His majesty went this day to the house of lords, and after his assent to
several bills, he, in a speech from the throne to both houses of the
senate, acquainted them, that the war raised against the queen of
Hungary, and the various claims on the late German emperour's
succession, might expose the dominions of such princes as should incline
to support the Pragmatick sanction to imminent danger. That the queen of
Hungary required the twelve thousand men stipulated by treaty, and
thereupon he had demanded of the king of Denmark, and of the king of
Sweden, as sovereign of Hesse Cassel, their respective bodies of troops,
of six thousand men each, to be in readiness to march to her assistance.
That he was concerting such farther measures as may disappoint all
dangerous designs forming to the prejudice of the house of Austria,
which might make it necessary for him to enter into still larger
expenses for maintaining the Pragmatick sanction. He, therefore, in a
conjuncture so critical, desired the concurrence of his senate, in
enabling him to contribute, in the most effectual manner, to the support
of the queen of Hungary, the preventing, by all reasonable means, the
subversion of the house of Austria, and to the maintaining the liberties
and balance of power in Europe.
The house of commons, in their address upon this occasion, expressed a
dutiful sense of his majesty's just regard for the rights of the queen
of Hungary, and for the maintaining the Pragmatick sanction; they
declared their concurrence in the prudent measures which his majesty was
pursuing for the preservation of the liberties and balance of power in
Europe; they assured his majesty, that, in justice to, and vindication
of the honour and dignity of the British crown, they would effectually
stand by and support his majesty against all insults and attacks, which
any power, in resentment of the just measures which he had so wisely
taken, should make upon any of his majesty's dominions, though not
belonging to the crown of Great Britain. They farther assured his
majesty, that in any future events which might make it necessary for him
to enter into still larger expenses, they would enable him to
contribute, in the most effectual manner, to the support of the designs
he proposed.
His majesty, in his answer to this address, observed their readiness in
enabling him to make good his engagements with the queen of Hungary, and
the assurances given him not to suffer his foreign dominions to be
insulted on account of the measures he was pursuing for the support of
the Pragmatick sanction, etc.
In consequence of this procedure, the house, pursuant to order, resolved
itself into a committee, to consider of the supplies granted to his
majesty.
Upon this occasion, a motion was made by sir Robert WALPOLE for a grant
of three hundred thousand pounds, for the support of the queen of
Hungary, on which arose the following debate:
Sir Robert WALPOLE supported his motion by a speech, in substance as
follows:--Sir, the necessity of this grant appears so plainly from the
bare mention of the purposes for which it is asked, that I can scarcely
conceive that its reasonableness will be disputed. I can discover no
principles upon which an objection to this motion can be founded, nor
the least arguments by which such objection can be supported.
The indispensable obligations of publick faith, the great ties by which
nations are united, and confederacies formed, I cannot suppose any man
inclined to invalidate. An exact performance of national promises, and
inviolable adherence to treaties, is enforced at once by policy and
justice, and all laws both of heaven and earth.
Publick perfidy, sir, like private dishonesty, whatever temporary
advantages it may promise or produce, is always, upon the whole, the
parent of misery. Every man, however prosperous, must sometimes wish for
a friend; and every nation, however potent, stand in need of an ally;
but all alliances subsist upon mutual confidence, and confidence can be
produced only by unlimited integrity, by known firmness, and approved
veracity.
The use of alliances, sir, has, in the last age, been too much
experienced to be contested; it is by leagues well concerted, and
strictly observed, that the weak are defended against the strong, that
bounds are set to the turbulence of ambition, that the torrent of power
is restrained, and empires preserved from those inundations of war,
that, in former times, laid the world in ruins. By alliances, sir, the
equipoise of power is maintained, and those alarms and apprehensions
avoided, which must arise from daily vicissitudes of empire, and the
fluctuations of perpetual contest.
That it is the interest of this nation to cultivate the friendship of
the house of Austria, to protect its rights, and secure its succession,
to inform it when mistaken, and to assist it when attacked, is allowed
by every party. Every man, sir, knows that the only power that can
sensibly injure us, by obstructing our commerce, or invading our
dominions, is France, against which no confederacy can be formed, except
with the house of Austria, that can afford us any efficacious support.
The firmest bond of alliances is mutual interest. Men easily unite
against him whom they have all equal reason to fear and to hate; by whom
they have been equally injured, and by whom they suspect that no
opportunity will be lost of renewing his encroachments. Such is the
state of this nation, and of the Austrians. We are equally endangered by
the French greatness, and equally animated against it by hereditary
animosities, and contests continued from one age to another; we are
convinced that, however either may be flattered or caressed, while the
other is invaded, every blow is aimed at both, and that we are divided
only that we may be more easily destroyed.
For this reason we engaged in the support of the Pragmatick sanction,
and stipulated to secure the imperial crown to the daughters of Austria;
which was nothing more than to promise, that we would endeavour to
prevent our own destruction, by opposing the exaltation of a prince who
should owe his dignity to the French, and, in consequence of so close an
alliance, second all their schemes, admit all their claims, and
sacrifice to their ambition the happiness of a great part of mankind.
Such would probably be the consequence, if the French should gain the
power of conferring the imperial crown. They would hold the emperour in
perpetual dependence, would, perhaps, take possession of his hereditary
dominions, as a mortgage for their expenses; would awe him with the
troops which they sent under a pretence of assisting him, and leave him
only the titles of dominion, and the shadows of empire.
In this state would he remain, whilst his formidable allies were
extending their dominions on every side. He would see one power subdued
after another, and himself weakened by degrees, and only not deprived of
his throne, because it would be unnecessary to dethrone him; or he would
be obliged to solicit our assistance to break from his slavery, and we
should be obliged, at the utmost hazard, and at an expense not to be
calculated, to remedy what it is, perhaps, now in our power to prevent
with very little difficulty.
That this danger is too near to be merely chimerical, that the queen of
Hungary is invaded, and her right to the imperial dignity contested, is
well known; it is, therefore, the time for fulfilling our engagements;
engagements of the utmost importance to ourselves and our posterity; and
I hope the government will not be accused of profusion, if, for three
hundred thousand pounds, the liberties of Europe shall be preserved.
We cannot deny this grant without acting in opposition to our late
professions of supporting his majesty in his endeavours to maintain the
Pragmatick sanction, and of assisting him to defend his foreign
dominions from any injuries to which those endeavours should expose
them; for how can he without forces defend his dominions, or assist his
ally? or how can he maintain forces without supplies?
Mr. SHIPPEN next rose, and spoke thus:--Sir, as I have always
endeavoured to act upon conviction of my duty, to examine opinions
before I admit them, and to speak what I have thought the truth, I do
not easily change my conduct, or retract my assertions; nor am I
deterred from repeating my arguments when I have a right to speak, by
the remembrance that they have formerly been unsuccessful.
Every man, when he is confident himself, conceives himself able to
persuade others, and imagines that their obstinacy proceeds from other
motives than reason; and that, if he fails at one time to gain over his
audience, he may yet succeed in some happier moment, when their
prejudices shall be dissipated, or their interest varied.
For this reason, though it cannot be suspected that I have forgotten the
resentment which I have formerly drawn upon myself, by an open
declaration of my sentiments with regard to Hanover, I stand up again,
with equal confidence, to make my protestations against any
interposition in the affairs of that country, and to avow my dislike of
the promise lately made to defend it: a promise, inconsistent, in my
opinion, with that important and inviolable law, the _act of
settlement!_--a promise, which, if it could have been foreknown, would,
perhaps, have for ever precluded from the succession that illustrious
family, to which we owe such numberless blessings, such continued
felicity!
Far be it from me to insinuate that we can be too grateful to his
majesty, or too zealous in our adherence to him; only let us remember,
that true gratitude consists in real benefits, in promoting the true
interest of him to whom we are indebted; and surely, by hazarding the
welfare of Britain in defence of Hanover, we shall very little consult
the advantage, or promote the greatness of our sovereign.
It is well known how inconsiderable, in the sight of those by whom the
succession was established, Hanover appeared, in comparison with
Britain. Those men, to whom even their enemies have seldom denied praise
for knowledge and capacity, and who have been so loudly celebrated by
many, who have joined in the last address, for their honest zeal, and
the love of their country, enacted, that the king of Britain should
never visit those important territories, which we have so solemnly
promised to defend, at the hazard of our happiness. It was evidently
their design that our sovereign, engrossed by the care of his new
subjects, a care which, as they reasonably imagined, would arise from
gratitude for dignity and power so liberally conferred, should in time
forget that corner of the earth on which his ancestors had resided, and
act, not as elector of Hanover, but as king of Britain, as the governour
of a mighty nation, and the lord of large dominions.
It was expressly determined, that, this nation should never be involved
in war for the defence of the dominions on the continent, and,
doubtless, the same policy that has restrained us from extending our
conquests in countries from which some advantages might be received,
ought to forbid all expensive and hazardous measures, for the sake of
territories from whence no benefit can be reaped.
Nor are the purposes, sir, for which this supply is demanded, the only
objections that may be urged against it, for the manner in which it is
asked, makes it necessary at least to delay it. The ministers have been
so little accustomed to refusals that they have forgot when to ask with
decency, and expect the treasure of the nation to be poured upon them,
whenever they shall think it proper to hint that they have discovered
some new opportunity of expense.
It is necessary, that when a supply is desired, the house should be
informed, some time before, of the sum that is required, and of the ends
to which it is to be applied, that every member may consider, at
leisure, the expediency of the measures proposed, and the proportion of
the sum to the occasion on which it is demanded; that he may examine
what are the most proper methods of raising it, and, perhaps, inquire
with what willingness his constituents will advance it.
Whether any man is enabled by his acuteness and experience, to determine
all these questions upon momentaneous reflection, I cannot decide. For
my part, I confess myself one of those on whom nature has bestowed no
such faculties, and therefore move that the consideration of this supply
may be deferred for a few days; for if it be now pressed upon us, I
shall vote against it, because I do not yet fully discover all the
reasons for it, nor all the consequences which it may produce, and I
think myself obliged to know for what purpose I give away the money
which is not my own.
Mr. VYNER spoke as follows:--Sir, whatever may be the necessity of
maintaining the Pragmatick sanction, or whatever the obligations of
national pacts, of which I hope no man is desirous of countenancing the
neglect, yet they cannot oblige us to arm without an enemy, to embarrass
ourselves with watching every possibility of danger, to garrison
dominions which are not threatened, or assert rights which are not
invaded.
The expediency of maintaining the house of Austria on the imperial
throne, it is not at present necessary to assert, because it does not
appear that any other family is aspiring to it. There may, indeed, be
whispers of secret designs and artful machinations, whispers, perhaps,
spread only to affright the court into treaties, or the senate into
grants; or designs, which, like a thousand others that every day
produces, innumerable accidents may defeat; which may be discovered, not
only before they are executed, but before they are fully formed, and
which, therefore, are not worthy to engross much of our attention, or to
exhaust the wealth of the people.
The Pragmatick sanction is nothing more than a settlement of the
imperial dignity upon the eldest daughter of the late German emperour
and her son; and if she has no son, upon the son of the second daughter;
nor has the crown of Britain, by engaging to support that sanction,
promised any thing more than to preserve this order of succession, which
no power, at present, is endeavouring to interrupt; and which,
therefore, at present, requires no defence.
The dispute, sir, between the king of Prussia and the queen of Hungary,
is of a different kind; nor is it our duty to engage in it, either as
parties or judges. He lays claim to certain territories usurped, as he
alleges, from his ancestors by the Austrian family, and asserts, by
force, this claim, which is equally valid, whether the queen be emperess
or not. We have no right to limit his dominions, or obligation to
examine the justice of his demands. If he is only endeavouring to gain
what has been forcibly withheld from him, what right have we to obstruct
his undertaking? And if the queen can show a better title, she is, like
all other sovereigns, at liberty to maintain it; nor are we necessarily
to erect ourselves into judges between sovereigns, or distributors of
dominions.
The contest seems to have very little relation to the Pragmatick
sanction: if the king of Prussia succeeds, he will contribute to support
it; and if the queen is able to frustrate his designs, she will be too
powerful to need our assistance.
But though, sir, the Pragmatick sanction were in danger of violation,
are we to stand up alone in defence of it, while other nations, equally
engaged with ourselves by interest and by treaties, sit still to look
upon the contest, and gather those advantages of peace which we
indiscreetly throw away? Are we able to maintain it without assistance,
or are we to exhaust our country, and ruin our posterity in prosecution
of a hopeless project, to spend what can never be repaid, and to fight
with certainty of a defeat?
The Dutch, whose engagements and whose interests are the same as our
own, have not yet made any addition to their expenses, nor augmentation
of their troops; nor does a single potentate of Europe, however united
by long alliances to the house of Austria, or however endangered by
revolutions in the empire, appear to rouse at the approach of alarm, or
think himself obliged to provoke enemies by whom he is not yet injured.
I cannot, therefore, persuade myself that we are to stand up single in
the defence of the Pragmatick sanction, to fight the quarrel of others,
or live in perpetual war, that our neighbours may be at peace.
I shall always think it my duty to disburse the publick money with the
utmost parsimony, nor ever intend, but on the most pressing necessity,
to load with new exactions a nation already overwhelmed with debts,
harassed with taxes, and plundered by a standing army.
For what purpose these numerous forces are maintained, who are now
preying on the publick; why we increase our armies by land when we only
fight by sea; why we aggravate the burden of the war, and add domestick
oppressions to foreign injuries, I am at a loss to determine. Surely
some regard should be had to the satisfaction of the people, who ought
not, during the present scarcity of provisions, to be starved by the
increase of an army, which seems supported only to consume them.
As, therefore, part of our present expense is, in my opinion,
unnecessary, I shall not contribute to aggravate it by a new grant, for
purposes of which I cannot discover that they will promote the advantage
of the publick.
Sir Robert WALPOLE replied to the following effect:--Sir, the Pragmatick
sanction, which we are engaged to support, is not confined to the
preservation of the order of succession, but extends to all the rights
of the house of Austria, which is now attacked, and by a very formidable
enemy, at a time of weakness and distraction, and therefore requires our
assistance.
That others, equally obliged by treaty and by interest to lend their
help on this occasion, sit reluctive, either through cowardice or
negligence, or some prospect of temporary advantage, may, perhaps, be
true; but is it any excuse of a crime, that he who commits it is not the
only criminal? Will the breach of faith in others excuse it in us?
Ought we not rather to animate them by our activity, instruct them by
our example, and awaken them by our representations?
Perhaps the other powers say to themselves, and to one another, Why
should we keep that treaty which Britain is violating? Why should we
expose ourselves to danger, of which that mighty nation, so celebrated
for courage, is afraid? Why should we rush into war, in which our most
powerful ally seems unwilling to support us?
Thus the same argument, an argument evidently false, and made specious
only by interest, may be used by all, till some one, more bold and
honest than the rest, shall dare to rise in vindication of those rights
which all have promised to maintain; and why should not the greatest
nation be the first that shall avow her solemn engagements? Why should
not they be most diligent in the prosecution of an affair who have most
to lose by its miscarriage?
I am always willing to believe, that no member of this assembly makes
use, in any solemn debate, of arguments which do not appear rational to
himself, and yet it is difficult to conceive that any man can imagine
himself released from a promise, because the same promise is broken by
another, or that he is at liberty to desert his friend in distress,
because others desert him, whose good offices he has equal reason to
expect, and that the more his assistance is needed, the more right he
has to deny it.
Surely such arguments as these deserve not, need not a confutation.
Before we regulate our conduct by that of others, we must either prove
that they have done right, which proof will be a sufficient defence
without the precedent, or own that they are more capable of judging than
we, and that, therefore, we pay an implicit submission to their dictates
and example; a sacrifice which we shall not willingly make to the vanity
of our neighbours.
In the present case it is evident that if other nations neglect the
performance of their contracts, they are guilty of the breach of publick
faith; of a crime, that, if it should generally be imitated, would
dissolve society, and throw human nature into confusion, that would
change the most happy region into deserts, in which one savage would be
preying on another.
Nor are they only propagating an example, which in some distant times
may be pleaded against themselves, but they are exposing themselves to
more immediate dangers; they are forwarding designs that have no
tendency but to their ruin, they are adding strength to their inveterate
enemies, and beckoning invasion to their own frontiers.
Let us, therefore, instead of hardening ourselves in perfidy, or lulling
ourselves in security by their example, exert all our influence to unite
them, and all our power to assist them. Let us show them what they ought
to determine by our resolutions, and teach them to act by our vigour;
that, if the house of Austria be preserved, our alliance may be
strengthened by new motives of gratitude; and that, if it must be that
the liberties of this part of the world be lost, we may not reproach
ourselves with having neglected to defend them.
Mr. PELHAM spoke next to this purpose:--Sir, it is not to be supposed
that such members of this assembly as are not engaged in publick
affairs, should receive very exact intelligence of the dispositions of
foreign powers, and, therefore, I do not wonder that the conduct of the
Dutch has been misrepresented, and that they are suspected of neglecting
their engagements at a time when they are endeavouring to perform them.
The Dutch have now under consideration the most proper methods of
assisting the queen of Hungary, and maintaining the Pragmatick sanction;
it may be, indeed, justly suspected, from the nature of their
constitution, that their motions will be slow, but it cannot be
asserted, that they break their engagements, or desert their
confederates.
Nor is there any reason for imagining that the other princes, who have
incurred the same obligations, will not endeavour to perform their
promises; it may be easily conceived that some of them are not able at a
sudden summons to afford great assistance, and that others may wait the
result of our deliberations, and regulate their conduct by our example.
Not that we ought to neglect our engagements, or endanger our country,
because other powers are either perfidious, or insensible; for I am not
afraid to declare, that if that should happen, which there is no reason
to suspect, if all the other powers should desert the defence of the
Austrian line, should consent to annul the Pragmatick sanction, and
leave the queen of Hungary to the mercy of her enemies, I would advise
that Britain alone should pour her armies into the continent, that she
should defend her ally against the most formidable confederacy, and show
mankind an example of constancy not to be shaken, and of faith not to be
violated.
If it be, therefore, our duty to support the Pragmatick sanction, it is
now the time for declaring our resolutions, when the imperial crown is
claimed by a multitude of competitors, among whom the elector of
Bavaria, a very powerful prince, has, by his minister, notified his
pretensions to the court of Britain.
The ancient alliance between this prince and the French is well known,
nor can we doubt that he will now implore their assistance for the
attainment of the throne to which he aspires; and I need not say what
may be expected from an emperour, whose elevation was procured by the
forces of France.
Nor is this the only prince that claims the imperial crown upon
plausible pretences, or whose claims other powers may combine to
support; it is well known, that even the Spanish monarch believes
himself entitled to it, nor can we, who have no communication with him,
know whether he has not declared to all the other princes of Europe, his
resolution to assert his claim.
It is far from being impossible that the pretensions of the house of
Bourbon may be revived, and that though no single prince of that family
should attempt to mount the imperial throne, they may all conspire to
dismember the empire into petty kingdoms, and free themselves from the
dread of a formidable neighbour, by erecting a number of diminutive
sovereigns, who may be always courting the assistance of their
protectors, for the sake of harassing each other.
Thus will the house by which Europe has been hitherto protected, sink
into an empty name, and we shall be left to stand alone against all the
powers that profess a different religion, and whose interest is opposite
to that of Britain.
We ought, indeed, to act with the utmost vigour, when we see one of the
most powerful of the reformed princes so far forgetful of the interest
of our religion, as to cooperate with the designs of France, and so
intent upon improving the opportunity of distressing the house of
Austria, as to neglect the common cause, and expose himself or his
posterity to the danger of becoming a dependant on the house of Bourbon.
For this reason, I cannot agree that our army, though numerous and
burdensome, is greater than the necessity of affairs requires: if we
cast our eyes on the continent, nothing is to be seen but general
confusion, powerful armies in motion, the dominions of one prince
invaded, of another threatened; the tumults of ambition in one place,
and a panick stillness in another.
What will be the event of these commotions who can discover? And how can
we know what may determine the course of that flood of power, which is
now in a state of uncertain fluctuation, or seems driven to different
points by different impulses? How soon may the Dutch see their barrier
attacked, and call upon us for the ten thousand men which we are obliged
to send them? How soon may the house of Austria be so distressed, as to
require all our power for its preservation?
That we are to leave nothing unattempted for the security of our own
religion and liberty, will easily be granted, and, therefore, unless it
can be proved that we may be equally secure, though the house of Austria
be ruined, it will necessarily follow that we are, with all our power,
to enforce the observation of the Pragmatick sanction.
This is not an act of romantick generosity, but such as the closest
attention to our own interest shows to be necessary; in defending the
queen of Hungary we defend ourselves, and only extinguish that flame, by
which, if it be suffered to spread, we shall ourselves be consumed. The
empire may be considered as the bulwark of Britain, which, if it be
thrown down, leaves us naked and defenceless.
Let us, therefore, consider our own danger, and remember, that while we
are considering this supply, we are deliberating upon nothing less than
the fate of our country.
Mr. PULTENEY spoke next, to the effect following:--Sir, I am on this
occasion of an opinion different from that of the honourable member who
spoke the second in this debate, though on most questions our judgment
has been the same. I am so far from seconding his proposal for delaying
the consideration of this supply, that I think it may justly be
inquired, why it was not sooner proposed.
For the support of the house of Austria, and the assertion of the
Pragmatick sanction, no man can be more zealous than myself; I am
convinced how closely the interest of this nation and that of the
Austrian family are united, and how much either must be endangered by
the ruin of the other, and, therefore, I shall not delay, for a single
moment, my consent to any measures that may reestablish our interest on
the continent, and rescue Germany once more from the jaws of France.
I am afraid that we have lost part of our influence in the neighbouring
countries, and that the name of Britain is less formidable than
heretofore; but if reputation is lost, it is time to recover it, and I
doubt not but it may be recovered by the same means that it was at first
obtained. Our armies may be yet equally destructive, and our money
equally persuasive.
We have not yet suffered, amidst all our misconduct, our naval force to
be diminished; our sailors yet retain their ancient courage, and our
fleets are sufficient to keep the dominion of the ocean, and prescribe
limits to the commerce of every nation. While this power remains
unimpaired, while Britain retains her natural superiority, and asserts
the honour of her flag in every climate, we cannot become despicable,
nor can any nation ridicule our menaces or scorn our alliance. We may
still extend our influence to the inland countries, and awe those
nations which we cannot invade.
To preserve this power let us watch over the disposal of our money;
money is the source of dominion; those nations may be formidable for
their affluence which are not considerable for their numbers; and by a
negligent profusion of their wealth, the most powerful people may
languish into imbecility, and sink into contempt.
If the grant which is now demanded will be sufficient to produce the
ends to which it is proposed to be applied, if we are assured of the
proper application of it, I shall agree to it without hesitation. But
though it cannot be affirmed that the sum now demanded is too high a
price for the liberties of Europe, it is at least more than ought to be
squandered without effect, and we ought at least to know before we grant
it, what advantages may be expected from it.
May not the sum demanded for the support of the queen of Hungary be
employed to promote very different interests? May it not be lavished to
support that power, to which our grants have too long contributed? that
power by which ourselves have been awed, and the administration has
tyrannised without control?
If this sum is really intended to support the queen of Hungary, may we
not inquire how it is to be employed for her service? Is it to be sent
her for the payment of her armies, and the support of her court? Should
we not more effectually secure her dominions by purchasing with it the
friendship and assistance of the king of Prussia, a prince, whose extent
of dominions and numerous forces, make him not more formidable than his
personal qualities.
What may be hoped, sir, from a prince of wisdom and courage, at the head
of a hundred and ten thousand regular troops, with eight millions in his
treasury? How much he must necessarily add to the strength of any party
in which he shall engage, is unnecessary to mention; it is evident,
without proof, that nothing could so much contribute to the
reestablishment of the house of Austria, as a reconciliation with this
mighty prince, and that, to bring it to pass, would be the most
effectual method of serving the unfortunate queen that requires our
assistance.
Why we should despair, sir, of such a reconciliation I cannot perceive;
a reconciliation equally conducive to the real interest of both parties.
It may be proved, with very little difficulty, to the king of Prussia,
that he is now assisting those with whom interests incompatible and
religions irreconcilable have set him at variance, whom he can never see
prosperous but by the diminution of his own greatness, and who will
always project his ruin while they are enjoying the advantages of his
victories. We may easily convince him that their power will soon become,
by his assistance, such as he cannot hope to withstand, and show, from
the examples of other princes, how dangerous it is to add to the
strength of an ambitious neighbour. We may show him how much the fate of
the empire is now in his hands, and how much more glorious and more
advantageous it will be to preserve it from ruin, than to contribute to
its destruction.
If by such arguments, sir, this potent monarch can be induced to act
steadily in defence of the common cause, we may once more stand at the
head of a protestant confederacy; of a confederacy that may contract the
views and repress the ambition of the house of Bourbon, and alter their
schemes of universal monarchy into expedients for the defence of their
dominions.
But in transacting these affairs, let us not engage in any intricate
treaties, nor amuse ourselves with displaying our abilities for
negotiation; negotiation, that fatal art which we have learned as yet
very imperfectly, and which we have never attempted to practise but to
our own loss. While we have been entangled in tedious disquisitions, and
retarded by artful delays, while our commissaries have been debating
about what was only denied to produce controversies, and inquiring after
that which has been hid from them only to divert their attention from
other questions, how many opportunities have been lost, and how often
might we have secured by war, what was, at a much greater expense, lost
by treaties.
Treaties, sir, are the artillery of our enemies, to which we have
nothing to oppose; they are weapons of which we know not the use, and
which we can only escape by not coming within their reach. I know not by
what fatality it is, that to treat and to be cheated, are, with regard
to Britons, words of the same signification; nor do I intend, by this
observation, to asperse the characters of particular persons, for
treaties, by whomsoever carried on, have ended always with the same
success.
It is time, therefore, to know, at length, our weakness and our
strength, and to resolve no longer to put ourselves voluntarily into the
power of our enemies: our troops have been always our ablest
negotiators, and to them it has been, for the most part, necessary at
last to refer our cause.
Let us, then, always preserve our martial character, and neglect the
praise of political cunning; a quality which, I believe, we shall never
attain, and which, if we could obtain, would add nothing to our honour.
Let it be the practice of the Britons to declare their resolutions
without reserve, and adhere to them in opposition to danger; let them be
ambitious of no other elogies than those which may be gained by honesty
and courage, nor will they then ever find their allies diffident, or
their enemies contemptuous.
By recovering and asserting this character, we may become once more the
arbiters of Europe, and be courted by all the protestant powers as their
protectors: we may once more subdue the ambition of the aspiring French,
and once more deliver the house of Austria from the incessant pursuit of
those restless enemies.
The defence of that illustrious family, sir, has always appeared to me,
since I studied the state of Europe, the unvariable interest of the
British nation, and our obligations to support it on this particular
occasion have already been sufficiently explained.
Whence it proceeded, sir, that those who now so zealously espouse the
Austrian interest, have been so plainly forgetful of it on other
occasions, I cannot determine. That treaties have been made very little
to the advantage of that family, and that its enemies have been suffered
to insult it without opposition, is well known; nor was it long ago that
it was debated in this house, whether any money should be lent to the
late emperour.
No publick or private character can be supported, no enemy, sir, can be
intimidated, nor any friend confirmed in his adherence, but by a steady
and consistent conduct, by proposing, in all our actions, such ends as
may be openly avowed, and by pursuing them without regard to temporary
inconveniencies, or petty obstacles.
Such conduct, sir, I would gladly recommend on the present occasion, on
which I should be far from advising a faint, an irresolute, or momentary
assistance, such supplies as declare diffidence in our own strength, or
a mean inclination to please contrary parties at the same time, to
perform our engagements with the queen, and continue our friendship with
France. It is, in my opinion, proper to espouse our ally with the spirit
of a nation that expects her decisions to be ratified, that holds the
balance of the world in her hand, and can bestow conquest and empire at
her pleasure.
Yet, sir, it cannot be denied that many powerful reasons may be brought
against any new occasions of expense, nor is it without horrour and
astonishment that any man, conversant in political calculations, can
consider the enormous profusion of the national treasure. In the late
dreadful confusion of the world, when the ambition of France had set
half the nations of the earth on flame, when we sent our armies to the
continent, and fought the general quarrel of mankind, we paid, during
the reigns of king William and his great successour, reigns of which
every summer was distinguished by some important action, but four
millions yearly.
But our preparations for the present war, in which scarcely a single
ship of war has been taken, or a single fortress laid in ruins, have
brought upon the nation an expense of five millions. So much more are we
now obliged to pay to amuse the weakest, than formerly to subdue the
most powerful of our enemies.
Frugality, which is always prudent, is, at this time, sir,
indispensable, when war, dreadful as it is, may be termed the lightest
of our calamities; when the seasons have disappointed us of bread, and
an universal scarcity afflicts the nation. Every day brings us accounts
from different parts of the country, and every account is a new evidence
of the general calamity, of the want of employment for the poor, and its
necessary consequence, the want of food.
He that is scarce able to preserve himself, cannot be expected to assist
others; nor is that money to be granted to foreign powers, which is
wanted for the support of our fellow-subjects, who are now languishing
with diseases, which unaccustomed hardships and unwholesome provisions
have brought upon them, while we are providing against distant dangers,
and bewailing the distresses of the house of Austria.
Let us not add to the miseries of famine the mortifications of insult
and neglect; let our countrymen, at least, divide our care with our
allies, and while we form schemes for succouring the queen of Hungary,
let us endeavour to alleviate nearer distresses, and prevent or pacify
domestick discontents.
If there be any man whom the sight of misery cannot move to compassion,
who can hear the complaints of want without sympathy, and see the
general calamity of his country without employing one hour on schemes
for its relief; let not that man dare to boast of integrity, fidelity,
or honour; let him not presume to recommend the preservation of our
faith, or adherence to our confederates: that wretch can have no real
regard to any moral obligation, who has forgotten those first duties
which nature impresses; nor can he that neglects the happiness of his
country, recommend any good action for a good reason.
It should be considered, sir, that we can only be useful to our allies,
and formidable to our enemies, by being unanimous and mutually confident
of the good intentions of each other, and that nothing but a steady
attention to the publick welfare, a constant readiness to remove
grievances, and an apparent unwillingness to impose new burdens, can
produce that unanimity.
As the cause is, therefore, necessarily to precede the effect, as
foreign influence is the consequence of happiness at home, let us first
endeavour to establish that alacrity and security that may animate the
people to assert their ancient superiority to other nations, and restore
that plenty which may raise them above any temptation to repine at
assistance given to our allies.
No man, sir, can very solicitously watch over the welfare of his
neighbour whose mind is depressed by poverty, or distracted by terrour;
and when the nation shall see us anxious for the preservation of the
queen of Hungary, and unconcerned about the wants of our
fellow-subjects, what can be imagined, but that we have some method of
exempting ourselves from the common distress, and that we regard not the
publick misery when we do not feel it?
Sir Robert WALPOLE replied, to the following effect:--Sir, it is always
proper for every man to lay down some principles upon which he proposes
to act, whether in publick or private; that he may not be always
wavering, uncertain, and irresolute; that his adherents may know what
they are to expect, and his adversaries be able to tell why they are
opposed.
It is necessary, sir, even for his own sake, that he may not be always
struggling with himself; that he may know his own determinations, and
enforce them by the reasons which have prevailed upon him to form them;
that he may not argue in the same speech to contrary purposes, and weary
the attention of his hearers with contrasts and antitheses.
When a man admits the necessity of granting a supply, expatiates upon
the danger that may be produced by retarding it, declares against the
least delay, however speciously proposed, and enforces the arguments
which have been already offered to show how much it is our duty and
interest to allow it; may it not reasonably be imagined, that he intends
to promote it, and is endeavouring to convince them of that necessity of
which he seems himself convinced?
But when the same man proceeds to display, with equal eloquence, the
present calamities of the nation, and tells to how much better purposes
the sum thus demanded may be applied; when he dwells upon the
possibility that an impolitick use may be made of the national treasure,
and hints that it may be asked for one purpose and employed to another,
what can be collected from his harangue, however elegant, entertaining,
and pathetick? How can his true opinion be discovered? Or how shall we
fix such fugitive reasonings, such variable rhetorick?
I am not able, sir, to discern, why truth should be obscured; or why any
man should take pleasure in heaping together all the arguments that his
knowledge may supply, or his imagination suggest, against a proposition
which he cannot deny. Nor can I assign any good purpose that can be
promoted by perpetual renewals of debate, and by a repetition of
objections, which have in former conferences, on the same occasion, been
found of little force.
When the system of affairs is not fully laid open, and the schemes of
the administration are in part unknown, it is easy to raise objections
formidable in appearance, which, perhaps, cannot be answered till the
necessity of secrecy is taken away. When any general calamity has fallen
upon a nation, it is a very fruitful topick of rhetorick, and may be
very pathetically exaggerated, upon a thousand occasions to which it has
no necessary relation.
Such, In my opinion, sir, is the use now made of the present scarcity, a
misfortune inflicted upon us by the hand of providence alone; not upon
us only, but upon all the nations on this side of the globe, many of
which suffer more, but none less than ourselves.
If at such a time it is more burdensome to the nation to raise supplies,
it must be remembered, that it is in proportion difficult to other
nations to oppose those measures for which the supplies are granted; and
that the same sum is of greater efficacy in times of scarcity than of
plenty.
Our present distress will, I hope, soon be at an end; and, perhaps, a
few days may produce at least some alteration. It is not without reason,
that I expect the news of some successful attempts in America, which
will convince the nation, that the preparations for war have not been
idle shows, contrived to produce unnecessary expenses.
In the mean time it is necessary that we support that power which may be
able to assist us against France, the only nation from which any danger
can threaten us, even though our fleets in America should be
unsuccessful.
If we defeat the Spaniards, we may assist the house of Austria without
difficulty, and if we fail in our attempts, their alliance will be more
necessary. The sum demanded for this important purpose cannot be
censured as exorbitant, yet will, I hope, be sufficient: if more should
hereafter appear necessary, I doubt not but it will be granted.
The question passed without opposition.