RELATION OF THE SABBATH TO POSITIVE INSTITUTIONS
Is there then no difference between the law of the Sabbath and the
other precepts of the decalogue? We do not mean to say there is no
difference whatever. There is something in it which partakes of the
nature of a _positive institution_, as theologians are pleased to term
it. Positive institutions are generally considered to be such as are
not discoverable by the light of nature, their obligation resting upon
the mere will of the Lawgiver. While on the other hand, moral precepts
are supposed to be ascertained by the light of nature, and to be
binding independently of any appointment of the Lawgiver.
We are free to admit the positive nature of the Sabbatic institution,
so far as it respects the particular day to be observed, and the
proportion of time; also as it respects the great reason on which the
law is founded. For it is not a dictate of nature, that one seventh
part of time is more holy, or has any more demand upon us in a
religious way, than one tenth, or one fifth, or any other proportion.
Nor is it a dictate of nature, that God created the world in six days,
and rested on the seventh, blessing and sanctifying _it_. The light of
nature, it is true, teaches that the world was created by eternal
Power; but it gives no information of the time occupied in it, nor of
the fact of His resting on the seventh day, after it was finished.
Therefore, so far as the mere light of nature is concerned, we are
left in the dark respecting what constitutes the very foundation of
the institution.
But after all, we very much doubt the propriety of classing all those
precepts which we cannot discover by the mere light of nature, under
the sweeping name of positive institutions, as if they were on the
same level with the passover, circumcision, the ordinance of the red
heifer, &c. Indeed, we utterly protest against it, if the intention is
to underrate their importance, or to depreciate them as
"_non-essential_," according to the cant term of the day. For what in
such case would become of the whole system of Christianity itself? We
mean the system of appointing a Mediator, and the redemption of the
world through him. It is a positive institution, that is, purely a
matter of revelation, and wholly undiscoverable by the light of
nature. But shall we therefore call it a non-essential? Shall we
regard it as something of minor importance in comparison with the
religion of nature? Does it not devolve upon us with obligations just
as strong and overwhelming as the moral law? Most certainly it does;
not only because it is enjoined by the same authority, but also
because it is the only means of promoting a conformity to the moral
law. The same may be said of all positive institutions: they are
designed to promote a conformity first to that dispensation to which
they are peculiar, and second, to the moral law.
Whoever attempts a close investigation of the nature of positive
institutions, will find that the line of separation between them and
moral duties, is not always so easy to be drawn as might at first be
imagined. We say, indeed, that the former are not discoverable by the
light of nature. The reason of that, however, may be, not because they
do not in reality originate in the nature of things, but merely
because, our powers of discovery are so feeble. Were these powers
expanded, and the range of our intellectual vision widened, we might
possibly see that those very institutions we call positive, grow
naturally and necessarily out of the relation between God and us. Not
only might we see the reasons of positive institutions in general,
(which indeed is already sufficiently obvious,) but with such enlarged
capacities, we might see the reason why such particular ones are
pitched upon rather than others. The real difference between moral and
positive duties may, after all, be nothing more than this, that the
former we can readily discover for ourselves, narrow as the range of
our vision is--while the latter, we are so short-sighted, we cannot
discover, and are therefore wholly dependent on revelation for them.
Hence we suppose it is assuming more than can be proved, when it is
argued that positive appointments are altogether arbitrary, and have
no real foundation in the nature and fitness of things.[7]
Now when we admit that the Sabbath is a positive institution, we mean
that it is not discoverable by the light of nature, but is purely a
matter of revelation; and this is all we mean. It still possesses the
main attributes of a moral precept. For as we have already shown, any
duty which has its origin in the natural relation of creature to
Creator, must be of a moral nature, whether we can discover it for
ourselves, or whether by reason of our short-sightedness, we are
altogether dependent on revelation for it. That such is the origin of
the Sabbath law, is plain from the most casual inspection of it. It
grew out of God's creating the world in six days, and resting on the
seventh, and is a constant memorial of it. Besides, it provides for
the performance of the worship of God, which is confessedly a moral
duty; while the satisfaction it yields to the conscience of every man,
is a sufficient indication of its parity with other moral precepts.[8]
But to dismiss all further argument concerning the distinction between
moral and positive duties, let it be admitted that the Sabbath is a
positive institution in the very strictest sense; let it be admitted
to be nothing more than an arbitrary appointment, having no foundation
in the natural and primary relation of man to his Creator--it must
nevertheless remain in force so long as that dispensation lasts to
which it is peculiar. Hence it must still be in force; for the
dispensation to which it belongs, is the dispensation of nature
itself. While the dispensation of nature lasts, the day which God the
Creator originally "blessed and sanctified," will continue to be
sacred. It is utterly impossible that it should be otherwise; and
therefore all speculations about its changeable nature, resulting from
its being a positive appointment, are vain. Changeable and positive as
were the carnal ordinances of the old economy, they were not
changeable while that economy lasted, but were sacred throughout the
whole of it. Changeable and positive as are the ordinances of Baptism
and the Lord's Supper, they are not changeable while the dispensation
to which they belong continues, but are sacredly binding until the
dispensation ends. So of the Sabbath; yes, even of the very day
originally appointed.
Customary as it is with writers to draw the broad line of distinction
between what they call the _moral_ and _positive_ parts of the
institution, and whatever advantage it may have in _theory_, so far as
_practice_ is concerned, nothing is gained by it. Indeed, with those
who pretend to be guided by divine revelation, rather than by the
unaided deductions of their own minds, it is always an unnecessary
distinction. He whose heart is subdued to the will of God, will not be
studious to inquire which of his commands are of a moral, and which of
a positive nature. His inquiry will be simply this: "Lord, what wilt
thou have me to do?" If God command, he will obey, let the nature of
the command be what it will. Were man left to deduce the knowledge of
his duty from the nature and fitness of things, without the aid of any
light from above, God would not blame him if he should wholly neglect
to practice those duties, which are commonly called positive. All that
would be required of him in such case, would be the practice of those
duties which are most obviously of the moral kind. But with the
statute book of Almighty God in his hand, he stands on very different
ground. He is thus brought under obligation--yea, under _moral_
obligation, to esteem ALL the divine precepts concerning _all things_,
to be right. Psalm cxix. 128.