CHAPTER I

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A SHORT HISTORY

OF THE

ROYAL NAVY

A SHORT HISTORY

OF THE

ROYAL NAVY

1217-1815

BY

DAVID HANNAY

VOLUME II

1689-1815

METHUEN & CO.

36 ESSEX STREET W.C.

LONDON

_First Published in 1909_

PREFACE

I submit this second part of the _Short History of the Royal Navy_ to

the kindness of the reader and the animadversions of reviewers with a

profound sense of its deficiencies. That some were inevitable where so

much had to be told in so narrow a space is no excuse for such errors

as I have committed. It is my sincere hope that they are not very

frequent nor very gross, and that my book does at least indicate the

main outlines of the polity and the achievements of the navy. It is my

pleasant duty to thank the Reverend William Hunt for his kindness in

revising my proofs, and for the many excellent suggestions he made.

I have also to present my thanks to Messrs. Blackwood for giving me

their permission to make use in Chapter III. of matter published in

_Blackwood’s Magazine_; and to the proprietors of the _Saturday Review_

for allowing me to make use of articles on the mutinies of 1797,

formerly published in that periodical.

DAVID HANNAY

CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

I. The War with France till 1693 1

II. Expeditions, Convoy, and the Privateers 49

III. The Men and the Life 80

IV. The Two Colonial Wars 98

V. The Seven Years’ War till 1758 133

VI. The Years of Triumph 166

VII. The American War till 1780 204

VIII. The American War till the Fall of Yorktown 243

IX. The Close of the War and the East Indies 271

X. The First Stage of the War 293

XI. The War till the End of 1797 323

XII. The Mutinies 355

XIII. The Nile 385

XIV. Invasion till the Close of 1801 411

XV. Trafalgar 436

XVI. The Command of the Sea 467

Index 493

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY

CHAPTER I

THE WAR WITH FRANCE TILL 1693

AUTHORITIES.—Burchett, _Memoirs of Transactions at Sea 1688-1697_;

Lediard, _Naval History of England_; Colomb, _Naval Warfare_;

Troude, _Batailles navales de la France_; Delarbre, _Tourville

et la Marine de son temps_; Toudouze, _Bataille de la Hougue_;

Lambert de Sainte-Croix, _Marine de France 1689-1792_; _Code

des Armées Navales_; Crisenoy, _L’Inscription maritime_;

Calmon-Maison, _Châteaurenault_; Martin Leake, _Life of Sir John

Leake_; De Jonge, _Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewesen_.

The Revolution of 1688 drew a line across the history of England,

and marked the termination of the great struggle between King and

Parliament. From that time forward it was settled beyond all dispute

that when the two differed the last word was not to be with the king.

Our sovereigns have ruled by a Parliamentary title, and the authority

which conferred the Crown must always be superior in fact, if not in

theory, to the Crown itself. Within Parliament the dominating body

must necessarily be the House of Commons, which has the command of the

purse. After 1688 the Crown, or the aristocracy, could only govern

by securing the support, by means of pocket boroughs, by persuasion

or corruption, of a majority of the Lower House. The navy, like the

rest of the nation, was deeply affected by the change. From this time

forward we hear little of the personal influence of the king. It was

to the House of Commons that the navy appealed. Officers who wished

to push their fortunes no longer thought of securing the goodwill

of the sovereign or of a favourite. They became members of the House

of Commons and earned promotion by serving a Parliamentary party. In

one way the change was for the manifest good of the navy. It now had

a master who might be unwilling to pay handsomely, but who both would

and could pay whatever he chose to promise with a regularity far beyond

the power of the king. In the years following the Revolution there were

indeed complaints of wages in arrear and of necessities neglected. But

this was only during the first period of strife. The increasing wealth

of the nation supplied Parliament with ample means, and after a time

the money was always regularly forthcoming. In another way the change

was not so good. A great deal of party spirit was introduced into the

navy, and there were times when Whig and Tory animosities interfered

with the loyal discharge of duty.

The Revolution also dates, if it did not cause, an evolution in the

navy. After 1688 the sea service was sharply marked off from the army.

During the reign of King James it had not been uncommon to find men who

had served alternately as soldiers and sailors, while some held double

employments. Isolated cases of the kind may be met with later, but they

became very rare, and soon disappeared altogether. The formation of a

large standing army, and the participation of England in Continental

wars, drew off the gentlemen volunteers who had been found in the

fleets of Charles II. The stamp of man described in old plays as “a

coxcomb but stout,” had a natural preference for the army. It did

not take him off dry land, and the practice of retiring into winter

quarters enabled him to combine a great deal of pleasure with his

fighting. A ship was at all times but a prison, and in those it was a

prison very much overcrowded and abounding in foul smells. The navy was

left entirely to the tarpaulin who had been bred to the sea, and could

endure its hardships.

The final victory of the tarpaulin element in the corps of naval

officers brought with it both good and evil. The good lay in their

seamanship. Even a bad seaman is better than an ignorant or careless

landsman in command of a ship. The purely technical part of the navy’s

work, that which consisted in the mere handling of the vessel, was

better done in the years following the Revolution than had been the

case before, except during the Interregnum, when also the sailors had

been the predominant element. The evil which came was of a kind not

to be wholly attributed to the disappearance of the military officer

from the higher ranks of the fleet. It was that there was a distinct

fall in the purely military spirit, and as a navy is a fighting as

well as a navigating force, this was a misfortune. When we speak of

a fallen military spirit, it is not meant that there was any sinking

in the mere courage of the service, but only that the naval officer

as he became at the Revolution and as he remained till far into the

eighteenth century, was first and foremost a seaman, and that he had a

tendency to discharge the military side of his duty in blind obedience

to various rules of thumb. Two reasons may be assigned for this. Times

of revolution are very often followed by times of lassitude. The

seventeenth century had been very stormy, and it was to be expected

that the Englishman of the following generations would be a less daring

and original man than his ancestor of the Civil War time. The sailors

shared in the general deadening and commonplaceness of their age. It

was only natural that men who went to sea as boys, and were never asked

to be more than sailors, should not have tried to be more. Then it was

the misfortune of the navy that just at a time when it was tending to

stupidity in military conduct, it was called upon by authority to obey

a set of hard and fast rules.

Mention has already been made of the fighting orders drawn up by the

admirals of the Commonwealth at the close of the First Dutch War, and

reissued by Penn when he sailed on his expedition to San Domingo. It

will be remembered that these rules established the line ahead as the

regular formation for a fleet about to engage the enemy. After the

Second Dutch War they were reissued by the Duke of York with certain

additions of his own, and they became the orthodox pattern for the

navy’s method of fighting. It is to them that we owe it that the line

of battle passed from being the order adopted for the purpose of coming

most effectually into action with the enemy, and grew to be regarded

as an end in itself. The duke’s orders would not perhaps have hampered

a more original generation; but they were sure to have a deadening

effect upon men who felt no natural impulse to think. The admiral

who conformed to the orders could always plead that he had obeyed

authority, whereas if he departed from them, and his independence was

not justified by a brilliant victory, he would be in considerable

danger of being accused of insubordination. The harm done by these

instructions arose mainly from two of the articles. No. VIII. lays it

down that “if the enemy stay to fight (his majesty’s fleet having the

wind), the headmost squadron of his majesty’s fleet shall steer for

the headmost of the enemy’s ships.” No. XVI. contains the following

peremptory instruction: “In all cases of fight with the enemy, the

commanders of his majesty’s ships are to keep the fleet _in one line_,

and (as much as may be) to preserve that order of battle which they

have been directed to keep before the time of fight.” The duke had

foreseen that an English fleet, being to leeward, might wish to force

on a battle. In this case it was directed that the van upon obtaining

a favourable position for the purpose, should tack and break through

the enemy. So soon as it had broken through it was to turn, and attack

from windward. In the meantime the centre and rear were to remain to

leeward, and co-operate with the van. But this was a very difficult

manœuvre to carry out against even a moderately efficient opponent.

Ships performing it would be liable to lose spars and to drift to

leeward towards their own centre. Moreover, an enemy who kept his wind

and stood on might possibly file past, and so deliver the fire of all,

or the greater part, of his ships into the unsupported English van.

Article III., which prescribed this method of attack, remained a mere

counsel of perfection, and was soon dropped out of the fighting orders.

It was, I venture to affirm, never acted on except by Howe on the 29th

of May 1794, and then with only partial success.

The course followed by English admirals was less complicated and risky

than this, but also less likely to prove effectual when fully carried

out. When they were to leeward and the enemy would not attack them,

they manœuvred to gain the weather-gage. When they had the wind of

the enemy, they came down on him with their fleet in line—the leading

ship of the English steering for the leading ship of the enemy, and

the others behind for their respective opponents. Thus the two fleets

engaged van to van, centre to centre, rear to rear. To take “every man

his bird” was the familiar naval image for a well-conducted action

with an enemy who did not shirk. Of course this method only applied to

the case where the two fleets were going in the same direction. If one

turned, the two would pass one another, and then they must curl round

again before the action could be resumed. The advantage of engaging the

enemy from the leading ship to the last was this, that it prevented

any portion of his ships from tacking, and so putting some of the

English between two fires. The drawback was that if the two fleets were

even not very unequal, no overwhelming superiority was developed on

either side at a chosen point. The damage done was about equivalent,

and the two separated without decisive result. This would not have

been the case if the admirals after the Revolution had been as ready

as the chiefs of the Dutch wars to depart from their line when once

it had served its purpose of bringing them in contact with the enemy.

If the captains had been allowed to steer through the hostile line

wherever they could find or make an opening, a general mêlée must have

ensued, and the battle would have been fought out. But here came in the

influence of Article No. XVI., which prescribed the retention of the

“same order” all through the battle. If an English captain stood out of

the line to press through the enemy, it must necessarily be broken. But

this was rigidly forbidden. Therefore the system of fighting adopted

by our navy at the close of the seventeenth century made it inevitable

that our admirals would attack from windward, would spread themselves

all along the enemy’s line, that the damage done would be pretty

equally divided between the two fleets, and that the enemy, having the

road to leeward open, could retire whenever he pleased.

The Revolution brought no considerable alteration in the mere

administrative machinery of the navy. From that time forward the office

of Lord High Admiral was habitually put into commission, but the change

was made for the purpose of finding the greatest number of places for

Parliamentary supporters, and was in substance not very different

from the method adopted by the Commonwealth, by Charles I., and by

James I. It was of more importance that the reign of William III. saw

the complete establishment of half pay. The later Stuarts had granted

allowances to flag officers and a few captains, but the Parliament of

the Revolution first regularly provided for the support of a body of

officers of all commissioned ranks when not in active service. This

also was inevitable if the country was to maintain a regular staff for

the fleet. It was neither possible to maintain the navy continually on

a war footing, nor to disband the whole corps of officers so soon as

peace was signed, and trust to forming another when the need had arisen.

The establishment made by King James II. in 1686 fell with its maker.

The handsome table-money allowance was not paid after the Revolution,

and the officers were thus thrown back on the old scale of pay. This

meant that the captain of a first-rate who had flattered himself with

the hope of receiving £535, 18s. 4d. per annum found that he was in

fact only entitled to £285, 18s. 4d. Captains of the lesser rates were

disappointed in proportion. At the same time the regulations depriving

them of convoy money, and restricting their chances of casual gains,

were more strictly enforced. The trading classes had won great power

by the Revolution, and could put pressure on the House of Commons, and

they were not unnaturally eager to defend themselves against extortion.

Their case was good, but the grievance of the naval officer was not the

less genuine. Yet the loss of King James’s establishment was probably

not much regretted by the navy at large, since it benefited the

captains only. Other ranks had their grievances. The complaints of the

sea officers were so loud and persistent that at last the Government

was compelled to do them some justice. By an Order of the Commissioners

of the Admiralty dated 14th February 1694, it was established that the

sea pay “of the flag officers, commanders, lieutenants, masters and

surgeons of their majesty’s ships be increased to as much more as it

is at present.” As a set off to this the number of servants they were

entitled to take to sea at the expense of the Crown was reduced. With

this provision for the officers on active service came the formation

of a half-pay list. It was somewhat arbitrarily constructed. The

benefit was confined to “all flag officers and commanders of ships of

the first, second, third, fourth and fifth rates, and of fireships, and

also the first lieutenants and masters of the first, second and third

rates who have served a year in ships of rates respectively, or have

been in a general engagement with the enemy, and shall have performed

their duties to the satisfaction of the Lord High Admiral of England

or the Commissioners executing that office.” These were to “be allowed

half pay during their being on shore in time of peace at home.”

This establishment was too good to last. When the Peace of Ryswick was

made, the country was burdened with a heavy debt. The House of Commons

was in an economical mood. It insisted upon disbanding a large part of

the troops, and was only prevented from leaving the officers entirely

without support by the strenuous exertions of the king. William III.

made no effort to save the naval officers, for the House of Commons

had no such jealousy of the fleet as of the army. The sea officers

presented a petition stating their hard case. The petition was laid on

the table in a busy session, and was for a time smothered, but in the

following year the Commons took up the case of the naval officers, and

the result was the establishment of April 1700. This new scheme cut

down the rate of pay allowed during the last six years. According to

a tolerably uniform practice, the reduction was less severe with the

higher than with the lower ranks. While the Admiral of the Fleet was

reduced from £6 to £5 per diem, a captain of a fifth-rate was reduced

from 12s. to 8s. But while the House of Commons was thus economising

the whole pay, it fully recognised the necessity of maintaining a

“competent number of Experienced Sea Officers, supported on Shore, who

may be within reach to answer any sudden or immergent Occasion; and

therefore do humbly propose the number of Flag Officers, Captains,

Lieutenants, and Masters following, to be always supported on Shore

while out of Employment, by the Allowances against their Names

exprest.” The scale drawn up by Parliament provided for 9 admirals at

sums ranging from 17s. 6d. per diem for the Rear-Admiral to £2, 10s.

for the Admiral of the Fleet. For 50 captains who had served during the

“late war,” at 10s. a day for 20 and 8s. for 30. For 100 lieutenants

who had seen service, in the following proportions: 40 at 2s. 6d. and

60 at 2s. For 30 masters, of whom one half were to receive 2s. 6d.

and the other half 2s. per diem. The total half-pay charge of that

time was only £18,113. No officer who took service with the merchants,

or had other employment, was to be entitled to the allowance. As

officers on the half-pay list died or were drawn for active service,

an equal number of others who were duly qualified were to step into

the enjoyment of the allowance. It will be seen that this was at

best a half measure. Many men who deserved to be supported were left

without provision, yet the House of Commons had adopted the principle

of granting half pay, and that was a great step towards the complete

establishment of the rule that all who served the State were entitled

to be maintained at its expense, even when they were not immediately

wanted. It is in this tentative way, not by great administrative

schemes, but by small measures meant to meet a present necessity, that

the whole of the organisation of our navy has grown. At the close of

the reign of Queen Anne the right to half pay was made general.

One other great change directly affecting the navy was brought about by

the Revolution. The expulsion of King James left England free to become

the leader, and the main promoter, of the opposition to Louis XIV. From

that time forward our enemy was always France. When we met the Spaniard

or the Dutchman again, it was with very rare exceptions because they

were allies of the French. The resistance to Louis XIV. grew into a

general colonial and political rivalry between France and England. The

fight was prolonged throughout the eighteenth century and into the

nineteenth. Some knowledge of the navy we were to meet in every sea and

in so many battles during a century and a quarter is necessary in any

history of the Royal Navy.

The French Navy is marked off very sharply from our own by the fact

that it was always, and solely, the handiwork of the Crown. In England

necessity taught the nation that it must have a fleet, and the nation

either forced attention to its wants on the Crown at times when the

king was indifferent, or provided itself with a naval force when the

royal authority was suspended or subordinate. France is admirably

placed for commerce, but it has not the same need for trade as

England. It is a great corn-growing and wine-producing country, and

its inhabitants have grown rich by constant industry and thrift. They

have rarely shown much faculty for trade on a great scale. In such

conditions the navy fell into neglect, except when the ruler wished

to possess one for political reasons. When Louis XIV. attained his

majority vigorous efforts were made to form a powerful fleet. In 1669

the king restored the office of Admiral, which had been suspended by

Richelieu, in favour of his natural son the Count of Vermandois. The

Count was a child and the navy was governed in his name by a Minister

of Marine and a Council. The Minister of Marine for some years was

M. de Lyonne, who worked under the supervision of Colbert. This

great administrator, who laboured hard to supply France with foreign

commerce and colonies, applied an almost feverish activity to the work

of creating a fleet. Five military ports were established, namely,

Dunkirk, Havre, Brest, Rochefort, on the Channel and the Ocean, and

Toulon on the Mediterranean. Dunkirk and Havre were too shallow for

ships of great burden. The long stretch of coast from Brest to the

frontier of Spain is ill provided with harbours. The old port of

Brouage, which had been used in the Middle Ages, had become silted

up, and was useless. Colbert was compelled to create a harbour and

an arsenal at Rochefort, where there had formerly not even been a

village, though the place has great natural aptitude. Yet Rochefort

has always been of subordinate importance. The great naval station

of France on the Ocean has been at the magnificent harbour of Brest.

Toulon, the naval station of the Mediterranean, is also a fine natural

harbour. The mechanical ingenuity of the French has always been shown

in shipbuilding. It was comparatively easy for Colbert to provide fine

vessels. Some of the noblest warships of the time were built under

his directions. These were the ships which excited the admiration of

Charles II. and his brother, when the Count D’Estrées brought his

squadron to Portsmouth at the beginning of the Third Dutch War.

It was less easy to form a corps of officers and to collect crews.

Although France possesses some excellent seamen in Normandy and

Brittany, the maritime population has never been large. There were few

experienced officers, either gentleman or tarpaulin, to command the

king’s ships. The seamen of Dieppe, St. Malo, or Havre were daring.

They had invaded the Spanish West Indies before Hawkins made his first

voyage, but they were not numerous enough to supply the king with

an equivalent for the large body of ship’s captains trained among

ourselves by the Civil War and the wars with the Dutch. Besides, they

were hardly the men to whom a king of France would have cared to

entrust the honour of his flag. In the early years of the king’s reign

it was found necessary to give the command of fleets and individual

ships to mere gentlemen who were not only not seamen, but who looked

down upon those who were, with all the contempt usually shown by

the French _noblesse_ for mechanics. This partly accounts for the

ineptitude shown by French naval officers during the naval campaigns

of 1672 and 1673. The exertions of Colbert did much to remedy this

defect. By twenty years of hard work and the most energetic driving, he

formed a naval organisation. The orders issued for this purpose were so

numerous that it was found necessary to reduce them to a Code. Colbert

began the work, but did not live to finish it. On his death in 1683 he

was succeeded by his son Colbert de Seignelay, who continued what his

father had begun. The famous _Ordonnance_, or Code of Law of the old

French Royal Navy, was at last completed, and by a curious coincidence

it was promulgated in April 1689, in the month before the beginning of

the war with England.

This body of laws, or regulations, was very French in its completeness,

its air of logical coherence, and its excessive regulation, of every

detail of the service. It was contained in twenty-three books. It

divided the French Navy into four branches, three civil and one

military. The three civil branches, collectively known as _La Plume_,

or the Pen, were divided between the purchase, manufacture, and care

of materials. The administration of the dockyards was in the hands

of the Pen. At the head of each dockyard was a civil officer, called

the _Intendant de la marine_. The military branch, called _L’Epée_,

or the Sword, consisted of the naval officers. It was entrusted

with the navigation and the fighting of the ships. Under the old

organisation established by Richelieu, the control of the dockyards

had been given to the Sword; but Colbert, who was a civilian, and who

cherished a lively jealousy of the military officers, had reversed this

arrangement. The Sword was never quite reconciled to its degradation,

and its feuds with the Pen went on until the French Royal Navy was

destroyed by the Revolution. While Colbert lived and the king was

young, the central authority was strong enough to compel obedience,

but in later years all the parade of precision in the language of the

_Ordonnance_, and all the power of the king, could not keep the civil

and military officials from quarrelling, from disobeying orders, and

disputing the meaning of the most exactly worded regulations.

The head of the Sword was naturally the Admiral of France, who was

a member of the royal family, and except in the case of the Count

of Toulouse, a dignified figurehead, and not an effective chief.

His administrative work was done by the Minister of Marine and the

Council. Next to the Admiral came the two Vice-Admirals, _Du Levant_

the Mediterranean, and _Du Ponant_ the Ocean, who commanded in chief

when he was absent, each in his own sea. The next rank was that

of Lieutenant-General. We may say for purposes of comparison that

the Admiral of France answered to our Lord High Admiral, and the

Vice-Admirals to our Admirals, while the Lieutenants-General answered

to our Vice-Admirals. Next came an officer happily unparalleled in our

service. This was the _Intendant des armées navales_, who is not to

be confounded with the _Intendant de marine_. He was a civilian who

accompanied every French squadron, and had supreme authority over the

_Commissaires_, or Pursers, and the civil work in all its branches. But

he had also a right to sit on councils of war, and was authorised to

report on the behaviour of the naval chief in action. The _Intendant

des armées navales_ was in fact a French equivalent for the Dutch

Field Deputies, and he acted in exactly the same way, by hampering

the fighting chief when he was an energetic man, and by reducing him

to submission when he was a weak one, and of course by irritating and

exaggerating the jealousies of the Pen and the Sword. He was a spy

whose word could make or mar the fortunes of a naval officer, and yet

was not a competent judge of the naval officer’s work. That Colbert

should have created such a rank, and that it should have been preserved

by the very able men who succeeded him in the government of the French

Navy, shows that they were all blinded by the professional jealousy of

the civil official for the fighting man, and by the Frenchman’s mania

for over-governing.

The next in rank was the Chef d’Escadre, Rear-Admiral or Commodore.

Then we have another civil official, the _Commissaire Général à la

suite des armées navales_, a subordinate of the _Intendant des armées

navales_, who watched the Captain as his superior did the Admiral. The

order of precedence in a French ship could not offer much novelty.

There was the Capitaine du Vaisseau, or Post-Captain, and the Capitaine

du Brûlot, or Captain of a fireship. The second in command was called

the Major. He commanded the soldiers in the ship’s company, and all

landing parties. Then came the Lieutenant, and after him the Enseigne.

The recruiting of the corps of officers was provided for by the _Gardes

de la marine_. There were three companies of the Gardes: one at Brest,

one at Rochefort, and one at Toulon. They were mostly young men of

gentle birth—that is, members of the _noblesse_ who had a right to

a coat of arms and to the privileges of their caste,—but members of

respectable families who had received the education of gentlemen were

admitted. They were supposed to receive a very thorough professional

training, and to be drafted into the ships when qualified. The fact did

not always square with the theory. It was found that young gentlemen

of good family and some influence were kept to their books with great

difficulty. A certain number of them did no doubt attain to a level

of book-knowledge very rare among our officers, but the whole history

of the eighteenth century is at hand to prove that as a class they

were inferior in practical capacity to the men brought up in the rough

school of the English Navy.

The crews were raised by the _classes_, the predecessors of the

_Inscription maritime_, a great system of naval conscription. Like

so much else in France, this also was founded by Richelieu, but it

was perfected by Lyonne and Colbert, and was finally established by

the _Ordonnance_ of 1689. All Frenchmen engaged in working in ships

or boats throughout the whole coast of France, and on the banks of

rivers large enough to carry a lighter, were held to be subject to

serve in the _classes_. They were divided into seven, which were to

serve successively for periods of four years. All seafaring men,

waterman or lighterman, were inscribed on the lists of the Commissioner

of the District. During the four years of their liability to serve

the king they were not allowed to engage with private employers. It

was calculated that the total number subject to service was 60,000.

The obligation began at the age of ten, and lasted till the man was

too old to work. As a compensation for this unlimited obligation a

retaining fee was promised to men not serving, and those who had

served at sea were entitled to a small pension when their period of

liability to service was over; while hospitals were established at

all the ports, and employment in the dockyards was promised to all

who were so severely hurt as to be unable to go to sea, but were

still capable of doing some work. This famous institution exists in

a modified form to-day, and has often been the subject of admiration

among ourselves. On paper it no doubt possessed immense advantages over

our rough-and-ready system, or no system, of raising crews by bounties

and impressment. Yet whenever the French Crown endeavoured to use all

the resources provided by the _classes_, the neatly constructed machine

broke down. The seafaring population rebelled against its severity, and

in practice the king was constantly driven to impress men very much in

the English fashion, without regard to their class. In the last years

of the reign of King Louis and until the Revolution, the financial

distress of the French Government made it impossible to provide half

pay, and the hospitals were neglected. The _classes_ was in fact a more

uniform and grinding oppression than our own impressment, and was not

more efficient in producing crews.

In truth, the merit of the French organisation was altogether more

on paper than in reality. It looked very coherent and beautifully

divided, but its distinctions and divisions answered to no natural

classifications in the work to be done. For instance, to make the Sword

responsible for fitting out the ships and yet to leave the control of

the dockyards to the Pen was simply to provide for incessant conflicts

of authority between the two, and to divide the responsibility. The

English system of putting a retired naval officer at the head of

the dockyard as Commissioner was incomparably simpler and better.

It is needless to point out that nothing could be more fatal to the

independence of character of an officer commanding a fleet than the

presence of the _Intendant des armées navales_. But the spirit of the

_Ordonnance_ is best shown by the article which forbade the captain to

make any kind of changes in the armament of his ship. It was no doubt

necessary to guard against mere eccentricity, but if such a regulation

as this had been enforced in the English Navy it might never have had

the carronade, and would certainly have had to do without the many

improvements in gunnery introduced by Sir Charles Douglas in the last

quarter of the eighteenth century. The _Ordonnance_ was full of that

over-regulation which is the ruin of all independence of character and

originality of mind. Other faults the French Navy had which arose out

of the social condition of France. The officers were one of the many

privileged corps which ended by destroying the French monarchy. They

stood much on their rights, and were above all extremely jealous of the

admission of colleagues who were not of noble birth.

When King William’s Government was able to settle down after the

confusion of the Revolution, one of its first duties was the reconquest

of Ireland, which was still holding out for King James. Louis XIV. was

giving open support to his cousin, and war had really begun in March,

two months before the formal declaration, when a French squadron under

the command of Louis Gabaret landed King James at Kinsale. The material

force at the disposal of the English Government was considerable. It

consisted of 173 vessels of 101,892 tons, carrying 6930 guns, and

requiring when fully manned 42,003 men. Of the 173 vessels 108 were

rated. The rating of English ships, which had first been settled

according to the number of their crews, was now based on the number

of guns. There were six rates in all—the first carrying 90 guns and

upwards, the sixth 18 guns or less; unrated ships were little craft

such as sloops, ketches, smacks, yachts, etc. With the help of the

Dutch fleet, this was more than enough to be a match for the French,

but Parliament was justly persuaded of the necessity for increasing

the Navy. In 1690 it voted £570,000, to be employed in the building of

17 ships of 80 guns and 10 ships of 60. Three of 70 were also ordered

to be built, making the total addition of 30 vessels. The 80-gun ships

of that time were three-deckers, and of a burden of 1100 tons. The

60-gun ships were of 900 tons. The time allowed for completing this

list was four years. In spite of the wear and tear of the war, and

the limited number of prizes we were able to take from the French,

the additions made to the navy in the reign of William III. were very

considerable. It increased from 108 to 174 rated ships, and in tonnage

from 101,000 to 158,999. The increase was greatest in vessels of the

fourth and fifth rates—that is, in vessels carrying from 30 to 60 guns.

The political confusion of the early years of the king’s reign combined

with corruption to neutralise the material strength of the navy to some

extent. It was the policy of the king to divide employments between the

two parties to which he looked for support, the Whigs, and those Tories

who had accepted the Revolution. In pursuit of this policy his first

Board of Admiralty was chosen from both. Arthur Herbert, who was a

Tory, was made First Commissioner. Other members of the Board belonged

to the same party, but it included William Sacheverell, who was a

strong Whig. The presence of men belonging to different factions in the

same governing body was sure to lead to dissensions, and it was not

long before the quarrels of the Admiralty Board became very violent.

In order to facilitate the manning of the fleet two new regiments of

marines were raised. The admiral’s regiment had been disbanded because

it was suspected of being too much attached to the deposed king. The

new corps were formally established in 1690, but the work of recruiting

them was begun in 1689. They were raised by Herbert, who had been

created Earl of Torrington after an action about to be mentioned, and

by the Earl of Pembroke, and were named, according to the custom of the

time, after their colonels. By the first establishment they were to

consist of 12 companies each of 200 men; but the number of companies

was afterwards increased to 15.

As for the sailors, it is needless to say that they were raised in

the usual manner. Although much was done for the officers in this

reign, the men were no better paid than before. Their wages remained

throughout the century at the figure fixed in the reign of Charles

II., and were not increased till a rise was extorted by the mutinies

of 1797. The main grievance of the seamen was not so much the amount

as the irregular payment of their wages. In the earlier times after

the Revolution they were kept waiting because the Government was in

want of money, but the system of pay subjected them to long delays

even when the resources at the disposal of the Government were ample.

It had been the custom in the old days of the Winter and Summer Guard

to pay the men only at the end of the commission. This was no hardship

when the term of service lasted only a few months. But the practice

was continued when we had begun to maintain fleets abroad for years

together. In King William’s reign the injustice did not reach the

height it was destined to attain later on, yet the men were often

driven to sell their pay tickets at a heavy discount because the

distresses of the Treasury, or the delays due to a complicated system

of accounts, kept them waiting during months for their hard-earned

wages.

The great bulk of the officers who had served King James passed over to

his successor. A few, indeed, followed the exiled king, and among them

was Sir Roger Strickland, who as a Roman Catholic was disqualified for

office. Captain David Lloyd also adhered to his master, and was very

busy during the years next ensuing in endeavouring to shake the new

allegiance of his former brother-officers. In this, however, he had

no success. In spite of discontent, and although some naval officers

endeavoured to provide for their own safety in case of a restoration by

sending promises to King James, the navy as a whole remained loyal.

The war now beginning lasted with an interval of truce between 1697

and 1702, until the signing of the Peace of Utrecht, in the reign

of Queen Anne. It was in reality one continuous war waged by Europe

in self-defence, and by France for the purpose of establishing the

predominance of the house of Bourbon. The naval part of this struggle

is divided into two periods. During the first, which lasted to the

close of 1793, the French king kept great fleets at sea. After that

date the exhaustion of his treasury through the calls made upon it by

the land war rendered him incapable of meeting the allies at sea with

equal forces. He was driven by penury to lay up his ships, and the

war on the side of France was conducted by privateers. In this second

period the allied fleets still kept the sea, swept the French coast,

and co-operated with the armies.

When hostilities began in 1689, the first object of the French was to

give assistance to King James in Ireland. The first duty of the English

was to defeat his efforts, and then to cover the passage of our own

forces. The Dutch had to protect their own commerce and to co-operate

with us in the general purposes of the war.

The news that the French king was about to supply his cousin with the

means of passing over to Ireland reached London early in March. A

squadron was prepared to sail for the purpose of intercepting Gabaret,

but it started too late. Herbert, who went in command without resigning

his place as First Commissioner of the Admiralty, did not reach

Cork until the 17th of April. All he could do now was to intercept

whatever further help the French might be sending to the assistance

of the Jacobites. He knew that a force was preparing at Brest under

the command of the Count of Châteaurenault. Not finding any sign of

this expedition on the coast of Ireland, Herbert stood over to Brest.

Either at this time, or shortly afterwards, he detached George Rooke

with a small squadron to the west of Scotland, for the double purpose

of rendering what help he could to the Protestants of Ulster and

preventing the French from sending help to the Scottish Jacobites. The

wind was easterly on the coast of France, and Herbert failed to reach

Brest in time, or to approach it close enough to prevent Châteaurenault

from sailing with a fleet of vessels of from 40 to 60 guns, 5

fireships, and a number of transports carrying 6000 soldiers. Finding

that the French had escaped him, Herbert returned to the south coast of

Ireland, and was off Cork on the 29th April. The French fleet were seen

in the neighbourhood of Kinsale, and Herbert stood in to place himself

between them and the coast. Châteaurenault made no attempt to land at

Kinsale, but steered west for Bantry. At Baltimore, Herbert obtained

information of his enemy’s destination. He at once pursued, but on

rounding Cape Clear caught sight of the Frenchmen heading for Bantry

Bay. This was on the afternoon of the 30th of April. The day being far

advanced, Herbert did not follow Châteaurenault at once, but lay to all

the night. The force under his command is variously stated as nineteen

and twenty-two ships of the line. The average size of the English ships

was about the same as the French.

On the 1st of May the wind was blowing off the land. Châteaurenault had

disembarked as many of the soldiers as were carried in the men-of-war

on the previous evening. But the transports were still undischarged,

and had not yet been able to work up to the town of Bantry. Seeing

that the English were somewhat, though not much, inferior in number

to himself, the French admiral came to the very proper decision to

engage. He got under way about half-past eleven, and stood down the

Bay. As he had the weather-gage, he had the choice of attack. Herbert

lay to to receive him. At the moment of getting under way the French

fleet was in order of convoy, that is, in three parallel columns;

Châteaurenault himself in the middle, with the van division under the

command of Gabaret on one side, and the rear commanded by Forant on

the other. When the order to draw into a line of battle was given,

Gabaret should have stood on ahead, leaving a sufficient space for the

admiral’s division between himself and Forant. But he moved so slowly

and kept his wind at such a distance from the enemy that Châteaurenault

in a fit of impatience crowded on sail, ran between the van division

and the English, and took the place of van himself, thus leaving

Gabaret to fall in behind and form the centre. In consequence of these

misunderstandings the French line was in considerable disorder, which

was increased by the fact that the narrow water of Bantry Bay left

little room for manœuvring, and that the fleet was speedily compelled

to tack. It would appear that these conditions ought to have afforded

Herbert an opportunity for working to windward and forcing a close

action with the enemy. It is, indeed, asserted that he made an attempt

to gain the weather-gage, and could not do so because the French kept

their wind so carefully. Thus the battle was confined to artillery fire

at a considerable distance, and no great harm was done on either side.

The French make an unfounded claim to have sunk an English ship. On the

other hand, it is allowed that the French _Diamant_, Captain Coëtlogon,

was set on fire. The biographer of Sir John Leake, who served in the

battle as commander of the fireship =Firedrake=, claims the honour of

this achievement for his hero. He says that the feat was performed

by a “cushee piece” invented by Leake’s father, the Master-gunner of

England. But the cushee piece was never heard of again, as Captain John

Leake judged it to be as dangerous to its friends as its enemies, for

which independence of judgment he was badly treated in the will of his

indignant parent. The two fleets continued onwards in a disorderly way

and firing at one another over a distance of twenty-one miles till they

were off Dursey Head, then Châteaurenault, finding that he was being

drawn out to sea, and remembering that he was answerable for the safety

of the transports, returned to Bantry Bay. Herbert, satisfied that

enough had been done, made for the general rendezvous of the fleet near

the Scilly Isles, thereby leaving Châteaurenault free to complete the

disembarkation of his soldiers, collect his transports, and return to

Brest. His whole expedition had lasted only for eleven days, and was

considered by the French a glorious success.

This estimate shows that the French took a modest view of what

constituted success in naval operations. Châteaurenault, if he had

pushed his attack home on Herbert, might have had some English prizes

to show, and might have greatly encouraged the enemies of England,

besides landing his soldiers and bringing off his transports. But he

at least had some case. What is extraordinary, when we think what

had been once the standard of the English navy, was that Herbert

bragged of having gained a victory because he had not been routed by

an enemy of slightly superior force, and that his countrymen, instead

of laughing at him, or asking indignantly why he did not fight again,

threw up their caps and huzzaed. The battle, and the praise given it,

were melancholy signs of the poorness of spirit which had come over

Englishmen since the Second Dutch War. It was the beginning of a dull

method of doing work in the navy, happily never universal, but much

too common, during the next half century or more. We see the French

admiral intent on carrying out some operation other than attacking the

English fleet, fighting a little, but with great care not to fight

seriously. Opposite him is the English admiral, who has no idea that a

decisive battle is possible unless the enemy is good enough to supply

him with one, and perfectly ready to go off so soon as a few broken

spars give him an excuse for saying enough has been done. Herbert

went on from Scilly to Portsmouth. The king may not in his heart have

thought much of the battle, but he knew the necessity of pleasing the

naval officers and the great Tory party. He therefore professed himself

satisfied, knighted two of the captains, John Ashby and Cloudesley

Shovell, and made Herbert Earl of Torrington.

Rooke, on being detached by Herbert, had gone on at once to the west

of Scotland. He was in the estuary of the Clyde in May, and for

about a month was very active against King James’s partisan in the

islands. On the 8th of June he was called off to escort Kirke, who

had been detached with a body of troops for the purpose of raising

the siege of Londonderry. Rooke’s squadron consisted of five vessels,

one of which was the =Dartmouth=, now under the command of Leake,

who had been promoted for his use of the cushee piece on the 1st of

May. The squadron anchored in Rathlin Bay, and from thence went off

to Lough Foyle, whence there is a clear waterway up to Londonderry.

From what happened a month later, it may be taken for granted that

nothing whatever prevented the smaller ships from being carried up to

Londonderry, nothing, that is, except a want of goodwill and manhood on

the part of Kirke and Rooke. Unfortunately, they were wanting. Rooke

was indeed a brave man who did gallant service in later years. But his

conduct in these weeks was not worthy of his later reputation. Kirke

was a drunken, violent, foul-mouthed ruffian. It is idle to speculate

what was passing in his head. He may not have been a mere coward, but

he acted as if he had some hidden reason for not exerting himself. He

held a council of war on board the =Swallow=, and it was decided that

as there were not troops enough to operate against the enemy outside

the town, nothing could be done, as if it would not have been much

to carry provisions and a reinforcement of men into Londonderry. He

retired to the Island of Inch, and there remained perfectly quiescent.

Rooke in the meantime cruised in search of French privateers and

Jacobite prizes. Whatever his motives may have been, his actions

were those of a man who thought it no shame to fill his own pockets

by prize-hunting while his countrymen were starving and fighting in

desperation on the turf walls of Londonderry. At last, under the

influence of pressing orders from England, it was decided to do

something, and something was done in a way which covers with ignominy

the memory of the officers who did not dare to act before. During

the month of delay, due to their sloth or half-hearted treason, the

besiegers had had time to throw up batteries on the banks of the Foyle,

and to draw a boom across the river below Londonderry. The operation

was therefore more difficult than it had been, and yet it was done with

no great loss. On the 26th July the =Dartmouth= was told off to break

the boom, and convoy two victuallers, the =Mountjoy= and the =Phœnix=,

small vessels both belonging to Londonderry. Leake performed his

work in a thoroughly officer-like fashion. So soon as the flood-tide

began to run, and there was water enough to float the =Dartmouth= and

victuallers, he stood into the mouth of the Foyle, with the =Mountjoy=

and =Phœnix=, towing behind him the long boat of the =Swallow=. The

Irish batteries opened fire, but the little squadron held on steadily,

the =Dartmouth= giving all the cover she could to the merchant ships.

Their progress was slow for the wind was light, and the tide was not

yet running strongly. The =Mountjoy= reached the boom first, and was

steered straight at it by her skipper Browning. The victualler had

not enough way to break through the obstacle. She recoiled from the

boom and tailed on shore, that is to say, she grounded stern first.

The Irish raised a yell of gratification, and rushed down to the bank,

where they opened a heavy fire on the =Mountjoy=. Browning was shot

dead, but his men fired a broadside on the crowd. The shock, aided by

the tide, floated the =Mountjoy=. In the meantime the long-boat towed

by the =Dartmouth= had rowed up to the boom, and, undeterred by the

musket fire from the banks, had cut through the ropes which held the

spars together, and had made an opening. Then she towed the =Phœnix=

in. The =Mountjoy= and the =Dartmouth= easily forced their way through

the loosened spars. The disheartened besiegers broke up their camp and

marched away. It was a gallant piece of work, well done by Leake and

the merchant skippers, but the ease, and the trifling cost with which

it was done, are lasting reproaches to Kirke and Rooke.

After the relief of Londonderry, Rooke had other important work to do

in the Irish Sea. In August he covered the transport of Schomberg’s

army to Ireland, and co-operated in the capture of Carrickfergus. Then

he cruised down the coast, threatening the towns held for King James,

and landing where the enemy was not too strong to be attacked. As the

autumn drew on, and his ships became foul, Rooke came round to the

Downs, and his squadron was laid up for the winter. In the meantime,

the Grand Fleet of combined English and Dutch had cruised in the

Channel under the command of Herbert, who was joined by Edward Russell.

They looked into Brest, and cruised at the mouth of the Channel,

going every now and then into Torbay for provisions. There were many

complaints of the want of beer. At last, when the autumn had begun, the

Grand Fleet also came back, and was laid up. It was still not thought

prudent to keep the great ships out late in the autumn.

On a general survey of the operations of the year it cannot be said

that either party had displayed much energy. The French fleet had done

nothing proportionate to its pretensions and its paper strength. In

1692, the King of France was believed to possess 110 rated ships and

690 other vessels of war. This figure is of course absurd, unless we

are to suppose that it included all the lighters and row boats employed

in his harbours. The fleet carried 14,670 cannon, and was manned

by 2500 officers and 97,500 men. We may presume that this estimate

covers the dockyard workmen. Ninety-seven thousand five hundred men

was more than the whole number of Frenchmen liable to be drawn by the

_classes_, and it is very doubtful whether the French king ever had the

service at sea of one-half of them at any given moment. Still, when

all deductions are allowed for, this was a great force. It had done

nothing in proportion to its size. There would have been no difficulty,

considering that all Ireland except the north was in the hands of

King James, in establishing a naval station at Bantry Bay, or even

at Dublin, and from either of these ports the French could have done

something effectual to stop the passage of Schomberg’s army. They were

content to land their troops in Ireland, and then to return. But we

certainly did very little to prevent them, and the feeble conduct of

Herbert in the action of Bantry Bay promised very ill for the future.

The winter afforded the English Government an opportunity to prepare

for a vigorous campaign, but it was neglected. The first joy over

the Revolution was followed by a reaction. The two sections of the

victorious party, the Whig and the Tory, began to quarrel and to

struggle for predominance. These factions were nowhere more acutely

felt than at the Admiralty. It is said by several authorities, and

denied by nobody, that Herbert had fallen back into the dissolute

habits of his early life. He was addicted to excesses which are

ruinous to a man’s nerve and energy. It is certain that the work of

the Admiralty was so badly done that the French privateers were very

successful against our trade. In the new establishment of pay, made in

1694, it was said that the increase of salary was given in order that

the officers might no longer be able to make their poverty an excuse

for not doing their duty. Given the moral level of the Restoration and

the Revolution, it is not incredible that captains, who were sulky

at the loss of their table money, did refuse to exert themselves

in defence of the merchant ships unless they were bribed. The old

complaints of bad rations, bad pay, and bad beer were loud in the

fleet. At last it was found necessary to make a change at headquarters.

The existing Board of Admiralty was dissolved, and replaced by another

with the Earl of Pembroke at its head. Torrington was very indignant,

and threatened to resign the command of the fleet in the Channel. He

was pacified with gifts, and then showed his zeal as an officer by

staying in London to enjoy himself. He afterwards said that he had

warned the Government that a larger fleet must be prepared, but did

not take the effectual step of insisting upon resigning unless he was

supplied with sufficient force.

A strong fleet was indeed necessary, for the French king had at last

decided on making a serious attack in the Channel. His Toulon squadron

was to be brought round from the Mediterranean, and was to join the

Vice-Admiral _du Ponant_, the Count de Tourville, at Brest. Then the

whole force, which was intended to reach the imposing figure of 78

ships of the line, 30 fireships, and 15 galleys, besides frigates and

other attendant small craft, was to come into the Channel. The French

Government, exaggerating the meaning of the discontent in England, was

under the impression that a Jacobite rising would take place upon the

appearance of the French fleet. On our side there was no understanding

of the gravity of the coming crisis. In March Admiral Killigrew was

dispatched with thirteen sail of the line and two fireships to protect

the Mediterranean convoy. He was joined by some Dutch men-of-war.

The combined squadron met with bad weather, and put into Cadiz on

the 3rd of April. While lying here Killigrew received information

that Châteaurenault was to be expected shortly on his way out to the

ocean. Killigrew left Cadiz, and went into Gibraltar Bay, where he

was joined by Captain Skelton, who was also on convoy duty with six

ships. The combined force stood over to the Barbary coast to look for

Châteaurenault, who might be supposed to be likely to hug the shore of

Africa in order to escape observation. The common fate of our fleets

at that time attended this operation. Killigrew was too late. On

the 11th of May, Châteaurenault was seen outside the allied fleets.

Killigrew pursued, but his ships were foul with long cruising, perhaps

by neglect, for some of them had not been cleaned for seventeen months.

The French squadron easily outsailed its pursuers. Killigrew then

returned to Cadiz, and collected the trade before returning home. He

reached England at the beginning of July and there heard of a disaster

further up channel, which left him no resource but to carry his ship

into the Hamoaze, and there take shelter behind batteries.

This disaster was the Battle of Beachy Head, which the French call the

Battle of Bévisier, a corruption of Pevensey Bay. As the year grew

on, the English Government became aware that a large French force

might soon be expected in the Channel. The crisis was a very dangerous

one, since the king had sailed for Ireland with all the best troops.

There were few left in England, and the discontent of the Jacobites

was notorious. The naval preparations made to meet an enemy were

insufficient. When Torrington was at last sent down to Portsmouth on

the 28th May there were but thirty-two English ships and eighteen Dutch

collected.

Tourville had sailed from Brest on the 13th of June. The reinforcements

brought him by Châteaurenault raised his fleet to something over

seventy ships of the line, with thirty fireships and some small craft.

He sailed into the Channel, and his approach was first known to

Torrington on the 22nd. The English admiral was completely surprised

by the appearance of the enemy. At a later period, when his conduct

was called into question, he endeavoured to throw the blame for his

want of knowledge on the ministers, who, as he complained, had not

sent him down till the last of May, when it was too late for him to

station look-out ships off Brest. It does not, however, appear why

he thought it necessary to stay in London till he was driven out by

a special order. After the change in the Admiralty Board he had no

official duties in the capital, and if he stayed there till he earned

from the sailors the nickname of Lord Tarry-in-Town, it was presumably

because he did not wish to leave. Even so, he was with the fleet on

the 30th of May, and might have detached look-out ships to the mouth

of the Channel. He said he did, and then immediately afterwards said

he did not, because all his frigates were engaged in shipping Lord

Pembroke’s newly raised regiment of marines. The Dutch, to whom he

entrusted the duty, without taking the trouble to see whether it were

executed, were too busy shipping their stores to have leisure for

anything else. The allied fleet, in fact, presented a picture of sloth

and carelessness. When the enemy was known to be in the immediate

neighbourhood, it weighed anchor, and dropped down to Dunnose. Here

it was joined by two English and three Dutch ships of the line, which

raised it to fifty-five. Torrington anchored and remained at anchor

until the 25th. On that day he again weighed with the wind at N.E. and

on the afternoon sighted the French to the south of the Isle of Wight.

They were much scattered, and some of them were far to leeward. In

such circumstances Monk would at once have attacked the enemy within

striking distance in the hope of crippling him severely before he could

be reinforced. Torrington drew his fleet into a line of battle and

made towards the enemy. But he soon came to the conclusion that “they

had enough in a body to have given us more than sufficient work.” He

could not understand why they had not attacked him. It is probable that

they abstained because he was to windward and they were scattered. To

Monk the fact that the enemy was shy would have been an extra reason

for attacking. To Torrington it only suggested dismal reflections as to

what might happen if the French became enterprising, and therefore he

retired. During the 26th he worked back from the south of the Isle of

Wight to the N.E. A letter which he wrote on this day to the Council

is marked on every line with glee over the embarrassment the crisis

was likely to cause to his political opponents. He did indeed say that

he would watch the enemy, and get to westward of them if he could; but

before this he had expressed his opinion that the best course was to

fall back to the Gunfleet, and then the ships from the west might come

up to Portsmouth, and join him over the “Flats,” that is the shallows

at the mouth of the Thames. The ships from the west were Killigrew’s

squadron. Torrington knew that they had been cruising and must be foul,

and it was certainly within his knowledge that they were less numerous

than his own fleet. Yet he proposed to subject them to the risk of

passing the French fleet, which he thought too great to be run by

himself. This was not how Tromp had behaved when he united the fleets

of the Maas and the Texel in defiance of Monk at the end of the First

Dutch War.

It would seem that there are two types of fighting man. The first when

in presence of the enemy instinctively thinks, “How can I strike with

the most effect.” The great race are of this type. To it belong Blake

and Monk, Hawke, Hood, Nelson, and their like, among our admirals;

and, among our enemies, Tromp, De Ruyter, and Suffren. Then there is

another kind of fighting man who may be brave enough personally, but

who, when he is a commander, instinctively says, “How can I prevent the

enemy from hurting me.” This kind of leader has fortunately been rare

with us at sea, but Herbert was of the race, and so was Byng. Such men

are always looking over their shoulders, always making the most of the

enemy’s force, always exaggerating the defects of their own command.

They seek for excuses to do nothing, and when they do come to the

resolution to fight, the opposite determination to retreat forms itself

underneath, as it were spontaneously. This was the natural tendency of

Herbert as he had already shown in Bantry Bay, and it was strengthened

by his wish to punish those political rivals in London who had refused

to take his advice, and had turned him out of the Admiralty.

When his letter of the 26th reached the Council it was not unnaturally

interpreted by them as indicating a wish to retire to the Gunfleet at

once. This may have been a mistake, but an admiral who said that he

had “heartily given God thanks” that the enemy declined battle, and

added, “I shall not think myself very unhappy if I can get rid of them

without fighting,” had no ground to complain if he was thought to be

wanting in spirit. No member of the Council was more bitter against

Herbert than his brother seaman Edward Russell, a rancorous man, and

an extreme Whig. He was very probably moved by jealousy, but the queen

and the civil members of the Council can hardly be severely blamed

for not entirely trusting one admiral, when another admiral condemned

him without stint. On general grounds the Council was justified in

expecting more energy from Torrington. The danger was not that a

great French army could land, this the queen’s counsellors knew to be

impossible, but that a small corps of French troops might be thrown

on shore which could act as a rallying point to the partizans of King

James. It was a great object to rouse the general patriotic feeling

of the country, and there was no more effectual method of doing that

than a battle. The case was one in which it was better to fight, and be

beaten, than not to fight at all. A letter was written in the queen’s

name to Torrington. It was worded with no apparent want of confidence,

and it left him free not to fight if he preferred; but it ordered him

strictly not to lose sight of the French, to get to windward of them if

he could, but to fight on the first advantage rather than to go to the

Gunfleet.

The letter reached Torrington on the 29th of June. He called a council

of war which agreed with him that it implied an order to fight on the

first advantage. A previous council of war had confirmed his opinion

that it was better not to fight. It may be laid down as a general rule

that a council of war is a mere blind for the commander-in-chief. When

it does not consist of his dependants it must still necessarily be full

of his inferiors in rank, who have been trained by the habits of their

life not to contradict the commanding officer. Besides, when he wants

to fight, it looks cowardly to recommend retreat, and, when he wants

to retreat, it looks like a reflection on his courage to insist upon

fighting.

The fleet was now lying off Beachy Head some nine or ten miles to the

south. The enemy again were some eighteen miles off to the S.W. The

fleet weighed anchor at nine o’clock at night, and remained beating

to and fro till daybreak. The wind was off the shore. The enemy also

was under way at sundown, but at two o’clock in the morning Tourville

was heard to fire guns as a signal to anchor. The sound was heard and

understood in the English fleet. An opportunity now presented itself

for slipping between the French and the land, and getting to the

westward of them for the sake of joining Killigrew. Tromp would have

made a push, but Torrington seems to have been in a dogged and stupid

mood with no very fixed intention in his mind, save to make all the

trouble he could for other people. At daybreak the fleet had not much

altered its position. Beachy Head was still twelve miles to the N.E.

and the French were visible at anchor to the south. At four o’clock

the signal was made to form the line, and at eight o’clock the “bloody

flag,” the red flag hoisted at the fore-topmast-head, which was the

signal to engage the enemy, was run up in the flagship. Two vessels had

joined Torrington since he left Dunnose. His total force now consisted

of thirty-five English, and twenty-two Dutch. According to the order

established for the fleet, the Dutch led when it was upon the starboard

tack. As the wind was N.E. and the enemy to the South and West, the

fleet bore down with the wind on the right quarter, the Dutch led.

Torrington himself was in the centre with the Red Squadron, with Sir

John Ashby between him and the Dutch, and Sir George Rooke between him

and the Blue Squadron in the rear. Sir Ralph Delaval commanded the Blue

Squadron. The fleet it must be understood was not perpendicular, but

parallel to the enemy though a little behind him. Thus the ships of

the allied fleet had to bear down on the French in a number of lines

which struck upon them at an angle, but were parallel to one another.

When the allied fleet was seen to be approaching, the French weighed

anchor and lay with their heads pointing to N. of W. in a long concave

line. The official French list gives seventy-two vessels present in

the line, but the English counted that there were thirty-four ahead

of the French admiral and forty-eight behind him. In this there was

probably exaggeration, and perhaps downright lying. Tourville himself

had his flag in the _Soleil Royale_, a magnificent ship of 110 guns.

The van was commanded by the Lieutenant-General Châteaurenault and

Lieutenant-General the Marquis de Villette Mursay. The rear was under

the command of Count D’Estrées, Vice-Admiral _du levant_, and the

Lieutenant-General Gabaret, who had been promoted after the action of

Bantry Bay.

Fire began at nine o’clock when the Dutch ships under Admiral

Cullemburg came into action with the French van. Owing to the

inferiority of the allies in numbers there was a danger that as they

could not stretch all along the line of the French fleet some of the

ships in the French line would turn to windward, and put either the

Dutch or the English, according to circumstances, between two fires.

The danger was one which De Ruyter had had to face in the battles of

1672 and 1673, and he had provided for it by telling off a squadron to

watch the enemy’s van and had then thrown the bulk of his own force

on the rear. It shows how useless experience is to naturally stupid

men, that although all the senior officers present had served either

with, or against, De Ruyter, none of them thought of following his

example. All the allied leaders could do was to endeavour to get as

near as they could to stretching themselves out to the same length

as the enemy by sending the van down against the French van; by

keeping the Red Division opposite the enemy’s centre; and by leaving

the attack on the rear to Sir Ralph Delaval. While they were bearing

down, Herbert changed his mind once, or twice, as to the exact point

of the enemy’s line he wished to reach, and altered the course of his

ship accordingly. The result was that Sir John Ashby became puzzled

as to the intentions of his commander-in-chief, and finally ended by

attaching himself to the Dutch. In the end Torrington placed himself

opposite the rear of the French centre so that there came a gap between

him and Ashby. Being afraid that the French would stand out of their

own line, in order to pass through this opening, Herbert kept his ships

a good distance from the enemy so that he might be the better placed to

head off such as attended this movement. As the French began to move

ahead slowly, just as the allies came down, the Dutch could not get

abreast of the leading ship, and struck on them at the ninth.

The Dutch began to fire at nine, Sir Ralph Delaval at half-past nine,

and the centre at ten. At the two extremities the fighting was hot. Sir

Ralph Delaval pressed eagerly on the squadron of Count D’Estrées, and

pushed his attack with such energy that the enemy seemed to flinch.

Sir John Ashby in the van found himself abreast of Tourville. He fired

two guns in order to see whether the Vice-Admiral _du Ponant_ would

be a “reasonable enemy.” Tourville disdained to strike first at his

inferior in rank, and it was not until Ashby’s first broadside had been

delivered that the _Soleil Royal_ opened fire. The wind, which had been

strong in the early morning was still blowing a good breeze. It was

used by the ships at the head of the French line to work to windward.

Between eleven and twelve o’clock they succeeded in doubling on the

Dutch and putting them between two fires. Admiral Cullemburg’s squadron

fought gallantly but was overpowered. What had happened was seen on

the centre and rear. Torrington’s attention was called to the movement

by his flag-captain who asked if he also intended to allow himself to

be weathered. He answered that he did not, and began at once to work

up to windward. As Sir Ralph Delaval had pressed closely on D’Estrées,

he had fallen to leeward of the commander-in-chief, and there was an

“elbow” in the English line. By two o’clock the wind fell away to a

dead calm and movement became restricted on either side to what could

be done by towing, or drifting along with the tide. Cannonading went on

between the two stationary fleets for some time. At last the ebb-tide

set up a strong westerly current. The Dutch dropped anchor with all

sails set. As the French were not seamen enough to do the same thing

they drifted to the west. One Dutch ship which was too much damaged to

anchor floated away, and became a prize. Then Herbert drifted down to

the neighbourhood of the Dutch and anchored close by them. The allies

remained at anchor, till the easterly current began to flow with the

flood-tide in the evening. Then they got up anchor and tided eastwards

towards the Thames. The pursuit of Tourville was timid. He followed

next day, but in line of battle which limited the speed of his fleet to

that of the slowest vessel in it. To this timidity Torrington owed his

safety from complete destruction. A few of the more severely crippled

Dutch and English vessels were set on fire, but the great bulk of the

allied fleet got safely into the Thames.

The subsequent movements of Tourville may be dismissed in a few lines.

He remained in the Channel until the early days of August, ranging at

will up and down and of course paralysing commerce, but he did nothing

more against our coast than burn the little town of Teignmouth in

South Devon. There was nothing in fact that he could do. The Jacobite

rising did not take place because he had no troops to land to help the

country gentlemen, who were resolved not to move until they were secure

against being attacked by the Government’s forces before they were

sufficiently organised to offer any resistance. In August Tourville

returned quietly to Brest. There had been a furious outbreak of anger

in the country against Torrington and a great movement of patriotism

which was unspeakably to the advantage of King William’s government.

Yet when Torrington was brought to trial in December he was acquitted.

The acquittal was intelligible. King William’s victory at the Boyne,

gained just after the battle of Beachy Head, had put the country into

good humour, and the admiral’s most bitter accusers were the Dutch who

were not popular in England. But it was none the less a misfortune.

Torrington had not done his utmost. His position indeed was a difficult

one, but it was not worse than Monk’s in 1666, or De Ruyter’s in 1672,

’73, and he had not behaved as these men had done. When a court martial

could find no fault with his management it lowered the whole standard

of conduct expected of an English naval officer. It showed that a man

who leaned to the side of timidity would not be condemned by other

officers. Then, too, the court, which could see nothing to blame in

his feeble effort of attack on the 30th June, must have been composed

of men of a lower level of intelligence than the sea chiefs, whether

Dutch, or English of the previous wars. It laid the foundation of that

pedantic adherence to the line and the practice of engaging from van to

rear which afterwards led to the monstrous sentence on Admiral Mathews,

to the helpless weakness of Byng, and to the stupidity of Graves.

Perhaps the ugliest feature of the whole transaction was this, that the

English excused Torrington very largely on the ground that the chief

sufferers in the battle had been the Dutch. There was something very

base in the code of honour of people who did not think it ignoble to

throw the burden of battle on an ally.

While Tourville was ranging the Channel the English government had

fitted out a fresh armament. It was put under the combined command

of Sir Richard Haddock, Sir John Ashby, and Admiral Killigrew. This

fleet could, however, do little. The French were no longer at sea, and

the great ships were laid up as usual before the beginning of autumn.

Yet one good piece of service was done before the year was closed.

Marlborough had suggested that an expedition might be sent to act

against the partisans of King James in the south of Ireland. The scheme

was approved by King William, and Marlborough sailed in September,

under an escort of third and fourth rates commanded by the admirals.

Cork was taken on the 29th September, and the bulk of the ships then

returned to the Channel, leaving a few to co-operate with Marlborough

in the attack on Kinsale. This completed the expedition. A separate

squadron of ships had cruised during this year on the coast of Ireland,

under the command of Sir Cloudesley Shovell, and had co-operated in the

taking of Duncannon.

In this year the French had again made very little use of their naval

force. In spite of Tourville’s victorious cruise in the Channel, the

English cause had advanced as a whole. King James had been beaten from

the north and east of Ireland, and deprived of two very important ports

in the south. That this was so was due to the little help afforded

him by the French navy. King Louis seems never to have thought of

keeping a squadron permanently on the coast of Ireland, though it would

have been easy and manifestly advantageous so to do. In the Channel,

Tourville had really effected very little. He is perhaps not to be

blamed for retiring in August. Nobody then thought of keeping the great

ships out in autumn, and the French ports in the Channel are very poor.

But he had shown undeniable want of enterprise against Torrington. His

pursuit had been so feeble after Beachy Head that we may doubt whether

he was the man to have taken advantage of the weather-gage of the

change of wind which Herbert feared had occurred. His own countrymen

were ill-satisfied with him. The famous epigram of Seignelay that he

was _poltron de tête mais non de cœur_, is well known. If this was all

the French could do when their powers were at the best it would be the

fault of the allies if they did not some day turn the tables on their

enemy.

The operations of 1691 were of a nature to confirm this belief. A

powerful fleet was sent to sea by the allies under the command of

Russell. Its movements throughout the summer were wearisome and

unimportant. It went to and fro between May and the beginning of

autumn. In the meantime Tourville was at sea with a fleet of eighty

sail of the line. His cruise is rather a famous passage in French naval

history. He contrived to keep the sea without allowing himself to be

forced to battle—and at last, by making clever use of a shift of wind,

managed to get into Brest untouched by the allied fleet. The pride of

the French of the time with this achievement, and the satisfaction

they have expressed at it since, are the condemnation of a navy, and a

method of conducting war. Tourville was quite strong enough to fight

the allies, yet his movements were directed to avoiding battle and to

capturing merchant ships. As a matter of fact, he missed his great

prize, the Smyrna convoy, and in the meantime Limerick, King James’s

last stronghold in Ireland, was taken, and the country thoroughly

subdued. The great French fleet had preserved itself, but the King of

France had lost an ally who kept up a useful diversion of the resources

of England. A fighting force which makes it a principal object to avoid

battle is doomed to defeat when it comes across an enemy who makes it

a steady rule to fight. But the French never took the view that if

you wish to use the sea you must drive your enemy off it, and if you

want to do that you must smash him. In the dullest times the English

navy has always understood that the beating of the French navy was the

preliminary to everything else. The French government, which was much

distressed by lack of money, was angry with Tourville for missing the

convoy, and accused him of timidity.

In 1692 the French at last learnt by a painful experience the truth

of Bacon’s saying that “_Occasion turneth a bald noddle after she has

presented her locks in front, and no hold taken_, or at least turneth

the handle of the bottle first to be received and afterwards the belly

which is hard to clasp.” After wasting three years either in delivering

their blows wide, or hitting feebly when the direction was good, the

French at last made a serious effort to strike England to the heart.

But what they might have done with a fair prospect of success in ’89,

’90, or ’91, they attempted with insufficient means in ’92. Their

deficiencies were due to causes which a little foresight would have

made them understand were sure to operate sooner or later. The events

of ’90 had taught the English Government the necessity for vigorous

preparations. At the same time an accident, such as was always likely

to occur, prevented a timely concentration of their own forces. The

Toulon fleet, under Châteaurenault, ought to have joined Tourville at

Brest early in the year, but it was delayed by bad weather. It was,

and always has been, a cause of weakness to the French that their two

seacoasts on the Mediterranean and the Atlantic are separated from one

another by the Spanish Peninsula. An enemy who is in a position to

occupy the Straits of Gibraltar with a strong naval force is admirably

placed, to prevent one-half of the French fleet from uniting with

the other. Even when there was no hostile squadron in the Straits,

persistent bad weather might confine the French in the Mediterranean.

At a later date, attempted concentrations of the French fleet broke

down from these very causes. But this was a probability which ought

to have been provided for. Louis XIV. ought either to have made his

officers act with more spirit or not to have allowed an important part

of his fleet to go back to the Mediterranean at the close of ’91. As

it was, his effort to carry out a scheme of invasion with a part of

his naval force, when the whole of them would not have been too many,

ended, as it was bound to end, in disastrous failure.

The allied Dutch and English fleets were out early. Their Governments

had a double motive for wasting no time. They were aware that an army

of invasion, consisting in part of Irish regiments in the service of

France, was being collected in Normandy for the invasion of England. In

spite of many disappointments King James was still hopeful, and he had

persuaded the King of France to make an effort to help the Jacobites

in England. The army of invasion, some 30,000 strong, was collected in

the Côtentin. They were quartered at La Hougue, on the eastern side of

the Côtentin. Another object for which the allies had to provide was

the safe return of the ships, Dutch and English, composing the Smyrna

convoy. It was coming home under the protection of a squadron commanded

by Sir Ralph Delaval. In order to discharge the double duty of covering

the return of the convoy and watching the French, a detached squadron

under the command of Rear-Admiral Carter cruised on the coast from

Brest to Cape La Hague, the north-westerly point of the Côtentin.

Delaval brought his convoy back in March and then joined Carter on the

coast of France. In later times the English navy would have prepared to

prevent the concentration of the French fleet by cruising off Brest,

but at the end of the seventeenth century our officers had not yet

acquired that confidence in their vessels, and the vessels had not been

so far perfected, as to make cruising in spring on so dangerous a coast

as that about Brest appear practicable for the great ships. The grand

fleet was not in fact fully ready for sea till May, when Russell called

in the detached squadrons, and united his whole force at St. Helens.

There was another reason for bringing the fleet together. The

Government had decided on making a demonstration. During the last few

months, as indeed at all times in King William’s reign, the Jacobite

agents had been very busy. The great discontent undoubtedly existing

among the naval officers, and partly due to the grievances as to

their pay, had appeared to give the friends of the exiled king an

opportunity. Captain David Lloyd had been running to and fro with great

zeal. His old comrades were too much attached to him to betray him

to the Government even when they were opposed to his party, and there

were no doubt great numbers of English naval officers who were as well

disposed as other Englishmen to restore the exiled king if only he

would not be his own worst enemy. These men would not be shocked by

arguments in his favour. As they had themselves been praised and in

some cases rewarded for deserting King James, it would be unreasonable

to expect that they should have been greatly offended when asked by

an old brother officer to desert back to him from King William. The

activity of Lloyd was perfectly well known to the English Government.

He had spoken to Carter, who had immediately reported the whole of the

conversation to the queen. Lloyd himself does not appear to have taken

all the grumblings he heard among his brother seamen very seriously,

and the Council of Regency was probably not very frightened. But it

wisely decided to bring all doubts to the test. On the 15th May a

letter drawn up in the queen’s name by the Secretary, Nottingham, was

sent down to the flag officers and captains of the fleet. In this

letter the queen informed them that she had heard stories accusing them

of disloyalty but she did not believe the accusations, and continued to

repose the most complete confidence in their fidelity. This profession

of a confidence it would have been wise to assume, even if it had

not been sincerely felt, was at once communicated by Russell to his

subordinates. It had the effect which had been hoped for. The fleet

answered by unanimous expression of loyalty. An address expressing the

perfect readiness of all the officers to venture their lives, with all

imaginable “alacrity and resolution,” in defence “of the Government

and of the religion and liberty of the country and against all Popish

invaders whatsoever,” was drawn up and signed on behalf of the fleet by

sixty-four flag officers and captains.

An opportunity was speedily given to these officers to show that they

could be as good as their word. A council of war decided to take the

initiative against the French. A body of troops was to be landed at St.

Malo, while the allied fleet was to lie to the westward of that place

in order to provoke a battle. On the 18th May, Russell sailed from St.

Helens, and on the following day when he was about twenty miles off

Cape Barfleur, the easterly corner of the Côtentin, the look-out ships

to the westward of the fleet made the signal for seeing the enemy. In

fact, while the allies had been talking of invading France, Tourville

had sailed from Brest with the intention of covering an invasion of

England, and after suffering some delay from the weather had come so

far. The two fleets now opposed to one another were divided as follows,

and consisted of the elements shown on these lists:—

+-------------------------+----------------------------------------------+

| THE DUTCH | THE ENGLISH |

+-------------------------+-----------------------+----------------------+

| The White Squadron | Red Squadron | Blue Squadron |

+-------------------------+-----------------------+----------------------+

| Guns | Guns | Guns |

| _The Zealand_ 90 | =The Royal | =The Victory= 100 |

| _Konig Wilhelm_ 92 | William= 100 | =Albemarle= 90 |

| _Brandenburg_ 92 | =London= 100 | =Windsor Castle= 90 |

| _West Friesland_ 84 | =Britannia= 100 | =Neptune= 90 |

| _Printz_ 92 | =St. Andrew= 100 | =Vanguard= 90 |

| _Printzess_ 92 | =Royal Sovereign= 100 | =Duchess= 90 |

| _Bexhirmer_ 84 | =St. Michael= 90 | =Ossory= 90 |

| _Casteel Medenblick_ 86 | =Sandwich= 90 | =Duke= 90 |

| _Captain General_ 84 | =Royal Catherine= 90 | =Resolution= 70 |

| _North Holland_ 68 | =Cambridge= 70 | =Monk= 60 |

| _Erste Edele_ 74 | =Plymouth= 60 | =Expedition= 70 |

| _Munickendam_ 72 | =Breda= 80 | =Royal Oak= 74 |

| _Gelderland, A._ 72 | =Kent= 70 | =Northumberland= 70 |

| _Stadt Meeyden_ 72 | =Swiftsure= 70 | =Lion= 60 |

| _Etswout_ 72 | =Hampton Court= 70 | =Berwick= 70 |

| _Printz Casimir_ 70 | =Grafton= 70 | =Defiance= 70 |

| _Frisia_ 70 | =Restoration= 70 | =Montague= 60 |

| _Riddershap_ 72 | =Eagle= 70 | =Warspight= 70 |

| _De 7 Provintzen_ 76 | =Rupert= 60 | =Monmouth= 70 |

| _Zurick Zee_ 60 | =Elizabeth= 70 | =Edgar= 70 |

| _Gelderland, R._ 64 | =Burford= 70 | =Stirling Castle= 70 |

| _Vere_ 62 | =Captain= 70 | =Dreadnought= 60 |

| _Zealand, A._ 64 | =Devonshire= 80 | =Suffolk= 70 |

| _Haerlem_ 64 | =York= 60 | =Cornwall= 80 |

| _Leyden_ 64 | =Lenox= 70 | =Essex= 70 |

| _Amsterdam_ 64 | =Ruby= 50 | =Hope= 70 |

| _Velew_ 64 | =Oxford= 50 | =Chatham= 50 |

| _Maegd van Dort_ 64 | =St. Albans= 50 | =Advice= 50 |

| _Tergoes_ 54 | =Greenwich= 50 | =Adventure= 50 |

| _Medenblick_ 50 | =Chester= 50 | =Crown= 50 |

| _Gaesterland_ 50 | =Centurion= 50 | =Woolwich= 54 |

| _Ripperda_ 50 | =Bonaventure= 50 | =Deptford= 50 |

| _Schattershoff_ 50 | | |

| _Stadden Land_ 52 | | |

| _Hoorn_ 50 | | |

| _Delft_ 54 | | |

+-------------------------+-----------------------+----------------------+

The list of the French fleet given by Monsieur Troude is as follows:—

+-------------------+---------------------+------------------+

| Guns | Guns | Guns |

| _Bourbon_ 64 | _Fort_ 60 | _Content_ 64 |

| _Monarque_ 90 | _Henri_ 64 | _Souverain_ 84 |

| _Aimable_ 68 | _Ambitieux_ 96 | _Illustre_ 70 |

| _Saint Louis_ 60 | _Couronne_ 76 | _Modéré_ 52 |

| _Diamant_ 60 | _Maure_ 52 | _Excellent_ 60 |

| _Gaillard_ 68 | _Serieux_ 68 | _Prince_ 60 |

| _Terrible_ 76 | _Courageux_ 58 | _Magnifique_ 76 |

| _Merveilleux_ 94 | _Perle_ 56 | _Laurier_ 64 |

| _Tonnant_ 76 | _Glorieux_ 64 | _Brave_ 58 |

| _Saint-Michel_ 60 | _Conquerant_ 84 | _Entend_ 60 |

| _Sans-Pareil_ 62 | _Soleil Royal_ 104 | _Triomphant_ 76 |

| _Foudroyant_ 82 | _Saint-Philippe_ 84 | _Orgueilleux_ 94 |

| _Brilliant_ 68 | _Admirable_ 90 | |

+-------------------+---------------------+------------------+

It will be seen that the force of the two fleets was extremely unequal;

the allies being in fact more than twice as strong as their enemy.

If this was a surprise to the French, the information supplied to

Louis XIV. by the Jacobites in England, and by his agents in the Low

Countries, must have been far less accurate than is commonly supposed.

If, on the other hand, he really did believe that the grumblers in

the English fleet, and that Russell the admiral, who was undoubtedly

in communication with the exiled court at St. Germain, would betray

their country to its hereditary enemy on the field of battle, and under

the eyes of all the world, he must have been singularly impervious

to experience. Tourville received peremptory orders, dated the 26th

March, and worded in a style insulting to him. He was told to go near

enough to the enemy to see them for himself, and not to be misled into

believing that merchant-ships were men-of-war, as he was accused of

doing during the off-shore cruise of 1691. If on reaching La Hougue

he found the allies already there, he was to attack them whatever

their numbers might be. If victorious, he was to cover the passage of

the army to England. If defeated, he was to save his fleet as he best

could. Should the allies not be near La Hougue when he arrived, he was

to transport the army without waste of time. If the allies attacked him

during the passage, he was to fight with obstinacy, so as to give the

army time to land. In case the allies appeared after the landing, he

might avoid a battle if they exceeded in number by ten ships.

When the French were signalled by the guns of the look-out ships at

three o’clock on the morning of the 19th, the weather was foggy.

Fearing that the enemy might stretch past him to northward, Russell

signalled to the rear to tack and close the space between him and

the coast of England. At four o’clock the mist lifted and the enemy

were seen to the westward with their heads pointing to the south. As

this showed that they had no intention of attempting to turn him on

the north side Russell countermanded the order to the Rear or Blue

Division. The allied fleet was not in order of battle but scattered

some ahead, some to windward, and some to leeward of the admiral.

The wind was blowing from the S.W., and the French therefore had the

weather-gage. The line was formed at eight o’clock with the Dutch

or White Squadron in the van, and to the south of the Red Squadron

which formed the centre, then came the Blue Squadron farthest to the

north. There must have been a distance of many miles between the first

and last ship of this great fleet of ninety-nine sail, and the Blue

Squadron was still to leeward. Having made his simple disposition to

meet the attack Russell lay with his topsail to the mast waiting for

the enemy to come on. With a resolution of character which shows his

innate superiority to Herbert, Tourville charged home. He directed his

attack on the centre of the allied line, telling off a few ships in his

van and rear to watch the van and rear of the allies, and prevent them

from doubling on his own fleet.

The battle began about ten o’clock, and lasted till about five in the

afternoon. The French ships engaged with the Red Division made no

attempt to break through the English line. The battle was conducted

entirely by cannonading at short ranges, and the English claimed that

their fire was more rapid than the French. When the enemy’s attack was

fully developed Russell ordered the van to tack for the purpose of

getting to windward of the French, and putting them between two fires,

and at the same time signalled to the Blue Division to come closer to

the centre. Neither order could be obeyed, for the wind was very light

so that the ships were unable to manœuvre. The real battle was always

between the Red Squadron and the ships immediately around Tourville.

About two o’clock in the afternoon the wind, after falling altogether,

rose again, but from the N.W., thus giving the weather-gage to the

allies, and by five o’clock Tourville began to draw off. He doubtless

felt that enough had been done for honour, and he hoped that the Red

Squadron had been sufficiently mauled to cripple it from pursuing him.

The wind was light and variable. As the French ships drew away to the

westward it fell calm and the mist arose again; then there was a short

squall from the east. Sir Cloudesley Shovell with the rear division of

the Red Squadron broke through the French in the interval between the

centre and the ships which had been stretched out to observe the rear

of the allies. Captain Hastings of the =Sandwich= was killed at this

phase of the action. The two fleets became mingled in the fog, and

drifted to the westward with the ebb-tide. Both anchored at the flood,

but at this moment a portion of the Blue Squadron which had worked to

the westward of the French drifted back through them in the mist and

darkness. They were fired on as they came through, and Rear-Admiral

Carter, whose division made this movement, was killed. The sound of the

cannonading was heard by the rest of the allied fleet, but it could

take no part in the action. When he saw that the enemy was in retreat

Russell had ordered a general chase, that is to say he left each ship

free to go at its utmost speed. But no great rapidity of movement was

possible. The wind had fallen, and the fog made it impossible to see.

This was the end of what strictly speaking is called the battle of

La Hogue, from the old spelling of La Hougue. The name is improperly

used, for the actual battle was fought off Cape Barfleur. The battle of

Barfleur was in fact the title commonly given by our ancestors, but it

has been displaced by the name of the place which was the last scene

of the four days’ pursuit following on the action. The pursuit began

like a nightmare, in strenuous effort to act without the power to move.

Both fleets had anchored during the night. When daylight came there

was a thick haze and the French were invisible to the allied fleet.

What little wind there was, was from the N.N.E. At about eight o’clock

some of the Dutch ships caught sight of the enemy to the W.S.W. The

pursuit was resumed, but, as the ships could not move more quickly

than they were carried by the tide, the progress was very slow. At four

o’clock in the afternoon the ebb-tide ceased, and both fleets again

anchored, the French in order to avoid the risk of being carried among

their pursuers, and the allies so that they should not lose ground.

They had moved so little during the ebb-tide that they were still off

Cape Barfleur, and at no great distance from the scene of the battle.

As long as the tide was flowing it was useless to move, but at ten

in the evening, when it turned, both fleets again got under way and

began to drift to the west. About this time the fore-topmast of the

=Britannia=, which had been seriously injured in the action, came

down, and as Russell did not transfer his flag to another vessel, this

delayed the Red Squadron under his immediate command. Many of them must

have suffered in the action. Whether because they felt bound to remain

about their admiral, or because they could not move any faster, the

ships of the Red Squadron fell somewhat behind in the pursuit while

the Blue and White pressed on ahead. At four in the morning of the

21st both fleets anchored again. They had now tided so far that they

were almost off Cape La Hague. Both were much scattered. A part of the

French had passed the Cape, the others had not. Among those which had

failed to get beyond the headland was the _Soleil Royal_, Tourville’s

flagship. She had suffered very severely in the action from the fire of

the =Britannia= and the ships just ahead and astern. It has been said

with some appearance of truth that if Tourville had had the resolution

to set her on fire he might have brought the whole of his fleet round

Cape La Hague. But she was the pride of the French Navy, and had been

named from the king himself who was the royal sun of France, and the

admiral could not make his mind up to sacrifice her. He had, however,

transferred his flag to another ship the _Ambitieux_.

When the fleets were ordered to anchor, only a portion of the French

was able to obey. Whether it was because they had slipped their cables

on the previous night, and therefore could not anchor, or whether

their anchors would not hold, it is certain that they were unable to

stop themselves from being carried to the eastward towards the allies.

The position then in the early hours of the 21st was this, one part

of the French fleet was ahead, to the west another part was drifting

eastward between the land and the allies. The best sailing ships of

the White and Blue Squadrons were well ahead of Russell, who with the

Red Squadron was furthest of all to the east. The inability of the

ships immediately about him to anchor showed Tourville that it was

useless to endeavour to keep his now divided fleet acting as one body

any longer. If he summoned the ships to the west to his assistance he

would bring the whole fleet into a trap between the land and the enemy,

who was in overwhelming numbers. Since he could no longer exercise his

powers as commander to any advantage there remained nothing for him

but to abdicate. He therefore hauled down his flag of command from

the main-topmast-head, as a signal that every captain was free to act

as he thought best for the safety of his ship. The French fleet now

split into fragments. One part, under the Chef d’escadre Pannetier

made a push for the Channel between the coast of France and the island

of Alderney. The easterly current of the flood-tide splits at Cape La

Hague. While the main body flows up Channel a branch turns off, and

runs with great speed between the west side of the Côtentin and the

island of Alderney. This makes what we call the Race of Alderney, and

the French the Raz Blanchard. The navigation is dangerous, and would,

under ordinary circumstances, have been avoided by the heavy ships,

but circumstances only left the French a choice of evils, and they ran

through the Race to seek refuge under the guns of St. Malo.

Russell, seeing that the division of the French and the distress of the

vessels drifting towards him made it no longer necessary to keep his

fleet together, signalled to Ashby, and the Dutch to pursue Pannetier.

Meanwhile he, with the Red Division and the laggards of the White and

Blue, prepared to deal with those of Tourville’s ships which had failed

to round La Hague. Ashby could not reach the enemy. Pannetier had time

to get his ships over the bar of the Rance, and take refuge under the

guns of the corsair town of St. Malo, before his pursuers reached him.

Ashby returned next day and joined Sir Ralph Delaval, who, in the

meantime, had done a good stroke of work at Cherbourg. When it became

clear that they were trapped the ships of Tourville had no resource

but to endeavour to fly to the eastward between Russell and the land,

to round Cape Barfleur and to take refuge at La Hougue. Three of them

were too crippled for further flight. These were the famous _Soleil

Royal_, for whose sake so much had been risked, the _Admirable_, and

the _Triomphant_. All three were run ashore at Cherbourg, and the

others fled eastward. Russell left Sir Ralph Delaval to deal with the

stranded ships, and followed the rest. Delaval could do nothing on the

evening of the 21st, but on the following morning he sent in the boats

and fireships, under the command of Captain Heath, Captain Greenaway,

and Captain Foulis. The _Admirable_ and _Triomphant_ were burnt. But

the fireship with which Captain Foulis endeavoured to burn the _Soleil

Royal_ was sunk by the Frenchmen’s fire. Hereupon, Delaval hauled in as

close as he could and opened fire on the great stranded flagship. When

he had battered her for some time, and found that no further resistance

was made, he took his boats and boarded her. Sir Ralph Delaval’s

report contains a detail which is discreditable to King Louis’s navy.

He says he found many men and wounded men in the _Soleil Royal_, but

no officers. She was burnt by the English. When the work was done Sir

Ralph was disturbed by thirty sail approaching him from the west.

This, however, turned out to be Sir John Ashby’s squadron, and the two

officers united their forces, and followed the admiral to the east. A

few of the French ships under command of Nesmond escaped by sailing

round the British Isles.

Russell pursued Tourville round Cape Barfleur. The French admiral ran

as close as he could to La Hougue, with the thirteen vessels still

about him. It was not until the evening of the 22nd, so light was the

wind and so slow were the ships of that time amid tides and variable

breezes, that Russell was able to anchor in the neighbourhood of the

fugitives. On the 23rd he sent in the boats and fireships under Rooke,

who burnt six of the enemy. On the 24th the work was completed by the

destruction of the other seven. The French indeed were panic-stricken,

and the resistance was trifling. Not more than ten men were killed

in this piece of service, which if attempted against an alert and

resolute enemy must needs have been very costly.

The battle pursuit and destruction spread over these five days, and

included under the name of “La Hogue” make nearly the last passage of

naval warfare of a brilliant decisive character which we shall meet

for three-quarters of a century. The navy had work of vital importance

to do, and a function of unusual importance to fulfil. But it was no

longer to meet equal fleets at sea, except on rare occasions, and

when it did its own method of fighting was dull. The French fleet

very soon ceased to contend with the allies in the ocean and channel

altogether, and in the Mediterranean its efforts were spasmodic. The

great change has been attributed to the disaster of La Hogue, without

sufficient reason. We have seen that the operations of the French in

previous years had been very languid. Their weakness during the rest

of the war was to be mainly attributed to the French king’s want of

money. His resources were overburdened by the war on land against the

League of Augsburg, and he could not afford to fit out great fleets.

But to our ancestors the importance of the battle of La Hogue was

naturally a subject of high gratification. The material loss inflicted

on King Louis was considerable, and the blow to his prestige greater

still. They could feel that the Channel was now safe, not indeed from

privateers, but from great fleets sent out to cover an invasion of

England. Besides, after the spiritless straggling operations of the

last three years, the resolution of Russell and the vigour of his

pursuit were an immense change for the better.

The decline of the French navy was not immediately visible. An attempt

to attack St. Malo at the close of 1692 was given up as hopeless, and

the ships under Pannetier’s command were able to make their way to

Brest undisturbed. In 1693 the French even achieved a considerable

measure of success, partly through their own good management, and

partly by the help of mistakes of the English Government. Russell

was no longer at sea. The shifting politics of the time, and his own

position as one of the leaders of the Whig party, combined with the

king’s discovery of his intrigues with St. Germain to remove him from

command. His place was taken by Killigrew, Delaval, and Shovell, who

were combined in a joint commission as admiral. The practice of giving

the command at sea to a committee was once more revived because the

Government distrusted a single command. The result was to discredit for

ever the appointment of several men to do work which most especially

requires unity of will and authority.

The fleet was collected under the joint admirals in April. It was not

manned without great difficulty. Crews had to be found by taking men

out of the privateers and by embarking five regiments of soldiers to

serve as marines. Neither the Government nor the admirals had any

definite plan of operations for the year. But an object was found for

them by the necessity of escorting the Mediterranean trade safe on its

way. The French privateers had been very active, and the convoy work

at least of the English navy very badly done. Ships had remained in

port rather than face the risk of making a passage. The necessities

of the English and Dutch revenue compelled the Government to forward

the trade, and so a squadron was told off under the command of Rooke

and the Dutch admiral Van der Goes, to carry the outward-bound Smyrna

convoy into the Mediterranean. The twenty-three ships, Dutch and

English, appointed to protect the convoy would have been insufficient

to deal with the Brest fleet, and the admirals were therefore ordered

to see Rooke and his Dutch colleague well past Ushant. In the latter

days of May the whole force was collected and sailed with the merchant

ship under its protection in the beginning of June. By an oversight,

which reflects very little credit on their intelligence, the admirals

omitted to find out whether the French were in Brest or not. They had

been ordered to accompany the convoy thirty leagues past Ushant, and

they reached that point on the 4th of June. Not being satisfied that

enough had been done for safety they exceeded their instructions so far

as to continue with the merchant ships till they were fifty leagues

W.S.W. off the island of Ushant. Then they left them and returned to

the Channel. It is an example of the vices still prevailing in our

naval administration that though the fleet had only just been collected

it was in want of provisions already. When the admirals had returned to

Torbay they learnt what they ought to have been at the trouble to find

out before, namely, that Tourville had left Brest. At the same time

the English Consul at Leghorn forwarded information that the French

Toulon fleet was ready to sail from Toulon. This report did not reach

the admirals till the 13th June. When it was too late they realised the

extent of the danger threatening Rooke. Tourville had in fact sailed

south in May with orders to wait for the convoy. Messages were sent in

hot haste to warn Rooke of his danger, but the disaster had happened

before they could reach him.

While the admirals and Government were realising their mistake and

were looking forward to the inevitable outcry in the City and House

of Commons, the great convoy had been rolling southward at a speed

regulated by the slowest of the merchant ships, happy if it made three

miles an hour in favourable circumstances. It reached Cape St. Vincent

on the 17th June. Here Rooke despatched a look-out vessel ahead, to see

if there were any enemies in Lagos Bay, on the south coast of Portugal

between Cape St. Vincent and Faro. The wind was very light, and the

convoy made little progress. Next day the frigates discovered ten sail

of French ships standing out of Lagos. The position was an extremely

difficult one. With a large force of men-of-war so close at hand there

was little hope of safety in flight for heavily laden merchant ships.

It was decided to make a push for the friendly Spanish port of Cadiz.

The wind from the N.N.W. was still light, and it might be that the

French being to leeward would be unable to work up. But this course,

though perhaps the best, where all were bad, led the convoy right into

the jaws of Tourville’s fleet of eighty-six sail. Battle was hopeless,

and flight not much better. Yet to run was all there was to do. The

French advanced squadron had fallen back merely to draw the convoy on,

and even if the bait had not succeeded there could have been but one

end to the meeting. A hurry and a scurry such as may easily be imagined

followed. Some of the small ships ran close in shore, by Rooke’s

orders, and endeavoured to find a refuge in Faro, San Lucar, or Cadiz.

By these we must understand very small craft from 40 to 100 tons. The

heavier ships, meaning boats from 150 to 300 tons, the size of a large

merchant ship of those times, did their best to shelter themselves

behind Rooke and Van der Goes, and they all struggled to get away into

the open sea. The Dutch warships were in more danger than our own, for

being in the van they were to leeward and nearer the French. Tourville

must have suffered from a constitutional inability to act with energy

except by fits and starts. He now repeated, and with even less excuse,

the very mistake he made after the battle of Beachy Head. His pursuit

was slack. Some of the Dutch ships were overtaken and captured after

a gallant resistance. But Rooke was able to carry a great part of the

convoy to Madeira, and from thence home to Cork. He joined the admiral

in the Channel in August. Tourville, after giving up the pursuit of

Rooke too early, returned to the Straits where he spent his time in

capturing or destroying the smaller merchant vessels. The total loss

to the Dutch and English was put down at twenty-nine vessels taken and

fifty destroyed.

This business of the Smyrna convoy may be said to be the turning-point

of the war. Louis XIV. had sent Tourville to capture the Smyrna convoy

mainly because he looked to gain money. In the following year he

ordered the Brest fleet into the Mediterranean, and he made no serious

attempt to contend with the allies in the western seas during the

remainder of the war. At the time, and while the smart of the loss was

fresh in England and Holland, this could not be known. The capture of

the convoy led to a furious outcry against the Admiralty in England,

and to violent inconclusive discussions in Parliament. Yet it was the

direct cause of a great change for the better. The Government was

fully waked up to the necessity of taking its fleet more seriously

in hand. The effort to conduct a war by a committee was given up.

Russell was restored to the command. At the same time, the officers

were stimulated to do their work with a better heart by increase of pay

and the establishment of the half-pay list. With sinking energy on the

side of the French and increasing efficiency on our own the naval war

took a new character. From this time forward there was an overwhelming

superiority on the side of the allies. England came to contribute an

increasing proportion of the naval force employed, for the land war

was straining Holland to the utmost. When the struggle with Louis

XIV. came to an end at the Peace of Utrecht, England was much the one

unrivalled sea power as she was when Napoleon surrendered to Captain

Maitland of the =Bellerophon=.