The treaty of Vienna, my lords, which has been the parent of so many

terrours, consultations, embassies, and alliances is, I find, not yet to

be acknowledged, what it certainly was, a mere phantom, an empty

illusion, sent by the arts of the French to terrify our ministry. His

late majesty's testimony is cited to prove that stipulations were really

entered into by the two powers allied by that treaty, to destroy our

trade, subvert our constitution, and set a new king upon the throne,

without consent of the nation.

Such improbabilities, my lords, ought, indeed, to be proved by a high

testimony, by a testimony which no man shall dare to question or

contradict; for as any man is at liberty to consult his reason, it will

always remonstrate to him, that it is no less absurd to impute the folly

of designing impossibilities to any powers not remarkable for weak

counsels, than unjust to suspect princes of intending injuries, to which

they have not been incited by any provocation.

But, my lords, nowithstanding the solemnity with which his late majesty

has been introduced, his testimony can prove nothing more than that he

believed the treaty to be such as he represents, that he had been

deceived into false apprehensions and unnecessary cautions by his own

ministers, as they had been imposed upon by the agents of France.

This is all, my lords, that can be collected from the royal speech, and

to infer more from it is to suppose that the king was himself a party in

the designs formed against him; for if he was not himself engaged in

this treaty, he could only be informed, by another, of the stipulations,

and could only report what he had been told upon the credit of the

informer, a man, necessarily of very little credit. Thus, my lords, all

the evidence of his late majesty vanishes into nothing more than the

whisper of a spy.

But as great stress ought, doubtless, to be laid upon intelligence which

the nation is believed to purchase at a very high price, let it be

inquired, what proofs those have who dare to suspect the sagacity of our

ministers, to put in the balance against their intelligence, and it will

be discovered, my lords, that they have a testimony no less than that of

the German emperour himself, who could not be mistaken with regard to

the meaning of the treaty concluded at his own court, and to whom it

will not be very decent to deny such a degree of veracity as may set him

at least on the level with a traitor and a hireling.

If the treaty of Vienna was an imposture, most of our misfortunes are

evidently produced by the weakness of the minister; but even supposing

it real, as it was only a formidable mockery, an idle threat, that could

never be executed, it was not necessary, that in order to obviate it, we

should give ourselves implicitly into the hands of France.

It was not necessary, my lords, that we should suffer them first to

elude the treaty of Utrecht, by making a port at Mardyke, and then

directly and openly to violate it by repairing Dunkirk. That this latter

is a port contrary to treaty, the bills of entry at the custom-house

daily show; and as the customs are particularly under the inspection of

the commissioners of the treasury, this man cannot plead ignorance of

this infraction, were no information given him by other means. If it

should now be asked, my lords, what, in my opinion, ought to be done, I

cannot advise that we should attempt to demolish it by force, or draw

upon ourselves the whole power of France by a declaration of war, but

what it may be difficult now to remedy, it was once easy to obviate.

Had we shown the same contempt of the French power with our ancestors,

and the same steadiness in our councils, the same firmness in our

alliances, and the same spirit in our treaties, that court would never

have ventured to break a known solemn stipulation, to have exasperated a

brave and determined adversary by flagrant injustice, and to have

exposed themselves to the hazard of a war, in which it would have been

the interest of every prince of Europe who regarded justice or posterity

to wish their defeat.

Now they see us engaged in a war, my lords, they may be animated to a

more daring contempt of the faith of treaties, and insult us with yet

greater confidence of success, as they cannot but remark the cowardice

or the ignorance with which we have hitherto carried on this war. They

cannot but observe that either our minister means in reality to make war

rather upon the Britons than the Spaniards, or that he is totally

unacquainted with military affairs, and too vain to ask the opinion of

others who have greater knowledge than himself.

Nothing, my lords, is more apparent than that the minister was forced,

by the continual clamours of the nation, to declare war, contrary to his

own inclination, and that he always affected to charge it upon others,

and to exempt himself from the imputation of it. It is, therefore,

probable that he has not acted on this occasion so wisely as even his

own experience and penetration might, if they were honestly employed,

enable him to act, and that he has suffered our counsels to be

embarrassed; that he sees with great tranquillity those suffering by the

war, at whose request it was begun, and imagines it a proof of the

excellence of his own scheme, that those who forced him to break it, may

in time repent of their importunities.

For that in the management of the war, my lords, no regard has been had

either to the advantages which the course of our trade inevitably gives

to our enemies, or to the weakness to which the extent of their

dominions necessarily subjects them, that neither the interest of the

merchant has been consulted, nor the ease of the nation in general

regarded, that the treasure of the publick has been squandered, and that

our military preparations have intimidated no nation but our own, is

evident beyond contradiction.

It is well known, my lords, to every man but the minister, that we have

nothing to fear from either the fleets or armies of the Spaniards, that

they cannot invade us except in America, and that they can only molest

us by intercepting our traders. This they can only effect by means of

their privateers, whose vessels, being light and active, may be easily

fitted out, nimbly seize their prey, and speedily retire.

The experience of the last French war, my lords, might have taught us

how much we have to fear from the activity of men incited by prospects

of private gain, and equipped with that care and vigilance, which,

however omitted in national affairs, the interest of particular men

never fails to dictate. It is well known, my lords, how much we lost

amidst our victories and triumphs, and how small security the merchants

received from our magnificent navies, and celebrated commanders. It was,

therefore, surely the part of wise men, not to miscarry twice by the

same omission, when they had an opportunity to supply it.

I need not inform your lordships of what every reader of newspapers can

tell, and which common sense must easily discover, that privateers are

only to be suppressed by ships of the same kind with their own, which

may scour the seas with rapidity, pursue them into shallow water, where

great ships cannot attack them, seize them as they leave the harbours,

or destroy them upon their own coasts.

That this is, in its own nature, at once obvious to be contrived, and

easy to be done, must appear upon the bare mention of it, and yet that

it has been either treacherously neglected, or ignorantly omitted, the

accounts of every day have long informed us. Not a week passes in which

our ships are not seized, and our sailors carried into a state of

slavery. Nor does this happen only on the wide ocean, which is too

spacious to be garrisoned, or upon our enemies' coasts, where they may

have, sometimes, insuperable advantages, but on our own shores, within

sight of our harbours, and in those seas of which we vainly style our

nation the sovereign.

Who is there, my lords, whose indignation is not raised at such

ignominy? Who is there by whom such negligence will not be resented? It

cannot be alleged that we had not time to make better preparations; we

had expected war long before we declared it, and if the minister was the

only man by whom it was not expected, it will make another head of

accusation.

Nor was his disregard of our dominions less flagrant than that of our

trade: it was publickly declared by don Geraldino, that his master would

never give up his claim to part of our American colonies, which yet were

neither fortified on the frontiers, nor supplied with arms, nor enabled

to oppose an enemy, nor protected against him.

One man there is, my lords, whose natural generosity, contempt of

danger, and regard for the publick, prompted him to obviate the designs

of the Spaniards, and to attack them in their own territories; a man,

whom by long acquaintance I can confidently affirm to have been equal to

his undertaking, and to have learned the art of war by a regular

education, who yet miscarried in his design, only for want of supplies

necessary to a possibility of success.

Nor is there, my lords, much probability that the forces sent lately to

Vernon will be more successful; for this is not a war to be carried on

by boys: the state of the enemy's dominions is such, partly by

situation, and partly by the neglect of that man whose conduct we are

examining, that to attack them with any prospect of advantage, will

require the judgment of an experienced commander; of one who had learned

his trade, not in Hyde-park, but in the field of battle; of one that has

been accustomed to sudden exigencies and unsuspected difficulties, and

has learned cautiously to form, and readily to vary his schemes.

An officer, my lords, an officer qualified to invade kingdoms is not

formed by blustering in his quarters, by drinking on birth-nights, or

dancing at assemblies; nor even by the more important services of

regulating elections, and suppressing those insurrections which are

produced by the decay of our manufactures. Many gallant colonels have

led out their forces against women and children, with the exactest

order, and scattered terrour over numerous bodies of colliers and

weavers, who would find difficulties not very easily surmountable, were

they to force a pass, or storm a fortress.

But, my lords, those whom we have destined for the conquest of America,

have not even flushed their arms with such services, nor have learned,

what is most necessary to be learned, the habit of obedience; they are

only such as the late frost hindered from the exercise of their trades,

and forced to seek for bread in the service; they have scarcely had time

to learn the common motions of the exercise, or distinguish the words of

command.

Nor are their officers, my lords, extremely well qualified to supply

those defects, and establish discipline and order in a body of

new-raised forces; for they are absolutely strangers to service, and

taken from school to receive a commission, or if transplanted from other

regiments, have had time only to learn the art of dress. We have sent

soldiers undisciplined, and officers unable to instruct them, and sit in

expectation of conquests to be made by one boy acting under the

direction of another.

To their commander-in-chief, my lords, I object nothing but his

inexperience, which is by no means to be imputed to his negligence, but

his want of opportunities; though of the rest, surely it may be said,

that they are such a swarm as were never before sent out on military

designs; and, in my opinion, to the other equipments, the government

should have added provisions for women to nurse them.

Had my knowledge of war, my lords, been thought sufficient to have

qualified me for the chief command in this expedition, or had my advice

been asked with regard to the conduct of it, I should willingly have

assisted my country with my person or my counsels; but, my lords, this

man, who engrosses all authority, seems, likewise, to believe that he is

in possession of all knowledge, and that he is equally capable, as he is

equally willing, to usurp the supreme and uncontroulable direction both

of civil and military affairs.

Why new forces were raised, my lords, it is very easy to judge; new

forces required new commissions, and new commissions produced new

dependencies, which might be of use to the minister at the approaching

election; but why the new-raised troops were sent on this expedition

rather than those which had been longer disciplined, it is very

difficult to assign a reason, unless it was considered that some who had

commands in them had likewise seats in the senate; and the minister was

too grateful to expose his friends to danger, and too prudent to hazard

the loss of a single vote. Besides the commander-in-chief, there is but

one senator in the expedition, and, my lords, he is one of too great

integrity to be corrupted, and, though sensible of the weakness of the

troops, too brave to quit his post. How much our country may suffer by

such absurd conduct, I need not explain to your lordships; it may easily

be conceived how much one defeat may dispirit the nation, and to what

attempts one victory may excite our enemies; those enemies whom, under a

steady and wise administration, we should terrify into submission, even

without an army.

I cannot forbear to remark on this occasion, how much the ignorance of

this man has exposed a very important part of our foreign dominions to

the attempts of the Spaniards. Gibraltar, my lords, is well known to be

so situated, as to be naturally in very little danger of an attack from

the land, and to command the country to a great distance; but these

natural advantages are now taken away, or greatly lessened, by new

fortifications, erected within much less than gunshot of the place,

erected in the sight of the garrison, and while one of our admirals was

cruizing upon the coast.

The pretence, my lords, upon which they were erected, was, that though

Gibraltar was granted to Britain, yet there was no district appendent to

it, nor did the British authority extend beyond the walls of the town:

this poor excuse did the chicanery of the Spaniards invent, and with

this, my lords, was our minister contented, either not knowing or not

appearing to know what, I hope, the children whom we have despatched to

America have been taught, and what no man, versed in national affairs,

can be ignorant of without a crime, that when a fortress is yielded to

another nation, the treaty always virtually includes, even without

mentioning it, an extent of land as far as the guns of the fortification

can reach.

Whether this man, my lords, was so ignorant as to be deceived thus

grossly, or so abandoned as willingly to deceive his country, he is

equally unqualified to support the office of first minister, and almost

equally deserves to be prosecuted by the indignation and justice of this

assembly, in the severest manner; for how great must be his wickedness

who undertakes a charge above his abilities, when his country may be

probably ruined by his errours?

Your lordships cannot but observe, that I make use rather of the term

minister than that of the administration, which others are so desirous

to substitute in its place, either to elude all inquiry into the

management of our affairs, or to cover their own shameful dependence.

Administration, my lords, appears to me a term without a meaning, a wild

indeterminate word, of which none can tell whom it implies, or how

widely it may extend: a charge against the administration may be

imagined a general censure of every officer in the whole subordination

of government, a general accusation of instruments and agents, of

masters and slaves: my charge, my lords, is against the minister,

against that man, who is believed by every one in the nation, and known

by great numbers, to have the chief, and, whenever he pleases to require

it, the sole direction of the publick measures; he, to whom all the

other ministers owe their elevation, and by whose smile they hold their

power, their salaries, and their dignity.

That this appellation is not without sufficient reason bestowed upon

that man, I have already proved to your lordships; and as it has already

been made appear that common fame is a sufficient ground of accusation,

it will easily be shown that this man has a just claim to the title of

minister; for if any man be told of an accusation of the minister; he

will not ask the name of the person accused.

But there is in the motion one title conferred upon him, to which he has

no pretensions; for there is no law for styling him the first

commissioner of the treasury. The commissioners, my lords, who

discharge, in a collective capacity, the office of lord high treasurer,

are constituted by the same patent, invested with equal power and equal

dignity, and I know not why this man should be exalted to any

superiority over his associates.

If we take, my lords, a review of our affairs, and examine the state of

the nation in all its relations and all its circumstances, we cannot,

surely, conceive that we are in a state of prosperity, unless discontent

at home, and scorn abroad, the neglect of our allies, and insolence of

our enemies, the decay of trade, and multitude of our imposts, are to be

considered as proofs of a prosperous and nourishing nation.

Will it be alleged, my lords, has this man one friend adventurous enough

to assert, in open day, that the people are not starving by thousands,

and murmuring by millions, that universal misery does not overspread the

nation, and that this horrid series of calamities is not universally,

among all conditions, imputed to the conduct of this man?

That great evils are felt, my lords, no Briton, I am certain, who

converses promiscuously with his countrymen, will attempt to dispute,

and until some other cause more proportioned to the effect shall be

assigned, I shall join the publick in their opinion, and while I think

this man the author of our miseries, shall conclude it necessary to

comply with the motion.

Lord HARDWICK spoke next, to the following effect:--My lords, though I

very readily admit that crimes ought to be punished, that a treacherous

administration of publick affairs is, in a very high degree, criminal,

that even ignorance, where it is the consequence of neglect, deserves

the severest animadversion, and that it is the privilege and duty of

this house to watch over the state of the nation, and inform his majesty

of any errours committed by his ministers; yet I am far from being

convinced either of the justice or necessity of the motion now under

consideration.

The most flagrant and invidious part of the charge against the right

honourable gentleman appears to consist in this, that he has engrossed

an exorbitant degree of power, and usurped an unlimited influence over

the whole system of government, that he disposes of all honours and

preferments, and that he is not only _first_ but _sole_ minister.

But of this boundless usurpation, my lords, what proof has been laid

before you? What beyond loud exaggerations, pompous rhetorick, and

specious appeals to common fame; common fame, which, at least, may

sometimes err, and which, though it may afford sufficient ground for

suspicion and inquiry, was never yet admitted as conclusive evidence,

where the immediate necessities of the publick did not preclude the

common forms of examination, where the power of the offender did not

make it dangerous to attack him by a legal prosecution, or where the

conduct of the accusers did not plainly discover that they were more

eager of blood than of justice, and more solicitous to destroy than to

convict.

I hope none of these circumstances, my lords, can at present obstruct a

candid and deliberate inquiry: with regard to the publick, I am not able

to discover any pressing exigencies that demand a more compendious

method of proceeding, than the established laws of the land, and the

wisdom of our ancestors have prescribed. I know not any calamity that

will be aggravated, nor any danger that will become move formidable, by

suffering this question to be legally tried.

Nor is there, my lords, in the circumstances of the person accused, any

thing that can incite us to a hasty process; for, if what is alleged by

the noble lords is not exaggerated beyond the truth, if he is

universally detested by the whole nation, and loaded with execrations by

the publick voice; if he is considered as the author of all our

miseries, and the source of all our corruptions; if he has ruined our

trade, and depressed our power, impoverished the people, and attempted

to enslave them, there is, at least, no danger of an insurrection in his

favour, or any probability that his party will grow stronger by delays.

For, my lords, to find friends in adversity, and assertors in distress,

is only the prerogative of innocence and virtue.

The gentleman against whom this formidable charge is drawn up, is, I

think, not suspected of any intention to have recourse either to force

or flight; he has always appeared willing to be tried by the laws of his

country, and to stand an impartial examination; he neither opposes nor

eludes inquiry, neither flies from justice, nor defies it.

And yet less, my lords, can I suspect, that those by whom he is accused,

act from any motive that may influence them to desire a sentence not

supported by evidence, or conformable to truth; or that they can wish

the ruin of any man whose crimes are not notorious and flagrant, that

they persecute from private malice, or endeavour to exalt themselves by

the fall of another.

Let us, therefore, my lords, inquire before we determine, and suffer

evidence to precede our sentence. The charge, if it is just, must be, by

its own nature, easily proved, and that no proof is brought may,

perhaps, be sufficient to make us suspect that it is not just.

For, my lords, what is the evidence of common fame, which has been so

much exalted, and so confidently produced? Does not every man see that,

on such occasions, two questions may be asked, of which, perhaps,

neither can easily be answered, and which, yet, must both be resolved

before common fame can be admitted as a proof of facts.

It is first to be inquired, my lords, whether the reports of fame are

necessarily or even probably true? A question very intricate and

diffusive, entangled with a thousand, and involving a thousand,

distinctions; a question of which it may be said, that a man may very

plausibly maintain either side, and of which, perhaps, after months or

years wasted in disputation, no other decision can be obtained than what

is obvious at the first view, that they are often true, and often false,

and, therefore, can only be grounds of inquiry, not reasons of

determination.

But if it appear, my lords, that this oracle cannot be deceived, we are

then to inquire after another difficulty, we are to inquire, _What is

fame?_

Is fame, my lords, that fame which cannot err? a report that flies, on a

sudden, through a nation, of which no man can discover the original; a

sudden blast of rumour, that inflames or intimidates a people, and

obtains, without authority, a general credit? No man versed in history

can inquire whether such reports may not deceive. Is fame rather a

settled opinion, prevailing by degrees, and for some time established?

How long, then, my lords, and in what degree must it have been

established, to obtain undoubted credit, and when does it commence

infallible? If the people are divided in their opinions, as in all

publick questions it has hitherto happened, fame is, I suppose, the

voice of the majority; for, if the two parties are equal in their

numbers, fame will be equal; then how great must be the majority before

it can lay claim to this powerful auxiliary? and how shall that majority

be numbered?

These questions, my lords, may be thought, perhaps with justice, too

ludicrous in this place, but, in my opinion, they contribute to show the

precarious and uncertain nature of the evidence so much confided in.

Common fame, my lords, is to every man only what he himself commonly

hears; and it is in the power of any man's acquaintance to vitiate the

evidence which they report, and to stun him with clamours, and terrify

him with apprehensions of miseries never felt, and dangers invisible.

But, without such a combination, we are to remember, that most men

associate with those of their own opinions, and that the rank of those

that compose this assembly naturally disposes such as are admitted to

their company, to relate, or to invent, such reports as may be

favourably received, so that what appears to one lord the general voice

of common fame, may, by another, be thought only the murmur of a petty

faction, despicable, with regard to their numbers, and detestable, if we

consider their principles.

So difficult is it, my lords, to form any solid judgment concerning the

extent and prevalence of any particular report, and the degree of credit

to be given to it. The industry of a party may supply the defect of

numbers, and some concurrent circumstances may contribute to give credit

to a false report.

But, my lords, we are ourselves appealed to as witnesses of the truth of

facts, which prove him to be sole minister, of the number of his

dependents, the advancement of his friends, the disappointments of his

opponents, and the declarations made by his followers of adherence and

fidelity.

If it should be granted, my lords, that there is nothing in these

representations exaggerated beyond the truth, and that nothing is

represented in an improper light, what consequence can we draw, but that

the followers of this gentleman, make use of those arts which have

always been practised by the candidates of preferment, that they

endeavour to gain their patron's smile by flattery and panegyrick, and

to keep it by assiduity and an appearance of gratitude. And if such

applications exalted any man to the authority and title of first

minister, the nation has never, in my memory, been without some man in

that station, for there is always some one to whom ambition and avarice

have paid their court, and whose regards have been purchased at the

expense of truth.

Nor is it to be wondered at, my lords, that posts of honour and profit

have been bestowed upon the friends of the administration; for who

enriches or exalts his enemies? who will increase the influence that is

to be exerted against him, or add strength to the blow that is levelled

at himself?

That the right honourable gentleman is the only disposer of honours, has

never yet appeared; it is not pretended, my lords, that he distributes

them without the consent of his majesty, nor even that his

recommendation is absolutely necessary to the success of any man's

applications. If he has gained more of his majesty's confidence and

esteem than any other of his servants, he has done only what every man

endeavours, and what, therefore, is not to be imputed to him as a crime.

It is impossible, my lords, that kings, like other men, should not have

particular motions of inclination or dislike; it is possible that they

may fix their affection upon objects not in the highest degree worthy of

their regard, and overlook others that may boast of greater excellencies

and more shining merit; but this is not to be supposed without proof,

and the regard of the king, as of any other man, is one argument of

desert more than he can produce, who has endeavoured after it without

effect.

This imputed usurpation must be proved upon him either by his own

confession, or by the evidence of others; and it has not been yet

pretended that he assumes the title of _prime minister_, or indeed, that

it is applied to him by any but his enemies; and it may easily be

conceived how weakly the most uncorrupted innocence would be supported,

if all the aspersions of its enemies were to be received as proofs

against it.

Nor does it appear, my lords, that any other evidence can be brought

against him on this head, or that any man will stand forth and affirm

that either he has been injured himself by this gentleman, or known any

injury done by him to another by the exertion of authority with which he

was not lawfully invested; such evidence, my lords, the laws of our

country require to be produced before any man can be punished, censured,

or disgraced. No man is obliged to prove his innocence, but may call

upon his prosecutors to support their accusation; and why this

honourable gentleman, whatever may have been his conduct, should be

treated in a different manner than any other criminal, I am by no means

able to discover.

Though there has been no evidence offered of his guilt, your lordships

have heard an attestation of his innocence, from the noble duke who

spoke first against the motion, of whom it cannot be suspected that he

would, voluntarily, engage to answer for measures which he pursued in

blind compliance with the direction of another. The same testimony, my

lords, can I produce, and affirm with equal truth, that in the

administration of my province, I am independent, and left entirely to

the decisions of my own judgment.

In every government, my lords, as in every family, some, either by

accident or a natural industry, or a superiour capacity, or some other

cause, will be engaged in more business, and treated with more

confidence than others; but if every man is willing to answer for the

conduct of his own province, there is all the security against

corruption that can possibly be obtained; for if every man's regard to

his own safety and reputation will prevent him from betraying his trust,

or abusing his power, much more will it incite him to prevent any

misconduct in another for which he must himself be accountable. Men are,

usually, sufficiently tenacious of power, and ready to vindicate their

separate rights, when nothing but their pride is affected by the

usurpation, but surely no man will patiently suffer his province to be

invaded when he may himself be ruined by the conduct of the invader.

Thus, my lords, it appears to me to be not only without proof, but

without probability, and the first minister can, in my opinion, be

nothing more than a formidable illusion, which, when one man thinks he

has seen it, he shows to another, as easily frighted as himself, who

joins with him in propagating the notion, and in spreading terrour and

resentment over the nation, till at last the panick becomes general, and

what was at first only whispered by malice or prejudice in the ears of

ignorance or credulity, is adopted by common fame, and echoed back from

the people to the senate.

I have hitherto, my lords, confined myself to the consideration of one

single article of this complicated charge, because it appears to me to

be the only part of it necessary to be examined; for if once it be

acknowledged that the affairs of the nation are transacted not by the

minister but the administration, by the council in which every man that

sits there has an equal voice and equal authority, the blame or praise

of all the measures must be transferred from him to the council, and

every man that has advised or concurred in them, will deserve the same

censure or the same applause; as it is unjust to punish one man for the

crimes of another, it is unjust to choose one man out for punishment

from among many others equally guilty.

But I doubt not, my lords, when all those measures are equitably

considered, there will be no punishment to be dreaded, because neither

negligence nor treachery will be discovered. For, my lords, with regard

to the treaty of Vienna, let us suppose our ministers deceived by

ignorant or corrupt intelligence, let us admit that they were cautious

where there was no danger, and neglected some opportunities, which, if

they had received better information, they might have improved to the

advantage and security of the nation. What have they done, even under

all these disadvantageous suppositions, but followed the lights which

they judged most clear, and by which they hoped to be conducted to

honour and to safety?

Policy, my lords, is very different from prescience; the utmost that can

be attained is probability, and that, for the most part, in a low

degree. It is observed, that no man is wise but as you take into

consideration the weakness of another; a maxim more eminently true of

political wisdom, which consists, very often, only in discovering

designs which could never be known but by the folly or treachery of

those to whom they are trusted. If our enemies were wise enough to keep

their own secrets, neither our ministers nor our patriots would be able

to know or prevent their designs, nor would it be any reproach to their

sagacity, that they did not know what nobody would tell them.

If therefore, my lords, the princes, whose interest is contrary to our

own, have been at any time served by honest and wise men, there was a

time when our ministers could act only by conjecture, and might be

mistaken without a crime.

If it was always in our power to penetrate into the intentions of our

enemies, they must necessarily have the same means of making themselves

acquainted with our projects, and yet when any of them are discovered we

think it just to impute it to the negligence of the minister.

Thus, my lords, every man is inclined to judge with prejudice and

partiality. When we suffer by the prudence of our enemies, we charge our

ministers with want of vigilance, without considering, that very often

nothing is necessary to elude the most penetrating sagacity, but

obstinate silence.

If we inquire into the transactions of past times, shall we find any

man, however renowned for his abilities, not sometimes imposed upon by

falsehoods, and sometimes betrayed by his own reasonings into measures

destructive of the purposes which he endeavoured to promote? There is no

man of whose penetration higher ideas have been justly formed, or who

gave more frequent proofs of an uncommon penetration into futurity than

Cromwell; and yet succeeding times have sufficiently discovered the

weakness of aggrandizing France by depressing Spain, and we wonder now

how so much policy could fall into so gross an errour, as not rather to

suffer power to remain in the distant enemy, than transfer it to another

equally divided from us by interest, and far more formidable by the

situation of his dominions.

Cromwell, my lords, suffered himself to be hurried away by the near

prospect of present advantages, and the apprehension of present dangers;

and every other man has been, in the same manner, sometimes deluded into

a preference of a smaller present advantage, to a greater which was more

remote.

Let it not be urged, my lords, that politicks are advanced since the

time of Cromwell, and that errours which might then be committed by the

wisest administration, are now gross and reproachful; we are to remember

that every part of policy has been equally improved, and that if more

methods of discovery have been struck out, there have been likewise more

arts invented of eluding it.

When, therefore, we inquire into the conduct, or examine the abilities

of a minister, we are not to expect that he should appear never to have

been deceived, but that he should never be found to have neglected any

proper means of information, nor ever to have willingly given up the

interest of his country; but we are not to impute to his weakness what

is only to be ascribed to the wisdom of those whom he opposed.

If this plea, my lords, is reasonable, it will be necessary for those

who support the motion, to prove, not only that the treaty of Vienna was

never made, but that the falsehood of the report either was or might

have been known by our ministers; otherwise, those who are inclined to

retain a favourable opinion of their integrity and abilities, may

conclude, that they were either not mistaken, or were led into errour by

such delusions as would no less easily have imposed on their accusers,

and that by exalting their enemies to their stations, they shall not

much consult the advantage of their country.

This motion, therefore, my lords, founded upon no acknowledged, no

indisputable facts, nor supported by legal evidence; this motion, which,

by appealing to common fame, as the ultimate judge of every man's

actions, may bring every man's life, or fortune, into danger; this

motion, which condemns without hearing, and decides without examining, I

cannot but reject, and hope your lordships will concur with me.

Lord CARLISLE spoke next, to the following purport:--My lords, the state

of the question before us has, in my opinion, not been rightly

apprehended by the noble lord who spoke last, nor is the innocence or

guilt of the minister the chief question before us, because a minister

may possibly mean well, and yet be, in some particular circumstances,

unqualified for his station.

He may not only want the degree of knowledge and ability requisite to

make his good intentions effectual, but, my lords, however skilful,

sagacious, or diligent, he may be so unfortunate, in some parts of his

conduct, as to want the esteem and confidence of the people.

That a very able and honest minister may be misinformed by his

intelligence, disappointed by his agents, or baffled by other men of

equal capacity and integrity with himself, cannot be controverted; but

it must surely be owned likewise, that when this has happened so often,

and in cases of such importance, as to deprive him entirely of the

regard and affection of the people; when he is reduced to intrench

himself behind his privileges, to employ all the influence of the crown

for his own security, and make it his daily endeavour to create new

dependencies, he ought to be pitied and discarded.

That this is the state of the minister whose removal is desired by the

motion, cannot be denied; the exaltation of his adherents to places and

preferments, the noble lord has been so far from questioning, that he

has endeavoured to justify it, and has in plain terms inquired, who

would have acted otherwise?

Every man, my lords, would have acted otherwise, whose character had not

been blasted by general detestation; every man would have acted

otherwise, who preferred the publick good to his own continuance in

power; and every man has acted otherwise who has distinguished himself

as a friend to the publick.

It is the interest of the nation, my lords, that every office should be

filled by that man who is most capable of discharging it, whatever may

be his sentiments with regard to the minister; and that his attention

should be confined to his employment, rather than distracted by various

concerns and opposite relations. It is, therefore, an injury to the

publick, to thrust a skilful commissioner into the senate, or to

embarrass an industrious senator with a post or commission.

Yet, my lords, that multitudes have obtained places, who have no

acquaintance with the duties of their offices, nor any other pretensions

to them, than that they have seats in the other house, and that by

distinguishing himself in that assembly, any man may most easily obtain

the preferments of the crown, is too obvious for controversy.

This practice, my lords, is a sufficient foundation for the motion; a

practice so injurious to the nation, so long continued, and so openly

avowed, requires to be vigorously opposed, lest it should become

established by long custom, and entangle itself with our constitution.

If the minister, my lords, has made it necessary to employ none but his

adherents and blind followers, this necessity is alone a sufficient

proof how little he confides in his own prudence or integrity, how

apprehensive he is of the censure of the senate, and how desirous of

continuing his authority, by avoiding it. And, surely, my lords, it is

our duty, as well as our right, to address the throne, that a minister

should be removed who fears the people, since few men fear without

hating, and nothing so much contributes to make any man an enemy to his

country, as the consciousness that he is universally abhorred.

But, my lords, if this is done by him without necessity, if the general

preference of his friends is only the consequence of mistaken judgment,

or corrupt gratitude, this address is equally necessary, because the

effects are equally pernicious.

When a minister, suspected of ill intentions, is continued in

employment, discontent must naturally spread over the nation; and if the

end of government be the happiness of the people; if suspicion and

jealousy be contrary to a state of happiness; and if this suspicion

which generally prevails, this discontent which fills the whole nation,

can only be appeased by the removal of the minister; prudence, justice,

and the examples of our ancestors, ought to influence us to endeavour

that the affairs of the nation may be transferred to such whose greater

integrity or wisdom has recommended them to the affection of the people.

In this motion, therefore, we need not be supposed to imply that the

minister is either ignorant or corrupt, but that he is disliked by the

people, disliked to such a degree, my lords, that it is not safe for his

majesty to employ him.

It is, doubtless, our duty, my lords, to guard both the rights of the

people, and the prerogatives of the throne, and with equal ardour to

remonstrate to his majesty the distresses of his subjects, and his own

danger. We are to hold the balance of the constitution, and neither to

suffer the regal power to be overborne by a torrent of popular fury, nor

the people to be oppressed by an illegal exertion of authority, or the

more insupportable hardships of unreasonable laws.

By this motion, my lords, the happiness of the people, and the security

of his majesty, are at once consulted, nor can we suppress so general a

clamour without failing equally in our duty to both.

To what, my lords, is the untimely end of so many kings and emperours to

be imputed, but to the cowardice or treachery of their counsellors, of

those to whom they trusted that intercourse, which is always to be

preserved between a monarch and his people? Were kings honestly informed

of the opinions and dispositions of their subjects, they would never,

or, at least rarely, persist in such measures, as, by exasperating the

people, tend necessarily to endanger themselves.

It is the happiness of a British monarch, that he has a standing and

hereditary council, composed of men who do not owe their advancement to

the smiles of caprice, or the intrigues of a court; who are, therefore,

neither under the influence of a false gratitude, nor of a servile

dependence, and who may convey to the throne the sentiments of the

people, without danger, and without fear. But, my lords, if we are

either too negligent, or too timorous to do our duty, how is the

condition of our sovereign more safe, or more happy than that of an

emperour of Turkey, who is often ignorant of any complaints made against

the administration, till he hears the people thundering at the gates of

his palace.

Let us, therefore, my lords, whatever may be our opinion of the conduct

of the minister, inform his majesty of the discontent of his subjects,

since, whether it is just or not, the danger is the same, and whenever

any danger threatens the king, we ought either to enable him to oppose,

or caution him to avoid it.

Lord CHOLMONDELEY spoke next, to the following effect:--My lords, I

cannot but observe in this debate an ambition of popularity, in my

opinion not very consistent with the freedom of debate, and the dignity

of this assembly, which ought to be influenced by no other motive than

the force of reason and truth.

It has been a common method of eluding the efficacy of arguments, to

charge the opponent with blind adherence to interest, or corrupt

compliance with the directions of a court; nor has it been less frequent

to prevent inquiries into publick measures, by representing them as the

clamours of faction, the murmurs of disobedience, and the prelude to

rebellion.

So necessary, my lords, has it been always thought to be uninfluenced in

our examinations by dependence or interest, that the most irrefragable

reasons have lost the power of conviction, by the condition and

characters of those by whom they were produced; and so much is it

expected from innocence and justice to despise all foreign assistance,

and to stand the test of inquiry without asking the support of power,

that every man has been concluded guilty that has fled for shelter to

the throne.

And surely, my lords, if that man's suffrage is of little weight, who

appears determined to subscribe to the dictates of a minister, no

greater credit can be assigned to another, who professes himself only

the echo of the clamours of the populace. If it be a proof of a weak

cause, and consciousness of misconduct, to apply to the crown for

security and protection, it may be accounted an acknowledgment of the

insufficiency of arguments, when the people is called in to second them,

and they are only to expect success from the violence of multitudes.

That all government is instituted for the happiness of the people, that

their interest ought to be the chief care of the legislature, that their

complaints ought patiently to be heard, and their grievances speedily

redressed, are truths well known, generally acknowledged, and, I hope,

always predominant in the mind of every lord in this assembly. But, that

the people cannot err, that the voice of fame is to be regarded as an

oracle, and every murmur of discontent to be pacified by a change of

measures, I have never before heard, or heard it only to disregard it.

True tenderness for the people, my lords, is to consult their advantage,

to protect their liberty, and to preserve their virtue; and perhaps

examples may be found sufficient to inform us that all these effects are

often to be produced by means not generally agreeable to the publick.

It is possible, my lords, for a very small part of the people to form

just ideas of the motives of transactions and the tendency of laws. All

negotiations with foreign powers are necessarily complicated with many

different interests, and varied by innumerable circumstances, influenced

by sudden exigencies, and defeated by unavoidable accidents. Laws have

respect to remote consequences, and involve a multitude of relations

which it requires long study to discover. And how difficult it is to

judge of political conduct, or legislative proceedings, may be easily

discovered by observing how often the most skilful statesmen are

mistaken, and how frequently the laws require to be amended.

If then, my lords, the people judge for themselves on these subjects,

they must necessarily determine without knowledge of the questions, and

their decisions are then of small authority. If they receive,

implicitly, the dictates of others, and blindly adopt the opinions of

those who have gained their favour and esteem, their applauses and

complaints are, with respect to themselves, empty sounds, which they

utter as the organs of their leaders. Nor are the desires of the people

gratified when their petitions are granted; nor their grievances

overlooked when their murmurs are neglected.

As it is no reproach to the people that they cannot be the proper judges

of the conduct of the government, so neither are they to be censured

when they complain of injuries not real, and tremble at the apprehension

of severities unintended. Unjust complaints, my lords, and unreasonable

apprehensions, are to be imputed to those who court their regard only to

deceive them, and exalt themselves to reputation by rescuing them from

grievances that were never felt, and averting dangers that were never

near.

He only who makes the happiness of the people his endeavour, loves them

with a true affection and a rational tenderness, and he certainly

consults their happiness who contributes to still all groundless

clamours, and appease all useless apprehensions, who employs his care,

not only to preserve their quiet and their liberty, but to secure them

from the fear of losing it, who not only promotes the means of

happiness, but enables them to enjoy it.

Thus, it appears, my lords, that it is possible to be a friend, at the

same time, to the people and the administration, and that no man can

more deserve their confidence and applause, than he that dissipates

their unreasonable terrours, and contributes to reconcile them to a good

government.

That most of the clamours against the present government arise from

calumnies and misrepresentations, is apparent from the sanction of the

senate, which has been given to all the measures that are charged as

crimes upon the administration.

That the army is supported by the consent of the senate, that the senate

has approved the convention, and that our taxes are all imposed and

continued by the senate, cannot be denied. What then is demanded by

those that censure the conduct of publick affairs, but that their

opinion should be considered as an overbalance to the wisdom of the

senate, that no man should be allowed to speak but as they dictate, nor

to vote but as they shall influence them by their rhetorick or example?

To repeat the particular topicks of accusation, and recapitulate the

arguments which have been produced to confute it, would be a tedious and

unnecessary labour; unnecessary, because it is well known that they once

had the power of convincing this house, and that nothing has since

happened to lessen their force, and because many of them now have been

already repeated by the noble lords that have opposed the motion.

To search far backward for past errors, and to take advantage of later

discoveries in censuring the conduct of any minister, is in a high

degree disingenuous and cruel; it is an art which may be easily

practised, of perplexing any question, by connecting distant facts, and

entangling one period of time with another.

The only candid method of inquiry is to recur back to the state of

affairs, as it then appeared, to consider what was openly declared, and

what was kept impenetrably secret, what was discoverable by human

sagacity, and what was beyond the reach of the most piercing politician.

With regard to the Hanover treaty, it is not, my lords, requisite that

we should engage ourselves in a very minute examination; for it was not

only not transacted by the right honourable gentleman whose behaviour is

the subject of this debate, but cannot be proved to have been known by

him till it was formally ratified. If he afterwards approved it either

in the council or the senate, he cannot justly, how destructive or

ridiculous soever that treaty may be thought, be charged with more than

his share of the guilt, the bare guilt of a single vote.

But there is one accusation yet more malicious, an accusation not only

of crimes which this gentleman did not commit, but which have not yet

been committed, an accusation formed by prying into futurity, and

exaggerating misfortunes which are yet to come, and which may probably

be prevented. Well may any man, my lords, think himself in danger, when

he hears himself charged not with high crimes and misdemeanours, not

with accumulative treason, but with misconduct of publick affairs, past,

present, and future.

The only charge against this gentleman, which seems to relate more to

him than to any other man engaged in the administration, is the

continuance of the harbour of Dunkirk, which, says the noble duke, he

must be acquainted with as commissioner of the treasury; but if the

title of first commissioner be denied, if his authority be but the same

with that of his associates, whence comes it, my lords, that he is more

particularly accused than they? Why is his guilt supposed greater if his

power is only equal?

But, my lords, I believe it will appear, that no guilt has been

contracted on this account, and that Dunkirk was always intended, even

by those that demanded the demolition of it, to continue a harbour for

small trading vessels, and that if larger ever arrived from thence, they

lay at a distance from the shore, and were loaded by small vessels from

the town.

With regard to other affairs, my lords, they were all transacted by the

council, not by his direction, but with his concurrence; and how it is

consistent with justice to single him out for censure, I must desire the

noble lords to show who approve the motion.

If the people, my lords, have been, by misrepresentations industriously

propagated, exasperated against him, if the general voice of the nation

condemns him, we ought more cautiously to examine his conduct, lest we

should add strength to prejudice too powerful already, and instead of

reforming the errours, and regulating the heat of the people, inflame

their discontent and propagate sedition.

The utmost claim of the people is to be admitted as accusers, and

sometimes as evidence, but they have no right to sit as judges, and to

make us the executioners of their sentence; and as this gentleman has

yet been only condemned by those who have not the opportunities of

examining his conduct, nor the right of judging him, I cannot agree to

give him up to punishment.

Lord HALIFAX spoke next, in substance as follows:--My lords, though I do

not conceive the people infallible, yet I believe that in questions like

this they are seldom in the wrong, for this is a question not of

argument but of fact; of fact discoverable, not by long deductions and

accurate ratiocinations, but by the common powers of seeing and feeling.

That it is difficult to know the motives of negotiations, and the

effects of laws, and that it requires long study and intense meditation

to discover remote consequences, is indubitably true. And, with regard

to the people in general, it cannot be denied, that neither their

education qualifies them, nor their employments allow them to be much

versed in such inquiries.

But, my lords, to refer effects to their proper causes, and to observe,

when consequences break forth, from whence they proceed, is no such

arduous task. The people of the lowest class may easily feel that they

are more miserable this year than the last, and may inquire and discover

the reason of the aggravation of their misery; they may know that the

army is increased, or our trade diminished; that the taxes are heavier,

and penal laws become more grievous.

Nor is it less easy for them to discover that these calamities are not

brought upon them by the immediate hand of heaven, or the irresistible

force of natural causes; that their towns are not ruined by an invasion,

nor their trade confined by a pestilence; they may then easily collect,

that they are only unhappy by the misconduct of their governours; they

may assign their infelicity to that cause, as the only remaining cause

that is adequate to the effect.

If it be granted, my lords, that they may be mistaken in their

reasoning, it must be owned, that they are not mistaken without

probabilities on their side: it is probable that the ministry must

injure the publick interest when it decays without any other visible

cause; it is still more probable, when it appears that among those whose

station enables them to enter into national inquiries, every man imputes

his calamities to the minister, who is not visibly dependent on his

favour. It becomes more probable, yet, when it appears that it is the

great business of the minister to multiply dependencies, to list

accomplices, and to corrupt his judges.

At least, my lords, if it be granted, which, surely, cannot be denied,

that the people may be sensible of their own miseries, it is their part

to declare their sufferings, and to apply to this house for relief, and

it is our business to discover the authors of them, and bring them to

punishment.

That the people are very loud and importunate in their complaints, is

daily evident; nor is it less apparent, that their complaints are just;

if, therefore, their miseries must have an author, let the defenders of

this gentleman point out the man whom they may more properly accuse.

But, my lords, nothing is more evident, than that the crimes and the

criminal are equally known, that there is one man predominant in his

majesty's councils, and that it has long been the practice of that man

at once to oppress and ridicule the people, to plunder them, and set

them at defiance.

Nothing is more known than that this man pretends to a superiour

knowledge, and exerts a superiour power in the management of the publick

revenues, and that they have been so ill managed for many years, that

the expenses of peace have been almost equal to those of a most vigorous

and extensive war.

Nothing is more probable, than that most of the foreign negotiations are

conducted by his direction, nor more certain, than that they have

generally tended only to make us contemptible.

That the excise was projected in his own head, that it was recommended

by him upon his own conviction, and pressed upon the legislature by his

influence, cannot be questioned; and if this were his only crime, if

this were the only scheme of oppression that ever he planned out, it is

such a declaration of war upon the publick liberty, such an attack of

our natural and constitutional rights, as was never, perhaps, pardoned

by any nation.

Nor is it less notorious, that the late infamous convention was

transacted by one of his own dependents, that he palliated or concealed

the losses of our merchants, that he opposed the declaration of war, and

has since obstructed its operations.

On this occasion, my lords, it may be useful to remark the apparent

partiality of this gentleman's vindicators, who declare, that measures

are not to be censured as imprudent, only because they are unsuccessful,

and yet when other instances of his conduct fall under our examination,

think it a sufficient defence to exclaim against the unreasonableness of

judging before the event.

To deny that, in the conduct both of civil and military affairs, he has

obtained, I know not by what means, an authority superiour to that of

any other man, an authority irresistible, uncontroulable, and regal, is

to oppose not only common fame, but daily experience. If as commissioner

of the treasury he has no more power than any of his associates, whence

is it, that to oppose or censure him, to doubt of his infallibility, to

suspect his integrity, or to obstruct his influence, is a crime punished

with no lighter penalty than forfeiture of employment, as appears, my

lords, from the late dismission of a gentleman, against whom nothing can

be alleged but an obstinate independence and open disregard of this

arbitrary minister.

But happy would it be, my lords, for this nation, if he endeavoured not

to extend his authority beyond the treasury or the court; if he would

content himself with tyrannising over those whose acceptance of salaries

and preferments has already subjected them to his command, without

attempting to influence elections, or to direct the members of the other

house.

How much the influence of the crown has operated upon all publick

councils since the advancement of this gentleman, how zealously it has

been supported, and how industriously extended, is unnecessary to

explain, since what is seen or felt by almost every man in the kingdom

cannot reasonably be supposed unknown to your lordships.

Nothing can be more contrary to the true notion of the British

constitution, than to imagine, that by such measures his majesty's real

interest is advanced. The true interest, my lords, of every monarch, is

to please the people, and the only way of pleasing Britons, is to

preserve their liberties, their reputation, and their commerce. Every

attempt to extend the power of the crown beyond the limits prescribed by

our laws, must in effect make it weaker, by diverting the only source of

its strength, the affection of his subjects.

It is, therefore, my opinion, my lords, that we ought to agree to this

motion, as a standing memorial not only of our regard for the nation,

but of our adherence to our sovereign; that his councils may be no

longer influenced by that man whose pernicious advice, and unjustifiable

conduct, has added new hopes and new strength to his enemies,

impoverished and exasperated his subjects, inflamed the discontent of

the seditious, and almost alienated the affection of the loyal.

The bishop of SALISBURY spoke next, to the following purport:--My lords,

after all the exaggerations of the errours, and all the representations

of the malconduct of the right honourable gentleman; after the most

affecting rhetorick, and the most acute inquiries, nothing has appeared

of weight sufficient to prevail with me to agree to the present motion;

a motion, if not of an unprecedented, yet of a very extraordinary kind,

which may extend in its consequences to futurity, and be, perhaps, more

dangerous to innocence than guilt.

I cannot yet discover any proof sufficient to convict him of having

usurped the authority of _first_ minister, or any other power than that

accidental influence which every man has, whose address or services have

procured him the favour of his sovereign.

The usurpation, my lords, of regal power must be made evident by

somewhat more than general assertions, must appear from some publick act

like that of one of the prelates left regent of the kingdom by Richard

the first, who, as soon as the king was gone too far to return, in the

first elevations of his heart, began his new authority by imprisoning

his colleague.

To charge this gentleman with the dismission of any of his colleagues,

can, after the strongest aggravations, rise no higher than to an

accusation of having advised his majesty to dismiss him, and even that,

my lords, stands, at present, unsupported by evidence; nor could it,

however uncontestably proved, discover either wickedness or weakness, or

show any other authority than every man would exercise, if he were able

to attain it.

If he had discharged this gentleman by his own authority, if he had

transacted singly any great affair to the disadvantage of the publick,

if he had imposed either upon the king or the senate by false

representations, if he had set the laws at defiance, and openly trampled

on our constitution, and if by these practices he had exalted himself

above the reach of a legal prosecution, it had been worthy of the

dignity of this house, to have overleaped the common boundaries of

custom, to have neglected the standing rules of procedure, and to have

brought so contemptuous and powerful an offender to a level with the

rest of his fellow-subjects by expeditious and vigorous methods, to have

repressed his arrogance, broken his power, and overwhelmed him at once

by the resistless weight of an unanimous censure.

But, my lords, we have in the present case no provocations from crimes

either openly avowed, or evidently proved; and certainly no incitement

from necessity to exert the power of the house in any extraordinary

method of prosecution. We may punish whenever we can convict, and

convict whenever we can obtain evidence; let us not, therefore, condemn

any man unheard, nor punish any man uncondemned.

The duke of BEDFORD spoke next, in substance as follows:--My lords, it

is easy to charge the most blameless and gentle procedure with injustice

and severity, but it is not easy to support such an accusation without

confounding measures widely different, and disguising the nature of

things with fallacious misrepresentations.

Nothing is more evident than that neither condemnation nor punishment is

intended by the motion before us, which is only to remove from power a

man who has no other claim to it than the will of his master, and who,

as he had not been injured by never obtaining it, cannot justly complain

that it is taken from him.

The motion, my lords, is so far from inflicting punishment, that it

confers rewards, it leaves him in the possession of immense wealth,

however accumulated, and enables him to leave that office in security,

from which most of his predecessors have been precipitated by national

resentment, or senatorial prosecution.

There is no censure, my lords, made of his conduct, no charge of

weakness, or suspicion of dishonesty, nor can any thing be equitably

inferred from it, than that in the opinion of this house his majesty may

probably be served by some other person, more to the satisfaction of the

British nation.

Though it is not just to punish any man without examination, or to

censure his conduct merely because it has been unpleasing or

unsuccessful; though it is not reasonable that any man should forfeit

what he possesses in his own right, without a crime, yet it is just to

withdraw favours only to confer them on another more deserving; it is

just in any man to withhold his own, only to preserve his right, or

obviate an injurious prescription, and it is, therefore, just to advise

such a conduct whenever it appears necessary to those who have the right

of offering advice.

To advise his majesty, my lords, is not only our right but our duty; we

are not only justifiable in practising, but criminal in neglecting it.

That we should declare our apprehensions of any impending danger, and

our disapprobation of publick misconduct, is expected both by our

sovereign and the people, and let us not, by omitting such warnings,

lull the nation and our sovereign into a dangerous security, and, from

tenderness to one man, prolong or increase the miseries of our country,

and endanger or destroy the honour of our sovereign.

Lord HERVEY spoke next, in effect as follows:--My lords, this is surely

a day destined by the noble lords who defend the motion, for the support

of paradoxical assertions, for the exercise of their penetration, and

ostentation of their rhetorick; they have attempted to maintain the

certainty of common fame in opposition to daily observation; the

existence of a sole minister in contradiction to the strongest evidence;

and having by these gradations arrived at the highest degree of

controversial temerity, are endeavouring to make it appear that the

publick censure of the house of lords is no punishment.

If we take the liberty, my lords, of using known words in a new sense,

in a meaning reserved to ourselves only, it will, indeed, be difficult

to confute, as it will be impossible to understand us; but if punishment

be now to be understood as implying the same idea which has hitherto

been conveyed by it, it will not be easy to show that a man thus

publickly censured is not severely punished, and, if his crimes are not

clearly proved, punished in opposition to law, to reason, and to

justice.

It has been hitherto imagined, my lords, that no punishment is heavier

than that of infamy; and shame has, by generous minds, been avoided at

the hazard of every other misery. That such a censure as is proposed by

the motion, must irreparably destroy the reputation of the person

against whom it is directed, that it must confirm the reports of his

enemies, impair the esteem of his friends, mark him out to all Europe as

unworthy of his sovereign's favour, and represent him to latest

posterity as an enemy to his country, is indisputably certain.

These, my lords, are the evident consequences of the address moved for

by the noble lord; and, if such consequences are not penal, it will be

no longer in our power to enforce our laws by sanctions of terrour.

To condemn a man unheard, is an open and flagrant violation of the first

law of justice, but it is still a wider deviation from it to punish a

man unaccused; no crime has been charged upon this gentleman

proportioned to the penalty proposed by the motion, and the charge that

has been produced is destitute of proof.

Let us, therefore, my lords, reverence the great laws of reason and

justice, let us preserve our high character and prerogative of judges,

without descending to the low province of accusers and executioners; let

us so far regard our reputation, our liberty, and our posterity, as to

reject the motion.

[Several other lords spoke in this debate, which lasted eleven hours; at

length the question was put, and, on a division, carried in the

negative. Content, 59. Not content, 108.]

After the determination of the foregoing question, the duke of

MARLBOROUGH rose up, and spoke as follows:--My lords, though your

patience must undoubtedly be wearied by the unusual length of this day's

debate, a debate protracted, in my opinion, not by the difficulty of the

question, but by the obstinacy of prejudice, the ardour of passion, and

the desire of victory; yet, I doubt not but the regard which this

assembly has always paid to the safety and happiness of the state, will

incline you to support the fatigue of attention a little longer, and to

hear with your usual impartiality another motion.

The proposition which I am about to lay down, my lords, is not such as

can admit of controversy; it is such a standing principle as was always

acknowledged, even by those who have deviated from it. Such a known

truth as never was denied, though it appears sometimes to have been

forgotten.

But, my lords, as it never can be forgotten, without injury to

particular persons, and danger to the state in general, it cannot be too

frequently recollected, or too firmly established; it ought not only to

be tacitly admitted, but publickly declared, since no man's fortune,

liberty, or life, can be safe, where his judges shall think themselves

at liberty to act upon any other principle. I therefore move, "That any

attempt to inflict any kind of punishment on any person without allowing

him an opportunity to make his defence, or without any proof of any

crime or misdemeanour committed by him, is contrary to natural justice,

the fundamental laws of this realm, and the ancient established usage of

the senate, and is a high infringement of the liberties of the subject."

He was seconded by the duke of DEVONSHIRE:--My lords, though the motion

made by the noble duke is of such a kind, that no opposition can be

expected or feared, yet I rise up to second it, lest it should be

imagined that what cannot be rejected is yet unwillingly admitted.

That where this maxim is not allowed and adhered to, rights and

liberties are empty sounds, is uncontestably evident; if this principle

be forsaken, guilt and innocence are equally secure, all caution is

vain, and all testimony useless. Caprice will, in our courts, supply the

place of reason, and all evidence must give way to malice, or to favour.

I hope, therefore, my lords, that your regard to justice, to truth, and

to your own safety, will influence you to confirm this great and

self-evident principle by a standing resolution, that may not only

restrain oppression in the present age, but direct the judiciary

proceedings of our successors.

Lord LOVEL rose next, and spoke as follows:--My lords, liberty and

justice must always support each other, they can never long flourish

apart; every temporary expedient that can be contrived to preserve or

enlarge liberty by means arbitrary and oppressive, forms a precedent

which may, in time, be made use of to violate or destroy it. Liberty is

in effect suspended whenever injustice is practised; for what is

liberty, my lords, but the power of doing right without fear, without

control, and without danger.

But, my lords, if any man may be condemned unheard, if judgment may

precede evidence, what safety or what confidence can integrity afford?

It is in vain that any man means well, and acts prudently; it is even in

vain that he can prove the justice and prudence of his conduct.

By liberty, my lords, can never be meant the privilege of doing wrong

without being accountable, because liberty is always spoken of as

happiness, or one of the means to happiness, and happiness and virtue

cannot be separated. The great use of liberty must, therefore, be to

preserve justice from violation; justice, the great publick virtue, by

which a kind of equality is diffused over the whole society, by which

wealth is restrained from oppression, and inferiority preserved from

servitude.

Liberty, general liberty, must imply general justice; for wherever any

part of a state can be unjust with impunity, the rest are slaves. That

to condemn any man unheard is oppressive and unjust, is beyond

controversy demonstrable, and that no such power is claimed by your

lordships will, I hope, appear from your resolutions.

Lord GOWER spoke next:--My lords, to the principle laid down by those

noble lords, I have no objection, and concur with them in hoping that

all our proceedings will contribute to establish it; but why it should

be confirmed by a formal resolution, why the house should solemnly

declare their assent to a maxim which it would be madness to deny, it is

beyond my penetration to discover.

Though the noble lord's position cannot be controverted, yet his motion,

if it is designed to imply any censure of the proceedings of this day,

may reasonably be rejected, and that some censure is intended we may

conjecture, because no other reason can be given why it was not made at

some other time.

Lord HALIFAX then rose:--My lords, that a censure is intended, will, I

suppose, not be denied, and that such a censure is unjust must doubtless

be the opinion of all those who are supposed to have incurred it, and it

will, therefore, not be wondered that the motion is opposed by them, as

indecent and calumnious: late as it is, my lords, I will not, for my

part, suffer such an indignity without opposition, and shall think my

conscience and my honour require, that I should not be overborne by

perseverance or by numbers, but that I should, if I cannot convince the

noble lords by argument, of the impropriety of the motion, record my

reasons against it, which may, perhaps, be more candidly received by

posterity.

Lord TALBOT spoke to this effect:--My lords, it is not without

indignation that I hear a motion so injurious to my own honour, and to

that of the noble lords who have concurred with me in the last debate,

nor without contempt that I observed the motion confounded with the

positions contained in it; the low subtilty of such conduct is no less

to be despised than the malice to be abhorred.

Fifty-nine lords are here branded as strangers, or enemies to the first

principle of judicial equity, for doing what will entitle them to the

general applause of every man in the kingdom that has the full

possession of his understanding, or the free use of his senses; of every

man that can distinguish truth, or feel oppression.

They have endeavoured to rescue their country from the rapine of

pensioners and the tyranny of an army, from perpetual taxes, and useless

expenses; they have attempted to expose the errours of arrogant

ignorance, and to depress the power of greatness, founded on corruption,

and swelling beyond legal restraints.

That for such attempts they are vilified and reproached, is not to be

observed without indignation and astonishment; astonishment which

nothing could abate but the recollection of the situation of those lords

who have united to promote so unjust a censure.

Let us, my lords, consider the circumstances of the three noble lords by

whom this motion has been made and supported, let us take a view of

their conduct, and consider the visible motives to which it may be

ascribed, their places, their dependence--

Lord CHOLMONDELEY spoke next, in substance as follows:--My lords, I rise

thus abruptly to preserve that order and decency which is essential to

publick councils, and particularly suitable to the dignity of this

assembly, which can only become a scene of tumult and confusion by such

methods of debate, and lose that respect which it has hitherto

preserved, not only by the justice of its determinations, but by the

solemn grandeur of its procedure.

The motion, my lords, is allowed to contain nothing but what every man

avows in speculation, and observes, or ought to observe, in publick

transactions, and yet those that offer and support it are represented as

abettors of oppression, and instruments of tyranny.

It is surely wonderful, my lords, that those who are solicitous for the

preservation of their own honour, and so diligent to obviate the most

remote reflection that may glance upon it, should not remember, that the

same delicacy may raise in others the same resentment, when their

reputation is openly attacked; and that while they are asserting the

right of the minority to an exemption from censure, they shall not allow

the greater number at least an equal claim to the same privilege.

Lord TALBOT then resumed:--My lords, whether any thing has escaped from

me that deserves such severe animadversions, your lordships must decide.

For what I might intend to say, since by the interruption of that noble

lord I was hindered from proceeding, I hope I shall not be accountable.

Not that I acknowledge myself to have asserted any thing either contrary

to law, or to the privileges of the house, or inconsistent with the

character of an independent lord, a character which I shall always

endeavour to preserve, and which I will not forfeit for the smiles of a

court, the dignity of high employment, or the affluence of a pension.

Nor, my lords, whenever the necessities of my country require that I

should speak my sentiments with freedom, will I be awed into silence and

submission, but will set any power at defiance that shall dare to

restrain me.

I pretend not, my lords, to be always in the right, I claim no other

merit than that of meaning well; and when I am convinced, after proper

examination, that I am engaged on the side of truth, I will trample on

that insolence that shall command me to suppress my sentiments.

When I reflect, my lords, on the distresses of my country, when I

observe the security and arrogance of those whom I consider as the

authors of the publick miseries, I cannot always contain my resentment;

I may, perhaps, sometimes start out into unbecoming transports, and

speak in terms not very ceremonious of such abandoned, such detestable--

But as this is, perhaps, not the language of the house, I shall

endeavour to repress it, and hope that the bounds of decency have never

been so far transgressed by me that I should be exposed to the censure

of your lordships.

Lord ABINGDON next rose, and said:--My lords, the present motion is

undoubtedly just, but by no means necessary, or particularly adapted to

the present time. It contains a general principle, uncontested, and

established; a principle which this assembly has never denied, and from

which I know not that it has ever departed.

As there is, therefore, no particular necessity of confirming it by a

new resolution, and as the present time seems less proper than any

other, I cannot but declare my opinion, that to resume it at some other

time will be more prudent, than to give the lords, who think their

conduct censured, any occasion of resentment or discontent.

Lord CARTERET spoke to the following effect:--My lords, the maxim laid

down in the present motion, is in itself incontestable, and so far from

any inconsistency with the former, that as there was no reason for

making, there is, in my opinion, none for opposing it; as it may at any

time be made, it may at any time be properly passed. And I hope that our

unanimity on this occasion will show that truth, however unseasonably

advanced, will, in this house, be always received.

But, lest the noble lords who have opposed the motion, should think

their honour engaged in continuing the opposition, I take the liberty,

my lords, to move that the previous question may be put.

[Other lords spoke on each side; at last the previous question was put

by the president, who demanded, "Is it your lordships' pleasure, that

the question be now put? Those lords who are for it, say, Content:

those who are against it, say, Not content." There was, accordingly, a

cry of both; after which the president declared, "the contents have it;"

and some lords replying, "the non-contents have it," his lordship said,

"the non-contents must go below the bar:" which is the manner of

dividing the house. Those who remained being told in their seats, and

those who went out being told at coming in again, there were Content,

81; Not content, 54: so that the resolution moved for, passed without a

division.]