In December, 1864, I was assigned to the command of the Department of the
Missouri. In January, 1865, I received a dispatch from General Grant
asking if a campaign on the plains could be made in the winter. I
answered, "Yes, if the proper preparation was made to clothe and bivouac
the troops." A few days after I received a dispatch from General Grant
ordering me to Fort Leavenworth. In the meantime the Department of Kansas
was merged into the Department of the Missouri, placing under my command
Missouri, the Indian Territory, Kansas, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and all
the country south of the Yellowstone River, and embracing all the overland
mail-routes and telegraph-lines to the Pacific.
On reaching Port Leavenworth I found that General Curtis, the former
commander of that department, had reported against any campaign during the
winter; that the Indians had possession of the entire country crossed by
the stage-lines, having destroyed the telegraph-lines; and that the people
living in Colorado, Utah, California, Western Nebraska and Western Kansas
were without mails, and in a state of panic; that the troops distributed
along the routes of travel were inside their stockades, the Indians having
in nearly every fight defeated them. This success had brought into
hostility with the United States nearly every tribe of Indians from Texas
on the south to the Yellowstone on the north. It was a formidable
combination, and the friendly Indians were daily leaving the reservations
to join their hostile brethren. Two thousand Indians had destroyed over
one hundred miles of telegraph, and were in possession of the country
between the Arkansas and the North Platte Rivers.
The opinion at Fort Leavenworth before I arrived was that it was
impossible to make a successful campaign against these Indians during the
winter and successfully open these lines of communication. There were two
Regiments of Cavalry in Kansas, mostly idle. There was no communication
with any of the posts except by messenger. A dispatch from Colorado showed
a panic there, and the people demanded that troops of the Department be
stationed there to protect the citizens, instead of their organizing and
fighting the Indians, and that martial law had been declared.
I saw, after spending a day at Fort Leavenworth, that it was necessary to
change the depressed feeling and temper existing among the troops and the
citizens throughout the department. I sent for Bela M. Hughes, agent of
the overland stages, and Edward Craighten, general manager and
superintendent of the overland telegraph, and consulted fully with them. I
selected from my old guides some of the most trusted men, and some of the
trusted Indians that I had known, and sent by them to each district
commander who could be reached, these two short dispatches:
1. What measures are you taking to keep open the route and protect it?
What Indians are engaged in the struggle? Where are their villages? Do
their families travel with them? Have you spies in their camps? What
action have you taken to repair telegraph-lines? Give me all
particulars.
2. Place every mounted man in your command on the South Platte Route.
Repair telegraphs; attack any body of Indians you meet, large or
small. Stay with them and pound them until they move north of the
Platte or south of the Arkansas. I am coming with two Regiments of
cavalry to the Platte line and will open and protect it, and whip all
the Indians in the way.
I also found that the plains were covered with Indian traders who had
permits, under the guise of which they were stealing from the Indians,
both friendly and hostile, and were selling them arms and ammunition. I
immediately revoked all these permits, and ordered the arrest of all
traders who had in their possession Indian or Government stock. I also
immediately wired to Major Frank North, who was the interpreter of the
Pawnee Indians, and also to the Chief of the Omaha Indians, both of whom
had been with me on the plains, and instructed them to select their most
trusted men and send them on the plains to ascertain for me the purpose of
the hostile Indians, and whether they would head towards the settlements,
or if their movements indicated they would attack only the lines of
communication and the trains crossing the plains. At the same time we
stopped all trains on the plains and ordered them to the nearest military
post, instructing the officers to arm and organize them in companies, and
place a United States officer over them, and have them move with the army
trains.
Having perfected the preliminary organization for moving upon the stage-
and telegraph-lines, we saw it was necessary to concentrate on one line.
At this time the stage- and telegraph-lines on the north ran from Fort
Leavenworth to Fort Kearney, and from Omaha to Fort Kearney, where they
were consolidated, running up the Platte Valley to the mouth of the Lodge
Pole, the stage-station at that point being known as Julesburg. The lines
here separated again, the main telegraph-line running to old Fort Laramie,
thence up the Sweetwater through South Pass and thence to Utah. The
stage-line ran up the South Platte to Denver, then by the Cache La Poudre
to Laramie Plains, over them to Fort Halleck and Bridger, and on to Utah.
I concluded to concentrate all our efforts to open the line from Fort
Leavenworth and Omaha to Kearney, thence to Denver and on to Utah, known
as the South Platte Route.
The overland route from Fort Leavenworth and Omaha crossing the continent
had a stage-station about every twelve miles. The troops along the lines
were posted at the forts and stockades about every hundred miles, with a
few soldiers distributed at each stage-station. Then scattered along the
road were ranches, and relay- and feeding-stations for the regular
commercial and supply-trains that were continually on the road. The great
mining-camps, and all the inhabitants of Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and
Idaho, were dependent upon these trains for their supplies. In winter
these trains were generally mule-trains of twenty wagons each, and during
the summer were generally ox-trains of fifty to a hundred wagons each.
They were in the habit of straggling along through the country, taking
care of themselves. Their stock had to be herded at night, and it was a
great temptation to the Indians to steal, and a great deal of this had
been done, but no actual fighting or attacking of trains or troops
occurred until the winter of 1864-65. The stopping of these trains, mail,
and supplies, and the destruction of the telegraph wires, caused great
consternation in that country and on the Pacific Coast, and the demands
upon the Government to open and maintain these lines were persistent.
At Fort Leavenworth there appeared to have been no systematic effort to
reopen these lines. It seemed that the troops were taking care of the
posts and resisting attacks. They did not seem to appreciate the Indian
character; that the only way to strengthen and protect the lines of
communication was to go for the Indians. What troops had been sent against
the Indians were small and weak parties, and had evidently gone out with
the intention of locating the Indians and avoiding them.
Along the south emigrant line from Kansas City, following the Arkansas
River to New Mexico, was the line of supplies for all of New Mexico and
Southern Colorado. The Indians here were in possession. The travel and
traffic along it were not to be compared with that along the northern
lines. Then again the citizens of Kansas and Nebraska had settled along
these routes as far west as the 100th Meridian, obtaining their living
from this great traffic, and the Indians in their raids had picked them
up, a family at a time, until they had a great many prisoners, mostly
women and children, the men being generally massacred when captured.
I found the Eleventh Kansas Cavalry at Fort Riley, and the Sixteenth
Kansas Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth, and immediately placed them _en route_
for Fort Kearney. All the posts were, unfortunately, short of subsistence,
forage, and ammunition. The three-months' Regiments enlisted in Colorado
for the Indian service had been discharged, their time having expired, and
there had been no troops sent to take their places. My only resource was
to utilize the Colorado Militia until I could send troops 600 miles to
take their places.
I immediately started for Fort Kearney, taking with me a few soldiers in
the stage and one of my staff. It was the opinion of all the officers at
Fort Leavenworth that it would be impossible for me to make the trip, but
I knew it required personal presence among the troops to bring about quick
results. The troops that I had ordered to march from Fort Riley refused to
march in the winter. I answered to place under arrest all officers of the
companies and Regiments that refused to obey the order, and have them
report to Fort Leavenworth, intending to replace them with veteran
officers of the department whom I knew would move, no matter what the
hardship. The next morning I received a report from Fort Kiley that the
troops would move. The Regiment that marched from Fort Riley to Fort
Kearney lost thirteen men from freezing, as the weather was very severe,
and while they were properly clothed, they did not know how to protect
themselves from the weather.
On my arrival at Fort Kearney I immediately notified Mr. Hughes, agent of
the stage-lines, that I was prepared to protect his stages, and called
upon him to replace his stock immediately, ready to start out his stages.
I also notified Mr. Craighten, superintendent of the telegraph-lines, to
replace his operators, for I would have his lines open in a few days. Both
of these orders were made known to the public. I also notified the "press"
at Omaha and Fort Leavenworth that all trains which were tied up on the
plains would be moved to their destinations during that month. We found it
necessary to inspire energy and confidence in these three great interests,
as not one of them even thought we would succeed, and, in fact, the
"press" comments on our orders showed that they had no faith in them. I
found on the line of the Platte the Seventh Iowa Cavalry, and at Fort
Laramie and on the Sweetwater the Eleventh Ohio Cavalry.
When we arrived in sight of Fort Kearney the troops were prepared to fight
us, thinking it was a band of Indians. We discovered that the troops were
depressed from the success of the Indians and the murder and mutilation of
their comrades, and that they hardly stuck their heads out of the
stockade. Having had experience with Indians, I called the troops together
and instructed them how to handle and to fight Indians, telling them that
an aggressive war would be made against the Indians, and no matter how
large the Indian bands were, or how small the troop, that hereafter they
must stand and fight; that if they did the Indians would run. If they did
not, the Indians would catch and scalp them, and even if they had to
retreat, they must do so with their faces to the enemy.
The Indians, after the Chivington fight on Big Sandy, had concentrated
upon the South Platte and on the Sweetwater. The reports showed that they
held possession from Julesburg to Valley Junction and to Mud Springs, and
held the telegraph-line west of Fort Laramie. They had with them 2,000
head of captured stock and had captured all the stage-stations and many
trains, devastated the ranches, butchered many men, women, and children,
and destroyed 100 miles of telegraph.
To show more plainly than I can describe the condition of the country, I
give the reports of the three commanding officers along the South Platte
Route, in answer to the dispatches which I sent by messenger to all
commanders the day I arrived at Fort Leavenworth. These answers met me at
Fort Kearney.
General Robert Mitchell, who commanded the territory from Omaha to Lodge
Pole, replied as follows:
The telegraph from Lodge Pole Creek, twenty-five miles west to
Julesburg, on Laramie Route, is destroyed for fifteen miles. Poles cut
down and destroyed on the Denver line beyond Julesburg for the first
fifty miles. The telegraph is destroyed about ten miles north. We are
compelled to haul poles from 130 to 140 miles. Every means in my power
is used to have the lines fixed. All the available troops I have at my
disposal are in the vicinity of Julesburg, except some small garrisons
at posts required to be kept up on the Denver route. My district only
extends to Julesburg. I have sent some troops, however, up that route
fifty miles since the outbreaks and find everything destroyed. We have
no communication with Denver, and have not had since the last
outbreak. Neither can I communicate with Fort Laramie in consequence
of the lines being down. I have been traversing the country constantly
on and adjacent to the mail- and telegraph-lines during the past four
months, sending guards on the stages, and, when deemed necessary,
mounted guards and patrols on all dangerous portions of the road
through my district.
This plan succeeded until an overpowering force attacked Julesburg and
drove the troops inside of their works and burned the stage- and
telegraph-station, destroying a large amount of stores for both
companies. The overland stage cannot run through until they can
provide for supplies for stock from Julesburg to the Junction, where
overland stage leaves Denver route, everything belonging to the stage
company, citizens and government being entirely destroyed. The Indian
villages are unknown to us. From the best information I have I believe
them to be on the Powder River. I know certainly there is a large
village there. There have been no squaws in the country, to my
knowledge, since last fall. The tribes engaged are the Cheyennes,
Arapahoes, Kiowas, Brule, Ogallala Sioux, a portion of the Blackfeet,
and a large portion of what is known as the Missouri River Sioux, the
same Indians General Sully made the campaign against last summer. From
3,000 to 5,000 additional troops will be needed to punish the Indians.
One column will never be able to overtake them, unless they are
willing to give battle. I think three columns of men, 1,000 strong
each, with ample garrison on the overland-mail and telegraph lines,
well mounted and supplied, can clear out the country of all hostile
Indians, if done before grass comes. After that time, in my judgment,
it will take twice that number of men.
In addition to the troubles west, I would not be surprised any day to
hear of an outbreak in the northern part of my district. I am informed
by Indian scouts that there is a large encampment of Indians on the
Running Water that are ready to engage in the war against the whites.
Among them are some of the Yanktonais Sioux.
Colonel R. R. Livingston reported as follows:
In reply to your inquiries I would respectfully state that in the
early part of January last, indications of large parties of Indians
moving westward on Republican were reported by the scouts sent to gain
information of their movements. On January 7th they had crossed South
Fork of Platte River, twenty-three miles west of this post, camped
with their families, forming a camp of 400 lodges, containing eight
warriors each, many lodges being thirty robes in size. They commenced
the work of destruction along the road west as far as Junction
Station, 100 miles from here. Their forces in this fight were not less
than 2,000, well armed with breech-loading carbines and rifles. A
desperate attempt on their part to burn the overland-stage station
near this post was made at this time, but was frustrated by the
gallantry of Captain N. J. O'Brien, Company F, Seventh Iowa Cavalry.
Every ranch and stage-station from Junction Station to this post is
burned, and the charred remains of every inmate who failed to escape
tells of the brutality they were subjected to. I telegraphed Hon. Sam
H. Elbert, acting Governor of Colorado, early in January of the state
of things. The troops of Colorado have been withdrawn from Valley,
fifty miles west of here, I surmise, to concentrate around Denver. The
telegraph-lines to Salt Lake and the Denver branch lines are destroyed
for a distance of nearly ten miles on the northern route, and in
different points throughout 100 miles along the Denver route.
I have but 360 troops, but so long as human endurance holds out we
will work night and day to get the communication perfect with the
west.
The Indians engaged in this war are the Cheyennes, Ogallalas, and
Brule Sioux. They have gone northward towards Horse Creek and Fort
Laramie. Their trail leads in that direction, but they are slow in
marching, feeling audacious and indifferent to any effort from the
small body of troops in this district. I saw their signals today,
probably those of small war parties, on the North Platte. You will
hear of continued murders and robberies as long as the road is so
poorly protected by troops. No spies can be used now, owing to
numerous small war parties being met everywhere in this country. I
predict that if more troops are not sent into this district
immediately, this road will be stripped of every ranch and white man
on it. Should these Indians swing around by Niobrara River and take
the Omaha road below Kearney, where settlements are numerous, infinite
mischief will result to the settlers. What we need are troops,
supplies for them, and a vigorous campaign against these hostile
Indians. They must be put on the defensive instead of us. No
difficulty can arise in finding them. Over 2,000 cattle accompany
them.
HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT COLORADO.
DENVER, COLORADO TERRITORY, Feb. 2, 1865.
The Indians are bold in the extreme. They have burned every ranch
between Julesburg and Valley Station, and nearly all the property at
latter place; driven off all stock, both public and private. These
Indians are led by white men, and have complete control of all the
country outside my district, so that I am hemmed in.
The weather has been very severe here for nearly three weeks; the
thermometer 30 degrees below zero, with quite a fall of snow on the
ground. I have tried every means in my power to raise volunteers for
three months' State service, but as yet have not succeeded, owing to
the factional spirit existing in the community.
The Legislature took the matter in hand at my suggestion,
appropriating so much money. Territorial bonds, to give the men a
bounty and purchase horses to mount them on, as I have none; but the
members cannot agree on the spoil likely in their estimation to accrue
from such a proceeding, so the bill has not yet passed. I addressed
the Speaker of the House yesterday, informing him that unless
something was done within forty-eight hours I would be compelled, much
against my will, to proclaim martial law and stop all business,
forcing every man to enter the ranks and open the line of
communication. I have now a city organization of about 100 men
organized into companies, so that in case of an attack here I would
have something tangible to lay hold of and make a fight. I have had a
great deal of trouble in this matter, as there is no concert of
action, every man suspecting his fellow of some chicanery.
Fort Lyon is being rapidly fortified, so that 200 men can defend it
against 2,000 Indians. Militia companies are being organized all over
the settled parts of the country (under penalty of being pressed into
service) to defend the frontier settlements southward, and could I but
get a Regiment here now I could keep things in a running trim until
the arrival of a sufficient force to make a campaign. The Indians are
now determined to make it a war of extermination, and nothing short of
5,000 men can make it extermination for them.
Major Wynkoop informed me from Fort Lyon that many warriors were on
the headwaters of the Smoky Hill and intended attacking all the
settlements as well as Denver. Provisions, owing to the
transportation-line being cut off, are at an exorbitant price, as well
as labor and forage.
Cannot troops be sent out here immediately, or authority to raise
companies, which could be easily done, for one year?
The Santa Fe line has threatened to stop running on account of the
Indians. Should such be the case, then all is cut off.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,