MEMORY, LOGIC, AND ETHICS
The title that I have given to this chapter at once opens the way to
misinterpretation. It might appear as if the author supported the view
that logical and ethical values were the objects exclusively of
empirical psychology, psychical phenomena, like perception and
sensation, and that logic and ethics, therefore, were subsections of
psychology and based upon psychology.
I declare at once that I call this view, the so-called psychologismus,
at once false and injurious. It is false because it can lead to nothing;
and injurious because, while it hardly touches logic and ethics, it
overthrows psychology itself. The exclusion of logic and ethics from the
foundations of psychology, and the insertion of them in an appendix, is
one of the results of the overgrowth of the doctrine of empirical
perception, of that strange heap of dead, fleshless bones which is known
as empirical psychology, and from which all real experience has been
excluded. I have nothing to do with the empirical school, and in this
matter lean towards the transcendentalism of Kant.
As the object of my work, however, is to discover the differences
between different members of humanity, and not to discuss categories
that would hold good for the angels in heaven, I shall not follow Kant
closely, but remain more directly in psychological paths.
The justification of the title of this chapter must be reached along
other lines. The tedious, because entirely new, demonstration of the
earlier part of my work has shown that the human memory stands in
intimate relation with things hitherto supposed unconnected with
it--such things as time, value, genius, immortality. I have attempted to
show that memory stands in intimate connection with all these. There
must be some strong reason for the complete absence of earlier allusions
to this side of the subject. I believe the reason to be no more than the
inadequacy and slovenliness which hitherto have spoiled theories of
memory.
I must here call attention to a theory first propounded by Charles
Bonnet in the middle of the eighteenth century and towards the end of
the nineteenth century, specially insisted upon by Ewald Hering and E.
Mach. This theory regarded the human memory as being only a special case
of a property common to all organised matter, the property that makes
the path of new stimuli rather easier if these resemble stimuli that
have acted at some former time. The theory really makes the human memory
an adaptation in the sense of Lamarck, the result on the living organism
of repeated stimulation. It is true that there is a point in common
between the human memory and the increase of sensitiveness caused by the
repeated application of a stimulus; that identical element consists in
the permanence of the effect of the first stimulation. There is,
however, a fundamental difference between the growth of a muscle that is
much used or the adaptation of the eater of arsenic or morphia to
increased doses, and the recollection of past experiences by human
beings. In the one case the trace of the old is just to be felt in the
new stimulation; in the other case, by means of the consciousness, the
old situations are actually reproduced with all their individuation. The
identification of the two is so superficial that it is a waste of time
to dwell longer on it.
The doctrine of association as the theory of memory is linked with the
foregoing physiological theory as a matter of history, through Hartley,
and, as a matter of fact, because the idea of habit is shared by the
two. The association theory attributes memory to the mechanical play of
the linking of presentations according to four laws. It overlooks the
fact that memory (the continuous memory of man) is a function of the
will. I can remember a thing if I really _will_. In the case of
hypnosis, when the recollection of all that has been forgotten is
induced, an outside will replaces the will of the subject. It is will
that sets in action the chains of association, and we have to deal here
with something deeper than a mechanical principle.
In the association psychology, which first splits up the psychic life,
and then vainly imagines that it can weld the re-assorted pieces
together again, there is another confusion, the confusion between memory
and recollection, which has persisted in spite of the well-founded
objections of Avenarius and von Höffding. The recognition of a
circumstance does not necessarily involve the special reproduction of
the former impression, even although there seems to be a tendency for
the new impression, at least, partly to recall the old one. But there is
another kind of recognition, perhaps as common, in which the new
impression does not appear to be directly linked with an association,
but in which it comes, so to speak, “coloured” (James would say
“tinged”) with that character that would be called by von Höffding the
“familiarity quality.” To him who returns to his native place the roads
and streets seem familiar, even although he has forgotten the names, has
to ask his way, and can think of no special occasion on which he went
along them. A melody may seem “familiar” and yet I may be unable to say
where I heard it. The “character” (in the sense of Avenarius) of
familiarity, of intimacy, hovers over the sense-impression itself, and
analysis can detect no associations, none of the fusing of the old and
new, which, according to the assertion of a presumptuous
pseudo-psychology, produces the feeling; these cases are quite easy to
distinguish from cases in which there is a real although vague
association with an older experience in henid form.
In individual psychology this distinction is of great importance. In the
highest types of mankind the consciousness of the continuous past is
present in so active a form that the moment such a one sees an
acquaintance in the street he is at once able to reproduce the last
meeting as a complete experience, whereas in the case of the less gifted
person, the feeling of familiarity that makes recognition possible,
occurs when he is able to recall the past connection in all its details.
If we now, in conclusion, ask whether or no other animals than man
possess a similar faculty for remembering and reviving their earlier
lives in their entirety it is most probable that the answer must be in
the negative. Animals could not, as they do, remain for hours at a time,
motionless and peaceful on one spot, if they were capable of thinking of
the future or of remembering the past. Animals have the feeling of
familiarity and the sense of expectation (as we find from the
recognition of his master by a dog after twenty years’ absence); but
they possess no memory and no hope. They are capable of recognition
through the sense of familiarity, but they have no memory.
As memory has been shown to be a special character unconnected with the
lower spheres of psychical life, and the exclusive property of human
beings, it is not surprising that it is closely related to such higher
things as the idea of value and of time, and the craving for
immortality, which is absent in animals, and possible to men only in so
far as they possess the quality of genius. If memory be an essentially
human thing, part of the deepest being of humanity, finding expression
in mankind’s most peculiar qualities, then it will not be surprising if
memory be also related to the phenomena of logic and ethics. I have now
to explore this relationship.
I may set out from the old proverb that liars have bad memories. It is
certain that the pathological liar has practically no memory. About male
liars I shall have more to say; they are not common, however. But if we
remember what was said as to the absence of memory amongst women we
shall not be surprised at the existence of the numerous proverbs and
common sayings about the untruthfulness of women. It is evident that a
being whose memory is very slight, and who can recall only in the most
imperfect fashion what it has said or done, or suffered, must lie
easily if it has the gift of speech. The impulse to untruthfulness will
be hard to resist if there is a practical object to be gained, and if
the influence that comes from a full conscious reality of the past be
not present. The impulse to lie is stronger in woman, because, unlike
that of man, her memory is not continuous, whilst her life is discrete,
unconnected, discontinuous, swayed by the sensations and perceptions of
the moment instead of dominating them. Unlike man, her experiences float
past without being referred, so to speak, to a definite, permanent
centre; she does not feel herself, past and present, to be one and the
same throughout all her life. It happens almost to every man that
sometimes he “does not understand himself”; indeed, with very many men,
it happens (leaving out of the question the facts of psychical
periodicity) that if they think over their pasts in their minds they
find it very difficult to refer all the events to a single conscious
personality; they do not grasp how it could have been that they, being
what they feel themselves at the time to be, could ever have done or
felt or thought this, that, or the other. And yet in spite of the
difficulty, they know that they had gone through these experiences. The
feeling of identity in all circumstances of life is quite wanting in the
true woman, because her memory, even if exceptionally good, is devoid of
continuity. The consciousness of identity of the male, even although he
may fail to understand his own past, manifests itself in the very desire
to understand that past. Women, if they look back on their earlier
lives, never understand themselves, and do not even wish to understand
themselves, and this reveals itself in the scanty interest they give to
the attempts of man to understand them. The woman does not interest
herself about herself, and hence there have been no female
psychologists, no psychology of women written by a woman, and she is
incapable of grasping the anxious desire of the man to understand the
beginning, middle, and end of his individual life in their relation to
each other, and to interpret the whole as a continual, logical,
necessary sequence.
At this point there is a natural transition to logic. A creature like
woman, the absolute woman, who is not conscious of her own identity at
different stages of her life, has no evidence of the identity of the
subject-matter of thought at different times. If in her mind the two
stages of a change cannot be present simultaneously by means of memory,
it is impossible for her to make the comparison and note the change. A
being whose memory is never sufficiently good as to make it
psychologically possible to perceive identity through the lapse of time,
so as to enable her, for instance, to pursue a quantity through a long
mathematical reckoning; such a creature in the extreme case would be
unable to control her memory for even the moment of time required to say
that A will be still A in the next moment, to pronounce judgment on the
identity A = A, or on the opposite proposition that A is not equal to A,
for that proposition also requires a continuous memory of A to make the
comparison possible.
I have been making no mere joke, no facetious sophism or paradoxical
proposition. I assert that the judgment of identity depends on
conceptions, never on mere perceptions and complexes of perceptions, and
the conceptions, as logical conceptions, are independent of time,
retaining their constancy, whether I, as a psychological entity, think
them constant or not. But man never has a conception in the purely
logical form, for he is a psychological being, affected by the condition
of sensations; he is able only to form a general idea (a typical,
connotative, representative conception) out of his individual
experiences by a reciprocal effacing of the differences and
strengthening of the similarities, thus, however, very closely
approximating to an abstract conception, and in a most wonderful fashion
using it as such. He must also be able to preserve this idea which he
thinks clear, although in reality it is confused, and it is memory alone
that brings about the possibility of that. Were he deprived of memory he
would lose the possibility of thinking logically, for this possibility
is incarnated, so to speak, only in a psychological medium.
Memory, then, is a necessary part of the logical faculty. The
propositions of logic are not conditioned by the existence of memory,
but only the power to use them. The proposition A = A must have a
psychological relation to time, otherwise it would be At₁ = At₂.
Of course this is not the case in pure logic, but man has no special
faculty of pure logic, and must act as a psychological being.
I have already shown that the continuous memory is the vanquisher of
time, and, indeed, is necessary even for the idea of time to be formed.
And so the continuous memory is the psychological expression of the
logical proposition of identity. The absolute woman, in whom memory is
absent, cannot take the proposition of identity, or its contradictory,
or the exclusion of the alternative, as axiomatic.
Besides these three conditions of logical thought, the fourth condition,
the containing of the conclusion in the major premiss, is possible only
through memory. That proposition is the groundwork of the syllogism. The
premisses psychologically precede the conclusion, and must be retained
by the thinking person whilst the minor premiss applies the law of
identity or of non-identity. The grounds for the conclusion must lie in
the past. And for this reason continuity which dominates the mental
processes of man is bound up with causality. Every psychological
application of the relation of a conclusion to its premisses implies the
continuity of memory to guarantee the identity of the propositions. As
woman has no continuous memory she can have no _principium rationis
sufficientis_.
And so it appears that woman is without logic.
George Simmel has held this familiar statement to be erroneous, inasmuch
as women have been known to draw conclusions with the strongest
consistency. That a woman in a concrete case can unrelentingly pursue a
given course at the stimulation of some object is no more a proof that
she understands the syllogism, than is her habit of perpetually
recurring to disproved arguments a proof that the law of identity is an
axiom for her. The point at issue is whether or no they recognise the
logical axioms as the criteria of the validity of their thoughts, as
the directors of their process of thinking, whether they make or do not
make these the rule of conduct and the principle of judgment. A woman
cannot grasp that one must act from principle; as she has no continuity
she does not experience the necessity for logical support of her mental
processes. Hence the ease with which women assume opinions. If a woman
gives vent to an opinion, or statement, and a man is so foolish as to
take it seriously and to ask her for the proof of it, she regards the
request as unkind and offensive, and as impugning her character. A man
feels ashamed of himself, feels himself guilty if he has neglected to
verify a thought, whether or no that thought has been uttered by him; he
feels the obligation to keep to the logical standard which he has set up
for himself. Woman resents any attempt to require from her that her
thoughts should be logical. She may be regarded as “logically insane.”
The most common defect which one could discover in the conversation of a
woman, if one really wished to apply to it the standard of logic (a feat
that man habitually shuns, so showing his contempt for a woman’s logic)
is the _quaternio terminorum_, that form of equivocation which is the
result of an incapacity to retain definite presentations; in other words
the result of a failure to grasp the law of identity. Woman is unaware
of this; she does not realise the law nor make it a criterion of
thought. Man feels himself bound to logic; the woman is without this
feeling. It is only this feeling of guilt that guarantees man’s efforts
to think logically. Probably the most profound saying of Descartes, and
yet one that has been widely misunderstood, is that all errors are
crimes.
The source of all error in life is failure of memory. Thus logic and
ethics, both of which deal with the furtherance of truth and join in its
highest service, are dependent on memory. The conception dawns on us
that Plato was not so far wrong when he connected discernment with
memory. Memory, it is true, is not a logical and ethical act, but it is
a logical and ethical phenomenon. A man who has had a vivid and deep
perception regards it as a fault, if some half-hour afterwards he is
thinking of something different, even if external influences have
intervened. A man thinks himself unconscientious and blameworthy if he
notices that he has not thought of a particular portion of his life for
a long time. Memory, moreover, is linked with morality, because it is
only through memory that repentance is possible. All forgetfulness is in
itself immoral. And so reverence is a moral exercise; it is a duty to
forget nothing, and for this reason we should reverence the dead.
Equally from logical and ethical motives, man tries to carry logic into
his past, in order that past and present may become one.
It is with something of a shock that we realise here that we approach
the deep connection between logic and ethics, long ago suggested by
Socrates and Plato, discovered anew by Kant and Fichte, but lost sight
of by living workers.
A creature that cannot grasp the mutual exclusiveness of A and not A has
no difficulty in lying; more than that, such a creature has not even any
consciousness of lying, being without a standard of truth. Such a
creature if endowed with speech will lie without knowing it, without the
possibility of knowing it; _Veritas norma sui et falsa est_. There is
nothing more upsetting to a man than to find, when he has discovered a
woman in a lie, and has asked her, “Why did you lie about it?” that she
simply does not understand the question, but simply looks at him and
laughingly tries to soothe him, or bursts into tears.
The subject does not end with the part played by memory. Lying is common
enough amongst men. And lies can be told in spite of a full remembrance
of the subject which for some purpose some one wishes to be informed
about. Indeed, it might almost be said that the only persons who can lie
are those who misrepresent facts in spite of a superior knowledge and
consciousness of them.
Truth must first be regarded as the real value of logic and ethics
before it is correct to speak of deviations from truth for special
motives as lies from the moral point of view. Those who have not this
high conception should be adjudged as guilty rather of vagueness and
exaggeration than of lying; they are not immoral but non-moral. And in
this sense the woman is non-moral.
The root of such an absolute misconception of truth must lie deep. The
continuous memory against which alone a man can be false, is not the
real source of the effort for truth, the desire for truth, the basal
ethical-logical phenomenon, but only stands in intimate relation with
it.
That which enables man to have a real relation to truth and which
removes his temptation to lie, must be something independent of all
time, something absolutely unchangeable, which as faithfully reproduces
the old as if it were new, because it is permanent itself; it can only
be that source in which all discrete experiences unite and which creates
from the first a continuous existence. It is what produces the feeling
of responsibility which oppresses all men, young and old, as to their
actions, which makes them know that they are responsible, which leads to
the phenomena of repentance and consciousness of sin, which calls to
account before an eternal and ever present self things that are long
past, its judgment being subtler and more comprehensive than that of any
court of law or of the laws of society, and which is exerted by the
individual himself quite independently of all social codes (so
condemning the moral psychology which would derive morality from the
social life of man). Society recognises the idea of illegality, but not
of sin; it presses for punishment without wishing to produce repentance;
lying is punished by the law only in its ceremonious form of perjury,
and error has never been placed under its ban. Social ethics with its
conception of duty to our neighbour and to society, and practical
exclusion from consideration of the other fifteen hundred million human
beings, cannot extend the realm of morality, when it begins by limiting
it in this arbitrary fashion.
What is this “centre of apperception” that is superior to time and
change?
It can be nothing less than what raises man above himself (as a part of
the world of sense) which joins him to an order of things that only the
reason can grasp, and that puts the whole world of sense at his feet. It
is nothing else than personality.
The most sublime book in the world, the “Criticism of Practical Reason,”
has referred morality to an intelligent ego, distinct from all empirical
consciousness. I must now turn to that side of my subject.