_Brigadier-General_.
Upon notification of General Rosecrans of the movement of Colonel
Streight, I moved out to carry out the combined plan, engaging the enemy
at Little Bear and Tuscumbia, and defeated them as my report shows.
Colonel Streight was greatly delayed in starting from Nashville, and was
only partially mounted, his intention being to complete the mount of his
force as he traveled through the enemy's country--a fatal mistake. His
delay in reaching me and my movement caused Bragg to send General Forrest
to join General Roddey; and so by the time General Streight reached
Eastport, April 21st, the force before me had been doubled and the best
cavalry officer in the rebel force had arrived to take command in my
front.
Colonel Streight lost part of his horses and mules while unloading at
Eastport, and, although I made an effort to mount him, stripping my own
transportation and scouring the country in my vicinity, still he left us
after I captured Tuscumbia the second time, on May 26th, with two hundred
of his men dismounted and one-half of the rest on mules, illy prepared for
such a trip. I told Colonel Streight that I would hold the enemy in my
front as long as possible, but the moment Colonel Forrest got word of his
movement he would go after him and follow him to death. His only salvation
was to get three or four days' start by long marches before Forrest
learned of his movement. Colonel Streight was an officer peculiarly fitted
for such a raid. He was active, clearheaded, determined, and of excellent
judgment, and his many fights with Forrest showed him full of resources;
but his two-days' halt at Moulton, the heavy rains, and the condition of
his stock, were fatal to him.
On the morning of May 27th I felt carefully of the enemy and found them in
my front, and commenced immediately to force them back, trying to make
them believe, if they discovered Colonel Streight, that it was only a side
movement into the loyal part of Alabama, where we had many friends and
where we enlisted a Regiment of loyal Alabamians, which was afterwards
known as the First Alabama Cavalry, commanded by Colonel George E.
Spencer, whose Regiment became noted for its valuable service throughout
the war. General Sherman selected it as his headquarters escort in his
march to the sea.
Generals Forrest and Roddey, on May 28th, made a determined stand to halt
my advance on Town Creek. The high water delayed my crossing, but on the
morning of the 29th, after my force had crossed and driven the enemy from
the heights beyond, I discovered that I had only General Roddey and his
force in my front and I forced my cavalry out towards Decatur until the
enemy disappeared from the front. The evening of the 28th I notified
Colonel Streight that Forrest was still with me, and I was greatly alarmed
to find that Colonel Streight was still directly south of me, when I hoped
he would be well on the road. When General Bragg found that I was
continuing my advance up the Tennessee, destroying his stores, he
despatched General Van Dorn with his cavalry command to cross the
Tennessee at Florence and get in my rear, but as soon as the enemy
disappeared in my front, I turned immediately and marched rapidly back to
Bear River, so that, if General Van Dorn succeeded in crossing the
Tennessee River, I would have him in my front. My troops destroyed all the
supplies in the whole Valley of the Tennessee, burnt the railroad
stations, and destroyed the railroad so that it was never rebuilt until
after the war. There followed me back to Corinth almost the entire negro
population of that valley. They came in every conceivable conveyance from
their masters' private carriage to a wheelbarrow, and they had hitched to
the conveyances sometimes a cow and horse and sometimes a fine team of
horses, or a cow and an ox. Hundreds were on foot, with their household
goods packed on a mule, a horse, or a cow. They made a picturesque column,
much longer than my command. At night their camps spread over a large
territory, the camp-fires surrounded by the most motley and poorly-dressed
crowd I ever saw, and it was a problem to me what I could do with them or
what would become of them if the enemy's forces should happen to get into
my rear. However, we all arrived safely at Corinth, where I established
the great contraband camp and guarded it by two companies of Negro
soldiers that I uniformed, armed, and equipped without any authority, and
which came near giving me trouble. Many of the Negro men afterwards joined
the First Alabama Colored Infantry and other Negro Regiments that I raised
and mustered into the service.
In my advance up the Valley of the Tennessee, after I had passed Beaver
Creek the enemy got into my rear, committing depredations and picking up
stragglers, and all kinds of reports went back to Corinth of our fighting,
capture, and other calamities too numerous to mention. These reports were
all repeated to General Grant, who said, after being surfeited with them,
"Well, if Dodge has accomplished what he started out to do, we can afford
to lose him." General Grant said afterwards in discussing this movement
that he knew they could not capture or destroy the kind of troops I had
with me without my being heard from; that they might defeat me, but they
could not capture me; and the boys used to use this saying in rounding up
what value I was to the service. As my own report and that of Colonel
Streight gives more and better detail of the movements of both, and the
results, I submit them here:
I moved from Corinth with the Second Division, Sixteenth Army Corps,
Wednesday, April 15. Camped at Burnsville. The next day moved to
Cook's, two and a half miles west of Great Bear Creek, and made my
preparations to cross, the rebels holding the opposite side.
Friday morning, April 17, I made a feint at Jackson and Bailings
Fords, and, under the cover of my artillery, threw the most of my
force across at Steminine's Ford.
The cavalry, under Colonel Cornyn, and mounted infantry, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, made the crossing and pushed forward. My
instructions were for them to go forward three and a half miles, and
await my coming. Colonel Cornyn, meeting the enemy about a mile out,
commenced fighting them, they falling back rapidly. Hearing of Colonel
Roddey commanding a force of the enemy on my left flank, I sent
orders forward for the command to halt; but before the messenger got
to him Colonel Roddey had got between the cavalry and infantry. The
Third Brigade was in advance, commanded by Colonel Bane, who,
ascertaining this fact, pushed forward and fell upon their rear, but
not until Colonel Roddey had taken two pieces of artillery, twenty-two
men, and one company of mounted infantry, who were guarding it, which,
through neglect, had been allowed to fall three miles in the rear of
the advance.
Colonel Cornyn, hearing firing in the rear, immediately fell back, and
with the First Alabama Cavalry charged the rebels and retook the
artillery and caissons, with the exception of one gun, which the enemy
succeeded in getting off with.
The charge of the Alabamians with muskets only, and those not loaded,
is creditable, especially as they are all new recruits and poorly
drilled. In this charge, Captain Cameron, the commanding officer of
the Alabama Cavalry, a deserving and much-lamented officer, was
killed.
Colonel Bane, on his arrival, disposed of his troops admirably.
Colonel Cornyn advanced with his cavalry as a feint, and the rebels
advanced to meet him. He fell back to the rear of the infantry, which
was posted under cover and out of sight on both flanks of the cavalry.
On the appearance of the enemy, the infantry opened a heavy and
destructive fire, which caused the rebels to fall back in confusion,
utterly routed. This day's work brought us thirteen miles in advance
of the main force.
Colonel Streight not arriving, I fell back with the advance to Great
Bear Creek, where the rest of the command was posted, to await his
coming.
Sunday afternoon, Colonel Streight commenced landing his force at
Eastport, but came poorly prepared for his contemplated movement. He
had two thousand infantry and about one thousand mules. At least four
hundred of them were unserviceable, and in unloading them, through the
carelessness of one of his officers, two hundred strayed away. He was
under the impression that he would find plenty of stock in the valley
to mount the rest and replace those broken down. During Monday and
Tuesday we scoured the country, and found all we could.
Tuesday night Colonel Fuller's Brigade, from Corinth, joined me.
Wednesday morning I advanced with all the force, and came up with the
enemy at Rock Cut, five miles west of Tuscumbia; planted my batteries,
and drove them out of it, taking the line of Little Bear Creek that
night. The enemy's position was a very strong one, and there was but
one way to flank it. The enemy fell back as soon as I brought the
infantry to bear upon them.
Thursday we moved, crossing at three places, throwing my cavalry by
the Frankfort and Tuscumbia road, into the enemy's rear; but during
the night, anticipating this movement, the enemy fell back. We reached
Tuscumbia about noon, and after slight skirmishing took possession of
the city. I immediately dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, with
two squadrons of mounted infantry, two squadrons of the Fifteenth
Illinois Cavalry, and a section of Welker's battery, to take Florence.
They refused to surrender, when Colonel Phillips immediately opened on
the town. A few shell brought them to terms, and we occupied the
place. At the same time I ordered Colonel Cornyn forward toward
Courtland, to feel the enemy. He came up with their rear some two
miles beyond Leighton. The command consisted on our part of the Tenth
Missouri and Seventh Kansas Cavalry, about eight hundred in all, and
drove the enemy eight miles. The rebel force was thirty-five hundred,
besides one battery. The fighting of the cavalry against such odds is
beyond all praise.
The next morning the cavalry fell back to Tuscumbia, to await the
advance of the main column.
Finding it impossible to obtain stock to mount Colonel Streight's
command, I took horses and mules from my teams and mounted infantry,
and furnished him some six hundred head, mounting all but two hundred
of his men. I also turned over all my hard bread, some ten thousand
rations, and he left me at midnight on the 26th instant, with the
intention of going through Russellville, Moulton, and Blountsville, to
Gadsden, then divide, one force to strike Rome and the other Etowah
Bridge.
I moved forward Monday morning, and drove the enemy across Town Greek
that night, and ascertained that they were in force, under Forrest, on
the opposite bank. That night I communicated with Colonel Streight, at
Mount Hope, and ascertained that he was all right.
Tuesday morning the creek rose ten feet, and the current was so swift
that neither horse nor man could cross. I immediately made disposition
to cross at three points, to cover the railroad bridge and throw
across foot-bridges.
The resistance of the enemy was very strong, and their sharpshooters
very annoying. The artillery duel was very fine, parts of Welker's,
Tannrath's, Richardson's, and Robinson's batteries taking part in it.
The practice on both sides was excellent. The Parrott guns drove the
enemy away from their pieces, disabling and keeping them away for two
hours, but the fact of my being unable to cross infantry prevented our
securing them.
About noon I crossed the railroad bridge with the Eighty-first Ohio
and Ninth Illinois Infantry, and soon after crossed the rest of my
force, except the artillery, on foot-bridges, and drove the enemy
within three miles of Courtland, when they, hearing of the force at
Moulton, fled to Decatur. I followed up, and then returned to camp at
Town Creek that night, being unable to cross any of my artillery.
Colonel Streight reached Moulton Tuesday night, and commenced crossing
the mountains Wednesday, having got nearly two days' start of them.
They supposed he was making for Decatur, and only discovered Wednesday
that he was crossing the mountains toward Georgia.
Having accomplished fully the object of the expedition, and driving
the enemy, which was 5,500 strong, to Decatur, and having been on half
rations for a week, I fell back to Tuscumbia, in order to communicate
with transports, to obtain rations and ammunition. On arriving there I
received information that the gunboats had gone down the river, taking
the transports with them, a part of Van Dorn's force having made their
appearance on the north side of the Tennessee River and shelled South
Florence that day at 4 p. m. They also planted a battery at Savannah
and Duck River; but my precaution in destroying all means of crossing
the river on my advance, prevented him getting in my rear, and the
gunboats, to save the transports, left the day before, having a short
engagement at Savannah and Duck River. Van Dorn's force then moved
toward Decatur. That was the last we heard of them.
On my return I burned all provisions, produce, and forage, all mills
and tan-yards, and destroyed everything that would in any way aid the
enemy. I took stock of all kinds that I could find, and rendered the
valley so destitute that it cannot be occupied by the Confederates,
except provisions and forage are transported to them. I also destroyed
telegraph and railroad between Tuscumbia and Decatur, and all the
ferries between Savannah and Courtland.
I have no doubt but that Colonel Streight would have succeeded had he
been properly equipped and joined me at the time agreed upon. The
great delay in an enemy's country necessary to fit him out gave them
time to throw a large force in our front. Although Colonel Streight
had two days' start, they can harass him, and perhaps check his
movements long enough for them to secure all their important bridges.
If he could have started from Bear Creek the day I arrived there, then
my movements would have been so quick and strong that the enemy could
not have got their forces together.
The animals furnished him were very poor at the start. Four hundred of
them were used up before leaving me, and those furnished him by me
were about all the serviceable stock he had, though I hear he got two
hundred good mules the day he left me, in Moulton Valley.
On my return, I sent Colonel Cornyn, with the Tenth Missouri, Seventh
Kansas, Fifteenth Illinois Cavalry, and Ninth Illinois Mounted
Infantry, to attack the force congregated at Tupelo and Okolona. He
came up with the enemy on Wednesday, and immediately attacked them,
they being some three thousand strong, under Major-General S. J.
Gholson and Brigadier-General Ruggles. Brigadier-General Chalmers,
with thirty-five hundred men, was at Pontotoc, but failed to come to
Gholson's aid, though ordered to.
Colonel Cornyn fought so determinedly and so fast that he soon routed
the force in his front, driving them in all directions, killing and
wounding a large number and taking one hundred prisoners, including
some seven officers; also a large number of arms and one hundred and
fifty horses, saddles, etc.
The enemy fled toward Okolona and Pontotoc, and Colonel Cornyn
returned to Corinth.
The expedition so far can be summed up as having accomplished the
object for which it started, the infantry having marched two hundred
and fifty miles and the cavalry some four hundred, and fought six
successful engagements, driving the enemy, three thousand strong, from
Bear Creek to Decatur, taking the towns of Tuscumbia and Florence,
with a loss not to exceed one hundred, including three officers.
Destroyed a million and a half bushels of corn, besides large
quantities of oats, rye, and fodder, and five hundred thousand pounds
of bacon. Captured one hundred and fifty prisoners, one thousand head
of horses and mules, and an equal number of cattle, hogs, and sheep;
also one hundred bales of cotton, besides keeping the whole command in
meat for three weeks. Destroyed the railroad from Tuscumbia to
Decatur; also some sixty flat-boats and ferries in the Tennessee
River, thereby preventing Van Dorn, in his move, from crossing to my
rear; also destroyed five tan-yards and six flouring-mills.
It has rendered desolate one of the best granaries of the South,
preventing them from raising another crop this year, and taking away
from them some fifteen hundred negroes.
We found large quantities of shelled corn, all ready for shipment,
also bacon, and gave it to the flames.