ST. LOUIS, MO., June 22, 1865.
_Hon. James Harlan, Secretary of the Interior, Washington, D. C._:
MY DEAR SIR: Copies of Senator Doolittle's and Commissioner Dole's
letters to you of dates May 31 and June 12 have been furnished me. My
acquaintance with you leads me to believe that you are endeavoring to
get at the real facts of our Indian difficulties and the best methods
for putting an end to them. So far as Senator Doolittle's letter
refers to "some general getting up of an Indian war on his own hook"
and for his own purposes, I shall indulge no reply. You know me, and
if it was intended in any way to apply to me I leave you to judge of
how much credence should be attached to it. My sincere desire is to
terminate these Indian troubles, and I have no hesitation in saying
that if I am allowed to carry out the policy now being pursued toward
them I will have peace with them before another emigration crosses the
plains. When I assumed command of the former Department of Kansas I
found all the important Indian tribes on the plains in open hostility
against us. Whether it was the fault of the white man or the Indian,
the fact was patent. They were holding the entire overland route from
Julesburg to Junction Station, had destroyed the telegraph-lines,
captured trains, burned ranches, and murdered men, women, and children
indiscriminately. I soon stopped these proceedings, opened our broken
lines of communication; repaired, so far as possible, the injury done;
pushed troops out there, and then tried to effect a settlement with
the Indians. On the southern route I found a similar state of affairs
existing. The Indians were on the warpath, and I at once started
expeditions against them, learning of which Colonel Leavenworth,
Indian Agent, informed me that he could make peace with them; that we
were at fault, etc. I stopped my expeditions on the southern route to
give him an opportunity to accomplish this object. He started for
their camps; they robbed him, stole his mules, and he hardly escaped
with his scalp; and on his return stated that it was useless to
attempt to make peace with them. I then, in accordance with the orders
of the Secretary of War, started for the Indians again, and had just
got my forces under way when the committee, of which Senator Doolittle
is a member, reached Fort Larned, and after an interview with Colonel
Leavenworth, gave orders for the expeditionary movements to stop. The
grounds for this action the Senator gives in his letter. I was then
aware that the Indians were moving north to attack that line, and was
moving two columns in concert with General Ford to intercept and
punish them; and I at that time telegraphed that the tribes spoken of
by Senator Doolittle were on their way north to attack our trains.
They had then driven out all traders, made a treaty with the southern
Indians and Texans, and sent me word that they wanted no peace.
Within ten days from the time Senator Doolittle and his party left
Fort Larned, and before I had time to countermand their orders and get
my troops disposed, the Indians attacked the posts and trains all
along the line, running off stock, capturing trains, etc., murdering
men, and showing conclusively that they were determined on war at all
hazards. Our overtures to them, as well as those of the agents sent
out by General Carleton, were treated with disdain. From Fort Laramie
I sent word to the Sioux, Cheyennes, etc., that if they wanted peace
to come in and stop their hostilities. A few of each tribe responded
by coming in; the rest refused, and indicated their purposes and
feelings by attacking the posts west of Fort Laramie, and on Laramie
Plains, murdering, stealing, etc. I undertook to remove the friendly
Indians from Fort Laramie to Fort Kearney, in order to get them away
from the troubles. When about sixty miles south of Fort Laramie they
attacked their guard, killed a captain and four privates, turned upon
five of their chiefs who were disposed to be friendly, killed them,
and then escaped, leaving their camps, etc., in our hands; so that now
we have every Indian tribe capable of mischief from the British
Possessions on the north to the Red River on the south, at war with
us, while the whites are backing them up. These facts, it appears to
me, are a sufficient answer to the letters of Senator Doolittle and
Commissioner Dole. That these Indians have been greatly wronged I have
no doubt, and I am certain that the agents who have been connected
with them are as much to blame as any one else. So far as the
Chivington fight was concerned, it occurred before I assumed command.
I condemned it, and I have issued orders that no such acts will be
tolerated or allowed; that the Indians on the warpath must be fought
wherever and whenever found, but no outrages or barbarities must be
committed. I am convinced that the only way to effectually settle
these troubles is for us to move our columns directly into their
country, punish them when we find them, show them our power, and at
the same time give them to know that: we are ready to make peace with
them--not, however, by paying them for murdering our people and
plundering our trains and posts, but by informing them that if they
will refrain from further hostilities they shall not be molested; that
neither agents nor citizens shall be allowed to go among them to
swindle them; that we will protect them in their rights; that we will
enforce compliance with our part of the treaty, and will require them
to do the same on their part. Let them ask for peace. We should keep
citizens out of their country. The class of men sent among them as
agents go there for no good purpose. They take positions for the sole
purpose of making money out of the Indians by swindling them, and so
long as they can do this they shield them in their crimes.
Colonel Leavenworth, who stands up so boldly for the southern Indians,
was dismissed from the United States service. He "blows hot and cold"
with singular grace. To my officers he talks war to the knife; to
Senator Doolittle and others he talks peace. Indeed, he is all things
to all men. When officers of the army deal with these Indians, if they
mistreat them, we have a certain remedy for their cases. They can be
dismissed and disgraced, while Indian agents can only be displaced by
others perhaps no better. Now I am confident we can settle these
Indian difficulties in the manner I have indicated. The Indians say to
me that they will treat with an officer of the army (a brave), in all
of whom they seem to have confidence, while they despise and suspect
civilian agents and citizens, by whom they say they have been deceived
and swindled so much that they put no trust in their words. I have
given orders to the commanders of each of my columns that when they
have met and whipped these Indians, or even before, if they have an
opportunity, to arrange, if possible, an informal treaty with them for
a cessation of hostilities, and whatever they agree to do, to live to
strictly, allowing no one, either citizen or soldier, to break it. I
shall myself go out on the plains in a few weeks and try to get an
interview with the chiefs and if possible effect an amicable
settlement of affairs; but I am utterly opposed to making any treaty
that pays them for the outrages they have committed, or that hires
them to keep the peace. Such treaties last just as long as they think
them for their benefit, and no longer. As soon as the sugar, coffee,
powder, lead, etc., that we give them, is gone, they make war to get
us to give them more. We must first punish them until we make them
fear us and respect our power, and then we must ourselves live
strictly up to the treaties made. No one desires more than I do to
effect a permanent peace with these Indians, and such is the desire of
every officer under me, all of whom agree in the method suggested for
bringing it about.
Very many of these officers on the plains have been there for years,
and are well acquainted with these Indians and their character, and my
own opinions in this matter are founded not alone from my experience
and observations since I have commanded here, but also with
intercourse with them on the plains during a number of years prior to
the war, in which time I met and had dealings with nearly every tribe
east of the Rocky Mountains. Until hostilities cease I trust that you
will keep all agents, citizens and traders away from them. When peace
is made with them, if civilian agents and citizens are sent among
them, send those who you know to be of undoubted integrity. I know you
desire to do so, and from the appointments you have already made I
believe you will be successful. My plan, however, would be to keep
these Indians under the care of officers of the army, stationed in
their country; that what is given them be given by these officers, and
that all citizens, agents and traders should, while among them, be
subject to their (the officers') supervision and police regulations.
In this way I have no doubt these Indians can be kept in their own
country, their outrages stopped, and our overland routes kept safe.
Now, not a train or coach of any kind can cross the plains in safety
without being guarded, and I have over 3,000 miles of route to protect
and guard. The statement that the Sand Creek affair was the first
Indian aggression is a mistake. For months prior to that affair the
Indians had been attacking our trains, posts, and ranches; had robbed
the emigrants and murdered any party they considered too weak to
defend themselves.
The theory that we cannot punish these Indians effectually, and that
we must make or accept any kind of a peace in order to hold our
overland routes, is not sustained by the facts, is singularly
erroneous, and I cannot agree to it by any means. I have now seven
different columns of troops penetrating their country in all
directions, while at the same time I am holding the overland routes.
This display of force alone will alarm and terrify them; will show
them that we are in earnest, have the power, and intend at all hazards
to make them behave themselves. After we have taught them this they
will sue for peace; then if the government sees fit to indemnify them
for any wrongs inflicted upon them, they will not charge it to our
fears or inability to cope with them. The cost of carrying on this war
with them is, to be sure, considerable; but the question arises, Had
we not better bear this cost now while the preparations are made and
the force on hand ready to be thrown in such strength into their
country as to make quick, effective, and final work of it, than to
suffer a continuance of their outrages for a long time and finally
have to do the work at greater expense of blood and treasure? I have
written you this frankly and truly, knowing that you want to get at
the facts and do that which is for the best, and I am convinced that
when you fully understand these matters you will agree with me. I
shall be glad at any and all times to furnish you any information in
my possession that you may desire, and I assure you I shall bend all
my energies to the accomplishment of the great object in view and so
much desired--a lasting and just peace with these Indians.