THE BATTLE OF THE SWASH
_AND_
THE CAPTURE OF CANADA.
_BY_
SAMUEL BARTON.
NEW YORK:
CHARLES T. DILLINGHAM,
718 AND 720 BROADWAY.
Copyright, 1888
by
Samuel Barton
[_All Rights Reserved_]
DEDICATION
To the Senators and ex-Senators, Members and ex-Members,
of past and present Congresses of the United States
of America, who, by their stupid and criminal
neglect to adopt ordinary defensive
precautions, or to encourage
the reconstruction of
THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE,
have rendered all American seaport towns liable to such
an attack as is herein but faintly and imperfectly
described, this historical forecast is
dedicated; with much indignation and
contempt, and little or no
respect, by
THE AUTHOR.
CONTENTS
Chapter
Introduction
I. The United States Prior to 1890
II. Secretary Whitney's Efforts to Rebuild the Navy
III. Canada and the United States
IV. Retaliation
V. The English Fleet
VI. The British Fleet Arrives off Sandy Hook
VII. The Battle of the Swash
VIII. The Return of the Fleet
IX. The Panic and Flight
X. The Bombardment
XI. The Armistice and Treaty of Peace
XII. Conclusion
Appendix
INTRODUCTION.
The only apology which I offer for this authentic account of an event
which (having occurred more than forty years ago), can scarcely be
supposed to possess much interest for the reader of to-day, is, that
having been a participant in the battle myself, I feel a sort of
pride in having an accurate and complete account of it handed down to
posterity.
In my humble judgment no such account has ever yet appeared; and
although I am but indifferently equipped for the task--having dabbled
but slightly in literature, during my busy life of three score and
ten years,--yet I trust that my earnest desire to relate the facts
just as they occurred--and which I propose to do, without fear or
favor--will atone for any shortcomings from a purely literary point
of view. Although I have said that no accurate and complete
narrative of this occurrence has ever been published, the reader must
not therefore assume that there exist no published accounts of it
whatever. On the contrary, it has been described more or less at
length, by so many different writers, both in transitory and
permanent form, that my chief embarrassment arises rather from a
superabundance than from a paucity of materials.
In the library of the N.Y. Historical Society are to be found no less
than ninety-seven books and pamphlets giving what purport to be
"full, true and particular" accounts of the attack upon New York by
the British fleet in the year 1890.
The titles of some of these contributions to contemporaneous history
are decidedly amusing and suggestive of the sensational spirit which
was such a marked characteristic of the general literature, and
especially of the newspaper press of that period.
For instance, we have among them, "The New Armada;" "The British
Blackmailer;" "Modern Piracy;" "The Doom of the Iron Clads;" "The
Disappearance of the British flag from North America;" and one, more
pretentious than the rest, is entitled "An inquiry into the causes
which led to the acquisition of Canada by the United States of
America."
In addition to these numerous books and pamphlets, the newspapers of
the period contained page after page of the most vivid and
sensational accounts, in which truth and falsehood, and sense and
absurdity, are so evidently mingled, that no conscientious historian
would be willing to utilize them as reliable authorities.
Nevertheless, a perusal of them even at this late day, may be found
interesting to many of my readers, and as they are kept on file in
most of the leading city libraries, they are within easy reach of all.
The reader of to-day will be vastly amused in looking over these old
journals, at the evidences to be found on every page, and in almost
every column, of intense and bitter rivalry and jealousy between
their several editors and proprietors. Indeed the journalistic world
at that period seems to have been suffering from an absolute epidemic
of sensationalism, which extended not only to the reading matter, but
to the "make up" as well; and in addition to the prurient details of
social scandals, divorce proceedings, and horrible crimes, the
reader's attention was sought to be attracted by glaring and
suggestive head lines, such as would be tolerated in no respectable
metropolitan journal of the present day. As an evidence of how our
tastes are influenced by our surroundings, I may here state, that
while I am now shocked at the total lack of good taste and the
superabundance of sensational vulgarity displayed by most of the
newspapers of that day, yet I cannot remember that I regarded them
with any such feelings at that time, although I was a man, and
certainly is competent a judge of propriety then, as I am now. But
this is to be a history, not a moral treatise.
With such a mass of material at my command, it will be apparent that
it has been no slight task to sift out the grain from the chaff, and
to condense the vast accumulation of authorities into a comparatively
brief volume like this.
I am fully aware that there are many defects in it, both of omission
and commission; but of one thing the reader may rest assured.
I have at least been conscientious in my efforts to get at the exact
truth, and to correct numerous errors which previous historians have
made, either through carelessness, prejudice, or willfulness.
With this brief introduction, and with extreme diffidence, I submit
my work to the consideration of the candid, unprejudiced, and I
trust, kindly disposed reader.
SAM'L BARTON.
NEW YORK, October, 1930.
THE BATTLE OF THE SWASH
AND
CAPTURE OF CANADA.
CHAPTER I.
THE UNITED STATES PRIOR TO 1890.
Before entering upon a detailed account of what naval experts of all
nationalities have conceded to be the most interesting and important
naval event of that remarkable century (the nineteenth), whose later
years many of my older readers can doubtless remember, I will
endeavor to present in as brief and concise a manner as possible, a
summary of the events which preceded it, and the causes which led up
to it; as without such an explanation the story of the battle itself
would possess little or no historical value.
The first thing which it is necessary for me to explain, is my reason
for choosing the title "_The Battle of the Swash_."
I am not aware that this title has ever been used before, but if the
reader will consult a chart of the Harbor of New York, he will at
once see the propriety of it.
It will be seen that what is known among pilots as the "Swash," is a
straight channel, forming a sort of a hypotenuse to the two sides of
the main ship channel, which bends almost at a right angle at the
Southwest spit.
Assuming, therefore, that the Narrows is effectually blockaded with
torpedoes or other obstructions, and that an attacking fleet desired
to bombard New York at long range, and at the same time be in a
position to withdraw easily and quickly in case of repulse or
accident, the Swash Channel is the point which would naturally be
chosen. The British Admiral was undoubtedly familiar with the upper
and lower Bays of New York, and therefore it is not at all strange
that he selected this spot as a base of his operations against the
city.
Here he anchored his fleet; and here the battle--such as it was--was
fought. I therefore claim that the title which I have chosen, is a
most appropriate one; and if this little work is to possess any value
as a historical authority, the remarkable contest herein recorded,
will be known to future generations as "The Battle of the Swash."
Having thus "made my title clear," I will endeavor to summarize
briefly the events, which either directly or remotely, contributed to
the final catastrophe, and induced Canada to declare war against the
United States.
And here at the very outset of my task, I am confronted with greater
difficulties than at any other portion of it.
Our ancestors of the Nineteenth Century were so constantly occupied
in making history, that they seemed to have little or no time to
record it; and therefore there will probably never be any adequate
historical record of the settlement, improvement and development of
the vast continent of North America. I regard this as in a measure a
calamity to the whole human race; for I think that history may be
searched in vain for any such grand and marvelous example of progress
and development, as that exhibited by our ancestors of the last
century.
In consequence of this dearth of detailed information, I have been
obliged to rely upon such data as could be collected from the files
of newspapers, magazines and similar publications, for the following
meagre sketch of the industrial and political condition of the United
States previous to the year 1890.
What has been called the "War of the Rebellion" occurred in the years
1861-5 inclusive; and was an attempt by the southern slave holding
States, to secede from the Union, and establish a separate
confederacy, based upon Free Trade and Human Slavery. Although the
rights of the slaveholders were fully acknowledged by the law of the
land, yet the growth of the sentiment in favor of abolition of
slavery was so rapid throughout the Northern States, that the
Southerners became alarmed lest their property rights should be
ignored and denied; and after several years of defiant wrangling and
threatening, at length formally seceded from the Union, and by the
attack on Fort Sumter--a fort in Charleston Harbor--inaugurated the
long and bloody conflict which finally resulted in the total
abolition of slavery, and the restoration of the authority of the
United States Government, in all portions of United States territory.
Previous to this war, the United States occupied a front rank among
the maritime powers of the world.
The "American Clipper Ships" (vessels propelled entirely by sail
power; which for purposes of ocean navigation is now practically
obsolete) were considered the perfection of marine architecture, and
bore the stars and stripes proudly and triumphantly upon every sea.
Over 2000 establishments were engaged in the shipbuilding industry,
giving employment to over 20,000 skilled laborers, whose wages
amounted to more than $12,000,000 annually; and who built from
$30,000,000 to $40,000,000 worth of vessels each year.
During the ten years immediately preceding the "War of the
Rebellion," 67 per cent. of the vessels entering the ports of the
United States, carried the American flag; as against 33 per cent.
carrying foreign flags.
In 1887 only about 15 per cent. were American, as against 85 per
cent. foreign.
Several causes had conspired to bring about this vast and disastrous
decline in American ownership.
The first, and most effective of these, unquestionably grew out of
the almost unconcealed and anxious efforts of England, to prevent the
Northern States from bringing the war to a successful issue, and thus
assuring the restoration of the Union.
The cause of this _animus_ on the part of England, was, as is always
the case, where any of her interests are involved, a purely and
intensely selfish one.
The Northern, and especially the New England States, were mercantile
and manufacturing States, and had become formidable rivals to England
in the two great interests in which the latter power had hitherto
deemed herself unapproachable. The American shipowner outsailed and
underbid his English competitor in all parts of the world; and the
American manufacturer, by improved methods and ingenious mechanical
appliances, had begun to successfully compete with his English rival,
not only in American markets, but in foreign ones as well; and
Englishmen viewed with unconcealed dismay, the imminent prospect of
having their immense carrying trade as well as their enormous
manufacturing interests, ruined by the competition of their
enterprising and ingenious American rivals.
Indeed, so marked had this development been, that an eminent French
writer, De Tocqueville, in a book called "Democracy in America,"
written nearly twenty years previous to the outbreak of the "War of
the Rebellion," in a chapter entitled "Some considerations on the
causes of the Commercial prosperity of the United States," wrote as
follows:
"The inhabitants of the United States constitute a great civilized
people, which fortune has placed in the midst of an uncultivated
country, at a distance of three thousand miles from the central point
of civilization. America consequently stands in daily need of
Europe. The Americans will, no doubt, ultimately succeed in
producing or manufacturing at home, most of the articles which they
require; but the two continents can never be independent of each
other, so numerous are the natural ties between their wants, their
ideas, their habits, and their manners. The Union has peculiar
commodities which have now become necessary to us, as they cannot be
cultivated, or can be raised only at an enormous expense, upon the
soil of Europe. The Americans consume only a small portion of this
produce, and they are willing to sell us the rest. Europe is
therefore the market of America, as America is the market of Europe;
and maritime commerce is no less necessary to enable the inhabitants
of the United States to transport their raw materials to the ports of
Europe, than it is to enable us to supply them with our manufactured
produce.
"The United States must therefore either furnish much business to
other maritime nations, even if they should themselves renounce
commerce, as the Spaniards of Mexico have hitherto done, or they must
become one of the first maritime powers of the globe.
"The Anglo-Americans have always displayed a decided taste for the
sea. The Declaration of Independence by breaking the commercial
bonds which united them to England, gave a fresh and powerful
stimulus to their maritime genius. Ever since that time, the
shipping of the Union has increased almost as rapidly as the number
of its inhabitants. The Americans themselves now transport to their
own shores nine-tenths of the European produce which they consume.
And they also bring three-quarters of the exports of the New World to
the European consumer. The ships of the United States fill the docks
of Havre and of Liverpool, whilst the number of English and French
vessels at New York is comparatively small. Thus, not only does the
American merchant brave competition on his own ground, but even
successfully supports that of foreign nations in their own ports.
This is readily explained by the fact, that the vessels of the United
States cross the seas at a cheaper rate....
"It is difficult to say for what reason the Americans can navigate at
a lower rate than other nations; one is at first led to attribute
this superiority to the physical advantages which nature gives them;
but it is not so.
"The American vessels cost almost as much to build as our own; they
are not better built, and they generally last a shorter time. The
pay of the American sailor is more considerable than the pay on board
European ships, which is proved by the great number of Europeans who
are to be found in the merchant vessels of the United States. How
happens it then, that the Americans sail their vessels at a cheaper
rate than we can ours? I am of opinion that the true cause of their
superiority must not be sought for in physical advantages, but that
it is wholly attributable to moral and intellectual qualities....
"The European sailor navigates with prudence; he sets sail only when
the weather is favorable; if an unforeseen accident befals him, he
puts into port; at night, he furls a portion of his canvass; and when
the whitening billows intimate the vicinity of land, he checks his
course, and takes an observation of the Sun.
"The American neglects these precautions and braves these dangers.
He weighs anchor before the tempest is over; by night and by day he
spreads his sheets to the wind; he repairs as he goes along, such
damage as his vessel may have sustained from the storm; and when he
at last approaches the term of his voyage, he darts onward to the
shore as if he already descried a port.
"The Americans are often shipwrecked, but no trader crosses the seas
so rapidly. And, as they perform the same distance in shorter time,
they can perform it at a cheaper rate.....
"I cannot better explain my meaning, than by saying that the
Americans show a sort of heroism in their manner of trading. The
European merchant will always find it difficult to imitate his
American competitor who, in adopting the system which I have just
described, does not follow calculation, but an impulse of his
nature.....
"Reason and experience prove that no commercial prosperity can be
durable if it cannot be united, in case of need, to naval force.
This truth is as well understood in the United States as anywhere
else; the Americans are already able to make their flag respected; in
a few years they will make it feared.....
"Nations, as well as men, almost always betray the prominent features
of their future destiny in their earliest years. When I contemplate
the ardor with which the Anglo-Americans prosecute commerce, the
advantages which aid them, and the success of their undertakings, I
cannot help believing that they will one day become the first
maritime power of the globe. They are born to rule the seas, as the
Romans were to conquer the world."[*]
[*] "Democracy in America," by Alexis de Tocqueville. Translated by
Henry Reeve, Esquire. Edited with notes by Prof. Francis Owen, of
Harvard University, Cambridge, 1863, Vol. 1, p. 648 to 552.
To a reader of the present day, these words, albeit they were written
nearly a hundred years ago, seem to have been almost inspired by
superhuman wisdom, so accurately do they describe the present
position of the United States as a maritime power; but if any
American could have read them about the time of the "Battle of the
Swash," they would have seemed either to convey the severest sarcasm
of which human speech is capable, or else to have been the wild and
unmeaning utterances of drivelling idiocy. For at this time, thanks
to English privateers, and American stupidity and indifference, the
American flag had practically disappeared from the ocean.
As has been already mentioned, English shipowners and manufacturers
were suffering severely from American competition; they therefore
hailed the possible or probable dismemberment of the American Union
with delight, and immediately upon the outbreak of the "War of the
Rebellion," determined to aid the seceding States in every possible
way. These States were exclusively agricultural communities, raising
most of the cotton which formed such an important portion of the raw
material required by English factories. Like all partially developed
agricultural communities, they had no capital to invest in vessels or
factories; and in case they secured their independence, they were
pledged to Free Trade, and would thus offer a vast and profitable
carrying trade to English ships; and a vast and profitable market for
English goods. The temptation was a great one; too great in fact to
be resisted; and a short time after the commencement of the war, a
number of so-called "Confederate cruisers," which had been built and
fitted out in English ports with English money, were scouring the
ocean, capturing and destroying American merchant vessels wherever
they could find them, and compelling the transfer of such as were not
destroyed, to the protection of some neutral flag. As our ancestors
were at that time engaged in a life and death struggle to maintain
their national existence, they could only protest against this
selfish and unfriendly action of England; but the guilt of the latter
power was practically conceded at an arbitration conference held at
Geneva several years later, at which the sum of $15,000,000 was
awarded as damages to be paid by England for the depredations
committed by these piratical cruisers upon American commerce. The
mischief, however, was done; our ocean commerce had been ruined; and
England could well have afforded to pay $15,000,000 _annually_ for
having thus paralyzed her great maritime rival.
Concurrently with this wiping out of our shipping by English
cruisers, iron and steel began to be used as a substitute for wood in
ship building; and by the time that the rebellion had been finally
crushed, our shipbuilders found themselves utterly unable to compete
with those of Great Britain on account of the greater cost of
materials and wages here, as well as the absence of machinery and
appliances for building iron and steel vessels. Gold remained at a
premium for several years after the conclusion of the war; and this,
together with the tariff on imported materials required in ship
building, rendered competition with foreign builders absolutely
impossible. To make matters worse, all the principal maritime
nations of Europe inaugurated a system of subsidies or bounties,
which stimulated shipbuilding enormously, and increased the supply of
vessels so rapidly, that carrying rates fell to figures, with which
unsubsidized vessels could not possibly compete. England, France,
Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and finally Spain, went into the
subsidy business; and the latter power actually subsidized lines of
steamers to the extent of over $1,000,000 per annum, to run along our
whole Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, trading between Mexico and Central
America on the south, and Canada and British Columbia on the north,
and stopping at all important American ports on their respective
routes.
The only demand for American built vessels was for the coasting
trade; but this demand was sufficient to induce the establishment of
several large iron shipyards, most of which were located on the
Delaware River, at or near Philadelphia, Chester, and Wilmington.
Thus was inaugurated that interest which has since attained such
enormous proportions, as to give to the Delaware River the
_sobriquet_ of "The American Clyde."
The vessels built at these yards, even in those early days, proved
conclusively that American shipbuilders were still the best in the
world, and then as now, American coastwise steamships were conceded
to be the finest and fleetest and best vessels of their class afloat.
The absolute refusal of Congress to offer any subsidy, or even to
offer decent compensation to American vessels for carrying the mails
to foreign countries, effectually prevented the building of any ships
suitable for that trade; and while England and France and Germany and
Spain were building swift merchant steamers on plans approved by
their naval departments, and paying them liberal annual subsidies for
the privilege of chartering or purchasing them at a fixed price, at
any time, and converting them into aimed cruisers; thus providing
themselves at a comparatively trifling cost with a most formidable
and efficient auxiliary naval force; the Congress of the United
States, with an apathy or indifference which seems utterly
unaccountable at the present time, absolutely refused to do anything
to encourage the rebuilding of the American Merchant Marine.
That such a suicidal policy should have been persisted in for more
than twenty years after the close of the war, at a time when the
annual receipts of the Treasury were over $100,000,000 in excess of
the government requirements, and when the extraordinary spectacle was
presented day after day, of senators and members of Congress,
wrangling and arguing over the question of "how to dispose of the
surplus," seems absolutely incredible; and yet, a perusal of the
files of the newspapers published during this period, (say from 1875
to 1888) will satisfy the most skeptical reader that it is strictly
true. For the convenience and satisfaction of such of my readers as
may not be able easily to refer to these files, I reproduce a few
articles and communications from some of the journals of that period.
SUBSIDIES TO BRITISH STEAMSHIPS--ARRANGEMENTS
WITH THE WHITE STAR AND CUNARD LINES.
_From the New York Journal of Commerce, March_ 31, 1887.
"A Liverpool cablegram received yesterday says: 'At the meeting of
the stockholders of the Cunard Steamship Company to-day the chairman
announced that the Government had granted the company an annual
subvention of $85,000 for a period of five years for the 'carrying of
the mails.'
"Details of the agreement entered into between the British Admiralty
and the owners of the White Star and Cunard companies, by which
certain of their vessels are placed at the disposal of the Government
on specified terms, are contained in a late parliamentary paper. The
White Star Line agrees to hold at the disposition of the Government
for purchase or hire, at the option of the Admiralty, to be exercised
from time to time during the continuance of the agreement, the
following vessels: Britannic, value £130,000; Germanic, £100,000;
Adriatic, £100,000; Celtic, £100,000. In the event of purchase the
foregoing prices were to be held as the values of the vessels on
January 1, 1887, plus 10 per cent. for compulsory sale, less an
abatement of 6 per cent. per annum on the depreciated annual value
for the period that might elapse between January 1, 1887, and the
date of purchase by the Government. In the event of charter by the
Admiralty the rate of hire of the before-mentioned vessels was fixed
at the rate of 20s. per gross registered ton per month, the owner
providing the crew, or at the rate of 15s. per gross registered ton
per month, the Admiralty finding the crew, all risks of capture and
of hostilities being assumed by the Admiralty. The company has
determined to build one or two vessels of high speed and of such a
type and speed as will render them specially suitable for service as
armed cruisers, and in accordance with the plans and specifications
submitted and approved by the Admiralty. In consideration of this
the Admiralty will have to pay to the company an annual subvention at
the rate of 15s. per gross registered ton per annum. On February 8,
the Admiralty accepted similar proposals made by the Cunard Line in
respect to the following vessels: Etruria, value £310,000; Umbria,
£301,000; Aurunia, £240,000; Servia, £193,000; Gallia, £102,000--a
subvention of 15s. per gross registered ton per annum, to be paid to
the company on account of the Etruria, Umbria and Aurania during the
continuance of the postal contract, and in the event of the
termination of that contract before these three vessels received five
years' payment, the company to be entitled to receive for the balance
a subvention at the rate of 20s., the five vessels being still held
at the disposition of the Government. In the event of the Cunard
Company building new vessels for the mail service, they will submit
the plans to the Admiralty for approval.
"The subvention will amount to about £6,500 for each of the new
vessels of the White Star Line, so long as they carry the mails, or
£8,500 should the mails be withdrawn. The annual charge for the
retention of the Cunarders Etruria, Umbria and Aurania is stated at
£5,400 each.
The Admiralty announce that they are ready to make the same
arrangement as with the White Star Company for the first ten steamers
that may be offered by any of the British steamship companies."
The following letter from Admiral D. D. Porter shows conclusively the
feeling which must have existed in Naval circles upon the subject of
the revival of the American Merchant Marine. The letter was
addressed to a Mr. Aaron Vanderbilt, representing the American
Shipping and Industrial League and was published in the New York
_World_ and other journals, some time during the year 1888.
DEAR SIR: I received your letter and pamphlet this morning in
relation to American shipping. It is a matter in which I am greatly
interested. I only wish I really had some influence in this country
to help forward measures for the advancement of our mercantile
marine, without which we can never be a great naval power. I have
written a great deal on the subject and the files of the Senate have
now many letters of mine in favor of granting subsidies to ocean
steamships, in order to open lines wherever they could be run to
advantage. Indeed, I have been so persistent in this matter ever
since the close of the civil war that I ran the risk of being
considered queer--for that is the term people apply nowadays to men
of progressive ideas, whose opinions come in conflict with those of
persons who are altogether guided by local prejudices.
I have written a good deal for the _American Protectionist_ on the
subject, also a long article for the Chicago _Inter Ocean_, covering
one side of the paper, which had an extensive circulation in the
West. I wrote so much that I was afraid I might come under the head
of "penny-a-liner," but all to no purpose, as the cause didn't seem
to advance an inch.
This country is a young giant, full of resources, overflowing with
wealth, and the people themselves full of progressive ideas, yet you
see how difficult it is to get anything done even for the defense of
our coast and great cities.
With all our wealth and enterprise we are, owing to the force of
circumstances over which our people seem to have no control, Bourbons
up to the hub, learning nothing and forgetting nothing.
The nation that can put the most ships and the best ships on the sea
will be the one that can set the world at defiance. No nation can
put its commerce on its bottom again, after it has been broken up as
ours has been, without subsidies, which are considered by some people
as opposed to our institutions, although I myself cannot see it: but
subsidies to steamships that must carry our products over the world
and bring back other products in return must help every industry in
the country. Every State in the Union is interested in having our
commerce re-established, no matter at what cost. Think what an
impetus the establishment of great lines of steamships would give to
our iron and steel interests. How many thousands of mechanics who
are now out of employment would again enjoy ample compensation for
their labor. What rejoicings there would be throughout the land at
such an event. How the cotton and hemp manufactories would be
crowded with workers. Think how many million yards of canvas would
be spread upon the ocean.
The great British steam lines which are running to and from our ports
so frequently, bring their coal from England and take little back
from this country. Think of the coal-mines that would be worked to
supply our great ocean steam lines should we ever establish such as
are necessary to the country. Sit down and reckon the different
industries that would be benefited by the establishment of great
steamship lines, and you will be surprised at the amount that would
be thrown into the hands of the laboring people of this country.
What is the object of a government if it is not to build up the
industries of a country, as opposed to those of other countries? A
republican government should be the best in the world. Its
legislators should advance all its industries. It should be more
paternal in its organizations than any other, for those who are
elected to office are put there by the people to promote their
interests. We have gone on for the past twenty-five years, showing
no more ability to cope with the matters to which I have referred
than the minor republics of South America, which scarcely hold any
place in the estimation of the world. Instead of being a government
for the people, ours seems to be a government made for the advantage
of a select clique.
I almost despair, although not naturally of a despairing nature. I
thought when our civil war was over and there was no longer a
question which could seriously divide the country, that we would put
our household in order and unite to become the great nation of the
world, which we are fully capable of doing; but, with thousands of
others who helped to fight for the country and put it on its legs
again, I have been wofully disappointed, particularly in the
decadence of that ocean commerce which was once second only to Great
Britain.
Even Spain, that has been for years behind all other nations, and for
more than sixty years has been considered the most effete government
in Europe--Bourbon all over--has now taken the lead of us, has voted
millions in a lump to build up her navy, and is about to establish
those very steam lines which should have been American. If this
country does not take proper steps to resurrect our commerce and
place a number of steamship lines on a footing with those of European
countries, foreigners may well say that the resources of the country
have been developed faster than the education of the people has
progressed, and that the Americans are not sufficiently advanced in
intelligence to understand that no nation can be a first-class power
that allows another to do its carrying. For my part, I expect to
step out soon without witnessing the fulfilment of any of my
cherished ideas. As for the "naval reserve" they are talking about
at present, it ought to have been established in the days of the
Revolution.
Every steamship that we build for ocean service should be able to
carry guns, and the Government should condemn her for national use
whenever it is considered necessary--in fact, exercise greater power
over the mercantile marine than over the militia. An organization of
this kind, however, can only be established by stringent acts of
Congress, without which no action of the Secretary of the Navy or a
board of officers would enable the Government to use merchant vessels.
Nothing, however, in this direction can be done the present session,
and we can only hope that a more enlightened feeling in regard to
these matters will be shown in the future than has prevailed in the
past.
The people who make this outcry against "subsidies" apparently do not
reflect that no nation in the world has gone so far in this direction
as the United States. For instance, the grants to the great
railroads which connect the Atlantic with the Pacific, by which
millions of dollars and millions upon millions of the public lands
were given, enough to have built up our mercantile marine and navy
twenty times over; yet few people have objected to these donations on
the part of the Government, as it was felt to be the only means by
which we could open the country for settlement and obtain control of
the great commerce of the East.
That was the great cry at the time, but unfortunately we only half
did the work we started to accomplish, and failed to continue the
road to China by not appropriating money to put upon the Pacific a
sufficient number of steamships to entirely control the China trade,
and give us a large number of fast and powerful vessels that could,
when necessary, be transformed into heavily armed men-of-war for the
protection of our northwest coast.
At the present time a single powerful vessel of an enemy could
devastate the whole of that coast. I remain, very truly yours, DAVID
D. POUTER, Admiral.
In a letter to the _New York Tribune_, published in May, 1887, Mr. H.
K. Thurber, Pres't of the N. Y. & Brazil S. S. Co., among other
strong language, used the following:
"'Trade is following the flag' with a vengeance. The policy that
mails on the ocean should not be paid a much higher rate than
'inanimate freight' is bringing its fruits home to us in a very
unpleasant manner. The direct contrary policy of England, France,
Germany, Spain and Italy is driving the stars and stripes from the
Ocean. Will Americans sit tamely by and see this insane policy
continued?"
The following letter addressed to this same Mr. Thurber, and,
(curiously enough) signed by a person bearing the same name as the
author of this book, (probably a member of the same family) was also
published in several newspapers about this time.
NEW YORK, Sept. 16, 1887.
_H. K. Thurber, Esq., President U. S. & B. S. S. Co.:_
DEAR SIR: I am in receipt of your pamphlet, and I beg to say that in
my humble judgment it is entirely unanswerable, and that the mere
statement of facts which it contains should bring the blush of shame
to every American cheek.
Indeed, if we were not living witnesses and victims of it, it would
be utterly beyond belief that such a stupid and vicious system as
that under which our mercantile marine is being absolutely strangled
"in the house of its friends" could prevail in any country having the
slightest pretensions to intelligence or enterprise; and it is
certainly not too much to say that if our present laws had been
framed by our worst national enemies or our bitterest commercial
rivals, they could not be more effectual in paralyzing our foreign
commerce and rendering us as nearly as possible a cipher among the
nations of the earth.
Two years ago I was obliged to give up active business on account of
ill health, and since that time I have traveled quite extensively in
Europe, and the most striking fact which confronted me at every turn,
was the enormous increase and development of foreign trade among
nations which we have hitherto regarded as only second or third rate
commercial powers. This remarkable development, in which France and
Germany took the lead, has extended to other countries, and Italy,
Spain and even little Belgium, are rapidly coming to the front as
great maritime nations. Upon inquiring into the causes of this
remarkable increase of commercial activity, I found that it was
entirely due to the policy of "protection by bounty" or subsidy.
Moreover, it has been made principally at the expense of the United
States of America.
England has of course suffered to some extent also: but I think it is
entirely within bounds to assume that at least 75 per cent. of the
foreign traffic secured by these enterprising Europeans within the
last fifteen or twenty years, is traffic which rightfully belongs to
us, and which we should have had, if our law-makers had exhibited the
slightest desire to foster our commercial interests. Walking along
the magnificent wharves of Antwerp, I saw steamer after steamer
loading and unloading for and from ports in South America, whose
trade by every natural law should come to us. It was the same at
Southampton and Liverpool and Havre, and even away down in Naples
there were evidences on every hand of how we Americans are being
robbed of what may be justly considered our birthright; that is,
South American, West Indian, and even Mexican trade. The intense and
monumental stupidity which permits this process to continue, is
doubtless amusing to those who profit by it, but it is death to us as
a maritime nation.
It seems inconceivable that with an overflowing Treasury, and with
exports of over $700,000,000 per annum, our shipping interest should
be thus wiped out of existence merely because a lot of idiots have
inherited a political superstition which invariably throws them into
spasms of indignant protest whenever the word "subsidy" is mentioned.
This inherited superstition is practically all there is behind the
opposition to a fair and reasonable system of protection and
encouragement to our shipping interest.
Of what use are arguments in the face of patent and notorious facts?
Our commerce was swept from the ocean during our civil war. Its
place has been usurped by subsidized vessels of other countries.
Against these vessels unsubsidized ones cannot compete successfully.
This is the whole question in a nutshell.
Shall we, by a judicious system of paying a fair price for American
mail service, restore our foreign commerce, and take once more the
front rank among maritime nations? Or shall we continue to yield to
the paralyzing influence of a mere word, which only represents an
idiotic and threadbare superstition; and turn our whole enormous
export trade over to our foreign competitors, who, while ridiculing
our stupidity, gladly take advantage of it, and pocket the profits
which we thus thrust upon them? Public sentiment is gradually
changing on this great subject; and the demand for reasonable and
sensible legislation in the interest of American shipowners will soon
make itself heard with no uncertain sound. Meanwhile, the fact that
practical and intelligent business men are taking part in the public
discussion of it, is one of the most encouraging signs of the times.
I remain, yours very truly,
SAM BARTON.
It is scarcely necessary for me to say that the foregoing letter
expresses what my sentiments would have been at that time, quite as
fully and as well, as I could, if I had written it myself.
Not only had our merchant marine thus been permitted to be wiped out
of existence, but our navy had also become worn out and decayed, and
our antiquated coast fortifications were the laughing stock of
military and naval experts all over the world.
Concerning the deplorable condition of the United States Navy,
Secretary Whitney, in his annual report for 1885, said, "At the
present moment it must be conceded that we have nothing which
deserves to be called a navy. It is questionable whether we have a
single naval vessel finished and afloat at the present time, that
could be trusted to encounter the ships of any important power--a
single vessel that has either the armor for protection, speed for
escape, or weapons for defense."
This was a notorious fact, as was also the defenseless condition of
our seaboard cities.
Mr. Samuel J. Tilden--who was the democratic candidate for President
of the United States in 1876, and who was believed by many to have
been elected, notwithstanding the decision of the electoral
commission in favor of Mr. Hayes--had in a public letter, made a very
strong appeal for the utilization of the so-called surplus revenues
in fortifying our coasts.
Admiral Porter in his report for the year 1887, also made the
following astounding statement in this connection:
"Two heavy iron-clads could commence at the eastern-most point, and
proceed along the coast to Texas, laying every city under
contribution. In time of war, the torpedo system will be useless for
defense in the absence of proper fortifications and guns. For the
event of war we are no more prepared than we were a year ago;
although we have made a beginning to repair simply the waste in our
navy for the past twenty-five years."
A writer in the _North American Review_ of July, 1888, had also
called attention to the utterly defenseless condition of our
seaports, and showed that a hostile fleet anchored in New York
Harbor, could destroy property valued at $1,500,000,000 in New York,
$600,000,000 in Brooklyn, and $100,000,000 in Jersey City. The only
alternative to such a bombardment would be the payment of a ransom,
whose amount would of course bear some relation to the immense amount
of property involved.
The _New York Herald_ had also, during the summer of 1887, published
a series of sensational articles, showing the enormous amounts of
property thus exposed on our Atlantic, Pacific and Gulf coasts. It
will thus be seen that our ancestors had not even the excuse of
_ignorance_, in permitting such a state of affairs to continue. The
question had been the subject of frequent conferences and
investigations; and committees and sub-committees had reported upon
it, times without number. The fortification board had estimated the
cost of a complete system of coast defences, including armored
turrets and casemates, barbette and mortar batteries, rifled guns,
torpedoes, torpedo boats and floating batteries, at $126,377,800; and
bills had been introduced looking to the gradual expenditure of that
amount of money, such expenditure to cover a period of ten years.
But all such propositions were met by the "economical" statesmen of
that day, with howls of indignant protest; and were characterized as
attempts to steal and squander the proceeds of an excessive and
burdensome system of taxation, which was levied for the sole benefit
of a privileged class of manufacturers, monopolists and capitalists.
Thus these backwoods statesmen, nine-tenths of whom would probably
have failed, if they had attempted to carry on any business more
extensive than the keeping of a peanut stand, assumed to be the
judges of what was the best economy for a nation of over 60,000,000
of people, and exemplified their ideas of economy by rolling up an
annual pension list of about $150,000,000; spending $30,000,000 or
$40,000,000 in so-called river and harbor improvements and public
buildings in different parts of the country; and absolutely _throwing
away_ $20,000,000 or $30,000,000 in paying exorbitant premiums for
the privilege of cancelling a debt not yet due. And thus it had come
to pass, that in the year of grace, 1886, the United States of
America, with a population of more than 60,000,000, with a coast line
whose length was more than double that of any other country, with an
annual available revenue of more than $100,000,000, notwithstanding
that its system of taxation was lighter and less burdensome than that
of any other nation, and its laboring classes better paid, better
housed, better clothed, better fed, and better educated than any
similar classes in any other portion of the world; and with an annual
foreign commerce exceeding $1,600,000,000 in value, found itself
practically without any merchant marine, and actually without a
single war vessel with the "necessary armor for protection, speed for
escape, or weapons for defense;" with its coasts and harbors entirely
unprotected, and its seaports,--containing property aggregating more
than $10,000,000,000 in value--utterly defenseless, and absolutely
inviting attack from any nation which possessed a modern iron-clad,
armed with two or more long range guns, capable of throwing a shell
ten miles or so. This will doubtless seem an incredible statement to
readers of the present day; and yet it is strictly true. Moreover,
these rural solons, in their zeal for what they considered "economy,"
unsettled the industrial interests of the country by an acrimonious
discussion of the tariff; and the most lightly taxed, prosperous,
intelligent and wealthy community in the world was asked to believe
that it was ground down and oppressed by an excessive and burdensome
system of taxation; and "the surplus," "_the surplus_," "THE
SURPLUS," was held over it constantly _in terrorem_, as a monster
that was eating out the nation's vitals, and would soon involve it in
financial ruin.
Meanwhile, new fortifications were recommended year after year, and
the necessity for these was conceded by both political parties;
but--they were not built.
Elaborate estimates for the establishment of gun foundries were made
and favorably reported on; but--the foundries were not built. Huge
appropriations for formidable armored battle ships were talked over
and recommended; but--the armored battle ships were not built.
Bills looking to the re-establishment of our mercantile marine by the
adoption of a similar system of encouragement to that in vogue among
all modern maritime nations, were introduced, and debated on, and
argued over; but--the bills were not passed, and our merchants were
obliged to continue shipping their goods in foreign bottoms. And all
this criminal failure to adopt ordinary defensive precautions, was
justified on the ground of "_economy_." If history ever exhibited a
striking instance of the folly of "saving at the spigot and wasting
at the bung," our ancestors of the latter part of the nineteenth
century may fairly claim pre-eminence as exhibitors in that line.
But I must not anticipate.