PREPARATIONS FOR THE GREAT DRIVE
At the end of August 1918 the 5th and Australian Cavalry Divisions were
encamped near Khurbet Deiran and Ramleh respectively; the 4th Division
and the Anzac Mounted Division were still in the Jordan Valley. The
new 5th A.L.H. Brigade, which had only two regiments, was completed by
the inclusion of the French 'Régiment Mixte de Cavalerie.' This was
a four-squadron unit, consisting of two squadrons of regular French
cavalry and two of Algerian Spahis, and was commanded by Colonel Le
Bon, an officer who had had many years' experience in the East. The
Spahis, with their picturesque half-Arab uniforms and their enormous
curved sabres, which they carried under the flaps of their saddles,
added a note of colour to the division, and caused endless diversion to
the Australians. They were mounted on good-looking barbs, which could
march indefinitely, if allowed to go at their own rate, but the pace
of our big horses was rather too hot for them, as was proved by the
subsequent operations.
As there were only ten batteries of Horse Artillery available, one
battery ('B' H.A.C.) was withdrawn from the Australian Mounted Division
in August, and joined the 5th Cavalry Division. These two divisions had
thus only two batteries each.
During the first half of September preparations for the Great Drive
were pushed forward energetically. Our broad-gauge railway had now
been carried forward as far north as Ludd, and the old Turkish line
from Ludd to Jerusalem had been relaid for broad gauge. Light railways
had been built along the coastal plain, from Ludd up to our front
line; tracks had been improved, and roads made behind the line in
the mountain sector, and, from Jiljulie to the sea, the gunners were
working ceaselessly, like a legion of ants, preparing positions for the
considerable force of artillery that was to assist in forcing the enemy
defences here.
The Turkish line west of the Jordan ran east from the coast, at a point
just north of the old Crusader fortress of Arsuf, over the coastal
plain to Jiljulie, near the railhead at Kalkili. Here it entered the
mountains, and ran a little south of east, passing roughly through
Mesha, Furkha and El Lubban, to the Jordan at Umm el Shert.
Forty miles north of this line lie the Plain of Esdraelon, or
Armageddon, and the Valley of Jezreel, which cut a gap right through
the mountain range from the sea to the river Jordan. Esdraelon is
shaped roughly like a broad-bladed arrow head, having its point at
Haifa on the sea coast, and the extremities of its blades at Mount
Tabor on the north, and at the little town of Jenin on the south.
Mid-way between these two lies the village of Afule, whence the Valley
of Jezreel, forming the shaft of the arrow, runs down to the Jordan at
Beisan, which is about fifteen miles south of the Sea of Galilee, and
four miles west of the Jordan.
From Deraa Junction on the Hedjaz Railway, about thirty-five miles east
of the Sea of Galilee, a branch line runs westwards to Semakh, at the
southern end of the lake, and thence southwards down the Jordan Valley
to Beisan. From here two roads lead south down the valley, one on each
side of the river, and a third goes south-west through the mountains
to Nablus. Leaving Beisan, the railway continues in a north-westerly
direction up the Valley of Jezreel, through Afule, to Haifa. From
Afule a branch line runs south to Jenin, and thence to Samaria and
Nablus; and from Messudieh, near Samaria, another branch winds through
the mountains to Tul Keram on the coastal plain, and thence south to
Kalkili.
Thus, to quote the Commander-in-Chiefs despatch:[22] 'Afule, Beisan,
and Deraa were the vital points on the enemy's communications. If they
could be seized, his retreat would be cut off. Deraa was beyond my
reach, but not beyond that of mobile detachments of the Arab Army. It
was not to be expected that these detachments could hold this junction,
but it was within their power to dislocate all traffic.'
The coastal plain, consisting of rolling down-land, is about ten miles
wide at Arsuf. From this point northwards it gradually narrows, till
it is shut off altogether at Haifa, where the Mount of Carmel, an
offshoot from the main Judæan range, falls in steep cliffs to the sea.
The only track over the Carmel Range into the Plain of Esdraelon that
is possible for wheeled traffic is by the famous Musmus Pass, from
Kerkur to Lejjun on the river Kishon, over which Thothmes III. led his
army, 'horse behind horse and man behind man,' to the great victory of
Megiddo, in 1479 B.C.
The pass, which carries the age-old caravan road from Egypt to
Mesopotamia, leads through a narrow, rocky defile, in steep and
difficult mountain country, and, near the top of the range, is enclosed
in places between sheer cliffs. Skilfully handled, a small body of
troops could hold it for a long time against a greatly superior force.
The enemy VIIth and VIIIth Armies held the line from the sea to the
Jordan Valley. His IVth Army was disposed in the valley and east of
the Jordan. A fairly good, metalled road runs from Jiljulie, through
Tul Keram, to Nablus. From here two bad mountain tracks lead down to
the Jordan, one through Beit Dejan, and the other by Ain Shibleh and
down the Wadi Farah. These two tracks join one another at El Makhruk,
four miles west of the river, and then continue over the Jordan at
Jisr el Damieh, and on to El Salt. This was the enemy's only lateral
communication, and the portion between Nablus and El Salt was so
difficult that the IVth Army was practically isolated from the rest of
the force.
The Turkish armies opposed to us, including reserves and lines of
communication troops, numbered some 90,000 men, of whom perhaps 5000
were cavalry, with about 400 guns. Their Commander-in-Chief was the
German Marshal Liman von Sanders, who had his headquarters at Nazareth.
Our own troops numbered about 120,000, including 25,000 cavalry, with
540 guns.
The _morale_ of the enemy troops, both Turkish and German, was lower
than it had been at any time since the beginning of the campaign.
Many of the Turkish soldiers were ill-trained and of poor character.
Disheartened by a long series of successful small raids, carried out
by our infantry during the past two months, utterly weary of a war
the objects of which they little understood, racked with disease, and
imbued with a bitter hatred of their German masters, who despised and
bullied them, they were in no state to withstand the onslaught that was
preparing. The ill-feeling between Turks and Germans, which had existed
from the very beginning of the war, had now reached an acute stage.
The Germans, with characteristic stupidity, failed to do anything to
allay the irritation caused by their overbearing manner, and openly
expressed contempt for their allies.
Numerous documents, subsequently captured by us at the enemy G.H.Q.,
testified to the deplorable state of internal strife and suspicion
to which the enemy army was now reduced. Indeed, with the exception
of a few senior officers, the Germans seemed to take a delight in
ill-treating and insulting the unhappy Turks.
These factors must be borne in mind in estimating the tactics adopted
by the British Commander-in-Chief. His plan was one of the boldest
and simplest ever conceived by a great captain, and will live in the
text-books of the soldiers of all nations, as a model of the use of
cavalry, as long as war is waged. Such risks as he took in the carrying
out of that plan, and they were numerous, were justified by the state
of the enemy armies opposed to us, and were, in every instance,
triumphantly vindicated by the success of the operations.
In broad outline, the plan was to concentrate an overwhelming force
of infantry and guns in the coastal sector, together with three
divisions of cavalry: for the infantry to attack the enemy positions
from Jiljulie to the sea, and, having captured them, to wheel to the
right, pivoting on Jiljulie, and bend back the enemy's right wing
into the hills, exactly like opening a door. Through this open door
the cavalry were to dash, and ride up the coast and over the Musmus
Pass into the Plain of Esdraelon. Once in the plain, their task was to
seize Afule, and then ride down the Valley of Jezreel to Beisan and
the Jordan, and cut the railways at these two places, while an Arab
force cut it farther east at Deraa. Later on Haifa was to be occupied,
and thus a net of cavalry would be drawn from the sea to the Jordan.
As soon as the cavalry were well through the gap on the coastal plain,
our infantry were to attack all along the line in the mountain sector,
while the troops that had opened the door endeavoured to roll up the
enemy line from his right flank. Our force in the Jordan Valley was
to advance simultaneously, and seize the bridge over the Jordan at El
Damieh. The two Turkish armies west of the Jordan would thus be caught
in a trap, with the sea on their right and the Jordan on their left,
and, with all their communications cut, would be forced back into the
cavalry net behind them.
Once the crossing over the Jordan at Jisr el Damieh was in our hands,
the Turkish IVth Army east of the river would find itself isolated,
with its communications cut (at Deraa), and exposed to the converging
attacks of our force in the valley, which would hold the river
crossings, and of the Arab forces on the east. At the beginning of
September a mobile column of the Arab Army, accompanied by armoured
cars and a mountain battery, was assembling at Kasr el Azrak, in the
desert fifty miles east of Amman, under the energetic direction of
Lawrence.
The first essential for the success of the plan was to conceal from the
enemy the considerable concentration of troops on the coastal plain,
especially that of the three cavalry divisions.
It is doubtful if there has ever been a greater master of the art of
deception in war than the British Commander-in-Chief. No detail was too
small, no dodge too insignificant to engage his full attention. The two
trans-Jordan raids had given the enemy the impression that we intended
to attack either up the Jordan Valley, or east of it, at Amman and
along the Hedjaz Railway, and General Allenby now set himself to foster
this belief by every possible means.
To this end he ordered Major-General Chaytor, who was in the Jordan
Valley, in command of a mixed force consisting of the Anzac Mounted
Division and eight battalions of infantry, to make a series of
demonstrations, with the object of inducing the enemy to believe that
an attack east of Jordan was intended. The camps in the valley vacated
by the cavalry were left standing, and other camps were pitched there,
and occupied by a few men, to show signs of movement, and to make
tracks about, and leading to, the camps, in order to deceive enemy
airmen. New bridges were thrown across the Jordan, miles of Décauville
railway were laid, and thousands of dummy horses were erected on dummy
horse lines in the dummy camps. Every day, for some considerable time,
a battalion or two of infantry marched down the Jerusalem-Jericho
road from Talaat el Dumm, and occupied one or other of these camps.
During the night they were brought back to Talaat el Dumm, in returning
empty motor lorries, ready to march back again next day. These troops
could be plainly seen, marching down into the valley, by the enemy at
Shunet Nimrin, who was thus induced to believe that a considerable
concentration was taking place in the valley. This unpleasant daily
promenade fell to the lot of the British West Indies regiments.
For the benefit of the native population, elaborate bogus preparations
were made for the removal of G.H.Q. to Jerusalem. One of the hotels
there was cleared of its occupants, much to their disgust, and staff
officers busied themselves installing office furniture and telephone
equipment, and painting the names of a multitude of departments on the
doors of the rooms.
Lastly, lest a chance word should reach a native enemy spy within our
lines, everything was done to further the belief among our own troops
that we were likely to attack on the east flank. The writer remembers
receiving a visit one day from his Divisional General, and being told
to do nothing to discourage the idea that the cavalry would once again
find themselves in the Valley of Desolation. He also remembers vividly
the lurid language that arose on all sides when this report spread
about the camps!
No orders were committed to paper other than those issued by G.H.Q. and
the three Corps. Secret conferences were called in turn at the various
Divisional Headquarters, when the scheme was explained to staffs and
commanders of brigades, each of whom then prepared his scheme, and
submitted it verbally to his immediate superior.
The three cavalry divisions on the left of our line were hidden
securely from the eyes of enemy aeroplane observers; the Australian
Mounted Division in the immense, old olive woods round Ramleh, the
4th Cavalry Division in the orange groves near Selmeh, and the 5th
Division, which had left the Jordan Valley on September 11, in those
north-west of Sarona.
Shortly before the operations commenced, the 60th and 75th Infantry
Divisions were brought across to the coastal sector, where they
remained, unseen by the enemy, till the attack was launched.
During all the period of concentration, the magnificent work of
the Royal Air Force played a dominant part in keeping the enemy in
ignorance of our movements. The Commander-in-Chief paid the force a
well-deserved compliment in his despatch when he said: 'The chief
factor in the secrecy maintained must be attributed, however, to the
supremacy in the air which had been obtained by the Royal Air Force.
The process of wearing down the enemy's aircraft had been going on all
through the summer. During one week in June 100 hostile aeroplanes
had crossed our lines. During the last week in August this number had
decreased to eighteen. In the next few days a number were shot down,
with the result that only four ventured to cross our lines during the
period of concentration.'[23]
On the 18th of September, the day before the attack, a large force
of bombing aeroplanes was directed over Nablus, where it was known
the enemy had his main telephone and telegraph exchange. This was
completely destroyed, a fact which played an important part in enabling
our cavalry to reach the Plain of Esdraelon next day, before the enemy
G.H.Q. knew they had broken through.
The striking success of these measures was afterwards proved by
captured enemy documents. Among these was the German Intelligence
Service map, issued on the very day before our attack commenced. This
map shows three cavalry divisions still in the Jordan Valley, and only
one in the coastal sector. Only two infantry divisions are shown in the
coastal sector instead of five, and the whole map points to an attack
in, or east of, the Jordan Valley. A German air reconnaissance report,
dated 17th of September, and found among Liman von Sanders' papers
at Nazareth, stated that 'far from there being any diminution in the
cavalry in the Jordan Valley, there are evidences of twenty-three more
squadrons there.'
The Turkish line on the plain consisted of two defensive positions,
well constructed and heavily wired. The first, 14,000 yards in
length and 3000 in depth, ran along a sandy ridge in a north-westerly
direction from Bir Adas to the sea. It consisted of a series of works
connected by a continuous network of fire trenches. The second, or
El Tire system, 3000 yards in the rear, ran from the village of that
name to the mouth of the Nahr el Falik. On the enemy's extreme right
the ground, except for a narrow strip along the coast, was marshy, and
could only be crossed in few places. The defence of the second system
did not, therefore, require a large force.
The attack of these positions was entrusted to the 21st Corps (3rd,
7th, 54th, and 75th Divisions), to which were also attached the 60th
Division, the French Infantry Detachment, and the 5th A.L.H. Brigade
(Australian Mounted Division), together with a large number of heavy
guns and two brigades of mountain artillery. This force was to break
through the enemy's defences between the railway and the sea, in order
to open the door for the cavalry, and, at the same time, to seize the
foothills south-east of Jiljulie. The Corps was then to swing to the
right, pivoting on Jiljulie, as already explained, on to the line
Hableh-Tul Keram, and advance in a north-easterly direction, converging
on Samaria and Attara (on the Jenin-Samaria Railway about five miles
north-west of the latter place), so as to drive the enemy up the two
roads from Messudieh Junction and Samaria to Jenin, into the arms of
the cavalry on the Plain of Esdraelon. The 5th A.L.H. Brigade was to
cover the outer (left) flank of the Corps during this turning movement,
capture Tul Keram station, and then raid and cut the Messudieh-Jenin
Railway, near Ajje.
As soon as the infantry had broken through, the three cavalry divisions
were to advance rapidly up the plain, the 5th Division along the coast
road, through Mukhalid, the 4th _via_ Tabsor and Mughair, and the
Australian Mounted Division following the 4th.
The enemy had partially prepared an entrenched position across the
plain from about Jelameh, through El Mejdel and Liktera, to the sea
near the mouth of the Nahr Mefjir, and this was known to be held by a
few troops. The 4th Division had orders to seize the portion of this
line between Jelameh and Liktera, while the 5th dealt with the western
half from Liktera to the coast.
Having made good the line of the Nahr Mefjir, they were to turn
north-east and cross the Carmel Range, the 4th and Australian Divisions
by the Musmus Pass, and the 5th by a little-known track from Sindiane
to Abu Shusheh, and enter the Plain of Esdraelon. Arrived on the plain,
the 4th Cavalry Division was to seize Afule and then push rapidly down
the Valley of Jezreel to Beisan, occupy the Jordan bridges there, and
send a force to hold and, if necessary, destroy the bridge at Jisr
Mejamieh, twelve miles farther north. This programme entailed a ride
of ninety-seven miles on end, and included the crossing of a mountain
range by a difficult pass.
The 5th Division was directed on Nazareth (seventy miles) to capture
the enemy General Headquarters, which was located there, and, if
possible, Liman von Sanders himself, and then clear the plain as far
east as Afule. The Australian Division was to remain on the Plain of
Esdraelon at El Lejjun, sending a force to Jenin (sixty-eight miles),
to intercept the Turks retiring from Samaria, when that place had been
captured by our infantry.
As these immense distances had to be covered in one 'bound,' speed
was essential. The 4th and 5th Divisions, were, therefore, ordered to
move up the coast on a wide front, and sweep over the Jelameh-Liktera
positions with the sword and lance. If unexpectedly strong opposition
was encountered there, the Australian Division was available,
immediately in rear, to reinforce. The crossing of the Carmel Range was
to be carried out as rapidly as possible, as it was recognised that
our troops could only move in very narrow columns over the mountains,
especially through the Musmus Pass, and flank guards would be out of
the question. The 5th Division was, however, directed to drop a small
force on the Sindiane-Abu Shusheh track, at the top of the range, to
protect the left flank of the other two divisions, while they were
passing through the defile.
The 20th Corps, in the hills north of Jerusalem, was ordered to attack
all along its front on the day after the attack in the coastal plain,
and drive the enemy northwards into the arms of the cavalry, while, in
the Jordan Valley, Chaytor's Force had first to seize the bridge over
the river at El Damieh, and then to cross the Jordan for the third and
last time, and advance on Amman.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 22: Dated October 31, 1918.]
[Footnote 23: Despatch dated October 31, 1918.]