CHAPTER VII

THE BIOLOGICAL SUBSTRATE OF THE NEUROTIC CONFLICT IN ITS ORGANIC

SIGNIFICANCE

In studying the neurotic diathesis one recognizes the existence of two

marked reaction-types more or less clearly delineated one from another

in mood and _tempo_, though they equally sustain the same central

_motif_. The vicarious method of dream-analysis described in the last

chapter as having all the appearance of adequacy, when inherently it

is invalid, is especially characteristic of one of these two types

of personality. The two types may be distinguished by the contrast

between their specific reactions to the original repressive incident

occasioning the organism’s primary dissociation.

I am not in sympathy, however, with the _implication_ in the

discrimination of types demarcated as “introvert” and “extravert.”

These terms imply, as they are meant to imply, an essential difference

of type rather than a circumstantial difference of reaction. In general

the extravert is rather approvingly regarded in the light of a “jolly

good fellow,” as contrasted with the introvert whose disaffectivity,

on the contrary, tends to be regarded with an undisguised slant.

As if the jolly good-fellowship of the hysterical type, with all

its aggressiveness and ebullience, were not as truly a substitutive

alternative resultant upon repression as is the reaction of his more

silent, ingrown confrère of the opposite type! As if the affable,

effervescent type were not as truly “shut-out” as his psychological

vis-à-vis is “shut-in”! Psychiatry has a great deal to say about

the shut-in type of personality but it has nothing to say about the

shut-out type of personality. Yet of the two the latter is by no means

a less serious form of dissociation, and certainly it is by far the

more widespread in its results.

There are, then, two types of reaction to be discriminated. There is

the type of individual who upon the initial stimulus to defence has

recourse to a tactic of unconditional retreat. He simply withdraws

_in toto_, and his attitude toward his congeners is thenceforward

completely negative. He no longer sees nor is seen by them. They

are so far outside his ken that their existence is not for a moment

admitted by him. Excluded from the range of his actualities he does not

even concede them an hypothetical status. Such is the _autocentric_

individual. This personality is the subsequent precoid, if in his

withdrawal he does not even so much as pretend acknowledgment of

the external world; he is the later psychasthenic, or normal of the

socially detached type, if he adopts the more temperate policy of a

seeming _rapprochement_. In either case, enclosed within a system all

his own, he lives entirely apart from the world of actuality, ruling

alone (and of course supreme) over his self-determined cosmogony.

Then there is the type of personality whose course is the exact

opposite of that just described, the difference of reaction being due

to the modifying conditions, “constitutional” for aught I know, that

attend the repressive occasion. With this type of personality, due

to the fact that the arresting instance overtakes him, as it were,

in the open, retreat is automatically barred. He is surprised in

the act, discovered with the goods in his possession. Detection and

apprehension are here simultaneous. Unable to deny the actuality of the

situation, his instinctive recourse is in the direction of a desperate

effort to palliate the attending circumstances. Resort to an alibi

being out of the question, he seeks to exculpate himself by adopting

a policy of a more or less truckling servility. He would atone his

offence by propitiating his accusers and so winning a recommendation

of leniency. Such is the _allocentric_ type of personality. This type

may be seen either in the so-called normal individual of the socially

adaptive reaction or in the definitely efflorescent or hysterical

neurotic, according respectively as he succeeds in conniving in the

social pretence and unconsciousness about him and thus saves his

own neck, or as he fails in his effort at social compromise--the

process flatteringly known to-day as “sublimation.” In this event his

failure of adaptation is due to the stronger urge within him of the

factors that are allied with the underlying communism of his organic

consciousness but which in his mental dissociation he is unable to

co-ordinate with his innate experience.

Viewed biologically these two types represent, as I see them, a

functional over-emphasis _in the individual_ of the reactions

pertaining to one or the other of the two fundamental co-ordinated

systems underlying the biology of man’s confluent life and determining,

when in balanced relation to one another, the integral health of the

organism. I refer to the cerebro-spinal and the sympathetic nervous

systems. The opposite recourses of behaviour, manifested in the two

psychological types just cited, represent, I believe, the two extremes

of reaction resultant upon the disturbed balance between these two

systems coincident with the factor of repression.

In the preconscious form of life[40] preserved among the animals, there

has occurred no break between these two fundamental systems. In the

feline series, for example, one observes the same graceful, organic

undulations in the movements actuated by the voluntary muscles or in

the reactions presided over by the cerebro-spinal system, as occur

in the rhythmic and harmonious co-ordinations that characterize the

function of the internal viscera controlled by the sympathetic ganglia.

With man the picture is a very different one. Upon the introduction

of suggestion or repression and their concomitant interdiction to

his inherent feeling, there resulted an organic cleavage within his

personality. Coincident with this artificial summons to an adaptive

and ulterior response, the spheres of reaction corresponding to these

two systems within the organism of man were henceforth divided.

Affective responses within the organism’s subjective nuclear life, with

its physiological substrate in the vasomotor and visceral reactions

(sympathetic system), were no longer correlated with affective

responses which, having their substrate in the nuclei of the brain and

spinal cord (cerebro-spinal system), pertain to the objective, external

adaptations observable in the organism’s voluntary activities. Hence,

from this moment forward the co-ordination between the two systems

became automatically impaired, and there could no longer be the smooth,

uninterrupted confluence of function that originally united the two

systems into a single co-ordinated unit.

The disintegrating effect of this artificial cleavage between these

two reciprocal systems occurs only in the constituent that marks the

adaptive cerebral reactions or in the segment or terminal mediating

the relationships _socially_ of the individual elements _inter

se_. In the central or visceral system the organic unities remain

intact. Here in the depths of man’s organic being, actuated by his

involuntary, instinctive life, the disparity of separateness cannot

enter. Here is unbroken continuum. Here the organism is susceptible

to no interstitial flaw. In this central, involuntary system which is

organically common and confluent throughout the species, the extraneous

element of repression with its reaction in disparate, ulterior quests

is automatically excluded, for in its native inherency the organism

is one and indivisible. It is the peripheral portion of our organisms

with its specialization into the external sense-organs, through which

is mediated our recognition of objective difference or interval and

through which occurs, as has been said, our consequent inference of

intrinsic differentiation. In the peripheral system, therefore, the

fallacy of separateness due to this biological fission may be enforced

with seeming success. In a word, it is only in our social and external

relations that the fallacy of organic differentiation works havoc in

any positive or active sense.

In this generic schema is probably represented the physiological

substrate of the schism within the organism caused by the impact from

without of the trauma of repression, and there is represented as well

the basis of the resultant contrast of reaction-types in accordance as

the repression tends more strongly toward one or the other side of the

divided reaction.

Replacing essential continuity with mere contiguity, or the unity of

our organic life with the superficial gestures of an outer code, the

_normal_ of the hysterical type may rub surfaces, as it were, and play

desperately at the game of vicarious unity. We see this everywhere

exemplified among the devotees of normality in reactions that are

apparently confluent but that are, in reality, determined cerebrally or

peripherally in response to the division within the unitary organism

of man. Such are the expressions to be seen, for example, in our

religious hobnobbings, our spurious social covenants, our ingenious

political and economic affiliations, and in the superficial flatteries

and connivances common to normality generally. How definitely such

vicarious reactions are an infringement upon man’s organic life is

readily seen in the unfailing equalization that follows swiftly upon

them, exacting their inevitable toll in the ultimate retributive

penalties of national and industrial wars, of social and political

dissension and in the world-wide expression of disaffection that marks

the social periphery of our self-plumed “civilization.”

On the other hand the _neurotic_ of the hysterical type, by reason

of the greater sensitiveness of his organism, is held within the

grip of this organic conflict. It permits him neither to fawn nor to

defy whole-heartedly, but because of the irreconcilable urge of this

inner conflict it keeps him ever torn between its two extremes. As an

expression of the allocentric reaction he lives within a system that

is divided against itself, sensing throughout life, only intuitively,

the unassuageable pain of his division.

In direct contrast with this reaction the autocentric type lives within

a system that is completely dissociated from the common, congeneric

life. But, though the system is in itself uniform throughout, he

suffers no less the affliction of his life’s incompleted cycle

because of his organic separation from the socially reciprocal,

peripheral system. The allocentric seeks in vain to atone to

himself for his extradition from the co-ordinated organism in the

spurious compensations of a peripherally (socially) separative

system. The autocentric would annul the pain of his separation from

the co-ordinated organism in the futile appeasements of a central

(individual) system which, in its insulation, represents no less his

complete dissociation from the world of actuality. The one would repair

the organic breach within him through recourse to conciliations that

lie exclusively within the social sphere (peripheral dissociation).

The other would resort to reparations, which, being wholly enclosed

within the _ego_, embody exclusively the individual factor (central

dissociation). In brief, the allocentric sees himself as _picture_

in the world outside of him. The autocentric sees the world outside

of him as picture _within_ himself. If the conduct of the latter

personifies the smoke-screen, the conduct of the former is typical of

the red-herring!

Here again we witness the vacillations between the social consensus and

our personal resistance to its behests, between the opposed factors of

suggestion and of repression, of personal advantage and of personal

disadvantage, due to our unconscious alternatives of good and bad. In

the disorganization pertaining to these two reciprocally dissociated

spheres--the cerebral and the visceral--our unconsciousness consists,

in either case, in the individual’s inability to realize a unification

of personality comprised of the balanced inclusion of the two through

the co-ordination of the organic and the conscious spheres of his

experience.

It is my view that in the phenomena of repression or of sexuality

artificial symbols are substituted for the natural gestures represented

in the innate feelings of life and sex. In substituting the manifold

symbols of expression for the natural gestures of spontaneous feeling,

there is manifested a dissociation of the consciousness of man of which

the union of his nuclear and peripheral fields of feeling (affectivity)

is the biological basis. Just as the gesture is the motor expression of

its concomitant sensory reaction, so is the symbol the motor expression

of the sensory _repression_ concomitant to it. As the gesture is

the organic accompaniment of reality, the symbol is the vicarious

barrier against reality. We find the sponsorship for the symbol in

unconsciousness or in a mode that is personal, systematized, repressed,

while the gesture has its sponsorship in a mode of consciousness or in

a confluence of feeling that is impersonal, societal, organic.

If one may speak of ethnic modes, it may be said that in what is called

the period of Greek thought--with its preference for form to substance,

for “the good” conceived rather as beauty than as truth, for life felt

more in its outward line than in its inner meaning--there is ethnically

reflected the allocentric or peripheral type of reaction. A close

sympathy with all that pertains to this early period of Greek culture

is certainly characteristic of the strongly marked types of this

reaction.

On the other hand, the era of Christ and of the psychasthenic reaction

of Christianity, with its lugubrious reversal of the Greek _motif_,

is a mode one finds pre-eminently adapted to the autocentric type

of character, with its apotheosis of the symbols of love, of truth

and of the spirit. Said Christ: “The spirit is more than flesh,”

thus controverting the tendency of the Greek ideal, and an ascetic

Christianity has flocked to him. But in the eidolon of Greek as of

Christian there is offered again but the symbol. In the organic

incompleteness of each there is presented only the inadequacy of the

letter, of that which serves as a sign. In the first it is form,

colour, substance; in the second it is the word, the concept, the

spirit. To-day there are not wanting indications that there awaits

man a period that is confluent of the two in which these symbolic or

separative racial modes shall become absorbed in a unification of word

and of substance. This moment of man’s organic realization within

himself of the integrity of life in its totality will usher in a

sociological renascence when man’s life will embody a mode in which the

spirit _is_ flesh.[41]

The contrasting systems here denoted as allocentric and autocentric,

corresponding to the contrast between the cerebral, peripheral or

social mode of reaction on the one hand and the visceral, central

or nuclear reaction-type on the other, merely mark anew a very old

and commonly recognized division. Here in this more physiological

envisagement of it there is offered merely a different conceptual

basis. There is an analogous division in the experimental

psychologists’ discrimination between motor and sensory. Doubtless also

in the contrast more rhetorically defined as romantic and classical

there is contemplated the same division of types, not to mention

the contrasted reaction-types popularly known as temperamental and

phlegmatic.[42]

It is needful to remember that the allocentric type of individual

is, within the peripheral division of his cerebro-social system, as

truly self-centred as is the autocentric type within the central,

visceral division of his sympathetic system. The difference is that

the allocentric embodies dissociation in his seeming adaptation toward

the social dream that is his day, and the autocentric in his seeming

adaptation toward the individual dream that is his night. Every

psychiatrist is familiar with the facility with which the dementia

præcox patient may analyze his own dreams. But what avails his

facility? He is by very virtue of it not less but rather more shut in,

for his “analysis” is but the trick through which he subtly evades the

social demands existing outside his own centrally dissociated mode. At

all times he holds the stage of his self-determined drama, viewing the

spectacle of it not as onlooker but as producer. What he permits you

to see is but a play within a play, conceived and enacted within the

theatre of his own mind. And so in the autocentric type embodied in

the psychasthenic personality--the reaction of the type of normal or

neurotic that is related to the precoid in its extreme expression--one

may be led quite far from the touchstone of reality by reason of the

very simplicity and quite genuine correctness of his “analysis.” And

so no less with the allocentric type and the equally plausible decoys

of _his_ illusory system. What is needed is our realization that in

the projections of one as in the _intrajections_ of the other there

is equally embodied the identical purpose of self-withdrawal from the

common medium of reality.

Most significant of all is the need that the psychoanalyst realize,

on the one hand, the peripherally determined tendencies of his own

socially compensative reactions or of his own allocentric normality,

and, on the other, the centrally biased trends of his own insularly

compensative adjustments or of his own autocentric adaptation. Failing

to accept, through his own analysis, the possibility of the completely

theatrical or symbolic nature of the so-called actualities of his own

day as they tend to be expressed in the immediate moment at hand, he

may himself easily succumb to the fallacy of a too ready credence

(analyst’s wish-fulfilment) in judging the validity of a patient’s

presumable self-envisagement. This unconscious alternative which we

trace again and again throughout the varying manifestations of the

mind of man, whether in its single or in its collective expression,

whether in the immediate reaction of the individual or in the remoter

adaptations of the race mind, is equally the unconscious actuation

underlying the system of psychoanalysis.

It would seem to mark some strange miscarriage in our sociological

progress that a dualistic system, such as psychoanalysis, should have

arisen as an emanation of Jewish thought, when one considers the

essentially monotheistic tradition of the Hebrew consciousness. In this

sense the sociological reaction of the Hebrew mind manifested in the

dualistic principle of Freud, as exemplified in his basic theory of

psychic ambivalence, would seem to denote some inadvertence in racial

perception. Monotheism with its principle of a universal immanence

of good is clearly a sublimation of the unitary preconscious mode

(autocentric), just as the dualistic theism of the Gentiles, with its

basis in the alternatives of good and evil, is the sublimation of an

irreconcilable unconscious mode (allocentric). May it not be that

unconsciously psychoanalysis is a Semitic repudiation of the basal law

of Moses and of its preconscious principle of an underlying unity,

precisely as Christianity is an unconscious repudiation of the same

unitary precept as exemplified preconsciously in the teachings of

Christ? May it not be, too, that these unconscious alternatives now

actuating the dualistic systems of Jew and Gentile will ultimately

resolve themselves into an organic monism of accord which, in the

societal encompassment of each, will become equally understanding and

inclusive through the united consciousness of both?

The social basis of consciousness · 第 7 / 10 章