CHAPTER XVI.

SOCIETY.

Social Stages, 401—Family, 402—Morals of Lower Races,

405—Public Opinion and Custom, 408—Moral Progress,

410—Vengeance and Justice, 414—War, 418—Property,

419—Legal Ceremonies, 423—Family Power and Responsibility,

426—Patriarchal and Military Chiefs, 428—Nations, 432—Social

Ranks, 434—Government, 436.

In the reports of crimes which appear daily in the newspapers of our

civilized land, such phrases often occur as _savage_ fury, _barbarous_

cruelty. These two words have come to mean in common talk such behaviour

as is most wild, rough, and cruel. Now no doubt the life of the less

civilized people of the world, the _savages_ and _barbarians_, is more

wild, rough, and cruel than ours is on the whole, but the difference

between us and them does not lie altogether in this. As the foregoing

chapters have proved, savage and barbarous tribes often more or less

fairly represent stages of culture through which our own ancestors passed

long ago, and their customs and laws often explain to us, in ways we

should otherwise have hardly guessed, the sense and reason of our own.

It should be understood that it is out of the question to give here even

a summary of the complicated systems of society: all that can be done is

to put before the reader some of its leading principles in ancient and

modern life.

Mankind can never have lived as a mere struggling crowd, each for

himself. Society is always made up of families or households bound

together by kindly ties, controlled by rules of marriage and the duties

of parent and child. Yet the forms of these rules and duties have been

very various. Marriages may be shifting and temporary pairing, or unions

where the husband may have several wives, and the wife several husbands.

It is often hard to understand the family group and its ties in the rude

and ancient world. Thus it seems to us a matter of course to reckon

family descent in the male line, and this is now put in the clearest

way by the son taking the father’s surname. But in lower stages of

civilization, on both sides of the globe, many tribes take the contrary

idea as a matter of course. In most Australian tribes the children belong

to the mother’s clan, not the father’s; so that in native wars father

and son constantly meet as natural enemies. Chiefship often goes down in

the royal mother’s line, as among the Natchez, who had their sun-temples

in what is now Louisiana. Yet this wide-spread law of female descent,

deep as it lies in the history of society, had been so lost sight of

among the ancient civilized nations, that when Herodotus noticed it

among the Lykians, who took their names from their mothers and traced

their pedigrees through the female branches only, the historian fancied

this was a peculiar custom, in which they were unlike all other people.

In the savage and barbaric world there prevails widely the rule called

by McLennan exogamy or marrying-out, which forbids a man to take a wife

of his own clan—an act which is considered criminal, and may even be

punished with death. It is a strange contrast to the popular idea that

savage life has no rules, when we find Australian tribes where every man

is bound to marry into the particular clan which is, so to speak, the

wife-clan to his own. Among the Iroquois of North America the children

took the clan-name or totem of the mother; so if she were of the Bear

clan, her son would be a Bear, and accordingly he might not marry a Bear

girl, but might take a Deer or Heron. Such laws appear also among higher

nations who reckon descent in the male line. Thus in India a Brahman is

not to marry a wife whose clan-name (her “cow-stall,” as they say) is the

same as his; nor may a Chinese take a wife of his own surname. Though the

family and tribe rules of the savage and barbaric world are too intricate

to be fully discussed here, there are some instructive points to which

attention should be called. Marriage is in early stages of society a

civil contract. Thus, among the wild hunting-tribes of Nicaragua, the

lad who wishes a girl for a wife kills a deer and lays it with a heap of

firewood at the door of her parents’ hut, which symbolic act is his offer

to hunt and do man’s work; if the gift is accepted, it is a marriage,

without further ceremony. Among peoples of higher culture more formal

promises and ceremonies come in, with feasts and gatherings of kinsfolk;

and then, as in other important matters of life, the priest is called in

to give divine blessing and sanction to the union. Where this is done, a

wedding has come to be very different from what it was in the rough times

of marriage by capture, such as might be seen in our own day among fierce

forest tribes in Brazil, where the warriors would make forays on distant

villages and by main force bring home wives. Ancient tradition knows this

practice well, as where the men of Benjamin carry off the daughters of

Shiloh dancing at the feast, and in the famous Roman tale of the rape

of the Sabines, a legend putting in historical form the wife-capture

which in Roman custom remained as a ceremony. What most clearly shows

what a recognised old-world custom it was, is its being thus kept up as

a formality where milder manners really prevail. It had passed into this

state among the Spartans, when Plutarch says that though the marriage

was really by friendly settlement between the families, the bridegroom’s

friends went through the pretence of carrying off the bride by violence.

Within a few generations the same old habit was kept up in Wales, where

the bridegroom and his friends, mounted and armed as for war, carried off

the bride; and in Ireland they used even to hurl spears at the bride’s

people, though at such a distance that no one was hurt, except now and

then by accident, as happened when one Lord Hoath lost an eye, which

mischance seems to have put an end to this curious relic of antiquity.

It was one of the consequences of increase of property in the world,

that the practice of buying wives came in, as where a Zulu bargains with

a girl’s people to let him have her perhaps for five oxen or ten. This

was the custom in England among our barbaric forefathers, as appears in

the West-Saxon law of Ine—“If a man buy a wife,” &c. Cnut somewhat later

forbade the wife to be sold, but the husband might give something of his

own will. It is an interesting problem in the history of law how the

money once paid as the bride’s price passed into a gift or dower for her;

some provision of this kind became necessary when the widow was no longer

provided for by being taken, as she would have been in a ruder state of

society, as a wife by her husband’s brother.

Marriage has been here spoken of first, because upon it depends the

family, on which the whole framework of society is founded. What has been

said of the ruder kinds of family union among savages and barbarians

shows that there cannot be expected from them the excellence of those

well-ordered households to which civilized society owes so much of its

goodness and prosperity. Yet even among the rudest clans of men, unless

depraved by vice or misery and falling to pieces, a standard of family

morals is known and lived by. Their habits, judged by our notions, are

hard and coarse, yet the family tie of sympathy and common interest is

already formed, and the foundations of moral duty already laid, in the

mother’s patient tenderness, the father’s desperate valour in defence of

home, their daily care for the little ones, the affection of brothers

and sisters, and the mutual forbearance, helpfulness, and trust of all.

From the family this extends to a wider circle. The natural way in which

a tribe is formed is from a family or group, which in time increases and

divides into many households, still recognising one another as kindred,

and this kinship is so thoroughly felt to be the tie of the whole tribe,

that, even when there has been a mixture of tribes, a common ancestor is

often invented to make an imaginary bond of union. Thus _kindred_ and

_kindness_ go together—two words whose common derivation expresses in the

happiest way one of the main principles of social life.

Among the lessons to be learnt from the life of rude tribes is, how

society can go on without the policeman to keep order. It is plain

that even the lowest men cannot live quite by what the Germans call

“faustrecht,” or “fist-right,” and we call “club law.” The strong savage

does not rush into his weaker neighbour’s hut and take possession,

driving the owner out into the forest with a stone-headed javelin sent

flying after him. Without some control beyond the mere right of the

stronger, the tribe would break up in a week, whereas in fact savage

tribes last on for ages. Under favourable circumstances, where food

is not too scarce nor war too wasting, the life of low barbaric races

may be in its rude way good and happy. In the West Indian islands where

Columbus first landed, lived tribes who have been called the most

gentle and benevolent of the human race. Schomburgk, the traveller, who

knew the warlike Caribs well in their home life, draws a paradise-like

picture of their ways, where they have not been corrupted by the vices

of the white men; he saw among them peace and cheerfulness and simple

family affection, unvarnished friendship, and gratitude not less true

for not being spoken in sounding words; the civilized world, he says,

has not to teach them morality, for though they do not talk about it,

they live in it. At the other side of the world in New Guinea, Kops,

the Dutch explorer, gives much the same account of the Papuans of Dory,

who live in houses built on piles in the water, like the old lake-men

of Switzerland; he speaks of their mild disposition, their inclination

to right and justice, their strong moral principles, their respect for

the aged and love for their children, their living without fastenings to

their houses—for theft is considered by them a grave offence, and rarely

occurs. Among the rude non-Hindu tribes of India, English officials

have often recorded with wonder the kindliness and cheerfulness of

the rude men of the mountains and the jungle, and their utter honesty

in word and deed. Thus Sir Walter Elliot mentions a low poor tribe of

South India, whom the farmers employ to guard their fields, well knowing

that they would starve rather than steal the grain in their charge;

and they are so truthful that their word is taken at once in disputes

even with their richer neighbours, for people say “a Kurubar always

speaks the truth.” Of course these accounts of Caribs and Papuans show

them on the friendly side, while those who have fought with them call

them monsters of ferocity and treachery. But cruelty and cunning in

war seem to them right and praiseworthy; and what we are here looking

at is their home peace-life. It is clear that low barbarians may live

among themselves under a fairly high moral standard, and this is the

more instructive because it shows what may be called natural morality.

Among them religion, mostly concerned with propitiating souls of

ancestors and spirits of nature, has not the strong moral influence it

exerts among higher nations; indeed their behaviour to their fellows is

little affected by divine command or fear of divine punishment. It has

more to do with their life being prosperous or miserable. When want or

the miseries of war upset their well-being, they (like their betters)

become more brutal and selfish in their ways, and moral habits are

at all times low among the comfortless hordes of savages whose daily

struggle for existence is too harsh for the gentler feelings to thrive.

Moreover, there is this plain difference between low and high races of

men, that the dull-minded barbarian has not power of thought enough to

come up to the civilized man’s best moral standard. The wild man of the

forest, forgetful of yesterday and careless of to-morrow, lolling in his

hammock when his wants are satisfied, has little of the play of memory

and foresight which is ever unrolling before our minds the panorama of

our own past and future life, and even sets us in thought in the places

of our fellows, to partake of their lives and enter into their joys

and sorrows. Much of the wrong-doing of the world comes from want of

imagination. If the drunkard could see before him the misery of next

year with something of the vividness of the present craving, it would

overbalance it. Ofttimes in the hottest fury of anger, the sword has been

sheathed by him across whose mind has flashed the prophetic picture of

the women weeping round the blood-stained corpse. The lower races of

men are so wanting in foresight to resist passion and temptation, that

the moral balance of a tribe easily goes wrong, while they are rough and

wantonly cruel through want of intelligent sympathy with the sufferings

of others, much as children are cruel to animals through not being able

to imagine what the creatures feel. What we now know of savage life will

prevent our falling into the fancies of the philosophers of the last

century, who set up the “noble savage” as an actual model of virtue to be

imitated by civilized nations. But the reality is quite as instructive,

that the laws of virtue and happiness may be found at work in simple

forms among tribes who make hatchets of sharpened stones and rub sticks

together to kindle fire. Their life, seen at its best, shows with

unusual clearness the great principle of moral science, that morality

and happiness belong together—in fact that morality is the method of

happiness.

It must not be supposed that in any state of civilization a man’s

conduct depends altogether on his own moral sense of right and wrong.

Controlling forces of society are at work even among savages, only in

more rudimentary ways than among ourselves. Public opinion is already a

great power, and the way in which it acts is particularly to be noticed.

Whereas the individual man is too apt to look to his own personal

interest and the benefit of his near friends, these private motives

fall away when many minds come together, and public opinion with a

larger selfishness takes up the public good, encouraging the individual

to set aside his private wishes and give up his property or even his

life for the commonwealth. The assembled tribe can crush the mean and

cowardly with their scorn, or give that reward of glory for which the

high-spirited will risk goods and life. Travellers have remarked that the

women, however down-trodden, know how to make their influence felt in

this way, and many a warrior whose heart was failing him in face of the

enemy, has turned from flight when he thought of the girls’ mockery when

he should slink home to the village, safe but disgraced. This pressure

of public opinion compels men to act according to custom, which gives

the rule as to what is to be done or not done in most affairs of life.

Explorers of wild countries, not finding the machinery of police they are

accustomed to at home, have sometimes rashly concluded that the savages

lived unrestrained at their own free will. We have here already noticed

that this is a mistake, for life in the uncivilized world is fettered

at every turn by chains of custom. To a great extent it is evident that

customs have come into existence for the benefit of society, or what was

considered so. For instance, it is generally held right in wild countries

that hospitality shall be freely given to all comers, for every one knows

he may want it any day himself. But whether a custom is plainly useful

or not, and even when its purpose is no longer known, once established

as a custom it must be conformed to. Savages may have finger-joints cut

off, or undergo such long and severe fasts that many die; but often the

only reason they can give for inflicting such suffering on themselves is

that it was the custom of their ancestors. In some parts of Australia

custom forbade to the young hunters, and reserved for the old men, much

of the wild fowl and the best joints of the large game. No doubt this was

in some measure for the public benefit, as the experienced elders, who

were past the fatigue of hunting, were able to stay in camp, make nets

and weapons, teach the lads, and be the repositories of wisdom and the

honoured counsellors of the tribe. Nothing could prove more plainly how

far society is, even among such wild men of the desert, from being under

the mere sway of brute force.

Thus communities, however ancient and rude, always have their rules of

right and wrong. But as to what acts have been held right and wrong,

the student of history must avoid that error which the proverb calls

measuring other people’s corn by one’s own bushel. Not judging the

customs of nations at other stages of culture by his own modern standard,

he has to bring his knowledge to the help of his imagination, so as to

see institutions where they belong and as they work. Only thus can it

be made clear that the rules of good and bad, right and wrong, are not

fixed alike for all men at all times. For an example of this principle,

let us observe how people at different stages of civilization deal with

the aged. Some of the lower races take much care of their old folks even

after they are fallen into imbecility, treating them with almost gentle

considerateness and very commonly tending them till death, when respect

to the living ancestor passes into his worship as an ancestral spirit.

But among other tribes filial kindness breaks down earlier, as among

those fierce Brazilians who knock on the head with clubs the sick and

aged, and even eat them, whether they find their care too burdensome, or

whether they really think, as they say, that it is kind to end a life no

longer gladdened with fight and feast and dance. We realize the situation

among roving tribes. The horde must move in quest of game, the poor

failing creature cannot keep up in the march, the hunters and the heavily

laden women cannot carry him; he must be left behind. Many a traveller

has beheld in the desert such heartrending scenes as Catlin saw when he

said farewell to the white-haired old Puncah chief, all but blind and

shrunk to skin and bone, crouched shivering by a few burning sticks, for

his shelter a buffalo-hide set up on crutches, for his food a dish of

water and a few half-picked bones. This old warrior was abandoned at his

own wish when his tribe started for new hunting-grounds, even as years

before, he said, he had left his own father to die when he was no longer

good for anything. When a nation settled in the agricultural state has

reached something of wealth and comfort, there is no longer the excuse of

necessity for killing or abandoning the aged. Yet history shows how long

the practice was kept up even in Europe, partly with the humane intent

of putting an end to lingering misery, but more through the survival of

a custom inherited from harder and ruder times. The Wends in what is

now Germany practised the hideous rite of putting the aged and infirm

to death, cooking and eating them, much as Herodotus describes the old

Massagetæ as doing. In Sweden there used to be kept in the churches

certain clumsy wooden clubs, called “family-clubs,” of which some are

still preserved, and with which in ancient times the aged and hopelessly

sick were solemnly put to death by their kinsfolk. It is interesting

to trace in the old German records the change from such hard ancient

barbarism to gentler manners, when the infirm old house-father, dividing

his substance among his children, is to sit henceforth well cared for

in the “cat’s place” by the hearth. One of the marks of advancing

civilization was the growing sense of the sacredness of human life, even

apart from its use and pleasure, and under this feeling the cutting

short of even a burdensome and suffering existence, which our ancestors

resorted to without reproach, has come to be looked upon with horror.

It must be clearly understood also that the old-world rules of moral

conduct were not the same towards all men. A man knew his duty to his

neighbour, but all men were not his neighbours. This is very clearly seen

in the history of men’s ideas of manslaughter and theft. The slaying of

a man is scarcely held by the law of any people to be of itself a crime,

but on the contrary it has been regarded as an allowable or praiseworthy

act under certain conditions, especially in self-defence, war, revenge,

punishment, and sacrifice. Yet no known tribe, however low and ferocious,

has ever held that men may kill one another indiscriminately, for even

the savage society of the desert or the jungle would collapse under such

lawlessness. Thus all men acknowledge some law “thou shall not kill,”

but the question is how this law applies. It is instructive to see

how it works among those fierce tribes who approve the killing of men

simply as a proof of valour. Thus the young Sioux Indian, till he had

killed his man, was not allowed to stick the feather in his head-dress

and have the title of brave or warrior; he could scarcely get a girl to

marry him till he had “got the feather.” So the young Dayak of Borneo

could not get a wife till he had taken a head, and it was thus with the

skull or scalp which the Naga warrior of Asam had to bring home, thereby

qualifying himself to be tattooed and to marry a wife, who had perhaps

been waiting years for this ugly marriage-licence. The trophy need not

have been taken from an enemy, and might have been got by the blackest

treachery, provided only that the victim were not of the slayer’s own

tribe. Yet these Sioux among themselves hold manslaughter to be a crime

unless in blood-revenge; and the Dayaks punish murder. This state of

things is not really contradictory; in fact its explanation lies in the

one word “tribe.” The tribe makes its law, not on an abstract principle

that manslaughter is right or wrong, but for its own preservation.

Their existence depends on holding their own in deadly strife with

neighbouring tribes, and thus they put a social premium on the warrior’s

proof of valour in fight against the enemy, though in these degenerate

days they allow the form to be meanly fulfilled by bringing in as a

warrior’s trophy the head of some old woman or wretched waylaid stranger.

In this simple contrast between one’s own people and strangers, the

student will find a clue to the thought of right and wrong running

through ancient history, and slowly passing into a larger and nobler

view. The old state of things is well illustrated in the Latin word

_hostis_, which, meaning originally stranger, passed quite naturally into

the sense of enemy. Not only is slaying an enemy in open war looked on as

righteous, but ancient law goes on the doctrine that slaying one’s own

tribesman and slaying a foreigner are crimes of quite different order,

while killing a slave is but a destruction of property. Nor even now does

the colonist practically admit that killing a brown or black man is an

act of quite the same nature as killing a white countryman. Yet the idea

of the sacredness of human life is ever spreading more widely in the

world, as a principle applying to mankind at large.

The history of the notion of theft and plunder follows partly the same

lines. In the lower civilization the law, “thou shalt not steal,” is

not unknown, but it applies to tribesmen and friends, not to strangers

and enemies. Among the Ahts of British Columbia, Sproat remarks that

an article placed in an Indian’s charge on his good faith is perfectly

safe, yet thieving is a common vice where the property of other tribes

or of white men is concerned. But, he says, it would be unfair to

regard thieving among these savages as culpable in the same degree

as among ourselves, for they have no moral or social law forbidding

thieving between tribe and tribe, which has been commonly practised for

generations. Thus, although the Africans within their own tribe-limits

have strict rules of property, travellers describe how a Zulu war-party,

who have stealthily crept upon a distant village and massacred men,

women, and children, will leave behind them the ransacked kraal flaring

on the horizon and return with exulting hearts and loads of plunder.

The old-world law of a warlike people is well seen among the ancient

Germans in Cæsar’s famous sentence, “Robberies beyond the bounds of each

community have no infamy, but are commended as a means of exercising

youth and diminishing sloth.” Even in the midst of modern civilization,

a declaration of war may still carry society back to the earlier stages

of plunder and prize-money. But in peace the safety of property as well

as life is becoming more settled in the world. The extradition treaties

by which criminals, deprived of their old refuge over the border, are now

given up to justice in the country where they offended, mark the modern

tendency to unite nations in one community, which recognises among all

its members mutual right and duty.

Hitherto we have been looking at right and wrong chiefly as worked by

men’s own moral feelings and by public opinion. But stronger means have

at all times been necessary. It is now reckoned one of the regular duties

of civilization to have a criminal law to punish wrong-doers with fine,

imprisonment, blows, and even death. This system, however, only gradually

arose in the world, and history can show plain traces of how it grew up

from the early state of things when there were as yet no professional

judges or executioners, but it was every man’s right and duty to take the

law into his own hands, and that law was what we now call vengeance. When

in barbaric life fierce passion breaks loose and a man is slain, this

rule of vengeance comes into action. How it works as one of the great

forces of society may well be seen among the Australians. As Sir George

Grey says in his account of it, the holiest duty a native is called on to

perform is to avenge the death of his nearest relation. If he left this

duty unfulfilled, the old women would taunt him; if he were unmarried,

no girl would speak to him; if he had wives, they would leave him; his

mother would cry and lament that she had given birth to so degenerate a

son, his father would treat him with contempt, and he would be a mark for

public scorn. But what is to be done if the murderer escapes, as must

in so wild and thinly peopled a country be easy? Native custom goes on

the ancient doctrine that the criminal’s whole family are responsible;

so that when it is known that a man has been slain, and especially when

the actual culprit has escaped, his kinsfolk run for their lives; the

very children of seven years old know whether they are of kin to the

manslayer, and, if so, they are off at once into hiding. Here then we

come in view of two principles which every student of law should have

clearly in his mind in tracing its history up from its lowest stages. In

the primitive law of vengeance of blood, he sees society using for the

public benefit the instinct of revenge which man has in common with the

lower animals; and by holding the whole family answerable for the deed

of one of its members, the public brings the full pressure of family

influence to bear on each individual as a means of keeping the peace.

No one who sees the working of blood-vengeance can deny its practical

reasonableness, and its use in restraining men from violence while there

are as yet no judges and executioners. Indeed among all savages and

barbarians the avenger of blood, little as he thinks it himself in his

wild fury, is doing his part toward saving his people from perishing

by deeds of blood. Unhappily his usefulness is often marred through

ignorance and delusion turning his vengeance against the innocent. These

Australians are among the many savages who do not see why anybody should

ever die unless he is killed, so they account for what we call natural

death by settling it that some enemy killed the sufferer by magic art,

wounding him with an invisible weapon, or sending a disease-demon to

gnaw his vitals. Therefore, when a man dies, his kinsmen set themselves

to find out by divination what malignant sorcerer did him to death, and

when they have fixed on some one as the secret enemy the avenger sets

out to find and slay him; then of course there is retaliation from the

other side, and a hereditary feud sets in. This is one great cause of

the rancorous hatred between neighbouring tribes which keeps savages in

ceaseless fear and trouble.

Passing to higher levels of civilization, among the nations of the

ancient world we still find the law of blood-vengeance, but it is being

gradually modified by the civilization which in time ousts it altogether.

Thus the law of the Israelites, while still authorizing the avenger

of blood, provides that there shall be cities of refuge, and that the

morally innocent manslayer shall not be as the wilful murderer. Among

nations where wealth has been gathered together, and especially where it

has come to be measured by money, the old fierce cry for vengeance sinks

into a claim for compensation. In Arabia to this day the earlier and

later stages may be seen side by side; while the roaming Beduin tribes

of the desert carry on blood-feuds from generation to generation with

savage ferocity, the townsfolk feel that life can hardly go on with an

assassin round every street-corner, so they take the blood-money and

loose the feud. This state of things is instructive as being like that

of our own early ancestors when the Teutonic law was still that a man

took vengeance for hurt done to him or his, unless he compounded it. The

Anglo-Saxon word for such composition was _wér-gild_, probably meaning

“man-money,” 200 shillings for a free man, less for lower folk, and less

for a Welshman than an Englishman. Again, where the rule of vengeance is

a life for a life, lesser hurts are also repaid in kind, which is the

Roman _lex talionis_, or “law of the like”—_retaliation_. This is plainly

set forth in the Jewish law, life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth,

wound for wound, stripe for stripe. It is still law in Abyssinia, where

not long since a mother prosecuted a lad who had accidentally fallen

from a fruit-tree on her little son and killed him; the judges decided

that she had a right to send another son up into the tree to drop on the

boy who had unintentionally caused the first one’s death, which remedy

however she did not care to avail herself of. Of course retaliation came

to be commuted into money, as when old English laws provide that, if any

one happen to cut off the fist or foot of a person, let him render to him

the half of a man’s price, for a thumb half the price of a hand, and so

on down to 5_s._ for a little finger and 4_d._ for a little-finger nail.

In the times we live in, justice has passed into a higher stage, where

the State takes the duty of punishing any serious wilful hurt done to

its citizens. Reading some murderous tale of a Corsican “vendetta,” we

hardly stop to think of it as a relic of ancient law lingering in a wild

mountain island. Yet our criminal law grew out of such private vengeance,

as is still plain to those who attend to traces of the past, when they

hear such phrases as “the vengeance of the law,” or think what is meant

by the legal form by which a private person is bound over to prosecute,

as though he must still be suing, as he would have done in long-past

ages, for his own revenge or compensation. It is now really the State

that is seeking to punish the criminal for the ends of public justice.

The avenger of blood, once the guardian of public safety, would now be

himself punished as a criminal for taking the law into his own hands,

while the moralists, now that the conditions of society are changed, lay

it down that vengeance is sinful.

Law, however, though it has so beneficially taken the place of private

vengeance, has not fully extended its sway over the larger quarrels

between State and State. The relation of private vengeance to public war

is well seen among rude tribes, such as inhabit the forests of Brazil.

When a murder is done within the tribe, then of course vengeance lies

between the two families concerned; but if the murderer is of another

clan or tribe, then it becomes a public wrong. The injured community

hold council, and mostly decide for war if they dare; then a war-party

sets forth, in which the near kinsmen of the murdered man, their bodies

painted with black daubs to show their deadly office, rush foremost

into the fight. Among neighbouring tribes the ordinary way in which war

begins is by some quarrel or trespass, then a man is killed on one side

or the other, and the vengeance for his death spreads into blood-feud

and tribal war ever ready to break out from generation to generation.

This barbaric state of things lasted far on into the history of Europe.

It was old German law that any freeman who had been injured in body,

honour, or estate might, with the help of his own people, avenge himself

if he would not take the legal commutation; that is to say, he had the

right of private war. It was a turning-point in English history when

King Edmund made a law to restrain this “unrighteous fighting,” but it

was not stopped at once, especially in Northumberland, and we know how

it went on into modern times between clan and clan in the wild Scotch

Highlands. Long after the mere freeman ceased to go to war with his

neighbours, there were nobles who stood to their old right. As late as

the time of Edward IV. Lord Berkeley and his followers fought a battle

with Lord Lisle at Nibley Green in Gloucestershire. Lord Lisle was slain,

and in the end Lord Berkeley compounded by a money payment to the widow.

Freeman, who in his _Comparative Politics_ mentions this curious incident

of fifteenth-century history, thinks it the last English example either

of private war or the payment of the wér-gild. The law of England which

forbids the levying of private war represents one of the greatest steps

in national progress. The State now replaces, by the justice of legal

tribunals, the barbaric expedients of private vengeance and private war.

But State and State still fight out their quarrels in public war, which

then becomes on a larger scale much what deadly feud used to be between

clan and clan.

The civil law of property may, like the criminal law, be traced from

the ideas of old times. A fair notion may be had of what early rules of

property were like, by noticing what they are in the uncivilised world

still. Among the lower races, the distinction which our lawyers make

between real and personal property appears in a very intelligible way.

Of the land all have the use, but no man can be its absolute owner. The

simplest land-law, which is also a game-law, is found among tribes who

live chiefly by hunting and fishing. Thus in Brazil each tribe had its

boundaries marked by rocks, trees, streams, or even artificial landmarks,

and trespass in pursuit of game was held so serious that the offender

might be slain on the spot. At this stage of society in any part of the

world, every man has the right to hunt within the bounds of his own

tribe, and the game only becomes private property when struck. Thus there

is a distinct legal idea of common property in land belonging to the

clan or tribe. There is also a clear idea of family property: the hut

belongs to the family or group of families who built it; and when they

fenced in and tilled the plot of ground hard by, this also ceased to be

common land, and became the property of the families, at least while

they occupied it. To each family belonged also the hut-furniture, such

as hammocks, mealing-stones, and earthen pots. At the same time personal

ownership appears, though still under the power of the family, through

the father or head. Personal or individual property was chiefly what each

wore or carried—the man’s weapons, the ornaments and scanty clothing of

both sexes, things which they had some power to do as they liked with

during life, and at death very commonly took away with them to the world

beyond the grave (see p. 346). Here then we find barbarians already

acquainted with the ideas of common land, family freehold, family and

personal property in movables, which run through the systems of old-world

law. Not that they are worked out in the same way everywhere. Thus in

the village communities which had so great a part in settling Asia and

Europe, and whose traces still remain in modern England, not only the

hunting-grounds and meadows were held in common, but the families did

not even own the ploughed fields, which were tilled by common labour or

re-allotted from time to time among the households, so that the family

freehold did not reach beyond its house and garden-plot. At various times

in history, the rise of military nations revolutionised the earlier

ways of land-holding. In invaded countries, lands of the conquered were

distributed by the king or leader to be held by his captains or soldiers

doing military service in return; the greatest and best-known example

is the feudal system of Europe in the Middle Ages. It is instructive to

notice how in England, before the Norman Conquest, the folk-land, the

common property of the state, was already passing into the hands of

the king to grant at his pleasure. Or in a military state the sovereign

may become the universal landlord, allowing his subjects to hold lands

on payment of an annual tribute or tax—a system well known in ancient

Egypt and modern India. In Roman history we find the state, or families

owning large lands, letting portions of them as farms to tenants who

paid part of the produce in return. This shows the beginning of rent,

a thing unknown to primitive law. While these changes were coming on

as to the land, movable property was becoming more and more important.

War-captives kept as slaves to till the soil became part of the wealth

of the family, and the pastoral life brought in cattle, not only for

food, but to plough the fields. The manufacture of valuable goods, the

growth of commerce, the accumulation of treasure, and the use of money,

added other possessions. If now we look at our modern ways of dealing

with property, it is seen what great changes we have made by taking it

out of the hands of the family and allowing an individual owner to hold

and dispose of it—an arrangement suited to our age of shifting trading

enterprise. Even land is bought and sold by individuals, though the law,

by making a field and cottage transferable by a different process and

with greater formality and cost than a diamond necklace or a hundred

chests of tea, keeps up traces of the old system under which it could

only have changed hands, if at all, with difficulty and by the consent

of many parties. Through all changes it is instructive to notice how far

the old family system of property holds its place. This is well seen by

considering what becomes of a man’s property when he dies. The two most

usual arrangements made in early times are the simplest, namely, either

that the family shall go on living on the undivided property, or that

it shall be divided among the children, or sons. When the eldest son

is patriarchal head of the family, to keep up this dignity he may have

an extra or double portion for his “birth-right”; this is a well-known

ancient rule, common to the Aryan and Semitic nations, for it is both

in the Hindu laws of Manu and in Deuteronomy. In France at this day the

ancient principle of division is legally enforced, and the family take

their shares as a matter of right. In England the power of wills has

become so great, that in theory a man may leave his property to whom he

pleases; but practically this is kept within bounds by moral feeling and

public opinion, which condemn it as an unnatural act for a man to strip

his own children to endow a stranger or a hospital. If the Englishman

dies without leaving a will, the law recognises the rights of his family

by fairly dividing among them his personal property. It is otherwise with

the land or real estate, which in most cases will pass to the eldest son.

Why the law should thus allow the claims of the rest of the family to

the money, but not to the land, is an interesting point of history. The

reader of Maine’s _Ancient Law_ will find how, in Europe about a thousand

years ago, lands held as fiefs came to pass to the eldest son, not by any

means for the purpose of enriching him by disinheriting the others, but

that the united kinsfolk might live upon the land and defend it under

him as chief of the little clan. If in modern times the head of the

family has become possessed of the family estate for his own use, this

is because old laws working under new circumstances are apt to produce

results which those who framed them never foresaw. Primogeniture did not

prevail over the whole of England, but older rules of family inheritance

have in some parts lasted on from times before feudalism. The best known

of these is where at the father’s death the land is divided among the

sons, as Domesday Book shows was usual in Edward the Confessor’s time.

This is now known as gavelkind, or the custom of Kent, but it appears

elsewhere; for instance, Kentish Town in the north of London is supposed

to have its name from lands so held there. There even exists in England

a rule of inheritance which seems to belong to a yet earlier state of

society. This is the custom of borough-english, by which, for instance

at Hackney or Edmonton, if a man die intestate the land passes to his

youngest son. This right of the youngest, strange as it seems to us, is

still found here and there in Europe and Asia. It is a reasonable law of

inheritance of the settlers in a new country, where there is yet plenty

of land to be had for the taking, and the sons as they grow up and marry

go out and found new homesteads of their own. But the youngest stays at

home and takes care of the old father and mother; he is, as the Mongols

say, the “fire-keeper,” and at their death he naturally succeeds to the

family home. This is one of the hundreds of cases of customs which seem

arbitrary and unreasonable, because they have lost their sense by lasting

on from the state of life to which they properly belonged.

In the old days before there were lawyers and law books, solemn acts

and rights were made plain to all men by picturesque ceremonies suited

to lay hold of unlettered minds. Many of these old ceremonies are still

kept up and show their meaning as plainly as ever. For example, when two

parties wish to make firm peace or friendship, they will go through the

ceremony of mixing their blood, so as to make themselves blood-relations.

Travellers often now ally themselves in such blood-brotherhood with

barbarous tribes; an account of East Africans performing the rite

describes the two sitting together on a hide so as to become “of one

skin,” and then they made little cuts in one another’s breasts, tasted

the mixed blood, and rubbed it into one another’s wounds. Thus we find

still going on in the world a compact which Herodotus describes among the

ancient Lydians and Scythians, and which is also mentioned in the Sagas

of the old Northmen and the ancient Irish legends. It would be impossible

to put more clearly the great principle of old-world morals, that a man

owes friendship not to mankind at large but only to his own kin, so

that to entitle a stranger to kindness and good faith he must become

a kinsman by blood. With much the same thought even rude tribes hold

that eating and drinking together is a covenant of friendship, for the

guest becomes in some sort one of the household, and has to be treated

as morally one of the family. This helps to explain the vast importance

people everywhere give to the act of dining together. Among the millions

of India at this day the very constitution of society turns on the caste

rules whom a man may or may not eat with. Among the marriage ceremonies

of the world, one well known in the far East is that the couple by eating

together out of one dish become man and wife. How ceremony expresses

meaning in still more striking metaphor is seen in the Hindu marriage,

where the skirts of the bridegroom and bride’s garments are tied together

as a sign of union, and the bride steps on a stone to show she will be as

firm as stone. A custom is described among English vagrants of the last

century, where a man and woman would join hands across the body of a dead

beast, thus promising that they would be joined till death should part

them. Among the dramatic ceremonies known to European law is the scene in

an ancient Roman law-court, where a man put in his claim to a slave by

stepping forward and touching him with a rod which represented a spear;

or when in old Germany a piece of land was transferred by the owner

handing over a sod of the turf with a green twig stuck up in it; or when

in feudal times the vassal placed his hands between the lord’s, and so

“putting himself in his hands” became his man.

There were ceremonies in old-world law which were more than such

gesture-language. Barbaric law early began to call on magical and divine

powers to help in the difficult tasks of discovering the guilty, getting

the truth out of witnesses, and making a promise binding. This led to the

wide-spread system of ordeals and oaths. Some ordeals have really served

to discover truth by their effect on the conscience of the evil-doer.

It is thus with the mouthful of rice taken by all of a suspected

household in India, which the thief’s nervous fear often prevents him

from swallowing. This used to be done in England with the corsnæd or

trial-slice of consecrated bread or cheese; even now peasants have not

forgotten the old formula, “May this bit choke me if I lie!” Another of

the few ordeals that linger in popular memory may be seen when, in some

out-of-the-way farmhouse, all suspected of a theft are made to hold a

bible hanging to a key, which is to turn in the hands of the thief; this

keeps up a form of divination practised in the classic world with a sieve

hanging by the points of an open pair of shears. Ordeals have had their

day, and are now discarded from the laws of the most civilised nations.

Nowadays one has to go to such countries as Arabia to find the ordeal by

hot iron recognised by law, as it was in England in the days when the

legend was told of Queen Emma walking over the red-hot ploughshares; the

conjurors now go through this ancient performance as a circus-show. Yet

even of late years, English rustics have been known to duck some wretched

old woman supposed to be a witch, little knowing that they were keeping

up the ancient water-ordeal, where the sacred element rejects the wrong

and accepts the right, so that the guilty floats and the innocent sinks—a

judicial rite which forms part of the old Hindu law-book of Manu, and

which in English law, till the beginning of the 13th century, was a legal

means of trying those accused of murder or robbery. Ordeals by which

the taker brings down present harm on himself if he is guilty, are of

much the same nature as oaths. It is usual, however, for oaths to call

down future punishment, in this life or after death, as when, in Russian

law-courts in Siberia, the curious spectacle may be seen of bringing in

a bear’s head that an Ostyak may bite at it, thereby calling on a bear

to bite him if he is forsworn. The legal oaths in our own country bear

in their gestures the traces of high antiquity. In Scotland the witness

holds up his hand toward heaven, the gesture by which Greek and Jew took

the supreme Deity to witness, and called down divine vengeance on the

perjurer. In England the kissing of the book comes from the practice of

touching a halidome, or sacred object, as an ancient Roman touched the

altar, or Harold the casket of relics. The form “So help me God,” is

inherited from ancient Teutonic-Scandinavian law, under which the old

Northman, touching the blood-daubed ring on the altar, swore “So help

me Frey, and Niordh, and the almighty god” (that is, Thor). The first

and last of these are the two old English gods whose names we keep up in

_Friday_ and _Thursday_.

To come now to the last subject of this volume, the history of

government. Complicated as are the political arrangements of civilised

nations, their study is made easier by their simple forms being already

found in savage and barbaric life. The foundation of society, as has been

already seen, is the self-government of each family. Its authority is

apt to be vested in the head of the household; thus among low barbaric

tribes in the Brazilian forests, the father may do as he pleases with his

own wives and children, even selling them for slaves, and the neighbours

have no right or wish to interfere. Even what civilised nations now take

as a matter of course, that every human being coming into the world has a

right to live, is scarcely recognised by the lower races. In such a life

of hardship as the Australians and many savages lead, new-born children

are often put out of the way from sheer need, because the parents have

already as many mouths as they can feed. That among such tribes this

comes of hardness of life, rather than hardness of heart, is often seen

when the parents will go through fire and water to save the very child

they were doubting about, a few weeks before, whether it should live

or die. Even where the struggle for existence is not so severe, the

wretched custom of infanticide remains still common in the world. Nothing

more clearly shows that European nations came up from a barbaric stage

than the law which the ancient Romans had in common with our Teutonic

ancestors, that it was for the father of the family to say whether the

new-born child should be brought up or exposed. Once become a member of

the household, the child has a firmer assurance of life; and when the

young barbarian grows up to be a warrior, and becomes himself the head of

a new household, he is usually a free man. But the oldest Roman law shows

the head of the family ruling with a strictness hardly imaginable to our

modern minds, for the father might chastise or put to death his grown-up

sons, give them in marriage or divorce them, and even sell them. With the

advance of civilization, in Rome as elsewhere, the sons gradually gained

their rights of person and property; and in comparing old-world life

with our own, it is plainly seen how Christianity, looking not to family

rights but to individual souls, tended toward personal freedom. With all

the growth of individual freedom in modern life, the best features of

family despotism remain in force; it is under parental authority that

children are trained for their future duties, and the law is careful how

it gives the child personal rights against the parent, lest it should

weaken the very cement which binds society together. As, however, the

family ceased to be so perfect a little kingdom within itself, the

individual became responsible for his own doings. We have seen how, in

rude society, when a crime is committed, the family of the aggrieved take

vengeance on the culprit’s family. Modern ideas of justice may teach us

that this is wrong, that it is punishing the innocent for the guilty.

But in the lower barbaric life it is practically the best way to keep

order, and to those who live under it it seems right and natural, as

where, among the Australians, when one of a family has done a murder the

others take it as a matter of course that they are guilty too. Far from

this idea being confined to savages, the student becomes familiar with it

in the law of ancient nations, such as Greece and Rome. Here it will be

enough to quote the remarkable passage from the Hebrew law which at once

records what the old principle was, and reforms it by bringing in the

ideas of higher jurisprudence:—“The fathers shall not be put to death for

the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers:

every man shall be put to death for his own sin.” (Deut. xxiv. 16.)

Wherever the traveller in wild regions meets a few families roaming

together over the desert, or comes upon a cluster of huts by a stream

in the tropical forest, he may find, if he looks closely enough, some

rudiments of government; for there is business which concerns the whole

little community, such as a camping-ground to be chosen, or a fishery

quarrel to be settled with the next tribe down the river. Even among

the Greenlanders, as little governed a people as almost any in the

world, it was noticed that when several families lived together all the

winter, one weather-wise old fisherman would have the north end of the

snow-house for his place and be appointed to look after the inmates,

taking care about their keeping the snow walls in repair, and going out

and coming in together so as not to waste heat; also when they went out

in hunting parties an experienced pathfinder would be chosen as leader.

It is common to find among rude tribes such a headman or chief, chosen

as the most important or shrewdest; but he has little or no actual

authority over the families, and gets his way by persuasion and public

opinion. Naturally such a headman’s family is of consequence already,

or, if not, he makes them so, and thus there is a tendency for his

office to become hereditary. In tribes formed under the rule of female

kinship, where the chief’s own son may be out of the succession, the

new chosen chief will probably be a younger brother or a nephew on the

mother’s side. Under the rule of succession on the father’s side, which

is so much more familiar to us, the very growth of the family brings on

a patriarchal government. Suppose a single household to move out into

the wilds and found a new settlement, it begins under the rule of the

father, who, as new huts are built round the first home, remains head

of the growing clan; but as old age comes on, his eldest son more and

more acts in his name, and at his death will be recognised as succeeding

him in the headship of the community. Here then is seen the rise of the

hereditary chief or patriarch of the tribe, first in rank as representing

the ancestor, and with more or less of real authority. But here also

there is a practical power of setting the successor aside if he is too

timid or wilful or dull, when perhaps his uncle or brother will be put in

his place, though the line of succession is not set aside by this. The

patriarchal system extends far on in civilization. It is not confined

to one particular race or nation, but may at this day be studied alike

among the brown hill-men of India and the negroes of West Africa. To

us it is especially well known from the Old Testament, which shows it

in the form it takes in a pastoral nation, and which still may be seen

with little change among the Arabs of the desert, whose clans and tribes

are governed by their patriarchs, the sheykhs or old men. Not less does

it lie at the foundation of the politics of the Aryan race, where its

remains may still be traced in the village communities of India and

Russia, the village elder presiding in the council of “white-heads” being

the modern representative of the earlier patriarch with the chiefs of

younger branches of the clan around him. Under such mild rule, people

of few wants may prosper in time of peace, in the kindly communism

which is possible where there are no rich and no poor. The weak point

of such a society is that it can hardly advance, for civilization is at

a standstill where it is regulated by ancestral custom administered by

great-grandfathers. Everywhere in the world, in war some stronger and

more intelligent rule than this is needed and found. The changes which

have shaped the descendants of wild hordes into civilized nations have

been in great measure the work of the war-chief.

When among such uncultured tribes war breaks out, the peace-chief is

pushed aside and a leader chosen, or in warlike tribes the war-chief may

be the acting head at all times. Of course he is a tried warrior, and

his endurance may even be put to a special examination, as when the

Caribs would test a candidate for war-chief by mercilessly flogging and

scratching him, smoking him in a hammock over a fire of green leaves, or

burying him up to the middle in a nest of stinging-ants. We even find in

America the principle of competitive examination for king, when Chilian

tribes would choose as their chief the man who could lift the biggest

tree on his shoulder and carry it longest. In these rude countries the

change is wonderful when war turns the loose crowd into an army under

a leader, with powers of life and death to enforce discipline. When

Martius the naturalist was travelling through a Brazilian forest with

a Miranha chief, they came to a fig-tree where the skeleton of a man

was bound to the trunk with cords of creepers, and the chief grimly

explained that this was one of his men who had disobeyed orders by not

summoning a neighbouring tribe to help against the invading Umauas, and

he had him tied up there and shot to death with arrows. In barbarous

countries the tribe-chief and the war-chief may be found side by side;

but when the power of the bow and spear once asserts itself, it is apt

to grow further. Throughout history, war gives the bold and able leader

a supremacy which may nominally end with the campaign, but which tends

to pass into dictatorship for life. Military government in civil affairs

is, in fact, despotism; and if the military leader can thus become

the tyrant of his own land, still more can he rule with a rod of iron

a conquered country. The negro kingdom of Dahome, the result of two

centuries of barbaric military rule, is an astounding specimen of what a

people will submit to from a despot whom they regard as a kind of deity;

they approach him grovelling on all-fours, and throwing dust over their

heads; the whole nation are his slaves, whose lives he takes at will;

the women are all his, to give or sell; the land is all his, and none

owns anything but at his pleasure. The kings of Asiatic nations have

been theoretically as absolute as this, but practically in advancing

civilization the king makes or sanctions laws which bind himself and his

successors, making society more fixed and life more tolerable. Also, as

soon as religion becomes a power in the state, it becomes joined or mixed

with civil and military government. Thus among negroes the high-priest

and war-chief may be the two heads of the government, while the Incas of

Peru, as descendants and representatives of the divine sun, ruled their

nation with paternal despotism which settled for the people what they

should do and eat and wear, and whom they should marry. In such a kingdom

royalty must be hereditary in the divine ruling family. Indeed, monarchy,

however gained, tends to become hereditary, and especially the military

usurper will found a dynasty on the model of a patriarchal chief. Thus

sovereignty may be elective, hereditary, military, ecclesiastical, and,

difficult as is the history of kingdoms, some combination of these causes

can always be traced in them.

The effects of war in consolidating a loosely formed society are

described by travellers who have seen a barbaric tribe prepare to

invade an enemy or defend their own borders. Provisions and property

are brought into the common stock; the warriors submit their unruly

wills to a leader, and private quarrels are sunk in a larger patriotism.

Distant clans of kinsfolk come together against the common enemy, and

neighbouring tribes with no such natural union make an alliance, their

chiefs serving under the orders of a leader chosen by them all. Here are

seen in their simplest forms two of the greatest facts in history,—the

organised army, where the several forces are led by their own captains

under a general, and the confederation of tribes, such as in higher

civilisation brings on political federations of states like those in

Greece and Switzerland. Out of such alliances of tribes, when they

last beyond the campaign, there arise nations, where often, as in old

Mexico, the head of the strongest tribe will become king. Tribes which

thus unite are apt to be of common race, speaking kindred dialects, for

this is everywhere a natural bond of union; and when they have allied

themselves into one people, and come to bear a common name, such as

Dorians or Hellenes, they willingly take up the old patriarchal idea,

and imagine themselves more closely of one _nation_ or “birth” than they

really are, even setting up, as we have seen (p. 389), a fictitious as a

national ancestor. Events take a different course, but with a somewhat

like effect, when some Kafir leader conquers other tribes around, and,

setting himself above them all, forces the conquered chiefs to bring him

tribute and warriors to fight his battles. This is empire on a small

scale and with rude surroundings, but on the same principles as that of

a Cæsar or a Napoleon. Thus one understands why in the early history of

nations it is so inextricably difficult to make out how far any people

have grown up from a single unmixed tribe, or have been built up by

alliance and conquest. What shows how this piecing together of nations

must have gone on, is the number and variety of their gods. While a

tribe grows of itself, the names and worship of the same tribe-gods will

be a bond of union in all the clans, and even when they move far off

they will sometimes go on pilgrimage to the shrines of their old home.

But when peoples amalgamate, their different gods are kept up, as when

the Peruvians gave places to the gods of conquered tribes under their

own great deities. Every district in ancient Egypt shows by its varied

combination of gods how many little states and local religions went to

make up the great despotism and hierarchy. It was plainly through this

growth of nations, which had been going on we know not how long before

history began, that the higher civilization of mankind arose. Scattered

families of barbarians in a land where there is still elbow room may

thrive without strong government; but when men live in populous nations

and crowded cities, there has to be public order. That this political

order came out of military order cannot be doubted. War not only put

into the hands of the sovereign the power over a whole nation, but his

army served as his model on which to organize his nation. It is one of

the plainest lessons of history that through military discipline mankind

were taught to submit to authority and act in masses under command. Egypt

and Babylon, with military system pervading not only the standing army,

but the orders of priests and civilians, developed industry and wealth

highest in the ancient world, and were the very founders of literature

and science. They built up for future ages the framework of government,

which we freer moderns of our own will submit ourselves to for our own

benefit. A constitutional government, whether called republic or kingdom,

is an arrangement by which the nation governs itself by means of the

machinery of a military despotism.

As society in tribes and nations became a more complex system, it early

began to divide into classes or ranks. If we look for an example of the

famous first principle of the United States, “that all men are created

equal,” we shall in fact scarcely find such equality except among savage

hunters and foresters, and by no means always then. The greatest of

all divisions, that between freeman and slave, appears as soon as the

barbaric warrior spares the life of his enemy when he has him down,

and brings him home to drudge for him and till the soil. How low in

civilization this begins appears by a slave caste forbidden to bear arms

forming part of several of the lower American tribes. How thoroughly

slavery was recognized as belonging to old-world society may be seen

by the way it formed part of the Hebrew patriarchal system, where the

man-servant and maid-servant are reckoned as a man’s wealth just before

his ox and his ass. It was no less so under Roman law, as is evident from

the very word _family_, which at first meant not the children but the

slaves (_famulus_). We live in days when the last remains of slavery are

disappearing from the higher nations; but though the civilized world has

outgrown the ancient institution, the benefits which early society gained

from it still remain. It was through slave labour that agriculture and

industry increased, that wealth accumulated, and leisure was given to

priests, scribes, poets, philosophers, to raise the level of men’s minds.

Out of slavery probably arose the later custom of hired _service_, the

very name of which, as derived from _servus_, a slave, tells the story

of a great social change. The master at first let out his slaves to work

for his profit, and then free men found it to their advantage to work

for their own profit, so that there grew up the great wage-earning class

whose numbers and influence make so marked a difference between ancient

and modern society. In all communities, except the smallest and simplest,

the freemen divide themselves into ranks. The old Northmen divided men

into three classes, “earls, churls, and thralls,” which roughly match

what we should now call nobles, freemen, and slaves. Nobles again fall

into different orders, especially those who can claim royal blood forming

a princely order, and looking down on the chieftains and officers of the

army, state, and church who fill the lower ranks of nobility.

As nations become more populous, rich, and intelligent, the machinery

of government has to be improved. The old rough-and-ready methods no

longer answer, and the division of labour has to be applied to politics.

Thus, one of the chief’s early duties was to be judge. A Kafir chieftain

will make it his business to hear suits between his people; each side

brings him a gift of oxen. At higher levels of civilization the Eastern

monarch sits in the gate of justice; and it was so among the ancient

Germans, where the king sat crowned and gave judgment in his own court.

It is still the king’s court, but the actual administration has long

passed into the hands of professional judges. So with other departments

of government. By the time civilization had come to the level of ancient

Egypt and Babylon public affairs were administered by officials in grades

like an army, who collected the taxes, attended to public works, punished

offences, and did justice between man and man. It has just been noticed

how far a modern nation is worked by an official system similar to that

of the ancients, and how we, really among the freest of peoples, preserve

the forms of an absolute monarchy, where sovereign power is administered

through servants of the Crown down to the exciseman and constable. In

the politics of savages and barbarians, the outlines of the civilized

system of government already come into view. We have seen how among such

rude tribes the chief or king appears, who holds his place in some form

through higher nations. Even the consul or president of a republic is a

kind of temporary elective king. Of not less antiquity is the senate.

The old men squatting round the council fire of an Indian tribe on the

prairies have in their way a greater influence than a civilized senate,

for where there are no written records and books the old men are the very

sources and treasuries of wisdom. In the nations of the world, seats at

such councils are given to wise old men, priests and officers of high

rank, and heads of great families, so that the two terms _senate_ and

_house of lords_ both have their proper meaning, and the two claims of

wisdom and rank are more or less combined. With the very beginning of

political life appears also the popular assembly. In small tribes the

whole community, or at least the freemen, come together. It may be only

a forest tribe in Brazil called together by the chief to decide some

question of an expedition to net wildfowl or attack a neighbouring tribe,

yet solemn form will be observed. There is silence for the orators, and

if the assembly approve they will at last cry “good!” or “be it so!”

More civilized forms of the assembly of the people may be studied in

Freeman’s comparison of the Achaian _agora_ described in the second book

of the Iliad, with the “great meeting” held outside London in Edward the

Confessor’s time. Even in our own day the great meeting of the people

has not disappeared from Europe. The wonderful sight is still to be seen

of the people of a Swiss canton gathered together in a wide meadow or

market-place to vote Yes or No on the great questions which their supreme

authority decides. With the growth of nations the folk-moot or assembly

of the whole people, never a good deliberative body, soon becomes

unmanageable by mere numbers; but there is a way by which its authority

may be kept in a less unwieldy form when the people, no longer able to

go themselves, send chosen representatives to act for them. This seems a

simple device enough, and indeed the first savage tribe that ever sent a

discreet orator to negotiate peace or war on its behalf had seized the

idea of a political representative. But in fact it is one of the most

remarkable points in political history, how the principle of popular

representation has been worked out in England from the time of Simon de

Montfort’s famous parliament in the 13th century. It is for historians

to discuss how the knights and burgesses who came up to grant the king’s

supplies passed into the lower house of parliament as it is now; what

has to be noticed here is the change which, while the huge promiscuous

assembly of the people shrank into an aristocratic upper house, gave us

a new elective popular body, the _house of commons_. It is not too much

to say that no event in English history has had so great an effect in

shaping the course of modern civilization. On the whole, looking at what

government is coming to among the most enlightened nations, it will be

seen that it attains its ends, not so much by casting off the methods of

our remote barbaric ancestors, as by improving and regulating them. The

administration of the state under the system of sovereign authority, the

control of the senate, and the source of political power in the will of

the nation itself, are made to work together and restrain one another so

as fairly to keep the benefits and neutralize the excesses of all, while

the constitution has within it the power of continual reform, so that

the machine of government may be ever shaping itself into more perfect

fitness to its work.

Here this sketch of Anthropology may close. The examination of man’s age

on the earth, his bodily structure and varieties of race and language,

has led us on to enquire into his intellectual and social history. In

his many-sided life there may be clearly traced a development, which,

notwithstanding long periods of stoppage and frequent falling back, has

on the whole adapted modern civilized man for a far higher and happier

career than his ruder ancestors. In this development, the preceding

chapters have shown a difference between low and high nations, which it

only remains to put before the reader as a practical moral to the tale

of civilization. It is true that both among savage and civilized peoples

progress in culture takes place, but not under the same conditions. The

savage by no means goes through life with the intention of gathering more

knowledge and framing better laws than his fathers. On the contrary,

his tendency is to consider his ancestors as having handed down to him

the perfection of wisdom, which it would be impiety to make the least

alteration in. Hence among the lower races there is obstinate resistance

to the most desirable reforms, and progress can only force its way with

a slowness and difficulty which we of this century can hardly imagine.

Looking at the condition of the rude man, it may be seen that his

aversion to change was not always unreasonable, and indeed may often have

arisen from a true instinct. With his ignorance of any life but his own,

he would be rash to break loose from the old tried machinery of society,

to plunge into revolutionary change, which might destroy the present good

without putting better in its place. Had the experience of ancient men

been larger, they would have seen their way to faster steps in culture.

But we civilized moderns have just that wider knowledge which the rude

ancients wanted. Acquainted with events and their consequences far and

wide over the world, we are able to direct our own course with more

confidence toward improvement. In a word, mankind is passing from the age

of unconscious to that of conscious progress. Readers who have come thus

far need not be told in many words of what the facts must have already

brought to their minds—that the study of man and civilization is not only

a matter of scientific interest, but at once passes into the practical

business of life. We have in it the means of understanding our own lives

and our place in the world, vaguely and imperfectly it is true, but at

any rate more clearly than any former generation. The knowledge of man’s

course of life, from the remote past to the present, will not only help

us to forecast the future, but may guide us in our duty of leaving the

world better than we found it.

SELECTED BOOKS, &c.

PHYSICAL AND DESCRIPTIVE ANTHROPOLOGY:—

Waitz, Anthropologie der Naturvölker.

Topinard, Anthropology.

Darwin, Descent of Man.

Huxley, Man’s Place in Nature; Geographical Distribution of

Mankind (in _Journal of Ethnological Society_, Vol. II. 1870).

Vogt, Lectures on Man.

Prichard, Natural History of Man.

Wood, Natural History: Man.

Peschel, Races of Man.

Quatrefages, Human Species.

Flower, Hunterian Lectures on “The Comparative Anatomy of Man.”

_Nature_, July 1879, and May and June 1880.

Broca, Instructions Craniologiques.

Anthropological Notes and Queries for Travellers, &c. (British

Association).

Journal of the Anthropological Institute (London).

Revue d’Anthropologie (Paris).

Zeitschrift für Ethnologie (Berlin).

Accounts of races by travellers and missionaries, such as

Catlin, North American Indians; Ellis, Polynesian Researches;

Wallace, Travels on the Amazon, and Malay Archipelago; Burton,

Lake Regions of Central Africa; J. L. Wilson, Western Africa;

Grey, Travels in Australia; etc., etc.

GEOLOGY AND ARCHÆOLOGY OF MAN:—

Lubbock, Prehistoric Times.

Lyell, Antiquity of Man.

Dawkins, Cave-hunting; Early Man in Britain.

Evans, Ancient Stone Implements of Great Britain.

Fergusson, Rude Stone Monuments.

Keller and Lee, Lake Dwellings of Switzerland.

Nilsson, Primitive Inhabitants of Scandinavia.

Wilson, Prehistoric Man.

PHILOLOGY:—

Max Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language.

Sayce, Comparative Philology; Introduction to the Science of

Language.

Whitney, Language and the Study of Language.

Hovelacque and Vinson, The Science of Language.

Pictet, Origines Indo-Européennes.

Steinthal, Charakteristik der hauptsachlichsten Typen des

Sprachbaues.

CIVILISATION:—

Maine, Ancient Law.

Lubbock, Origin of Civilisation.

Bagehot, Physics and Politics.

Freeman, Comparative Politics; Historical Essays.

Draper, Intellectual Development of Europe.

McLennan, Studies in Ancient History.

Morgan, Ancient Society.

Spencer, Principles of Sociology.

Klemm, Allgemeine Culturgeschichte; Culturwissenchaft.

Tylor, Early History of Mankind; Primitive Culture.

INDEX.

A

Abacus, 314

Abstract ideas, 52, 119, 135

words, 135

Acclimatisation, 74

Administration, 434

Æsop, 399

Affixes, 142

Africans, 2, 57, 65, 87

languages, 164

Aged, 409

Agglutinating languages, 161

Agriculture, 214

Ainos, 73

Albinos, 68

Alchemy, 328

Alcoholic liquors, 268

Algebra, 322

Alliteration, 289

Alphabet, 175

Altar, 367

Amentum, 194

Americans, 63, 102, 168

languages, 165

Analogy, 338

Analytic languages, 139

Anatomy, 330

Ancestor-worship, 352, 358, 369

Animals, cries of, 122

domesticated, 219

quaternary, 30

succession of, 37

Animism, 371

Antiquity of Man, 1, 25, 33, 40, 113, 166

Apes and Man, 38, 48, 260

Arabs, 109

language, 11, 159

Arch, 235

Architecture, 21, 232

Aristocracy, 225, 435

Arithmetic, 17, 314

Armour, 222

Army, 226, 434

Arrow, 26, 195, 212

poisoned, 221

Artillery, 227

Aryans, 10, 109, 156, 381

languages, 10, 156

Assyrians, 22, 160, 313, 384

language, 160

Astrology, 339

Astronomy, 21, 332

Australians, 57, 91

Auxiliary words, 137

Avesta, 381

B

Babylonians, 22, 163, 172

language, 163

Baking, 266

Ball, 307

Bantu languages, 149, 164

Barbaric stage, 24, 401

Bark-clothing, 244

Barometer, 325

Barter, 281

Basuto, 165

Beast-fables, 399

Beer, 268

Berbers, 95

language, 160

Biblical history, 385

Bill-hook, 190

Bills of exchange, 284

Black races, 2, 5, 80, 87

Blood-brotherhood, 423

Blood-vengeance, 414

Blow-tube, 196

Blue Beard, 398

Boat, 252

Body-measures, 17, 316

Boiling, 266

Boomerang, 193

Borer, 192

Botany, 329

Bow, 16, 195, 212

Brachykephalic, 61

Brain, 45, 60

Brand-tillage, 218

Bread, 266

Brick, 234

Broiling, 265

Bronze, 21, 278

Bronze Age, 25, 279

Brown races, 2, 5, 91

Buddha, 399

Burial, 347

Burning-lens and mirror, 263

Bushmen, 57, 89, 165

C

Cafusos, 82

Candle, 272

Cannibalism, 224, 410

Canoe, 252

Cardinal points, 21, 334

Caribs, 78

Caste, 69

Cattle, 219

Cause, spirit, 356

Cave-men, 30, 261

Caves, 229

Celt, 26, 187

Cereals, 215

Ceremonies, 365, 403, 423

Chaldeans, 22, 384

Chemistry, 328

Chess, 308

Chiefs, 428

Children’s language, 128

Chimney, 264

Chinese, 2, 57, 63, 162, 170

language, 162

Civilisation, 13, 18, 24, 75, 180, 400

Civilised stage, 24, 401

Clicks, 165

Clothing, 15, 236

Club, 184

Coffee, 270

Coin, 283

Colour, 66, 81, 85

Comedy, 299

Commerce, 285

Common land, 419

Compass, 28, 341

Concord, 147

Consciousness, 53

Constitution of races, 73

Constitutionalism, 438

Cookery, 264

Copper, 277

Corn, 215

Counting, 18, 310

Creator, 358

Cromlech, 348

Cross-bow, 16, 196

Crossed races, 6, 80

Cultivation, 215

Cuneiform writing, 172, 31

Custom, 409

D

Dagger, 190

Dancing, 224, 296

Dark-whites, 2, 56, 68, 107

Dead, worship of, 352

Deaf-and-dumb signs, 115

Death, 343

Decimal counting, 311

Decline of culture, 19

Deformation of skull, &c., 240

Degeneration, 19, 86

Demoniacal possession, 353

Demons, 352

Demon-worship, 353

Descent, female and male, 402

Despotism, 431

Digging-stick, 216

Diseases, 73, 353

Distilling, 269, 328

Dog, 209

Dolichokephalic, 2, 61

Dolmen, 348

Domesticated animals, 219

Drama, 298

Dravidians, 94

languages, 164

Drawing, 31, 300

Dreams, 343

Drift, animals of, 30

implements of, 28, 187

Drift-period, 28

Drill, 202

Drum, 293

Dryads, 357

Dualism, 363

Dutch, 9

Dwellings, 229

E

Ear- and nose-ornaments, 242

Earth-god, 359

Echo, 357

Education, capacity for, 74

Egyptians, 3, 21, 69, 79, 95, 173, 383

language, 160

Electricity, 327

Elephants, fossil, 30, 388

Emotional sound, 120, 124

Empire, 433

English, 133

Eponymic myths, 389

Esquimaux, 105, 265

Ethiopians, 69

Etymology, 126, 134

Europeans, 60, 109

Evolution, 36, 331

Exogamy, 402

Exorcism, 354

Eyes, 2, 63, 70

F

Facial angle, 62

Fair-whites, 2, 56, 68, 107

Families of language, 9, 155

Family, 402, 426

Fates, 395

Father, power of, 427

Features, 44, 63

Federation, 433

Female succession, 429

Feudalism, 420

Fiction, 379

Fields, 218, 420

Figures, 312

Fijians, 90

Finger- and toe-counting, 18, 310

Finger-nails, 240

Finns, 98

Fire, 260

Fire-arms, 17, 197, 227

Fire-drill, 16, 261

Fire-god, 361

First man, 358

Fish-hook, 213

Fishing, 212

Flakes, stone, 26, 185

Flint-and-steel, 261

Food, 206, 264

Forests, succession of, 27

Fortification, 228

Fossil bones, 388

Fowling, 208

Freemen, 225, 434

Fruits, 216

Future life, 344, 349

G

Game law, 419

Games, 305

Garments, 249

Gas, 273

Gender, 149

Genius, 356

Geography, 335

Geology, 29, 32, 336

Geometry, 17, 318

Germans, 110

language, 9

Gesture-language, 114, 124, 310

Ghosts, 344, 349

Giants, 388

Glacial period, 30

Glass, 276

Gods, 358

Gogmagog, 390

Government, 15, 428, 437

Grain, 215

Grammar, 119, 146, 156

Grammatical words, 137

Gravitation, 325

Greeks, 158

Grimm’s law, 155

Guardian spirits, 356

Gypsies, 112

H

Hair, 2, 44, 71, 82

Hair-dressing, 238

Hammer, 185

Hand and foot, 42

counting on, 18, 310

Harmony, 293

Harp, 204

Harpoon, 214

Hatchet, 188

Hawking, 209

Heat, 327

Heaven-god, 359

Hebrew, 11, 159

Herodotus, 385

Hieroglyphics, 173

Hindus, 111, 157

Historic period, 5, 22, 375

Hoe, 216

Horatii and Curiatii, 397

Hospitality, 409

Hottentots, 89, 165

language, 165

House, 231

Houses of Lords and Commons, 437

Hungarians, 98

language, 162

Hunting, 207, 220

Hut, 230

I

Ideas, 52, 119, 135

Idols, 366

Imitative signs, 116

sounds, 124

words, 121

Implements, 183

Index, Kephalic, 61

India, hill-tribes, 2, 94

laterite, 31

races, 111, 164

Individuals, 421, 428

Infanticide, 427

Inflecting languages, 161

Inheritance, 421

Inspiration, 366

Instinct, 51

Interjections, 121, 124

Intonation, 162, 291

Iron, 21, 277

Iron Age, 25, 279

Italians, 158

J

Javelin, 193

Jews, 4, 109, 159, 385

Justice, 436

K

Keltic peoples, 28, 71, 110, 153

languages, 158

Kephalic index, 61

Killing, 412

old and infirm, 410

King, 430, 436

Knife, 189

L

Labret, 242

Lamp, 272

Lancet, 192

Land, common, 219, 419

Land-law, 218, 419

Language, 7, 53, 129, 152, 337

analytic and synthetic, 139

and race, 166

children’s, 128

connexion of, 154

development of, 130

families of, 9, 155

natural, 122

origin of, 130, 165

Lapps, 98

Lathe, 203

Latin, 7, 156

Law, 405, 412, 423

Lazo, 212

Leather, 245

Lens, 263

Libyans, 69

Life, future, 344, 349

Light, 326

Lion, cave, 30

Liquors, 268

Logic, 336

Long-bow, 16, 195

Loom, 248

Lucifer-matches, 263

M

Machines, 198

Magic, 338

Maize, 215

Malayo-Polynesians, 102

language, 163

Malays, 99

Mammoth, 30

Man, 38, 45

antiquity of, 1, 25, 33, 40, 113, 166

first, 358

primitive, 33, 40, 113

unity of, 6, 85

races of, 1, 56, 75, 85, 113

Manes, 352, 358

Manslaughter, 412

Maoris, 102, 374

Mariner’s compass, 328, 341

Marriage, 402

Masonry, 21, 233

Mathematics, 17, 321

Mats, 246

Maui, 393

Measures, 17, 316

Mechanics, 323

Medicine, 15, 330

Melanesians, 89

Melanochroi, 107

Melody, 293

Memory, 49

Menhir, 348

Mensuration, 317

Mesokephalic, 61

Metal Age, 25, 189

Metals, 20, 189, 277

Metaphor, 126, 290

Metre, 288

Mexicans, 105, 169

Micronesians, 102

Mill, 200, 204

Mind, 47

Mirror, 263, 326

Missiles, 193

Mixed races, 80, 85

Monarchy, 431

Money, 282

Mongolians, 5, 63, 96

languages, 162

Monosyllabic languages, 162

Monotheism, 364

Moon-god, 361

Moors, 111

Morals, 368, 405

Mourning, 237

Mulattos, 80

Music, 291

Mutilations, 240

Myth, 387

N

Nation, 433

Natural language, 122

Nature-myths, 391

Nature-spirits, 356, 391

Need-fire, 262

Needle, 249

Negritos, 89

Negro-European dialects, 153

Negros, 2, 57, 65, 87

Neolithic implements, 26, 187

Nets, 212

Nightmare, 357

Nobles, 435

Nomades, 219

Norns, 395

Nose, 63

Nubians, 94

Numerals, 18, 310

Nymphs, 357

O

Oar, 256

Oath, 362, 425

Oblique eyes, 2, 63

Oracle-priests, 366

Ordeal, 425

Origin of language, 130, 165

of man, 85

Ornaments, 241

Orthognathous, 62

Outrigger, 255

P

Paddle, 256

Painting, 301

body, 237

Palæolithic implements, 26, 186

Pantheism, 364

Pantomime, 114, 298

Paper-money, 284

Papuas, 72, 90

Parts of speech, 138

Pasturage, 219

Patagonians, 57

Paternal power, 427

Patriarchal system, 429

Pendulum, 324

Persians, 63, 157, 381

Personal property, 420

Personification, 395

Peruvians, 59, 105

Phœnicians, 175

language, 59

Physics, 323

Picture-writing, 168

Pipe, 294

Plaiting, 246

Plants, 214

Plough, 217

Poetry, 287, 375

Poison, arrow-, 221

fish, 213

Polynesians, 102, 374

language, 163

Polytheism, 362

Popular assembly, 437

Porcelain, 276

Possession, demoniacal, 15, 353

Potato, 215

Pottery, 274

wheel, 275

Præhistoric period, 5, 374

Prayer, 360, 364

Primogeniture, 422

Printing, 180

Private war, 419

Prognathous, 62

Prometheus, 396

Pronouns, 138

Property, 419

Proportions of body, 58

Prose, 287

Public opinion, 408

Pulley, 198

Punishment, 414

Pyramids, 21, 233, 334

Pyrites, 263

Q

Quadroons, 80

Quaternary period, 29

Quinary numeration, 311

R

Races and languages, 153, 165

characters of, 1, 56, 75, 80, 113

degeneration of, 86

mixture or crossing of, 80, 85

permanence of, 80

variation of, 80, 85

Raft, 255

Rain-god, 359

Rank, 434

Real words, 137

Reason, 50, 336

Red Ridinghood, 394

Reduplication, 128

Religion, 342, 368, 407, 432

Rent, 420

Representation, political, 437

Retaliation, 417

Retribution, future, 368

Rhyme, 289

Right of life, 427

River-god, 361

Romance languages, 7

Romulus and Remus, 380

Roots, 144

Rude stone monuments, 348

Rudimentary organs, 36

S

Sacrifice, 346, 360, 365

Sail, 256

Samoyeds, 60

Sanskrit, 10, 156

Savage stage, 24, 32, 401

Saw, 192

Scandinavians, 111, 158

Screw, 192, 203

Sculpture, 300

Sea-god, 360

Semitic nations, 4, 69, 80

languages, 11, 159

Senate, 436

Sentences, 139

Sewing, 249

Shield, 222

Ship, 257

Siamese, 97, 162

Sign-language, 114

Skin, 2, 66, 81

Skull, 2, 60

deformation, 240

Sky-god, 359

Slavery, 225, 421, 434

Sling, 194

Smell of races, 2, 70

Society, 401

Song, 224, 287, 375

Soul, 343, 350, 369

Sound, 326

South-East Asian languages, 162

Spade, 216

Spear, 186, 194, 213

Spear-throwers, 194

Species, descent of, 36, 331

Spelling, 178

Spinning, 246

Spirit, 344, 349, 356, 391

Stature, 56, 76

Steam-power, 204, 259, 271

Steel, 278

Stone Age, 25, 28, 187, 279

implements, 26, 187

monuments, 348

Stove, 264

String, 246

Succession, 429, 432

Sun-god, 360, 368

Sun-myth, 394, 397

Supreme deity, 364

Survivals, 15

Sword, 190

Symbolic sound, 126, 143

Syntax, 119, 139, 146

Synthetic languages, 141

Syrians, 69, 80

T

Tactics, 226

Tanning, 245

Tasmanians, 91

Tatars, 98

language, 161

Tatooing, 237

Tea, 270

Temperament of races, 74

Temple, 348, 367

Tent, 231

Teutons, 158

Theatre, 298

Theft, 413

Thunderbolt, 26, 359

Thunder-god, 359

Tools, 183, 192

Torch, 272

Totem, 403

Trade, 285

Tradition, 373

Tragedy, 299

Trance, 343

Transmigration of soul, 350, 369

Trapping, 211

Tree-spirits, 357

Tribe-land, 419

Trumpet, 293

Turanian languages, 161

Typical men, 76

V

Vampire, 356

Variation of races, 84

Veda, 156, 381

Veddas, 164

Vengeance, 414

Verse, 287

Vertebrates, 35, 47

Vessels, 274

Vigesimal counting, 311

Village community, 219, 420

Vishnu, 367, 397

Visions, 343

W

Wages, 435

War, 221, 418, 432

War-chief, 430

Water-wheel, 204

Weapons, 184, 221

Weaving, 247

Werewolf, 356

Wergild, 416

Wheel-carriage, 198

White race, 2, 5, 57, 69, 109, 113

Widow, 346, 404

Wife-capture, 225, 305, 403

Wife-purchase, 404

Wilhelm Tell, 397

Wind-god, 361

Wind-mill, 204

Wine, 268

Words, borrowed, 155

combination, 140

formation, 126, 140

Worship, 364

Writing, 169

X

Xanthochroic, 107

Y

Yellow race, 2, 5, 69, 96

Z

Zoology, 329

LONDON: R. CLAY, SONS, AND TAYLOR.

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