ULTIMATE RESOLUTION OF THE SOCIETAL NEUROSIS IN ITS SOCIAL IMPLICATION
The first demand of our organic completion through a unification with
another is a unification within oneself. From a basis of a divided self
one can look out only dividedly. From a separative mode one can judge
only separatively. If the individual embodies a symbolic replacement
within himself, others about him appear to him necessarily also as
symbolic replacements, and the degree of his resentment toward his own
separateness is the measure of his resentment toward theirs. After all,
the only implacable enemy of man is his own unconsciousness, and the
reconcilement of himself to himself the severest test of his essential
personality. Its realization is born of a patience that is not virtue
but encompassment.
Man, in his unconsciousness, stands ever by himself and for himself.
In the separateness of his personal resistances toward the societal
organism as a whole, the individual has become marooned within his
own insular habituations. But this isolated attitude of mind is a
condition which, in our interpretation, is societally anomalous. Though
originally imposed, this condition now automatically imposes itself
upon the social personality. Thus far this organic disaffection of man
has sought alleviation in the social convivialities that are but the
syndicate of men’s collective unconscious. Men have sought to appease
their personal isolation through the accommodations of mere objective
agreement. They have substituted the symbols of social fraternization
for the actuality of man’s organic consonance. Within the unconscious
of man his secret disaffection has remained unaltered still.
So often this statement that every man is for himself alone has
brought the rejoinder: “But why may he not be? Surely such selfishness
is natural to man.” But is it? I do not think so. Of course I
have not in mind the individual’s effort of preservation in the
interests of his natural life and growth. I have in mind the private
differentiations due to man’s _mental attitude of self-distinction_.
In the conservation of interests incident to the individual’s instinct
of physical preservation, man’s native experience entails no secret
_self-conscious_ design. But it is the tell-tale of man’s mental
attitude of personal separatism that he is constantly under the
necessity to _pretend_ that he is not separative or for himself. This
universal pretence reveals a biologically specious condition of life
for which we feel a universal need of concealment. For whatsoever
attitude of mind is not openly compatible with the personality imposes
a division of the personality. A socially divided personality is a
socially insecure personality. Back of the social mind that pretends
it is not concerned exclusively for self lies a basis of social fear
and distrust. Pretence is division of personality, and division of
personality is fear. If the pretence and the division are social, the
fear is social. The effort of numbers or of the social consensus to
combine in support of their mutual fear is unavailing, for a consensus
begotten of fear is an organically spurious consensus. At the heart of
it lies a secret division. This is the travesty of normality with its
secret soviet of fear.
The analyst or the psychiatrist whose outlook is objective fails
to regard this consensual fallacy in its social as in its personal
implication. Being of the social unconscious he cannot contemplate
the social unconscious. Being himself divided he cannot realize his
own division. We all prefer the satisfaction of seeming together
socially to the reality of being together organically. We like the
seeming integrity of the social unconscious because it conceals
our own disaffection. It is only this seeming security of numerical
preponderance, however, that affords us comfortable protection
against the aberrations of the isolated, non-conformable or neurotic
personality. Nowhere is the autocracy of unconsciousness more blindly
cruel than in the mass impetus of our social consolidation. We are not
unaware of the resistance of the individual to the social consensus,
but we have yet to discover the resistance of the social consensus
to the individual. The psychopathologist has offered interesting
formulations regarding delusions of persecution, but none whatever
regarding delusions that persecute.
The group work that has been gradually developing among my students
and myself has consisted essentially in a reversal of this habitually
objective course of the psychiatrist. Instead of studying ideas of
reference objectively as expressed in the individual, we have studied
ideas of reference subjectively as they occur socially among ourselves.
Our experience as a group has led us inevitably to the conclusion that
the personal analysis is a self-contradictory process, that only as
the individual realizes through his societal experience the futility
of the personal or private basis is it biologically possible to be
truly in harmony with a healthy and constructive environment. If our
position has any value and significance it is because it has come to
us through the daily test of an actual living experience, and because
as a societal experience it cannot fail to extend itself societally to
others also.
Let it not be thought, however, that our efforts toward a social
analysis have proceeded upon a smooth and untroubled course. If
the individual has his “ups and downs” in the effort to unify his
consciousness on the basis of a personal analysis, he meets no less
with alternations of satisfaction and depression according as his
resistances surge or ebb in his efforts toward a social unification of
consciousness. If the individual analysis presents a situation that is
unconscious and bidimensional, a group analysis presents a condition
that is equally unconscious and bidimensional. In the bidimensional
reaction of the individual toward the personal analysis, he tends, as
we have seen, toward a permanent fixation upon the analyst which shows
itself alternately in the mental reaction of “love” or of “hate.” But
in either the personal or social situation he tends to hold tenaciously
to this new object of his infantile affect in the secret hope of
ultimately reconciling and amalgamating it with the love that underlies
still the original mother-image. Unhappily, it is the invariable
failure of the personal analysis that the patient carries his secret
purpose to a successful issue. For either he remains fastened between
the old and the new love-objects in a consolidated image-fixation upon
the analyst, or else he returns to the original love-image afforded by
the parent or to its surrogates, with or without the collateral aids of
sublimation.
In the actual experience of our group analysis the tendency was
essentially no different. But there was an additional recourse in the
group analysis that is precluded in the personal analysis. In the
personal analysis there is a bidimensional attitude toward the analyst
that alternates constantly between infantile docility and infantile
resentment, between sentimental approbation at one time and outraged
disillusionment at another. But this alternation always occurs, of
course, within one and the same individual. In the social analysis
the situation is expressed quite differently. It was my experience
that this diversity of reaction within the group led at first to the
formation of reaction-clusters within the group, so that one unit
became consistently docile toward the analyst and resentful among
themselves, while the other unit became hostile toward the analyst and
docile toward one another. Both alternations (resentment or docility)
were, of course, equally spurious within each group of reactions.
The practical outcome in each sub-group was very different however. In
the cluster that united against the analyst, a confederacy was formed
that presented all the features of unconsciousness we have seen to
characterize the collective reactions occurring everywhere throughout
the domain of our normal adaptation. The psychology of this reaction,
as we know, is the collective pooling of the unconscious of its members
severally, with a view to the mass support afforded each individual
within the unit separately. The result as it occurred in this cluster
was a temporary deadlock and a corresponding re-adoption of the normal
level of bidimensional standards, personal and social.
In the cluster in which the sense of resentment was limited to
inter-reactions among its own members, while as a unit all held an
attitude of friendliness toward the analyst, there was offered a form
of group-unconsciousness that at least lent itself to progressive
analysis and resolution. But here again there was discoverable the
secret pooling of unconscious motives of personal interest and
self-protection that in no way differentiated this group division from
the former, that did not separate the “faithful” from the “unfaithful,”
nor absolve the “docile” any more than the “resentful” from a secret
complicity in the collective reaction that is the mass neurosis of
normality.
It should be remembered that the plan of group analysis was adopted
not because I had _a priori_ found in it the logical solution of
the neurosis. Not by any means. Neither had I inductively reached
conclusions that led to any such logical determination. Not even
theoretically was there at hand anything of the nature of a _logical_
solution. A dissociation is not logical and its solution could
not be logical. The neurosis is not a matter of the intellect and
the process of its unravelling could not have been intellectually
predetermined. As thought and affect are processes that occupy
essentially different spheres, to _think out_ a solution for a disorder
of affect is self-contradictory. To attempt to do so is beyond the
range of organic possibility. All that I had in mind in our group
undertaking was _to obtain affective conditions shared in common that
might afford a basis for the observation of affective conditions
withheld separately_. It seemed to offer the opportunity to secure a
relative and societal background against which the individual would be
enabled to view in impersonal perspective his own hitherto absolute
and personal evaluations. Up to this time I had for years worked on
the group conception in the absence of any tangible background of
experimentation. There was now needed the practical substantiation
of this group conception in the actual assembling of “analyzed”
individuals into an organized social aggregate. While the programme
of group analysis entered upon by my students and myself came into an
intensive application with the beginning of the year 1923,[52] it was
actually the summer of that year that marked the active inception of
our experiment as an organized unit, our group having then its first
opportunity of a practical test in the daily contact of its members;
so that we were still at this time only feeling our way toward the
ultimate outcome of an analysis involving more than two or three
individuals.
In my view the really significant finding that has resulted from
our close mental association as a group has been the opportunity of
demonstrating through group experience the practical significance of
the very unexpected disclosure upon which I chanced some years ago in
my conception of the bidimensional image and its influence upon the
reactions of consciousness at large. It is this conception which has
proved to be the real foundation of our work. I am convinced that an
adjustment of consciousness, whether analytic or conventional, whether
of the laboratory or of the street, will ultimately demand that we
bring to book the very origins of our mental and social systems of
“thinking,” that we challenge our customary values of mental adaptation
at their very foundation. Our problem resolves itself into one that
shall challenge in every detail the fixed basis of an arbitrary and
unconscious position of absolutism as contrasted with the fluent
evaluations that alone pertain to a basis of conscious relativity.
Upon the basis of our prevailing personal criterion first inculcated
through the alternative precept of good and bad, the mind of every
individual existing under our present social system is disposed
toward a dualism of outlook that renders every affective judgment of
the individual irreconcilable and self-contradictory. For a basis
that rests upon a mental _standard_ or criterion of evaluations is
necessarily moralistic and divided. A moralistic command entails a
moralistic interdiction. Every affirmation contains _in itself_ a
negation that is equal and contrary. That is, every criterion _of its
nature_ entertains its opposite. Whatsoever I must be or think or feel,
I must at the same time also not be or think or feel. Whatsoever I
believe, to that precise degree I likewise disbelieve.[53]
This is not so simple. It is not by any means so simple as we tend to
make it. It does not merely mean, as we would like to think, that if
I love good people I do not love bad people. Not at all. That would
be obvious and a matter of fact. It would leave our absolutism quite
intact and our criteria quite unchallenged in their fallacy. It means
something far subtler than this. It means that if I love good people I
_do not_ love good people. It means that in the measure in which I love
an object, in that measure I hate that object. It means, in sum, that,
within a system of absolute measures, my concept “love” as my concept
“good” is throughout fanciful and artificial, that, in disturbing the
natural equilibrium of the organism, my mental criterion is resisted
by a counter-judgment, which, being fanciful and artificial, tends
in a precisely reverse direction at one and the same time. It means
that every mental image, arising on the basis of our present absolute
criterion, possesses unconsciously an ambivalent value. _Stating the
proposition in psycho-dynamic terms, every affective mental image is
counterbalanced by an opposite image having an attractive force that
possesses the quality of all bidimensional (or pendular) motion and
accordingly it acts with a momentum the direction of which is at every
moment precisely equal and reverse to its own impulse._
After many years in which I have been delving into the processes of
the unconscious and striving to unearth its intricate mechanisms,
I have come upon no phenomenon that has seemed to me of such basic
significance as this illusory mechanism of unconscious dualism and
conflict that underlies our absolute criteria of values, individual
and social. Through Freud we have learned that a psychic ambivalence
underlies the neurotic processes of the individual, but we have not yet
learned that an equal ambivalence underlies the processes of the social
unconscious. Furthermore, while Freud has shown that there is this
ambivalence of motive underlying the individual process represented
by the neurotic conflict, it remains to be seen that each term within
this ambivalent outlook is itself likewise ambivalent--that psychic
ambivalence necessarily presupposes at all times an essential condition
of ambivalence that repeatedly doubles upon itself. For, if we will
examine either term of our ambivalent proposition, we shall find that
it too is based on opposed valences. That is, on our present absolute
basis of evaluation, every term of our subjective judgment necessarily
divides and re-divides with its very inception. Not only does the
contrast between love and hate represent ambivalence, but love contains
in itself an ambivalent motive, and hate contains in itself a motive
that is equally ambivalent. And so, to whatever subjective determinant
we may turn, there is inevitably this inseparable element of contrast
due to our own subjectively bidimensional basis.
As regards the neurosis of the individual, we have learned through
Freud that an unconscious system of images, operating to inhibit
spontaneous thought and action, is the essential meaning of this
disorder. Of course, Freud attributes such disorders of development
to an associative inadequacy resident in the individual organism. But
in the study of the social unconscious upon the inclusive basis of
a relative method of approach, we shall recognize that an identical
system of images operates to hinder the spontaneous expression of the
social organism; that as there exists a neurosis of the individual that
is due to an unconscious system of personal images, so there exists a
neurosis of the social mind due to an equally unconscious system of
social images; and finally that the latter condition within the social
consciousness as a whole is the primary and essential disorder of
which the individual manifestation is but a subsequent and secondary
symptom.[54]
It is not possible to speak of the group basis of analysis that has
become the central feature of my own work without calling attention to
a bidimensional situation that has made itself felt within the ranks
of psychoanalysts themselves. Moreover, this situation has forced into
prominence a hitherto unrecognized impasse within our psychoanalytic
interpretations, precisely because of the inevitable conditions of an
individualistic basis of analysis. The outstanding theoretical feature
of Freud’s position toward his patients has always been a policy of
“hands off.” With the inception of psychoanalysis it has been the
signal position of Freud, and subsequently of us all, that the patient
shall be left free of all domination or direction or suggestion, that
in order that he come into a sense of adult responsibility toward his
social environment generally he must come into a responsibility toward
his own mental processes as they relate directly to the analyst. This
policy of non-interference is one which those of us who have attempted
to follow the psychoanalytic programme have adhered to with strict
conformity. But it is clear that the analyst becomes automatically the
all-engrossing criterion (transference) of the patient’s unconscious
and that unconsciously the analyst assumes toward his patient a
corresponding position of personal criterion. So that, however sincere
our intention, there has resulted what is perhaps the weakest point
in our psychoanalytic technique, a point that has warranted the most
severe criticism of our work, namely, that treatment by psychoanalysis
continues for a far too long and indefinite term.
To offset this embarrassment recourse is now had to a procedure whereby
the analysis is brought to a conclusion at a certain definitely
assigned period--a period to be determined by the analyst according
to the circumstances in each case. The change proposed, then, is
from a course of indefinite to a course of definite duration; from
a procedure that, at least theoretically, places upon the patient
the responsibility of terminating the analysis to a procedure that
definitely takes this responsibility from him and places it in the
hands of the analyst. But, in proposing that the analyst shall at
an assignable moment in the analysis peremptorily determine upon a
definite period at which the analysis shall cease, and in formally
pronouncing that from this moment on the patient shall be cured,
we are confronted again with the deadlock of the bidimensional and
alternative. In this recourse we are merely resorting again to the
legislation of suggestion and, unconsciously falling a victim to the
pictorial concept “cure,” we are in no sense meeting the issue. For
in the criterion of the suddenly achieved “cure” we are not less the
unconscious victims of an illusory and absolute criterion than we
were victims of a criterion that is illusory and absolute when we
presumed the position that the patient must at all hazards be left in a
position of freedom toward the analysis.[55] In my view, this proposal
of psychoanalysts themselves that we no longer assume a policy of
non-interference but that we offer instead the arbitrary suggestion of
spontaneous “cure,” there is sounded the death-knell of psychoanalysis
as administered on the basis of the personal analysis. This does not
mean, however, the death-knell of the basic position of psychoanalysis
as deducible from the principle first enunciated by Freud. On the
contrary, if we would enlarge the application of psychoanalysis to
include the wider scope of our societal personality, there would be
realized the necessary advance toward the full significance of Freud’s
essential principle.
It is admittedly a part of the purpose of the present thesis to show
that there do exist conditions which make treatment through the method
of psychoanalysis, as it is at present, needlessly long. But to reduce
the length of treatment calculated to adjust the distorted mind would
seem as unreasonable as to curtail the length of treatment intended to
adjust the distorted limb. As Freud remarked long ago, no one would
question the validity of the orthopaedist’s method because of the
length of time it requires. Why then all the outcry because of the
length of time often required by the psychoanalyst’s method? It is
my own feeling that if there are conditions which make the method of
psychoanalysis needlessly long, what is required is the analysis of
these conditions. I believe that under these circumstances the method
will automatically adjust itself. But to shorten a course of treatment
because it is long seems unintelligent to me. It seems merely shifting
from one unconscious condition to its equally unconscious alternative.
Let us examine more closely the real alternative here. The fact
is that by reason of the dualistic basis existing in the personal
analysis, the analyst necessarily invites the indefinite continuation
of the analysis on the part of the patient, no matter what he may
theoretically say or do to the contrary. For the analyst is himself
the victim of an unconscious criterion represented in his personal
standard of “cure.” That is, he entertains for the patient an image
of self-dependence obtainable alone through psychoanalysis. But
in this standard of “cure” he entertains a wish-motive that is
self-contradictory. For, in wishing to cure a patient through a
process of self-dependence, the analyst, because of the involvement of
his personal wish toward the patient, necessarily presents his cure
through processes that interfere with self-dependence. It is again
the bidimensional dilemma of the absolute or personal criterion, and
an absolute criterion necessarily involves a wish-motive of two terms
either of which unconsciously invites its opposite. In his personal
criterion the analyst would both release a patient with a view to
the patient’s self-dependence and at the same time retain a patient
in order to make sure that his self-dependence is complete. With one
gesture he would detain him while with the other he would set him free.
This is undoubtedly an awkward deadlock. This is the very contrary
of a cure that aims at self-dependence. For the analyst, whether in
detaining or dismissing a patient, is acting for him. But, on the
basis of the criterion of the personal image, there is inevitably this
alternative. It is unescapable.
This solicitous attitude of mind, I concede, has undoubtedly tended to
extend the course of the analysis to an indefinite duration. But does
the alternative--the arbitrary manifesto that a certain time limit
shall peremptorily conclude the analysis--really settle the issue? Does
it not rather sustain than remove the dilemma? Of course, a theoretical
assumption has been invoked that is calculated to warrant this
procedure upon psychological premises--the premises, namely, that the
analysis consists in the fanciful reproduction of the birth experience,
that the trauma in which the birth culminates physiologically must
be psychically reproduced through the trauma of sudden separation of
the personality of the patient from that of the analyst. But does
corroborating the illusory and symbolic dramatization occurring within
the neurotic mind assist such a patient in disabusing his mind of
the fallacy of the illusory and symbolic? In this alternative of a
predetermined period for a patient’s withdrawal from analysis are we
not merely having recourse to the more decisive position of the father
as contrasted with the more lenient and compromising attitude of the
mother-image? Further, in what we call the mother-father alternation
are we not again merely projecting the dualistic criterion that is our
own personal and contrasting basis of evaluation?
In my own work I have had an opportunity to realize convincingly the
completely illusory and arbitrary character of this mother-father
alternation. This has been shown in the fact that patients undergoing
analysis with me have turned to my assistant, Mr. Shields, in the
thought that they would find in him a less severe analyst than in
myself, while patients who were being analyzed by Mr. Shields have
turned to me in a similar hope. Needless to say, in either case, the
patients were equally disappointed in their quest. Yet this alternation
would have continued indefinitely had not a solution been found
elsewhere, namely, under conditions of a social analysis in which
a personal attachment is not permitted the conditions of lodgment
necessary for completing the personal illusion of permanence and
fixation.
I have come to the definite conclusion that in the individual analysis
the neurotic patient pulls the wool over the eyes of the analyst and
inevitably comes out the victor, because unconsciously the analyst is
inevitably on the patient’s side. Besides, to show sufficient interest
in an individual to sit with him in personal conference daily or three
times weekly (whatever the routine may be) is to indicate to the very
susceptible emotions of the neurotic patient that his presence is
personally desirable. The situation is only interpretable on the part
of the neurotic patient, with his unfulfilled personal emotions, as
the implication that those emotions are fully reciprocated personally
on the part of the analyst. For with whomsoever we enter into a
personal situation of mutual secrecy we are in a situation of mutual
complicity. In the secrecy and confidence of the individual analysis,
in which there is the close, private, specialized relationship of one
individual to another, there is the tacit disavowal in each of the
commonness of the socially prevalent quality of all unconsciousness.
As long as there is a private and personal system resident within the
analyst, he necessarily corroborates the private and personal system
resident within the patient in front of him. The fallacy of the private
system is the illusion of personal secrecy. Clinically, it is the
secrecy of unconsciousness that is the backbone of unconsciousness.
Though a patient divulge in minutest detail all the data entering into
his unconscious experience, he yet retains his unconsciousness if he
retains a sense of secrecy toward it.
In our group activity, as we have seen, there were several, who in
refusing to meet the organic demand for a social amalgamation of
their personality, were forced unconsciously to seek the protective
regression afforded either in family, in friends, or in some form of
defence-reaction that led to the isolated activities of mere social
or normal connivance. On the other hand, others, with no less motive
of personal defence-reaction, sought protection in the alternative
of family union which they contrived to secure among themselves, and
unconsciously assumed collectively that I, as the analyst, could be
arbitrarily delegated by them to the rôle of _pater-mater noster!_ As
I have said, there was thus formed once more an unconscious cluster,
a cluster, however, that was no less an unconscious form of social
encapsulation than the first.
Biologically it is the natural process that with the growth of their
strength offspring become less and less attached or dependent upon
the parent and that concomitantly there is more and more aptitude for
equal give-and-take activities or play with their fellows, at first
with brothers and sisters and later with those of their congeners with
whom chance affords association. Of course, though, if the parent has a
mental background that attaches the child artificially to him through
the image-suggestion of omnipotence, then, on the basis of our present
individual and social adaptation, the child cannot find in any of his
contacts a natural medium of association. Although the child may leave
his natural parent and associate objectively with his congeners, he
carries with him the image of the parent, and naturally he foists this
image upon all with whom he comes in contact. At the same time all who
come in contact with him equally foist upon him the image of _their_
omnipotent parent. Our position is that _as this image is not personal
but social it cannot be personally but only socially resolved_.
The point would seem to be that the child cannot look for companionship
in the mother or father as long as he holds the mother or father in
the light of an image or criterion. Neither can he come into simpler
relationships with his fellows on the basis of this criterion of the
mother-image without investing the personalities of his associates with
an equal image or criterion. The difficulty of the personal analysis
is the preservation of an image-situation the while one endeavours
theoretically to dispel the image. But in the natural give-and-take
of human beings in their work and play activities under conditions of
social analysis, there is afforded the reality of a social equalization
that renders untenable the secret and obsessive fixation with which we
merely _look on_ one another from the background of the bidimensional
picture.
The result of our group affiliation, to express it symbolically, has
been a family of “good” and “bad” children, of whom some desired to
run away from home while others were content to remain beside the
family hearth. Socially, the result was a bidimensional division or
alternative that exactly parallels the division or alternative within
the individual. But there is this significant difference between the
personal and the social analysis. In the individual the component that
is unwelcome may be permanently repressed, while in the alternatives
represented socially it is possible to stimulate these components into
repeated recognition through the constant clashing resultant upon
placing the opposed elements, represented by the alternate issues,
under conditions of socially irritating contrast or competition.
In the social analysis there is no letting sleeping dogs lie. Once
the unconscious of one alternative reaction has been set upon the
other, the fight is to the finish. There is not the private recess
of personal secrecy into which one may retreat. There is not the
recourse to self-partiality that allows a smoothing over of unpleasant
reminiscences and a successful substituting of more flattering
condolences.
According to our group or social conception of the neurosis it is
assumed that the causative element in the production of these disorders
is social or phyletic and that the correction of these disorders must
proceed upon a social or phyletic basis. Our position is that the
individual cannot be healthy whose consciousness is the outgrowth of
an unhealthy social mind about him. It, therefore, becomes the essence
of our group conception that the disorder of the individual presented
_manifestly_ in the individual’s “symptoms” may only be corrected
through the analysis of the social processes constituting _latently_
the individual’s collective medium.[56]
As we first learned from Freud and as has been corroborated through
researches in psychoanalysis made independently of Freud, the neurosis
is synonymous with the repression of the instinctive life of man, and
in the prevailing interpretation of psychoanalysis the remedy lies in
the successful adaptation of the personal satisfaction of sexuality
expressed both in direct physiological release and in the equivalents
of sublimation. It is our position that this interpretation is far
too narrow, that in interpreting the neurosis as due primarily to
disorders within the sphere of man’s reproductive instinct, there is
left out of account the disorders of instinct due to the obstruction
of man’s tribal or congeneric life and to the consequent interruption
of the creative expression of his personality as a societal unit.
Our feeling is that sexuality, as it now exists, is very generally
of an over-stimulated or obsessive character, owing to the undue
and greatly aggravated insistence that has been vicariously brought
to bear upon this sphere. In the absence of the natural outlets of
man’s societally instinctive expressions through the common avenues
of concerted work and play, the function natural to the physiological
process of reproduction has been overburdened and inflated out of all
proportion to its primary significance. While, as a consonant part of
the congeneric instinct of man, sex is an undoubtedly powerful urge, in
the self-interested and bidimensional bias of its autosexual, personal
quest, this manifestation has become but a symbolic exaggeration of the
natural instinct of sex. This exaggerated condition is due secondarily,
however, to a repression of the reproductive faculty of man as
naturally expressed in the creative interests of his common societal
activities. As our give-and-take expressions among our fellows develop
into activities that are reciprocally creative, in the same measure
our obsessive drive toward the satisfactions of sexuality, whether
repressed or indulged, will cease to dominate human personality in its
present completely unconscious and bidimensional image insistence.[57]