DOWN TO THE JORDAN
The advance across the Nahr el Auja at the end of December 1917,
and the infantry operations north of Jerusalem about the same time,
established our line sufficiently far north of Jaffa and Jerusalem
to secure these two places from all but long-range gun fire from the
enemy. The line was then consolidated, and a period of trench warfare
set in, which, with the exception of several minor operations, was to
last till the autumn of the following year.
For the first part of this period, the Desert Mounted Corps remained in
the neighbourhood of Gaza to rest and train.
The horses were in a sorry state, and the remount depots were empty,
save for a few animals which had been returned from veterinary
hospitals, after treatment for wounds or other injuries. Owing to the
shortage of shipping, there was no prospect of any fresh remounts
arriving in the country for an indefinite time. Consequently all the
horses of the Corps had to be nursed back to condition before the
cavalry could take part in any further serious work.
The divisions were all camped on deep sand, among the coastal
dunes--the Yeomanry and the Australian Mounted Divisions round Gaza,
the Anzac Division farther north. The heaviest rain drained through
this sand immediately, and half an hour of sunshine was enough to dry
the surface. For the first time in many weeks the horses had clean,
dry standings, and the effect of this was soon evident in the improved
condition of their legs and coats. At the end of the first fortnight,
which was a period of rest for men as well as horses, there was an all
round improvement. Forage was plentiful again, and of fair quality,
though every one would have given a great deal for a few tons of good
oats, in place of the eternal barley.
After the first fortnight, training recommenced, gradually at first, so
as not to check the recovery of the horses. By the end of the month,
however, brigade and divisional schemes were in full swing.
The training was varied by salvage work on the old trenches at
Gaza, from which a great quantity of ammunition and stores of every
description was collected. Most of the men had an opportunity of
visiting Gaza, and many were the 'curios' collected among the ruins, to
be taken home to sweethearts and wives on that glorious 'leave,' that
was always coming, but never quite came.
At a little distance the city appeared to be intact, except for two
minarets, accidentally broken by shell fire, the jagged stumps of which
stood up conspicuously. This curious, undamaged appearance was due to
the great quantity of trees which grew all over the town, and which
had now put on their spring coat of green. The kindly leaves hid the
scarred and broken skeletons of the trees, and veiled the shapeless
ruins of the houses.
Inside, however, was a scene of utter desolation. Not a living thing
was to be seen in this city, which once held 40,000 souls, save an
occasional, hungry pariah dog, engaged in his horrible work among the
graves of the dead.
[Illustration: Ruins of the Great Mosque at Gaza, showing one of the
arches of the old Crusader Church.]
The great mosque, which had once been a noble, Christian church,
was almost entirely destroyed, but not by our guns. The Turks had used
it as an ammunition depot, with that callous disregard for the Holy
Places of their own religion which was always so characteristic of
them, and, when the city was abandoned, they blew up the great store of
shells there, and laid the mosque in ruins. Some of the lower arches
remained, and one beautiful Norman gateway, but all the rest was a heap
of tumbled masonry.
The German headquarters was in the north-west corner of the town,
close to the remains of a graceful little Greek church. The house in
which the officers lived was screened from view on all sides, and,
as it was far removed from any of the enemy defences, it had escaped
serious damage. But it was satisfactory to note that both the tennis
courts, which had been made with such evident pains, had been visited
by eight-inch shells.
The rest of the city was a mass of ruins, stark and silent. And so it
is likely to remain for all time, an awful witness to the devastation
of war. Its inhabitants have neither the energy of the people of
Europe, nor the incentive of a bitter climate, and they are never
likely to rebuild it.
By the end of January our front had been thoroughly consolidated, and
the infantry had recovered from the hard fighting and cruel weather of
December. The Commander-in-Chief now determined to extend his line to
the Jordan, in order to secure his right flank.
There were several other advantages to be gained by securing possession
of one or two crossings over the river. The enemy was at this time
obtaining large supplies of grain from the districts round Kerak, in
the land of Moab, on the eastern and south-eastern shores of the Dead
Sea. This grain was carried across the sea, in barges towed by motor
boats, to the north end, whence it was transported to the Turkish front
by the good metalled road from Jericho to Jerusalem. With Jericho and
the crossings of the Jordan immediately north of the Dead Sea in our
hands, we should have control of the sea, and all this traffic would be
stopped. The grain would then have to be brought up to Amman, thirty
miles east of the Jordan, by the Hedjaz Railway, and transported from
there over some fifty miles of bad mountain track. In the extremely
disorganised state of the Turkish transport, this would be likely to
cause the enemy much inconvenience and delay. The control of the river
crossings at Jericho would also facilitate raiding operations across
the Jordan, directed against the enemy's line of communications with
the Hedjaz.
The operations necessary to secure these objects were limited to the
establishment of one or more bridgeheads on the east bank of the
Jordan, and to an advance of our line northwards as far as the Wadi el
Auja, a small, perennial stream that flows into the Jordan some nine
miles north of the point where the latter enters the Dead Sea.
The watershed between the Mediterranean and the deep cleft of the
Jordan Valley runs roughly north and south, through the Mount of
Olives. Some description of the difficulties of the country on the west
of the watershed has already been given. On the east side they are very
much greater. The streams that run down from the mountains to the plain
have cut gorges through the rock, often many hundreds of feet deep,
which divide the eastern portion of the range into a series of parallel
ridges running east and west. Innumerable tributaries of the main
watercourses run in all directions, and split these ridges again into
isolated masses of rocks. It is only possible to cross the main wadis
in a few places, so that movement north and south on the part of any
considerable body of troops is out of the question.
Going down the road from Jerusalem to Jericho, the general fall of the
ground is gradual to Talaat el Dumm, the Hill of Blood, above the Good
Samaritan Inn. From here the road pitches down, in a series of zigzags
and hairpin turns, to the valley floor nearly 3000 feet below. Farther
north, at Jebel Kuruntul, the traditional Mount of Temptation, the
mountains end abruptly in a single stupendous cliff, over 1000 feet
high.
Over this country the 60th Division and the Anzac Mounted Division,
which had concentrated at Bethlehem on the 18th of February, were
directed to move on Jericho.
The advance began on the 19th of February, in heavy rain. All day the
infantry struggled forward, against strong opposition from the enemy,
and by nightfall had advanced nearly three miles, to a position about a
mile west of Talaat el Dumm.
Meanwhile the cavalry, moving to the south of the 60th Division,
through the Wilderness of Jeshimon, had reached El Muntar, about seven
miles from the Dead Sea, and some four miles south of the Jericho road.
Next day the infantry stormed Talaat el Dumm shortly after dawn, and
advanced against the high ridge of Jebel Ekteif, about one mile farther
south, while the cavalry moved on Jebel Kalimun and Tubk el Kuneitra.
Both these places were strongly held, and the only possible lines of
approach were under accurate shell and machine-gun fire from the hill
of Nebi Musa, a little to the north. The cavalry had to advance in
single file along a few goat paths, and they suffered considerably from
the enemy fire, without being able to make any adequate reply. Shortly
after mid-day, however, two regiments of the New Zealand Mounted
brigade, having left their horses under cover in a ravine, made an
assault on foot against the two hills, and captured both of them after
a sharp struggle.
Meanwhile the 1st A.L.H. Brigade found a way down, along the gorge of
the Wadi Kumran, and debouched on to the plain, on the shores of the
Dead Sea, at dusk.
At dawn on the 21st, the New Zealand Brigade, with a battalion from the
60th Division, occupied Nebi Musa without opposition, the enemy having
retired along his whole line during the night. The 1st A.L.H. Brigade
pushed rapidly over the plain, and entered Jericho, which was found
deserted, soon after eight in the morning. From here patrols were sent
out to the east and north, and located the enemy holding a bridgehead
on the west bank of the Jordan at Ghoraniyeh, east of Jericho, and in
position along the Wadi el Auja to the north.
A squadron of the New Zealand Brigade, patrolling east from Nebi Musa,
reached Rujm el Bahr, at the north-west corner of the Dead Sea, which
was the northern base for the fleet of German motor boats engaged in
towing grain barges across the sea. Shortly afterwards some of our
troops found one of these boats alongside the jetty, and succeeded
in capturing it intact. Mounting a machine gun in the bows, they at
once set out across the sea, and, soon afterwards, encountered another
German boat. After an exciting chase they forced the enemy to strike
his colours, and, putting a 'prize crew' aboard, continued their
voyage. In the course of their cruise they sank another boat, and
drove a fourth aground! Later on, these captured boats were taken over
by a detachment of the Royal Navy, and did good service patrolling the
sea, and keeping open the communications between our forces and the
Sherifian troops. They achieved the distinction of being the first
British war vessels to be navigated 1300 feet below the level of the
ocean.
As the enemy bridgehead at Ghoraniyeh was found to be strongly held,
and its capture would have entailed heavy losses, it was decided not to
attempt an attack. Our infantry withdrew to a position running north
and south astride the Jericho road, at Talaat el Dumm, and the Anzac
Mounted Division returned to Bethlehem, leaving one regiment to patrol
the valley.
Some idea of the difficulties of the country during these operations
may be gathered by the fact that a battery of field artillery,
unhampered by enemy action, took thirty-six hours to advance eight
miles.
During the first half of March the 60th Division again descended
into the valley, and, after some very stiff fighting, succeeded in
establishing our line north of the Wadi el Auja, from the Jordan to the
mountains. Thereupon the Turks withdrew their bridgehead at Ghoraniyeh,
and retired to the east bank of the river.
This operation cleared the lower Jordan Valley of the enemy, and
established a base broad enough to enable a raid to be undertaken
against the Hedjaz Railway, the Turkish line of communications for the
force operating against the Arabs round Maan.
The Arab forces, which were under the control of General Allenby, were
based on Akaba, at the north end of the Red Sea. They were supplied by
us with arms, ammunition and light guns, and largely led by British
officers, chief among whom were Lieutenant-Colonels Lawrence and Joyce.
Though intolerant of anything in the nature of discipline, and
constantly at war among themselves, many of the Arab tribes of the
Hedjaz had joined the standard of the old Sherif Hussein, moved thereto
by their hatred of the Turks. Under Hussein's energetic son Feisal,
they had carried on a successful guerilla warfare against the scattered
Turkish garrisons since June 1916. Their operations were directed
especially against the Hedjaz Railway. Under the leadership of the
daring and beloved Lawrence, train wrecking was elevated among the
Arabs to the status of a national sport. Many of the wrecked trains
yielded rich booty to the Sherif, and on one occasion the haul included
£20,000 in Turkish gold. Eighteen months of this warfare had given the
Arabs valuable experience, and numerous minor successes had induced
many tribes who were wavering to throw in their lot with the Sherif.
By the end of 1917 the Emir Feisal's forces were strong enough to
undertake more serious operations. In January 1918 he seized the
high ground a few miles south of Maan, while another force, under a
local leader, destroyed a large part of the Turkish light railway
which had been built from Kalaat Aneiza on the Hedjaz line to the
Hish Forest, and was used to transport wood as fuel for locomotives.
Shortly afterwards another force raided a station on the Hedjaz line,
some thirty miles north of Maan, destroying the station buildings and
some engines and rolling stock. In this raid the Arabs took over 200
prisoners, and killed a large number of Turks. Farther north, Arabs
of the Huweitat tribe captured Tafile, which is only fifteen miles
south-east of the south end of the Dead Sea. A considerable Turkish
force, with guns and machine guns, which was sent, towards the end of
January, to recapture this place, was decisively beaten by the Arabs,
with a loss of 500 killed and 250 prisoners. In March a larger body of
Turkish troops, reinforced by a German battalion, reoccupied Tafile,
the Arabs withdrawing to the south.[16]
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 16: See Appendix II. for note on the Arab Movement.]