CONCLUSION.
The treaty of peace was greatly objected to by such of the Canadians
as had favored a continuation of British rule, and the more bitter of
these attempted to organize an "Independence party."
Their numbers, however, were comparatively insignificant, and
although they made a show of organizing an army for the purpose of
opposing the United States troops, and achieving the independence of
Canada, they took good care not to risk a conflict with the vastly
superior forces of the Americans, and in less than a month, such of
them as had not deserted, surrendered; and all further traces of
opposition to American occupation disappeared. On the 4th of July,
1890, which was the one hundred and fourteenth anniversary of
American Independence, the United States took formal possession of
Canada; and the prosperity of that vast section of the North American
Continent may be said to date from that eventful day.
The war now being concluded, and the questions which had for more
than a century proved so vexatious, being permanently settled, the
people of the United States had plenty of leisure time to count up
the cost of the "economy" which their rulers had been treating them
to, ever since the end of the Civil War.
As has already been shown, these demagogues, while prating about the
surplus, and the tariff, and the down-trodden laboring man, and the
crime of spending the people's money for anything but river and
harbor and public building jobs, and exorbitant premiums on immature
bonds; had permitted the United States Navy to go to decay, from
motives of "_economy;_" had utterly refused to offer even decent
rates of compensation for the carrying of foreign mails in American
ships, for the sake of "_economy;_" had declined to encourage the
establishment of an auxiliary naval force, by the payment of an
annual rental for the privilege of employing swift American built
steamships as cruisers in time of war, because by not doing so, the
treasury would save $5,000,000 or $10,000,000 a year, and these
statesmen could continue to pose before the country as champions and
apostles of "_economy;_" and had neglected year after year to fortify
the seaboard cities, notwithstanding the constant and oft repeated
warnings uttered by military and naval experts, intelligent and
thoughtful writers, and farsighted statesmen of both political
parties; because, forsooth, when year after year the River and Harbor
Bill and the Public Buildings Bill had been inflated to the largest
possible figures that would be likely to escape a presidential veto,
they found that they could not spend any money on fortifications
without exceeding the appropriations made by their predecessors, and
would thus render themselves liable to be considered by their
constituents as lacking in the great essential element of "_economy_."
Well, these economical statesmen had had their way--and their
day--and their constituents and _masters--the People of the United
States_--said to them, "Gentlemen, render an account of your
stewardship. Let us see what your loud professions of 'economy' for
the past twenty-five or thirty years amount to. Let us have an
itemized account, debit and credit, and see how far your acts have
been justified by results."
You are clearly entitled to credit for the following amounts:
CREDIT.
Mail Subsidies saved annually . . . $5,000,000
Rental of Steamships (assuming 100 swift
ships at $100,000 each) as an auxiliary
naval force. . . . . . . . . . . 10,000,000
Adequate naval and fortification appropriations
annually. . . . . . . . . . . . 20,000,000
Total annual saving . . . . . $35,000,000
Total for ten years . . . . $350,000,000
A very handsome exhibit, gentlemen; now let us see the other side of
the account.
DEBIT.
Amount paid annually to foreign ships,
carrying American products. . . . . . . $150,000,000
Amount of wages lost to American ship-builders
and their workmen, annually
(figures previous to 1860) . . . . . . 12,000,000
Amount of domestic shipbuilding materials
not used annually (figures previous to
1860) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30,000,000
Passage money paid by Americans to foreign
shipowners annually (estimated) . . . . 5,000,000
Total annual cost . . . . . . . . . . $197,000,000
Total for ten years . . . . . . . . $1,970,000,000
To this must be added the following amounts:
War indemnity, paid to Great Britain by
reason of our not having a navy . . $1,500,000,000
Canadian debt assumed . . . . . . . . . . 300,000,000
Carried forward . . . . . . . . . $3,770,000,000
Brought forward . . . . . . . . $3,770,000,000
Amount expended by U. S. in War with
Great Britain . . . . . . . . . . . 100,000,000
Amount of damage done to New York and
Brooklyn by British fleet . . . . . 300,000,000
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . $4,170,000,000
Less credits as above . . . . . . . . . 350,000,000
Total cost of ten years of Congressional
"economy." . . . . . . . . . . . $3,820,000,000
"There are other items, gentlemen, which could easily be made to
swell the above debit balance; but these are sufficient. You may
step down and out. The people of the United States are the most
wealthy and liberal people in the world, but ten years more of such
"economy" as yours has been, would bankrupt us. We wish you no harm,
gentlemen, but we have no further need of your services."
Of course this monologue is not to be taken literally, but it is what
the people of the United States practically said, by their action, at
the elections which succeeded the Battle of the Swash.
It is, perhaps, needless to remark, that for many years subsequent to
1890, American statesmen were not called upon to wrestle with the
difficult problem of "how to dispose of the surplus revenue."
Their "economical" predecessors had effectually obviated all
necessity for any such discussion; but the lesson which the people
had learned, was a most valuable one, and instead of considering
themselves the suffering victims of an excessive and burdensome
system of taxation, they fully realized that they were the most
favored people in the world in that respect, and cheerfully supported
the new generation of Congressmen in authorizing the liberal
expenditures, which in a few years made our coasts and harbors
invulnerable; gave us a navy superior to that of any other nation,
and placed us once more in the van among the maritime powers of the
world.
At the first glance, the Battle of the Swash seemed to have been a
most disastrous event for the United States.
England got all the glory and all the money, and the United States
got Canada and--_the experience_. But the latter proved to be worth
infinitely more than it cost, in that it exploded the absurd system
of miscalled "economy," which only "saved at the spigot to waste at
the bung."
Let us rejoice that in this year of grace 1930, we have so profited
by the errors of our ancestors, that we now occupy unchallenged, the
foremost position among the Nations of the earth; and that with our
200,000,000 of intelligent, prosperous and contented citizens--each
one a sovereign in his own right--we can afford to look with
indifference upon the wars and struggles of our less fortunate
contemporaries on the other side of the Atlantic.
Too late, alas! had the truth and wisdom of these words--written by
that great founder of the Government, Thomas Jefferson--become
manifest.
"Our navigation involves still higher consideration; as a branch of
industry it is valuable; but as a resource of defense, it is
essential.
"The position and circumstances of the United States leaves them
nothing to fear from their land board, and nothing to desire beyond
their present rights.
"But on the seaboard they are open to injury, and they have then,
too, a commerce which must be protected.
"This can only be done by possessing a respectable body of artists
and citizen seamen, and establishments in readiness for shipbuilding.
"If particular Nations grasp at undue shares of our commerce, and
more especially, if they seize on the means of the United States, to
convert them into aliment for their own strength, and withdraw them
entirely from the support of those to whom they belong, defensive and
protective measures become necessary on the part of the Nation whose
marine sources are thus invaded, or it will be disarmed of its
defense, its productions will be at the mercy of the Nation which has
possessed itself exclusively of the means of carrying them, and its
politics may be influenced by those who command its commerce.
"The carriage of our own commodities, if once established in another
channel, cannot be resumed at the moment we desire.
"If we lose the seamen and artists whom it now employs, we lose the
present means of Marine defense, and time will be requisite to raise
up others, when disgrace or losses shall bring home to our feelings
the evils of having abandoned them."
The "disgrace and losses" incurred by our ancestors in this brief but
disastrous campaign, had indeed brought "home to their feelings the
evils of having abandoned" the great interest thus earnestly pleaded
for by the greatest statesman of his day; and the absurd folly of the
so-called "economy," which prompted its abandonment, was at length
reluctantly conceded by the noisiest and bitterest advocates of free
trade throughout the land.
THE END.
APPENDIX.
AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN
AUXILIARY NAVAL FORCE.
SECTION 1. Be it enacted that from and after the passage of this Act,
the Secretary of the Navy is authorized and directed to execute
contracts with the owners or agents of steam vessels, built and owned
in the United States of America, and sailing under the American flag,
upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth; and the faith of
the United States is hereby pledged to carry said contracts into
effect, and to make all payments arising thereunder, in strict and
prompt accordance with the terms thereof.
SECTION 2. All vessels now built or owned, or hereafter to be built
or owned in the United States of America, and carrying the American
flag, which possess the following qualifications and requirements,
shall be deemed subject to the provisions of this Act, and eligible
to the benefits conferred thereby.
1st. The said vessels must be of at least four thousand tons burden.
2nd. The said vessels must have a maximum speed of at least nineteen
statute miles per hour, the same to be established by actual test.
3rd. The said vessels must be built, both as to their hulls and
engines, on plans to be approved by a Bureau of Naval Construction
and Engineering, consisting of five members, to be appointed for that
purpose by the President and the Secretary of the Navy; and every
such vessel shall have carriages or platforms for two or more guns of
at least eight inches calibre, and also suitable accommodations for
an auxilliary battery of rapid firing guns.
4th. Estimates of the cost of such vessels and engines--exclusive of
furniture and equipment for passengers--shall also be submitted to,
and approved by, the said Bureau of Naval Construction and
Engineering, and the amount of cost, thus approved by such Bureau,
shall be taken as the value upon which the contracts provided for in
the first section of this Act, shall be based.
SECTION 3. Upon the completion of any such vessel, and the filing in
the office of the Secretary of the Navy of certified copies of the
report of the Bureau of Naval Construction and Engineering, approving
the plans of the hull and engines of such vessel, and also certifying
that the estimate of the cost of such vessel is not excessive; and
after actual tests of the speed of such vessel, under regulations
imposed by the Secretary of the Navy; the said Secretary shall, if
requested to do so by the owner or owners of such vessel, enter into
a contract with such owner or owners, for a period of not less than
ten, nor more than fifteen years, by which, in consideration of the
privilege of taking such vessel by charter or purchase, at any time
during the pendency of the said contract, on ten day's notice, the
United States shall pay as an annual rental, to the owners or agents
of such vessel, interest on her cost, as certified by the Bureau of
Construction and Engineering, as follows:
1st. For vessels having a speed of nineteen statute miles or over,
and less than twenty statute miles per hour, four per cent.
2nd. For vessels having a speed of twenty statute miles or over, and
less than twenty-one statute miles, per hour, four and one-half per
cent.
3rd. For vessels having a speed of twenty-one statute miles or over,
per hour, five per cent.
Provided. That such annual rental shall in no case exceed the sum of
one hundred thousand dollars for any single vessel.
SECTION 4. The maximum price at which the United States will purchase
such vessel, shall be fixed at the price approved as heretofore
provided, by the Bureau of Naval Construction and Engineering, plus a
bonus of not to exceed twenty-five per cent. of such price, to cover
the outlay for passenger equipment, and as a compensation to the
owners of such vessel for her withdrawal from her regular employment.
Such valuation shall govern until such vessel shall have attained the
age of five years; and thereafter a deduction of six per cent. shall
be made therefrom annually, to cover depreciation and wear and tear.
SECTION 5. In case the Secretary of the Navy shall elect to charter
such vessel or vessels, instead of purchasing them, the rate to be
paid therefor shall be five dollars per month per registered ton;
such vessel to be at the risk of the United States during the
pendency of such charter.
SECTION 6. This Act shall take effect immediately.