses and stockades, dotted for thousands of miles over each of the
overland routes. It is evident from our experience in the West that our
block-house and stockade system of defending our lines of communication
was a great success, not only as against raids of cavalry, but from
attacks of infantry and artillery, and saved to us a very large force for
the field. I left on the line of the railway from Nashville to Athens
during the Atlanta campaign only two Regiments of negroes, taking with me
my entire Corps, and without the block-houses to defend the lines from
Nashville to Stevenson and Stevenson to Atlanta, it would have taken a
thousand men without block-house protection for every hundred required
with it.