The several representations concerning the case of Flinders that were
made in France, the attention drawn to it in English newspapers, and the
lively interest of learned men of both nations, produced a moving effect
upon Napoleon's Government. Distinguished Frenchmen did not hesitate to
speak plainly. Fleurieu, whose voice was attentively heard on all matters
touching geography and discovery, declared publicly that "the indignities
imposed upon Captain Flinders were without example in the nautical
history of civilised nations. Malte-Brun, a savant of the first rank,
expressed himself so boldly as to incur the displeasure of the
authorities. Bougainville, himself a famous navigator, made personal
appeals to the Government. Sir Joseph Banks, whose friendly relations
with French men of science were not broken by the war, used all the
influence he could command. He had already, "from the gracious
condescension of the Emperor," obtained the release of five persons who
had been imprisoned in France,* and had no doubt that if he could get
Napoleon's ear he could bring about the liberation of his protege. (*
Banks to Flinders, Historical Records 5 646.)
At last, in March, 1806, the affair came before the Council of State in
Paris, mainly through the instrumentality of Bougainville. Banks wrote to
Mrs. Flinders:* (* Flinders' Papers.) "After many refusals on the part of
Bonaparte to applications made to him from different quarters, he at last
consented to order Captain Flinders' case to be laid before the Council
of State."
On the first of March an order was directed to be sent to Decaen,
approving his previous conduct, but informing him that, moved "by a
sentiment of generosity, the Government accord to Captain Flinders his
liberty and the restoration of his ship." Accompanying the despatch was
an extract from the minutes of the Council of State, dated March 1st,
1806, recording that: "The Council of State, which, after the return of
His Majesty the Emperor and King, has considered the report of its Marine
section on that of the Minister of Marine and the Colonies concerning the
detention of the English schooner Cumberland and of Captain Flinders at
Ile-de-France (see the documents appended to the report), is of opinion
that the Captain-General of Ile-de-France had sufficient reason for
detaining there Captain Flinders and his schooner; but by reason of the
interest that the misfortunes of Captain Flinders has inspired, he seems
to deserve that His Majesty should authorise the Minister of Marine and
the Colonies to restore to him his liberty and his ship." This document
was endorsed: "Approuve au Palais des Tuileries, le onze Mars, 1806.
NAPOLEON."
The terms of the despatch with which the order was transmitted contained
a remarkable statement. Decres informed Decaen that he, as Minister, had
on the 30th July, 1804--nearly one year and nine months before the order
of release--brought Flinders' case under the notice of the Council of
State. But nothing was done: the Emperor had to be consulted, and at that
date Napoleon was not accessible. He was superintending the army encamped
at Boulogne, preparing for that projected descent upon England which even
his magnificent audacity never dared to make. He did not return to St.
Cloud, within hail of Paris, till October 12th.* (* The movements of
Napoleon day by day can be followed in Schuerman's Itineraire General de
Napoleon.) Then the officials surrounding him were kept busy with
preparations for crowning himself and the Empress Josephine, a ceremony
performed by Pope Pius VII, at Notre Dame, on December 2nd. The
consequence was that this piece of business about an unfortunate English
captain in Ile-de-France--like nearly all other business concerned with
the same colony at the time--got covered up beneath a mass of more urgent
affairs, and remained in abeyance until the agitation stimulated by
Banks, Fleurieu, Bougainville, Malte-Brun and others forced the case
under the attention of the Emperor and his ministers.
Even then the despatch did not reach Ile-de-France till July, 1807,
sixteen months after the date upon it; and it was then transmitted, not
by a French ship, but by an English frigate, the Greyhound, under a flag
of truce. The reason for that was unfortunate for Flinders as an
individual, but entirely due to the efficiency of the navy of which he
was an officer. In 1805 the British fleet had demolished the French at
Trafalgar, and from that time forward until the end of the war, Great
Britain was mistress of the ocean in full potency. Her frigates patrolled
the highways of the sea with a vigilance that never relaxed. In January,
1806, she took possession of the Cape of Good Hope for the second time,
and has held it ever since. The consequences to Decaen and his garrison
were very serious. With the British in force at the Cape, how could
supplies, reinforcements and despatches get through to him in
Ile-de-France? He saw the danger clearly, but was powerless to avert it.
Of this particular despatch four copies were sent from France on as many
ships. One copy was borne by a French vessel which was promptly captured
by the British; and on its contents becoming known the Admiralty sent it
out to Admiral Pellew, in order that he might send a ship under a flag of
truce to take it to Decaen. The Secretary to the Admiralty, Marsden,
wrote to Pellew (December, 1806) that the despatch "has already been
transmitted to the Isle of France in triplicate, but as it may be hoped
that the vessels have been all captured you had better take an
opportunity of sending this copy by a flag of truce, provided you have
not heard in the meantime of Flinders being at liberty." As a fact, one
other copy did get through, on a French vessel.
Pellew lost no time in informing Flinders of the news, and the captive
wrote to Decaen in the following terms:* (* Decaen Papers.)
"July 24, 1807.
"General,
"By letters from Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Pellew, transmitted to me
yesterday by Colonel Monistrol, I am informed that orders relating to me
have at length arrived from His Excellency the Marine Minister of France,
which orders are supposed to authorize my being set at liberty.
"Your Excellency will doubtless be able to figure to yourself the
sensations such a communication must have excited in me, after a
detention of three years and a half, and my anxiety to have such
agreeable intelligence confirmed by some information of the steps it is
in Your Excellency's contemplation to take in consequence. If these
letters have flattered me in vain with the hopes of returning to my
country and my family, I beg of you, General, to inform me; if they are
correct, you will complete my happiness by confirming their contents. The
state of incertitude in which I have so long remained will, I trust, be
admitted as a sufficient excuse for my anxiety to be delivered from it.
"I have the honour to be, Your Excellency's most obedient humble servant,
"MATTW. FLINDERS.
"His Excellency the Captain-General Decaen."
In reply Decaen transmitted to Flinders a copy of the despatch of the
Minister of Marine, and informed him through Colonel Monistrol "that, so
soon as circumstances will permit, you will fully enjoy the favour which
has been granted you by His Majesty the Emperor and King."
But now, having at length received orders, countersigned by Napoleon
himself, that Flinders should be liberated, Decaen came to a decision
that on the face of it seems extremely perplexing. We have seen that in
August, 1805, Flinders, well informed by persons who had conversed with
Decaen, believed that the General "would be very glad to get handsomely
clear of me," and that in November of the same year he made the assertion
that Decaen "would have gladly suffered me to depart long since" but for
the reference of the case to Paris. We have direct evidence to the same
effect in a letter from Colonel Monistrol regarding Lord Wellesley's
application for Flinders' release.* (* Historical Records 5 651.) The
Colonel desired "with all my heart" that the request could be acceded to,
but the Captain-General could not comply until he had received a response
to his despatch. Yet, when the response was received, and Flinders might
have been liberated with the full approbation of the French Government,
Decaen replied to the Minister's despatch in the following terms (August
20th, 1807):
"I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that by the English frigate
Greyhound, which arrived here on July 21st under a flag of truce, in the
hope of gathering information concerning His British Majesty's ships
Blenheim and Java, I have received the fourth copy of Your Excellency's
despatch of March 21st, 1806, Number 8, relative to Captain Flinders.
Having thought that the favourable decision that it contains regarding
that officer had been determined at a time when the possibility of some
renewal of friendliness with England was perceived, I did not consider
that the present moment was favourable for putting into operation that
act of indulgence on the part of His Majesty. I have since received the
second copy of the same despatch; but, the circumstances having become
still more difficult, and that officer appearing to me to be always
dangerous, I await a more propitious time for putting into execution the
intentions of His Majesty. My zeal for his service has induced me to
suspend the operations of his command. I trust, Monsieur, that that
measure of prudence will obtain your Excellency's approbation. I have the
honour to be, etc., etc., etc., DECAEN."* (* This despatch was originally
published by M. Albert Pitot, in his Esquisses Historiques de
l'Ile-de-France. Port Louis, 1899.)
It will be observed that in this despatch Decaen describes the
circumstances of the colony he governed as having become "more
difficult," and Flinders as appearing to him to be "always dangerous." We
must, then, examine the circumstances to ascertain why they had become so
difficult, and why he considered that it would now be dangerous to let
Flinders go.
It is easy enough to attribute the General's refusal to obstinacy or
malignity. But his anger had cooled down by 1807; his prisoner was a
charge on the establishment to the extent of 5400 francs a year, and
Decaen was a thrifty administrator; why, then, should he apparently have
hardened his heart to the extent of disobeying the Emperor's command? The
explanation is not to be found in his temper, but in the military
situation of Ile-de-France, and his belief that Flinders was accurately
informed about it; as was, indeed, the case.
At this time Decaen was holding Ile-de-France by a policy fairly
describable as one of "bluff." The British could have taken it by
throwing upon it a comparatively small force, had they known how weak its
defences were. But they did not know; and Decaen, whose duty it was to
defend the place to the utmost, did not intend that they should if he
could prevent information reaching them. After the crushing of French
naval power at Trafalgar and the British occupation of the Cape, Decaen's
position became untenable, though a capitulation was not forced upon him
till four years later. He constantly demanded reinforcements and money,
which never came to hand. The military and financial resources of France
were being strained to prosecute Napoleon's wars in Europe. There were
neither men nor funds to spare for the colony in the Indian Ocean. Decaen
felt that his position was compromised.* (* "Il sentait sa position
compromise." Prentout page 521; who gives an excellent account of the
situation.) He addressed the Emperor personally "with all the sadness of
a wounded soul," but nothing was done for Ile-de-France. There was not
enough money to repair public buildings and quays, which fell into ruins.
There was no timber, no sail-cloth to re-fit ships. Even nails were
lacking. A little later (1809) he complained in despatches of the
shortness of flour and food. There was little revenue, no credit. Now
that the British had asserted their strength, and held the Cape, prizes
were few. Above all he represented "the urgent need for soldiers." He
felt himself abandoned. But still, with a resolute tenacity that one
cannot but admire, he hung on to his post, and maintained a bold front to
the enemy.
Did Flinders know of this state of things? Unquestionably he did; and
Decaen knew that he knew. He could have informed the British Government,
had he chosen to violate his parole; but he was in all things a
scrupulously honourable man, and, as he said, "an absolute silence was
maintained in my letters." He was constantly hoping that an attack would
be made upon the island, and "if attacked with judgment it appeared to me
that a moderate force would carry it."* (* Voyage to Terra Australis 2
419.) But all this while the British believed that Ile-de-France was
strong, and that a successful assault upon it would require a larger
force than they could spare at the time. Even after Flinders had returned
to England, when he was asked at the Admiralty whether he thought that a
contemplated attack would succeed, his confident assurance that it would
was received with doubt. Decaen's "bluff" was superb.
On one point, if we may believe St. Elme le Duc, Decaen did Flinders a
grave injustice. It was believed, says that writer's manuscript, that
Flinders had several times managed to go out at night, that he had made
soundings along the coast, and had transmitted information to Bengal
which was of use when ultimately the colony was taken by the English. For
that charge there is not a shadow of warrant. There is not the faintest
ground for supposing that he did not observe his parole with the utmost
strictness. Had he supplied information, Ile-de-France would have passed
under British rule long before 1810.* (* The belief that Flinders took
soundings appears to have been common among the French inhabitants of
Port Louis. In the Proceedings of the South Australian Branch of the
Royal Geographical Society, 1912 to 1913 page 71, is printed a brief
account of the detention of Flinders, by a contemporary, D'Epinay, a
lawyer of the town. Here it is stated: "It is found out that at night he
takes soundings off the coast and has forwarded his notes to India."
Those who gave credence to this wild story apparently never reflected
that Flinders had no kind of opportunity for taking soundings.)
A few passages written for inclusion in the Voyage to Terra Australis,
but for some reason omitted, may be quoted to show how rigorously
visiting ships were treated lest information should leak out.* (*
Manuscript, Mitchell Library.)
"It may not be amiss to mention the rules which a ship is obliged to
observe on arriving at Port North-West, since it will of itself give some
idea of the nature of the Government. The ship is boarded by a pilot one
or two miles from the entrance to the port, who informs the commander
that no person must go on shore, or any one be suffered to come on board
until the ship has been visited by the officer of health, who comes soon
after the ship has arrived at anchor in the mouth of the port,
accompanied with an officer from the captain of the port, and, if it is a
foreign ship, by an interpreter. If the health of the crew presents no
objection, and after answering the questions put to him concerning the
object of his coming to the island, the commander goes on shore in the
French boat, and is desired to take with him all papers containing
political information, and all letters, whether public or private, that
are on board the vessel; and although there should be several parcels of
newspapers of the same date, they must all go. On arriving at the
Government House, to which he is accompanied by the officer and
interpreter, and frequently by a guard, he sooner or later sees the
Governor, or one of his aides-de-camp, who questions him upon his voyage,
upon political intelligence, the vessels he has met at sea, his
intentions in touching at the island, etc.; after which he is desired to
leave his letters, packets, and newspapers, no matter to whom they are
addressed. If he refuse this, or to give all the information he knows,
however detrimental it may be to his own affairs, or appears to
equivocate, if he escapes being imprisoned in the town he is sent back to
his ship under a guard, and forbidden all communication with the shore.
If he gives satisfaction, he is conducted from the General to the
Prefect, to answer his questions, and if he satisfies him also, is then
left at liberty to go to his consul and transact his business. The
letters and packets left with the General, if not addressed to persons
obnoxious to the Government, are sent unopened, according to their
direction. I will not venture to say that the others are opened and
afterwards destroyed, but it is much suspected. If the newspapers contain
no intelligence but what is permitted to be known, they are also sent to
their address. The others are retained; and for this reason it is that
all the copies of the same paper are demanded, for the intention is not
merely to gain intelligence, but to prevent what is disagreeable from
being circulated."
Decaen's conduct in refusing to liberate Flinders when the order reached
him need not be excused, but it should be understood. To impute sheer
malignity to him does not help us much, nor does it supply a sufficient
motive. What we know of his state of mind, as well as what we know of the
financial position of the colony, induce the belief that he would have
been quite glad to get rid of Flinders in 1807, had not other and
stronger influences intervened. But he was a soldier, placed in an
exceedingly precarious situation, which he could only maintain by
determining not to lose a single chance. War is an affliction that
scourges a larger number of those who do not fight than of those who do;
and Flinders, with all his innocence, was one of its victims. He was
thought to know too much. That was why he was "dangerous." A learned
French historian* stigmatises Decaen's conduct as "maladroit and brutal,
but not dishonest." (* Prentout page 661.) Dishonest he never was; as to
the other terms we need not dispute so long as we understand the peculiar
twist of circumstances that intensified the maladroitness and brutality
that marked the man, and without which, indeed, he would not perhaps have
been the dogged, tough, hard-fighting, resolute soldier that he was.
Flinders could have escaped from Ile-de-France on several occasions, had
he chosen to avail himself of opportunities. He did not, for two reasons,
both in the highest degree honourable to him. The first was that he had
given his parole, and would not break it; the second that escape would
have meant sacrificing some of his precious papers. In May, 1806, an
American captain rejoicing in the name of Gamaliel Matthew Ward called at
Port Louis, and hearing of Flinders' case, actually made arrangements for
removing him. It was Flinders himself who prevented the daring skipper
from carrying out his plan. "The dread of dishonouring my parole," he
wrote, "made me contemplate this plan with a fearful eye."* (* Flinders'
Papers.) In December of the same year he wrote to John Aken: "Since I
find so much time elapse, and no attention paid to my situation by the
French Government, I have been very heartily sorry for having given my
parole, as I could otherwise have made my escape long ago." Again, he
wrote to his wife: "Great risks must be run and sacrifices made, but my
honour shall remain unstained. No captain in His Majesty's Navy shall
have cause to blush in calling me a brother officer."
As time went on, and release was not granted, he several times thought of
surrendering his parole, which would have involved giving up the pleasant
life at Wilhelm's Plains, and being again confined in Port Louis. But
escape would have meant the loss of many of his papers, the authentic
records of his discoveries; and he could not bring himself to face that.
Consequently the captivity dragged itself wearily out for three years
after the order of release was received. The victim chafed, protested,
left no stone unturned, but Decaen was not to be moved. Happily
depression did not drag illness in its miserable train. "My health
sustains itself tolerably well in the midst of all my disappointments,"
he was able to write to Banks in 1809.