psychological side prone to believe: the aesthetical is prone to value
form: the combination of the two makes possible a transcendent point of
view which grasps at form with a strong psychological conviction that it
must have real active value. The remarkable passage in which Lotze pleads
for the animation of nature is a shock to the reader in its betrayal
of new and startling elements in the author’s idea of a constructive
philosophy. Apart from the particular point, which we do not intend to
discuss, the passage is the first awakening of antagonism in a critical
reader who will at once proceed to ask whether the whole construction is
built on this foundation. He will, I think, find that it is.
The crucial point in the idealism of Lotze is the possibility of
constructing and defending the unity of the Whole. The beginning is
made from the Kantian element, the phenomenal character of the matter
of thought. Kant’s view is modified in so far as the doing which we
know is related to the being, the that-which-does, in an intimate way,
such as does not hold of noumena and phenomena: from this it follows
that the appearance is the life of the real rather than its output, the
actual doing rather than the product of its work. It follows also from
the Kantian element that our construction of reality is itself reality,
real doing, though not creative activity. In this concrete point of view
is involved the idea that our feelings, cravings, and inspirations are
reality, which is the justification for demanding that reality should be
presented as satisfying that craving. As we have a craving for unity and
form we can assert that Reality is both one and formed. We see the force
of the argument: we ask, what is its value?
To begin with—what is this craving? Is it ever universal, and if not,
does the craving for unity in particular spheres justify an advance to
a universal unity? The personal element is so manifest here that if
consciousness cannot be shown to have that craving as part of its own
nature the whole position is endangered. And it must be granted that
consciousness has not got it quâ consciousness. To get it at all we
must take consciousness as intimately bound up with impulse, will, and
individual purpose, and each of these elements, while it enriches the
notion of consciousness, draws me further away from the concept of a
Whole. I cannot admit that impulse proceeds wholly from consciousness,
or that will is entirely guided by reason, or that the unity I desire is
capable of projection away from my individual scope to a hyper-individual
Whole.
Reflection on the history of thought confirms the belief that ultimate
unity is generally made acceptable by withdrawing oneself from the
immediate conditions of life. Tradition ascribes this character to the
philosopher, and the history of philosophy is a record of attempts to
reach the higher truth by climbing down. Lotze gives us a fruitful idea
in the notion of a whole whose parts are unified by reciprocal action.
But here again he seems to have overstrained his parallel, which I take
to be human society. In his war against abstractions he notes the
hypostatising tendency expressed in such phrases as ‘the mind of the
people,’ ‘the spirit of the times.’ He does not however seem to have
fully estimated the value of these indications or seen how far they
show that a generalisation expressed in a general term may be the sign
of a real conceptual unity which in spite of its reality is not capable
of action or reaction. Now, if unity lies in significance, does not
the unity of anything partake essentially of the nature of concepts or
ideas? And if so, is not the unity the one point about things of which
nothing can be said in respect of action or reaction? This, I think, must
be allowed, and the consequence follows that in a world of action and
reaction unity must be irrelevant.
The point can be stated more clearly and directly, but I have put it in
this form because that is the line of argument which Lotze suggests, and
which seems to me to apply to him most aptly because it is the inversion
of his own progress. The simpler and clearer way is to assert that the
unity of the Whole implies a consciousness for which the Whole is a
unity. This leads us to the idea of a God. But if God is outside our
whole there must conceivably be a ‘higher unity’ giving a whole which
comprises God. Either therefore the Whole is not truly the Whole or
there is an infinite progress of wholes constituted by presentation to
a unifying agency which is merged with them in ever higher and higher
wholes.
We now seem to have reached a reductio ad absurdum. As stated, it is
such a reductio; but the absurdity consists in the inner contradiction
due to calling that the Whole which we at the same time do not make
all inclusive. This contradiction indicates that the thought movement
has become involved in itself. At the same time there emerges an idea
which is fruitful and which was partially expressed in the doctrine of
monads. The monad is a unity: the ruling monad is also a unity: this
latter unity includes plurality, and is therefore properly a unity: the
mere monad as simple nature ought not to be called a unity at all. Now,
leaving out other implications of the term monad, we may say that the
idea of progressive wholes comprehending at each stage the lower wholes,
is justifiable. We associate with development range of adaptation, and
increased range of adaptation is the objective manifestation of increased
organisation of either physical or psychical powers. At each stage the
being comprehends a wider plurality, and the scale of being is capable of
gradation on this basis.
But is there _any_ unity which is not unity for a mind? If we say no,
there is no course open but to set over against our Whole a mind for
which it is one. This would be a finite God. Not being able to comprehend
a world that sums itself any more than a series of feelings that sum
themselves, I am unable to see how a pantheistic solution helps us. On
the contrary, if I conceived unity to be necessary to the existence of
the world, I should deduce from that unity the being of God, and admit
that the unity was not only known but also felt and willed, but I could
not admit that the world was the same as God, and therefore should not
admit that the will was omnipotent. Thus the mere assertion of unity
seems to lead us back into a transcendental dualism.
The conclusion of the whole matter is that unity is meaningless unless
that which is unified is unified by some mind. In the first instance the
unity will be that of _my_ mind, and we must start from that.
Now I take it that in my mind unity is the product of purpose. I do not
consciously unify, but I do consciously subordinate: the tendency is to
think in what respects the one is many rather than how the many can be
one. This is due to the primacy of our practical life, in which the end
is given with all its plurality implicit. In action this is obvious:
the end is first and the discovery of means subserves it. In the world
of things it may be less evident, but that which I call function is
ultimately the power to fulfil my end or purpose, and the object as I
know it is the manifestation in perception of the thing that has the
function. What it is to itself I cannot know and need not ask.
It seems to me futile to speak of all existence as animated, or talk of
the ‘experience of the atoms’ as Lotze does, if the nature of the whole
cannot be determined. It is only as parts of a whole that the parts have
any claim to these qualities, and if we fail to construct our whole so
as to get a new edition of the old doctrine of a world soul (which Lotze
confessedly aims to do) the consequences dependent on that proof must
fail also.
Human society, coming last, seems the culminating point of all
development, and a revelation of the significance of all lower forms of
life. In it we have the fullest exhibition of reciprocal activity. But
its unity is dependent on mind, and only a spurious analogy can enable
us to regard the universe as a society. If we are not tempted to think of
the material world as _associated_ atoms, we may yet feel an inclination
to regard it as teleologically designed; we should then have formal unity
of purpose among diverse actions. But here again it seems impossible to
show that there is one supreme end, unless the whole is a unity; or that
the whole is a unity, unless there is a supreme end. These ideas are so
far implicated that a plurality of being necessitates a plurality of
ends. It is equally wrong to reject or to accept teleology as usually
advocated. The ethical view is right in emphasising the fact that there
are ends in the world. But these ends arise with consciousness, are
brought by us into the world, and take their place as forces because our
mind directs our action. The hierarchy of ends is the ideal counterpart
of the hierarchy of wholes, and each whole which exists for a mind is
dominated by an end. But that there should be an end of ends seems
unnecessary: we do not seek to unify ends, we seek to multiply them in
their diversity: the progress of society is a perpetual production of
minds which become more concrete in every generation, each one more
capable of interpreting through itself the end for its society, and
thereby increasing the number of ends that are efficient factors in life.
Self-preservation is the root from which spring all ends, and if the
higher organism of society seems to have its need of preservation and its
end we must not forget that its existence depends largely on the extent
to which individuals realise themselves by negation. Is it conceivable
that for the end of ends negation is equally necessary? Leibnitz thought
so when he limited the existent to the compossible. We too may think
so if we admit that our totality has emerged from a crowd of possible
totalities by a species of selection. If we are not prepared to sublimate
our conceptions in this way but return to the world of unfulfilled
purposes and unsatisfied desires, let us bravely acknowledge that _all_
things need not work together for good, that for such adjustment as we do
achieve or help others to achieve we are grateful each to each, and each
to all; but at the same time
‘could you and I with Him conspire
To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire,
Would we not shatter it to bits, and then
Remould it nearer to the Heart’s Desire?’
(3) In addition to these points of view we have in Lotze what may be
called a realistic element. To explain this is, I think, impossible:
to explain it away is unjustifiable. It is in opposition to Panlogism
that Lotze retains ‘nuclei,’ irreducible elements, in his system
of experience. This is the Leibnitzian factor retained against the
Spinozistic trend: it is also the Democritean element preserved through
Leibnitz for succeeding writers. No definition of these nuclei is
forthcoming: they are primarily reached from the standpoint that all
determination is not negation; that thought is a system of relations, but
reality includes over and above relations the relata.
To define these nuclei is impossible, because thought in its progress
moves away from the immediate point of contact given in sensation,
moves away from the stimulus in which they are revealed, and in working
up its material ignores existence in order to concentrate itself upon
significance. The nuclei are in this sense the irrational factors.
It is not necessary here to do more than draw attention to this point.
The preservation of these nuclei is of course one of the ways in which
Lotze defends the content of common consciousness against such idealistic
systems as seem to him to dissolve reality into the thin air of pure
thought. His general attitude toward this point must be understood by
reference to Kant’s views as expressed in the _Critique of Pure Reason_.
We must also bear in mind the fact that pluralism grounds itself in
some measure on the impenetrability of the individual consciousness, an
idea which leads us to think of individual minds as being to themselves
more than they can ever be to others. Hence the monad with its dual
existence, as it is in itself and as it is in other monads in which it
is represented. Hence, too, in more refined forms, the idea that to be
perfectly intelligible is not to be thought but to be thinkable, an idea
expressed by Lotze when he speaks of knowledge as a relation which would
be destroyed if the thinker could _be_ that which is thought, and wholly
absorbing into himself the object, exhaust not only the intelligibility
but also the being of that which is known.
Criticism of this view would lead us to consider the claims of a higher
unity. This criticism will not be attempted, for it is our immediate
purpose to accept Lotze as he is, and only indicate how he remains in
the mean position between the extremes of an idealism for which thought
seems to exhaust being and a realism for which thought seems to confront
an object only partly intelligible. The peculiar difficulty which Lotze
creates for us lies in the extent to which the idealism is carried. For
the nuclei certainly seem to be no more than nuclei of sensations, and it
is only in so far as these have a peculiar unity which is given to us by
the supersensible ground of objects, and not given by us to objects, that
they maintain the character of being more than phenomena. They cannot
be ‘matter’ in the crude sense, and if they are the matter of thought
they seem to be ultimately subjective affections in a sense that makes
it difficult to resist a progress toward pure idealism. Lotze’s refusal
to make the advance must be ascribed to his idea of the worth of the
individual, which is so bound up with the notion of consciousness that it
becomes necessary to re-interpret the idea of the nuclei on the analogy
of the individual consciousness as non-spatial units that maintain
themselves in a unity of co-operation without fusion.
The revulsion which invariably follows excessive systematisation seems
to indicate that if ever a ‘stable equilibrium’ is attained by thought,
it will have more of the character of the mean position than of either
extreme. For this reason a peculiar interest attaches to the line of
thought whose last great representative is Lotze. It may seem at first
sight paradoxical that realism should emerge finally as idealistic; but,
from the first, atomism combines with realism an idealistic element, and
the preponderance of idealism finally is a natural result due to the
character of our progress in the realm of thought.
Seeley has pointed out the way in which History has gradually refined
its content. At first it is a complicated mass such as we find it in the
times of Livy or Pliny: from this mass various elements detach themselves
and evolve into independence: natural history, for example, and political
economy are branches that have struck root and grow for themselves,
related to rather than dependent on the residuum which now takes the
place of the original whole. In a similar way the progress of the
sciences has slowly depleted philosophy of its original content and at
the same time defined its central elements and true scope. A comparison
between such a magnum opus as that of Gassendi and the worth of a modern
philosopher shows the effect of progressive specialisation. It suggests
also the question, What is to be ultimately the real matter of philosophy
in the strict sense?
The answer must be, in a sense, what it has always been, that philosophy
co-ordinates and systematises the results of the special sciences. There
is however a strong and not unjustifiable tendency to think that the
peculiar function of philosophy is the explanation of the possibility of
the objects with which the sciences deal: in other words, philosophy is
epistemology. In any case it seems clear that the duty of systematisation
which falls upon philosophy in no wise compels the philosopher to
unify his construction beyond the point which his material will admit.
That is to say, the emphasis must be on co-ordination rather than
systematisation, and philosophy mistakes its function if it in any
way undertakes to dictate results to the special sciences, as it has
notoriously done in some cases. We must, it seems, come back to the
view of philosophy as a dialectic of results, a sifting of ends. Above
all things, it must follow whithersoever the wind carries it, and not
pre-determine its haven in the face of all the forces upon which it
relies for progress.
Philosophy is then more than mere epistemology. But the epistemological
problem is undoubtedly its own peculiar centre. Upon the decision of
the nature of reality it centres its vital energies, and on this point
we seem to-day to have arrived at a temporary decision that ‘idealism
based on realism’ is the position which must be accepted for the present,
though we may hope it is not the last standpoint.
The reason why no further progress is possible is that as yet the
‘nucleus,’ as Lotze understood it, remains unresolved. However much may
be done to show that objects are ideal, that the ultimate is a unit ideal
in its character, the fact remains that the unity characteristic of an
existent thing is always a unity whose actuality does not come from
the subjective side. It need not be disputed that a thing is a complex
of universals; but this cannot blind us to the fact that the reason
for any one object being _this particular_ complex is to be found in a
determination _of_ our activity which comes to us, in perception, and
does not go forth from us.
The realistic element then must not be overlooked or ignored. But to
advocate realism is not to advocate materialism in any form. This may
be taken as self-evident. The formula, ‘no object without a subject,’ is
the last word on that point. But neither is the advocacy of an idealism
based on realism any ground for reaching a monism on the idealistic side.
In one of its aspects, the formula quoted above means no unity without a
consciousness for which the unity exists. And while materialism generates
its peculiar monism by ignoring this, idealism advances to its monism
by an equal denial of the truth of the formula only obscured by greater
subtlety. For extreme idealism expresses the unity of the whole under
the form of thought unifying itself, which involves the presentation
of thought to thought, or a thought that thinks itself. It is only in
default of an attempt to work out this idea that it seems plausible. On
further consideration it becomes a regress to infinity just as much as
the constitution of a whole by presentation to the mind of God proved an
infinite process. The question of the reality of time is the inner point
which wrecks idealism of this type. For the assertion of timeless thought
is a deduction from the concept of what _such a totality_ would be _if
there were_ such a totality. In experience however we find a sequence
of events which is not a mere logical interdependence, but an actual
order. Time may, and I think we are safe in saying must, be regarded as
subjective; but order in time implies over and above the subjective form
an extra-subjective determination.
These subjects are large, and deserve further elaboration. For the
present I only desire to indicate some of the reasons which seem to
force one back from the extremes to a middle course of some kind. To
define that middle course properly, it would be necessary to write a
metaphysic. Gassendi would help but little, for two obvious reasons: he
has no epistemology, and his idealistic tendencies are too embryonic,
as they were bound to be so long as he could neither estimate the
significance of the possibility of objects nor make up his mind as to the
nature of time and space. As I have indicated above, criticism finds him
an easy victim from this point of attack. His weaknesses are apparent;
the interesting point about his work is the way in which it defines
problems still unsolved.
If we look in modern philosophy for a match to Gassendi, we shall
probably find the nearest approach to one in G. H. Lewes. His ‘Reasoned
Realism’ is very much akin to ‘Empirical Realism,’ as used above of
Gassendi (_v._ _Problems of Life and Mind_, I. 176). Spencer’s position
is defined by Lewes as ‘Transfigured Realism’ (p. 192), ‘for that
theory professes to be a theory of Perception, and declares Perception
to be symbolical; whereas, according to the Principles here expounded,
Perception being the resultant of two factors, internal and external, the
conclusion deduced is that the object thus felt exists precisely as it is
felt: existing for us only in Feeling, its reality is what we feel....
Perception, because it is a resultant, not a symbol, does not alter the
Real: on the contrary, the object only _is_ to us what we feel it to
be—it exists in that relation.’ Lewes’ language is somewhat inaccurate:
a few lines lower he says, ‘this particular thing in this particular
relation is what it is in this relation, _i.e._ what it is felt to be.’
Here ‘thing’ is put in place of ‘object,’ and which of the two terms
should be used I cannot say: if Lewes meant ‘thing,’ the position is very
like Gassendi’s; shall we say ‘no better than Gassendi’s’? If he means
that ‘thing’ and ‘object’ are identical (except in so far as the thing
has _more_ relations than it realises with us), the position is one that
Gassendi might have endorsed: for that the real is the existent which
reveals itself to the senses, and has more reality (in its unrelated
self) than our senses are adequate to, is just what he tries to say.
But we cannot extend to Lewes the consideration which Gassendi deserves
on account of his disadvantages. When Lewes says ‘the object thus felt
exists precisely as it is felt,’ he is simply refunding into both terms
of the relation the product of their relatedness: he might just as well
say that hydrogen and oxygen have each of them all the properties of
water. It may be true that perception does not, as a process, alter, that
is vitiate, reality; but that statement leaves it open to us to regard
the perception as a development of the real grounds of perception and, as
such, a process vital to the real. In trying to get away from the notion
that being phenomenal is being unreal, Lewes has fallen into the other
pit and proves that perception has no real ground: for if reality does
not develope in perception, its indifference amounts to nonexistence.
With Lewes perception seems to be a relation in which both terms are
indifferent, and that is not conceivable. If perception involves a
subjective advance from mere sensation to definite apprehension, it must
also involve an objective advance from the mere stimulus to the true
object.
Gassendi would be in principle nearer to Lewes than to Spencer on the
question of perception. It is interesting to think over the points
of resemblance between the _Synthetic_ Philosophy and the _Syntagma_
Philosophicum. The scheme is so similar: the matter so different. The
progress of two centuries is condensed in their differences. But the
critical question of the nature of the object-in-itself seems to receive
an answer from Spencer less acceptable than that of Gassendi. We are
however precluded from discussion upon details by a primary difference
which completely swamps all similarity. This consists in the deductive
character of Spencer’s synthetic philosophy. In contrast to this
Gassendi’s method is reductive. It is indeed true that Spencer gives away
his deduction by omitting that most important element, the transition
from inorganic to organic: on consideration however it will be clear that
the deduction has really failed to vitally connect _any_ higher stage
with a lower. If the deduction were really successful at any point the
evolutionary doctrine could have passed from a method to a theory, and
attained that intuitive insight which, as Leibnitz foresaw, would make
it _prophetic_. Spencer was overweighted with the possibilities of a
doctrine of Force: Gassendi was saved from that, possibly by absence of
temptation.
We cannot afford to overlook in modern philosophy the recognition which
scholasticism is receiving. The best scholastic philosophy was marked
by a firm grasp on certain ultimate points and by clear if somewhat
formal definitions. Its relation to religion put it in close contact
with the deepest thought of all ages, while it tended to keep aloof
the encroaching sciences. While therefore it erred in dogmatically
asserting itself as an authority in spheres over which its formulae had
no jurisdiction either by nature or origin, it at the same time retained
intact, by force of circumstances, what modern philosophy is striving to
redeem from the grasp of an apparently all-victorious science. The points
which it thus retained, uncritically but resolutely, were the reality of
the spiritual and the necessity of a creator.
The creative factor we still must have. The concept of God is one of
those concepts which successive ages refine. But however much we refine
the idea, it cannot be wholly refined away. The elimination of sensuous
and imaginative elements is only a purification: as culture advances,
the construction which we put upon the idea advances from the crudeness
of anthropomorphism to other forms which correspond to the higher mental
level of the race. And as at one extreme the concept of God, so at the
other the concept of matter is perpetually refined and re-edited. But
neither seems as yet to have reached the vanishing point, and however
comprehensive our scheme of development, it retains the three movements
of a given which developes, a form of development which implies more than
mere mechanism, and a mind without which the development cannot have come
to its recognition.
The first is the matter. The second is the possibility of being
intelligible, which must be reluctantly allowed. The third is mind. As
regards the second, it must not be over-emphasised at present. To assert
that the given is purely intelligible overlooks faults; to assert that
it is intelligence, leads to confusion. For while it might be called
‘intelligible’ through and through, if we had any knowledge of a mind for
which it was thus intelligible, in the absence of such knowledge we have
to confess that what is not given to our intelligence as intelligence is
as much an unintelligible as though there were no such mind. And this
limitation to which the absence of any omniscience which we can show
forces us, leaves an irrational element which is foreign to us, however
much we prophesy its final elimination.
The attempt to remove this from the ethical side is premature. The
ethical import of the whole is not a valid ground for universal
statements, so long as the whole is not given as such. A view which
makes the whole a self-revelation of a Divine mind moves in a circle,
constructing the concept of that mind to support its own correlative,
the Whole viewed as a One intelligible and ethical in character. It is
sounder to regard ethical characteristics as not ‘cosmic,’ else our
will and our thought must be regarded as identical with that which we
attribute to God, whereas Spinoza’s determination of the voluntas and
cognitio Dei as only negatively determinable, must be regarded as the
true logical position.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Gassendi says Epicurus was neither ‘Primus nec solus qui Atomos
defenderit.’ Others are Moschus—‘de quo Empiricus et Strabo etiam
ante bellum Troianum’—Leucippus, Democritus, Metrodorus, Ecphantus,
Pythagoreus, Empedocles, Heracleitus, Plato (qui Empedoclis instar,
elementa composuit ex particulis prae exilitate inconspicuis),
Xenocrates, Asclepiades, Heraclides, Diodorus, Artemidorus, Mnesitheus,
alii’ (VI. 160). Truly a cloud of witnesses.
[2] For Leucippus _v._ Burnet, _Early Greek Philosophy_.
[3] Wallace, _Epicureanism_, p. 6.
[4] _Ibid._ p. 16.
[5] Usually called ‘free-will,’ but see p. 230, Note on Declination.
[6] _v._ Note, p. 239.
[7] W. Wallace, _Epicureanism_.
[8] The following anecdote given by Sorbière illustrates Gassendi’s love
of first-hand evidence: ‘ut suspicionem autem prorsus amoliretur quam
de canali Cholidocho habuerat, quem Chylodochum dicere maluerat, equos,
in quibus omnino deficit, introspicere voluit. Et memini offendisse me
aliquando euntem cum Martello, saeviente admodum hieme, ad loca illa in
quae deportari solent viarum purgamenta et trahi equorum cadavera quae
plura, soluto pretio aperiri jussit’ (Gassendi, _Op. Omnia_, vol. I.,
Preface).
[9] F. Bouillier, _Histoire de la Philosophie Cartésienne_, quoted by
Thomas, p. 14. Thomas also quotes the following address to the ‘Lords
of Mount Parnassus,’ written by Boileau, which gives some interesting
sidelights on the opinions with which the _Exercitationes_ were received:
‘Supplient humblement les maîtres ès arts, proffesseurs régens de
l’Université de Paris; disant qu’il est de notorieté publique que c’est
le sublime et incomparable Aristote qui est sans conteste le premier
fondateur des quatre premiers éléments, le feu, l’air, l’eau et la terre
...; et quoique pendant plusieurs siècles il ait été maintenu d’un commun
consentement dans une paisible possession de tous ses droits, néanmoins
depuis quelques années en-çà, deux particulières, nommées la Raison et
l’Expérience, se sont liguées ensemble pour s’ériger un trône sur les
ruines de son autorité; et pour parvenir plus adroitement à leurs fins
ont excité certains esprits fâcheux, qui sous les noms de Cartistes et
de Gassendistes ont commencé à secouer le joug du seigneur Aristote....
Ce consideré, Nosseigneurs, il vous plaise ordonner ... que Gassendi,
Descartes, Rohant, etc., et leurs adhérents seront conduits à Athènes et
condamnés d’y faire amende honorable devant tout la Grèce....’ (p. 9.)
[10] Gassendi was one of the first after the revival of letters who
treated the literature of philosophy in a lively way. His writings
of this kind, though too laudatory and somewhat diffuse, have great
merit. They abound in those anecdotal details, natural yet not obvious
reflexions, and vivacious turns of thought which made Gibbon style
him, with some extravagance certainly, though it was true enough up to
Gassendi’s time: ‘Le meilleur philosophe des litterateurs et le meilleur
litterateur des philosophes’ (_Encycl. Britt._, ‘Gassendi,’ vol. X.).
Ritter (_Geschichte der Philosophie_, X. 544), speaking of Gassendi’s
encyclopaedic knowledge, says, ‘Nicht ohne Grund hat Bayle von ihm
gesagt, er sei unter den Philologen der grösste Philosoph, unter den
Philosophen der grösste Philolog gewesen,’ which looks like the prototype
of Gibbon’s remark.
[11] I. 31. ‘objectum, seu tanquam scopus Intellectui propositus sit
Verum: objectum, seu scopus Voluntati propositus sit Bonum.’
[12] I. 31. ‘Quanquam et quia Regulae huiusmodi generales sunt, ideo
inservire intellectui non modo ad scientiam naturae, sed etiam ad omnem
omnino cognitionem possunt.’
[13] I. 33. ‘nam simul ac res nominatur, obversari nobis in mente
experimur illarum imagines, in quas veluti intuamur.’
[14] ‘C’est en s’appuyant sur ces déclarations, d’ailleurs formelles,
que les logiciens de Port-Royal et beaucoup de critiques à leur suite,
ont rangé Gassendi parmi les sensualistes. Nous verrons bientôt ce qu’il
faut penser de ce jugement lorsque, nous plaçant non plus au point de
vue psychologique, nous étudierons de plus près la formation de nos
connaissons, et chercherons à déterminer avec plus de précision le rôle
exact des deux facteurs dont elles dépendent: l’expérience et la raison’
(P. Félix Thomas, _La Philosophie de Gassendi_ (Paris, 1889), p. 38).
_v._ p. 13, note.
[15] I. 54. ‘impressa quaedam animo rei definitio’: ‘nisi talem quampiam
_animo deformatam_ habeamus.’
[16] I. 67.
[17] I. 68.
[18] I. 69. ‘non criterium, est enim potius crites.’
[19] I. 81. This equals the distinction of τεκμήριον and σημεῖον.
[20] Cp. Ritter, _Geschichte der Philosophie_, X. 545-555.
[21] I. 84.
[22] How is this to be understood? In a letter to Valerius (VI. 151,
dated 1642) Gassendi says: ‘id ipsum est quod alii dicunt nihil esse
in Intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu; insinuaturque interim ut
in sensu praefuerint quae videntur nunquam transisse per sensum.’ In
respect of God he says: ‘quas habemus species huiusmodi rerum, non esse
absque analogia ad res, ut corporeas sic sensu perceptas.’ This seems to
interpret the formula as meaning ‘all human thought is sensuous,’ which
is hardly half-way to Condillac.
[23] _v._ p. 4.
[24] Gassendi uses this example to explain the distinction between
logica utens and docens. To learn to count is merely to learn a method,
good enough in itself but useless by itself, and only acquired in order
that it may be applied to things. To go on with thought-processes in
abstraction is like multiplying a number by itself ad infinitum; the
result is _true_ but _true of nothing_: hence he insists on the return to
experience as being a process of verification. The inner significance of
mathematical reasoning does not seem to have struck Gassendi; he merely
sees that the assertion ‘twice two is four’ means that if two things have
been given me twice I _ought_ to have four; whether I have or not is a
contingent fact that requires immediate experience for its verification.
In both cases, mathematics and logic, we seem primarily to work with
ideas divorced from things; but does this divorce extend to the ideas
which are intuitively guaranteed? Gassendi apparently thinks it does, for
even the idea of God is ‘verified’ in the content of experience.
[25] Cp. p. xi.
[26] I. 138.
[27] I. 141. ‘Nam fatendum est quidem convinci demonstrationi non posse,
non esse mundos praeter hunc alios: quando profitemur potuisse et posse
adhuc condere Deum alios innumerabileis.... At vero tueri aliunde plureis
mundos reipsa esse, praeter rationem omnino est.’
[28] I. 155.
[29] ‘Plerique ... fatentur esse vim quandam per totum mundum sic
diffusam parteisque eius continentem cuiusmodi in Animali est Anima.’
[30] This is Gassendi’s interpretation of Plato’s phrase, νοῦς
μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, ψυχήν δὲ ἐν σώματι (_Timaeus_, 30 B). ‘Stallbaum,’
says Archer-Hind (_Timaeus_, p. 93), ‘following the misty light of
neo-platonic inspiration, says of ψυχή, media est inter corpora atque
mentem.’ In _Timaeus_, 36 E, we are told God constructed body within
soul: hence νοῦς, ψυχή, and σῶμα were conceived as each including the
other, like three concentric circles, with νοῦς comprehending ψυχή, ψυχή
comprehending σῶμα. The relation of this to the view that ‘νοῦς is simply
the activity of ψυχή according to her own proper nature’ (Archer-Hind),
is obvious if not orthodox: for νοῦς can think ψυχή but not vice versa,
includes but is not included by ψυχή.
[31] Cf. p. 226.
[32] ‘It might almost be supposed that the following lines were written
by one of our own contemporaries: they are, however, extracted from a
chapter of Avicenna on the origin of mountains. This author was born
in the tenth century. Mountains may be due to two causes. Either they
are effects of upheavals of the crust of the earth, such as might occur
during a violent earthquake, or they are the effect of water, which,
cutting for itself a new route, has denuded the valleys, the strata
being of different kinds, some soft, some hard. The winds and waters
disintegrate the one, but leave the other intact. Most of the eminences
of the earth have had this latter origin. It would require a long
period of time for all such changes to be accomplished, during which
the mountains themselves might be somewhat diminished in size. But that
water has been the main cause of these effects is proved by the existence
of fossil remains of aquatic and other animals on many mountains’ (_The
Intellectual Development of Europe_, Draper, I. 410). Gassendi at least
affects a knowledge of Avicenna, and frequently refers to him.
[33] Gassendi would allow both the assertions, namely—(1) Reality is
wider than Thought; (2) Thought is wider than Reality. The former is
correct, because knowledge is a relation, and there is no a priori reason
why all the existent should be in that relation. Since the relation
does not constitute the being of anything, that may be which is not
thus related; in other words, the knowable may include the unknown (not
unknowable) as well as the known. The latter is also correct, because we
may outrun our data and assert our subjective (imaginative) constructions
as real.
[34] It is perhaps necessary to point out that subjective does not
mean ‘mental’: there is no ‘mentalism’ at this stage of the history of
thought: the subjective is ‘the work of the mind,’ and is practically
always limited to the work of the _Imagination_. This is why we find so
much confusion in the interpretation of philosophies which belong to
this period of transition. It is frequently the case that the work of
the mind as reason is considered unimpeachable, while the work of the
mind as imagination is the source of constructions which may be, as we
still say, ‘put upon’ things. The phrase here means that an imaginative
construction is not necessarily _more_ than imaginative. It seems strange
that after his comprehension of the futility of abstract counting (p.
712) Gassendi should not have avoided this error. But Space, in spite of
being a substance, so combines plurality and unity (for many spaces are
one space) that Gassendi lost his way.
[35] This is a definite logical principle derived from Epicurus, _v._ p.
3, Canon iii.
[36] Space, then, is perceived by sense in so far as it is given with
body. The question might be asked, Would an animal, having sense only,
perceive space? I imagine Gassendi would have no answer to that: the a
priori objectivity of space and the possibility of a sensitive organism
that did not think would both be endangered by its discussion.
[37] I. 220. Gassendi quotes from the _Confessions_: ‘Si nemo ex me
quaerat quid sit Tempus, scio: si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio.’
[38] I. 223. ‘Jam vero neque Epicurus videtur posse dicere esse diem,
noctemque aut longam aut brevem ab eo tempore quod cogitatione ipsi
affingimus.’ The reference is to Diogenes Laertius, x. Cp. I. 222.
‘Videntur porro Stoici melius quam ipse Epicurus sensisse, reputantes
Tempus tale incorporeum, quod per se esse intelligatur, non tale quod
accidat rebus, eo sensu ut Tempus non foret, si res non essent, quae eo
durarent, aut nisi etiam nostra mens durare ipsas cogitaret.’
[39] I. 223. ‘Appositum est magis comparare Tempus cum Lucernae flamma,
cuius esse ita in fluxu consistit, ut quovis momento alia ac alia sit, et
nusquam sit amplius quaecumque ante fuit, nusquam adhuc sit, quaecumque
est futura.’
[40] I. 224. ‘Ut Locus secundum se totum est illimitatus, sic Tempus
secundum se totum nec principium nec finem habet.’
The syntax here shows that we must not call Time a Whole, but say, ‘time
regarded as a whole.’
[41] _Ibid._ ‘Ut quodlibet Temporis momentum idem est in omnibus
locis—ita quaelibet Loci portio omnibus temporibus subest.’
[42] His reference to Posidonius must therefore be read as meaning that
the present is a piece of real Time, a quantity of duration forming a
unit, not a ‘saddle-back’ of time; and the whole is therefore an infinite
multiplication of finite parts. In Time atomism finds a particularly
intractable item.
[43] If it were not so far from Gassendi’s general position, this
point would deserve further consideration. Modern psychology utilizes
this distinction of quality and quantity in order to correlate the
time-reference contained in an act of memory with the time-expanse of the
experience remembered. This line of thought is entirely useless for the
explanation of Gassendi, because it is not the nature of thought but the
nature of real time that he is trying to explain. His position therefore
leaves him with an existence that has a Time but no times, the whole
without the parts. Timeless thought may or may not be more intelligible,
but it is certainly not Gassendi’s present topic.
[44] I. 234.
[45] Atomi proinde non puncta sed tenuissima corpuscula sunt praeditique
adeo tantula magnitudine quae sit principium et quasi radix magnitudinis
omnium corporum.
[46] Inane vero solum locum discriminationemque ministrat.
[47] I. 335. ‘Atomi ob sui cuiusque figuram ac molem aut liberiores,
solutioresque sint et sese facilius ab irretientibus extricent
faciliusque vias inveniant quibus per corpus discurrentes inque
haerentiores partes impingentes motum imprimant.’
[48] I. 337. ‘Planius ergo dici videtur cum in unaquaque re principium
actionis et motus sit pars illa mobilissima, actuosissimaque et
quasi flos totius materiae quae et ipsa sit quam Formam solent
dicere, et haberi possit quasi tenuissima contextura subtilissimarum,
mobilissimarumque Atomorum; ideo primam causam moventem in Physicis rebus
esse Atomos: quod dum ipsae per se, et juxta vim a suo authore ab initio
usque acceptam moventur, motum omnibus rebus praebeant sintque adeo
omnium quae in Natura sunt motuum, origo, principium et causa.’
This quotation shows that Gassendi is confused. Motion in _bodies_
he attributes to the perpetual interaction of their parts, which is
possible, because some are finer than others. But the original motion
is in the Atom, which, as we have seen, being what it is cannot have
motion. To Gassendi this difficulty seems to be overcome by saying God
gave the motion to the Atoms. Gassendi’s atom is an ultimate, not only in
the sense of being the last in analysis, but also as the point at which
physical explanation collapses.
[49] I. 340.
[50] I. 346.
[51] Cp. I. 266. ‘Praeter hanc substantiam seu identitatem mavis seu
similitudinem dicere, attribuantur Atomis qualitates quaedam, sive
accidentia, quorum, ut jam ante insinuavimus, alia sunt Inseparabilia,
ἀχώριστα (sic enim Plutarchus), et Lucretio Conjuncta vulgo Propria
appellitentur; alia separabilia, et Lucretio Eventa, vulgo accidentia
communia dicantur: ideo sciendum est, agi heic non de separabilibus,
eventisve, qualia sunt concursus, connexio, positio, ordo, etc., sed de
inseparabilibus, conjunctisve, seu dicere malis, proprietatibus’ [_e.g._
magnitude, figure, weight].
[52] I. 374.
[53] _I.e._ implanted by God ab initio.
[54] I. 387.
[55] The difference between ‘potestate’ and ‘potentia’ should be noticed.
[56] ‘Pythagoras, Plato, Aristoteles apud Plutarchum fecere sonum
incorporeum.’ This was due to their considering the configuration of the
air the essence of sound: they took figure ‘profunditatis expertem,’ or
abstractly.
[57] I. 426.
[58] The English word ‘vision’ has exactly the double meaning (act
of seeing, thing seen) which expresses the problem that troubled the
ancients.
[59] Nehemiah Grew, whose investigations developed the idea of sex in
plants, was born in 1628, and did not publish his work until 1681. It is
improbable that Gassendi had an accurate knowledge of the subject, though
possibly it was ‘in the air.’
[60] ‘Perspicit abunde sagacitas tua, quo dicere sensu cum Sapiente
potuerim “nihil esse sub sole novum.” Quare et lubens tibi subscribo dum
argumentaris nova esse omnia, ob continentem, quae in rebus observitatur,
mutationem’ (_Ep. L. Valesio_, 1647, vi. 264).
[61] This must be taken with a limitation. The actual ultimate is not the
atom but the ‘semina rerum,’ _i.e._ atoms qualified to enter into any
combination of a given kind. The process of Generation is ‘assimilation,’
or reunion of like with like, a process of selection as well as
combination.
[62] I. 468. ‘Respondent potestatem materiae respectu Formae duplicem
esse, unam eductivam, quatenus forma potest vi agentis ex illa educi:
aliam receptivam quatenus potest eandem forman ex se eductam recipere:
sicque materiam utraque hac potentia formam continere. Ac primum
continere aliquid eductivâ potentiâ nihil aliud est quam habere actu in
se, quod possit exinde educi. Ita crumena, in qua sunt actu decem aurei,
dicetur illos continere eductivâ potentiâ, quatenus inde educi possint:
nam alioquin, nisi actu in se haberet, ii ex ea educi non possent, neque
crumena dici posset continere eductivâ potentiâ.’
[63] ‘Quamobrem calor quidem et frigus conferre interdum ad maturiorem
coitionem indurationemque possunt aliquid, at debet esse praeterea
vis quaedam lapidifica, quam et seminalem dicere nihil vetat ... est
praeterea vis seminalis quae ex preparata materia tam plantam quam pullum
delineet: ita quo lapides formentur debet omnino praeter calorem aliudve
agens extrinsecum esse interior quaedam vis quae conformationem moliatur
et seminalis censeri possit’ (II. 114).
[64] ‘videri esse in magnete ac ferro vim quandam analogam sensui: id
nempe propter attractionem haud absimilem Animali. Nam ut Animal specie
quadam objecti externi perculsum, ipsum statim appetit, et ad illud
rapitur: ita minor magnes ac ferrum quamprimum maioris sive potentioris
magnetis specie percellitur, appetitu quodam rapitur ad ipsum. Certe
ut sensibile objectum non.... Et ut objectum sensibile per immissam
speciem convertit trahitque ad se animam quae vi sua corpus quantumvis
crassum una versus objectum transfert: ita et magnes per transfusam
speciem videtur ad se convertere trahereque ipsam quasi animam (seu
florem substantiae) ferri, quae sua vi totam ferri massam versus magnetem
una abripiat.... Quare ut hoc modo subingressa speciei corpuscula in
substantiam animae (partisve sentientis ipsius) illam ita sollicitant
ut non sine quodam impetu in objectum feratur: ita videntur corpuscula
speciei magnetis subingressa ferri quasi animam, ipsius corpuscula sic
evolvere et in magnetem convertere ut hac ratione sollicitata impetum
vegetum in magnetem concipiat et quod amplius est etiam parem speciem
illico diffundat.’
[65] II. 144.
[66] We now speak of animated pictures as well as animated nature!
[67] II. 231.
[68] I say ‘in some degree intellectual’ without forgetting that the
tendency of much of our modern psychological writing is to go beyond what
we should ordinarily call intellectual phenomena. In spite of this, and
in spite of our ‘animal psychology’ (which is largely engaged in proving
its own possibility) and our treatment of subconscious phenomena, not to
mention our phrenology and our analysis of adolescence, we have not yet
got to the point at which we could speak of an active principle which did
nothing but control digestion, as a ‘soul.’
[69] This would not be admissible in all cases. Some thought that the
possession of Anima constituted a degree of dignity which could not be
attributed to all creatures, an opinion which was due to the tendency
to confuse the Anima Mundi with God, and a consequent repugnance to
including in the Anima Mundi beings not worthy of the heaven of the
elect. Hence the term Anima came to mean soul in the sense in which it is
used in the phrase, ‘the soul that sinneth it shall die.’ For that class
of thinker animals must be automata.
[70] Cp. with the account of Epicurus the following remarks by Gassendi
(II. 248-250): ‘Epicurus probably made the atoms of the soul round: he
does not seem to have said what they were so much as what they were
_not_: Lucretius says “fugiens nil corporis aufert,” which dematerialises
the concept: “ad haec memorant Plutarchus et alii Epicurum non fecisse
simplicem Animae naturam sed esse voluisse κρᾶμα ἐκ τεσσάρων, ἐκ ποιοῦ
πυρώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ ἀερώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ πνευματικοῦ, ἐκ τετάρτου τινὸς
ἀκατανομάστου ὃ ἦν αὐτῷ αἰσθητικόν[*] (Stob. _Ecl. Phys._ p. 798),
temperatum quid ex quibusdam quattuor nempe ex quodam igneo, ex quodam
aereo, ex quodam flatuoso, ex quarto quodam innominato quod ipsi est
sentiendi vis”: the four mix in such a way as to produce a one (inde fiat
una quaedam substantia). We see from this passage (1) that the matter
is defined so as to be practically immaterial; (2) that a substance
is introduced simply to explain that which the others do not explain,
sentience; (3) there is no suggestion of direct perception of a soul: it
is an inference, relying mainly on an induction from the data of a living
and a dead body by a method of differences. The Logic of the argument is
curious. It is said, a dead body is not lighter than a living body, hence
the soul has no weight: a dead body does not feel, hence the soul is that
which has feeling, etc. These two arguments alone would prove (1) that
there was no soul, or else that it stayed in the body, and (2) that death
is loss of feeling—not of a soul that feels. The assumption of the soul
made these “proofs” pass muster; but it is obvious that it would change
the position very little indeed if we left out the soul as it is and
confined ourselves to what it does.’
[*] Gass. sic. τοῦτο δ’ ἦν Ritter et Preller 384.
[71] II. 250. ‘Principio vero distinguendum inter Animam Hominis
Animaliumque aliorum est: et cum operosior res sit circa Animam
Hominis, ideo videtur prius dicendum de caeterorum Anima, ut de qua
Mentis immortalis experte et philosophari liberius, et falli minore cum
periculo liceat.’ It should be noted (1) that Gassendi expressly says he
will take for examination the Anima, ‘quae sit in perfecto, sanguineo,
respiranteque animali,’ and what is said of this will be true of all;
(2) that Gassendi obviously thinks that what is said about the Anima not
conjoined with Mens will be true of the composite Anima and mind. In both
cases therefore the difference is in the function, not the substance,
for, as nothing is subtracted in lower forms, so nothing is added in the
higher.
[72] II. 281. _I.e._ because if we could say at such and such a time that
the offspring is without the anima, and then afterwards that it now has
the Anima, the soul must be educed from nothing. The whole passage is
very interesting, but too long to quote. Writing in 1629 to ‘D. Thomae
Fieno, in Inclyta Louaniensi Academia, Professori Medico Primario,’
Gassendi speaks as though he had already made up his mind on the point.
At first, he says, I thought the child derived its Anima from the
parent, being only an offshoot, like the cutting from a tree (juvabat me
exemplum rami resecti ex salice). But this clashed with the testimony
of the Scriptures, while it was supported by the evidences of heredity;
so the only solution was to acknowledge that the Anima was twofold, and
say the Anima sensitiva is ex parente, the Anima rationalis was created
and ‘poured in’ by God, ‘statim atque decisione facta, seu foetus seu
seminis, rationalis Anima Parentis seu foetum seu semen informare
desineret’ (VI. 19). This statement is at once more orthodox and dogmatic
than that in the _Syntagma_. The real reason for distinguishing the being
of the Anima rationalis is the need for a position that will combine the
facts of heredity with the truth of immortality.
[73] Cp. with Gassendi’s words what Lotze says in his _Outlines of
Psychology_ (§ 81): ‘At the place where, and at the moment when, the germ
of an organic being is formed amid the coherent system of the physical
course of nature, this fact furnishes the incitement or moving reason
which induces the all-comprehending One to beget from himself, as a
supplement to such physical fact, the soul belonging to this organism.’
[74] Alteratio, cp. Stoic., ἑτεροίωσις.
[75] II. 330.
[76] non aliquid immitti, sed remitti potius repellive videtur: spiritus
nempe nervis contentus. Bernier translates this by ‘rebondissement.’
[77] περὶ ψυχῆς 424_a_: ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν
εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης.
[78] This is the passage quoted by Masson (_v._ p. 117). Clearly it has
a different meaning in its context from that which Masson gives it by
taking it out of that context.
[79] _Met._ 1072. b. 20.
[80] II. 398.
[81] II. 405.
[82] II. 440.
[83] This is not the question of opposition between the sun as it is and
as it appears, but of the limits to imaginative reproduction.
[84] II. 450.
[85] II. 447. ‘videtur mens nostra, seu Rationalis anima donec degit
in corpore, non aliis uti speciebus quam iis quas corpus subministrat,
quaeque in Phantasia resident: ac tum dumtaxat pari cum Angelis
conditione evadere, cum excedenti a corpore, ac Angelorum instar futurae
separatae, Deus indit species eiusmodi rerum, quas nosse eius interest,
sive ignoratae in corpore fuerint, sive eae sint quarum cognitarum
meminisse sit opus.’ It is therefore a bare soul that arrives in Heaven,
and Gassendi at least means that only in Heaven can we have an actus
purus.
[86] Si notiora et manifestiora sunt, alicui ergo facultati cognoscenti
eiusmodi sunt, dici enim quid notum, dici manifestum nisi respectu eius
cui innotescat manifestaturque, non potest.
[87] Cp. Bradley, _Ethical Studies_, on Lust.
[88] Thomas: _Gassendi_, p. 194.
[89] II. 505.
[90] II. 520.
[91] Max Müller, _Science of Language_, II. 382: ‘And this, better
than anything else, will, I think, explain the strong objection which
comparative philologists feel to what I called the Bow-wow and the
Pooh-pooh theories, names which, I am sorry to see, have given great
offence, but in framing which, I can honestly say, I thought more of
Epicurus than of living writers, and meant no offence to either.’
_Ibid._ 398: ‘Even Epicurus, who is reported to have said that in the
first formation of language men acted unconsciously, moved by nature ...
admitted that this would only account for one half the language, and that
some agreement must have taken place before language really began.’ The
‘reported to have said’ refers us to Proclus ad Plat. _Crat._ p. 9: ὁ
γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος ἔλεγεν ὅτι οὐχι ἐπιστημόνως οὗτοι ἔθεντο τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀλλὰ
φυσικῶς κινούμενοι, ὡς οἱ βήσσοντες καὶ πταίροντες καὶ μυκώμενοι καὶ
ὑλακτοῦντες καὶ στενάζοντες.
[92] II. 551.
[93] This is one of the finest passages in Gassendi. The chemists, he
says, would laugh at a surgeon who said the body could only be divided
as far as anatomy divides it: they would say ‘_we_ can divide still
further’; but ‘quemadmodum sit tibi chirurgus ineptus ... sic ipse
videaris futurus ineptus ... ineptus, inquam, ipsi Naturae.’ Even this
more penetrating analysis cannot get to the bottom of things: ‘utcunque
ergo nactus sis huiuscemodi quod dissolvat agens, non magis tamen nactus
es agens quod ab eo secreta compingat, quam chirurgus ille organum quod
parteis scalpello secretas adunet. Atqui est praeterea in Natura agens
quod compingat coadunetque.’
(adunare is Gassendi’s technical term for the producing of unity by
composition: it really denotes more than compingere, indicating the view
of the result as a whole, while compingere remains at the point of view
of the parts as being welded together.)
[94] II. 558. ‘neque intellectus, tanquam praeeunte face destitutus
penetrare suo acumine potest in illorum substantiam.’
‘Sensibus destituimur quibus praeeuntibus Intellectus sua acutie
principia huiuscemodi deprehendat, assequatur, prolustret, introspiciat’
(559).
[95] II. 557.
[96] ‘nullo non sacculo Natura illud homini insusurret aut potius
inclamet,
‘Tecum habita et noris quam sit tibi curta suppellex.’
But ‘nihil sit desperandum de humani ingenii sagacitate,’ II. 560.
[97] II. 695.
[98] With this idea of the plebeian mind seeking praeter lucrum nihil
there is a close parallel in Ruskin, _Crown of Wild Olive_, § 32: ‘In
every nation there are a vast class who are ill-educated, cowardly, and
more or less stupid. And with these people just as certainly the fee is
first and the work second, as with brave people the work is first and the
fee second.’
[99] ‘non voluit Epicurus tranquillitatem esse quasi merum torporem, sed
voluit potius esse statum in quo omnes vitae actiones placide simul et
jucunde peragerentur’ (II. 716).
[100] This is meant purely metaphorically: it has however been suggested
that Epicurus’ mode of life was a ‘dietetic experiment.’
[101] II. 729-730.
[102] II. 770.
[103] II. 795. ‘Itaque quicquid sit de illa seu suppositione seu
fictione status, in quo seu Epicurus seu alii vixisse aliquando dicunt
primos homines, tam esse profecto videtur ipsa societas hominum, quam
illorum est origo antiqua: ac non eo quidem solum modo quo bruta generis
eiusdem sociabilia inter se sunt, verum illo etiam, quo quatenus sunt
et intelligentes et ratione praediti, agnoscunt non posse ullam inter
se societatem esse securam nisi ea conventionibus pactisque mutuis
constabiliatur.’
[104] Voigt (_Jus. Nat._ vol. ii. 661) distinguishes Jus civile, Jus
gentium, and Jus naturale as the systems which applied respectively to
the citizen, the freeman, and the man. In the earlier stages of its
recognition it was an independent international private law which, as
such, regulated intercourse between peregrins, or between peregrins and
citizens, on the basis of their common libertas.
[105] Ulpian speaks of a jus naturale common to man and lower animals,
which is substantially instinct. This is said to be a law of nature
not referred to by any other jurist. The idea of jus naturale was not
peculiar to Ulpian. Gaius and Justinian equate Jus naturale and jus
gentium; but while the jus gentium is more natural than the civile, it is
far from identical with the naturale. The jus naturale is essentially a
speculative element. Its most noticeable features are: ‘(1) its potential
universal applicability to all men; (2) among all peoples; (3) at all
times; and (4) its correspondence with the innate conviction of right.’
It included among its propositions (1) recognitions of claims of blood;
(2) duty and faithfulness to engagements; (3) apportionment according to
equity; (4) voluntatis ratio. (For these facts see Voigt, quoted in the
_Encycl. Brit._, _loc. cit._) It will be obvious from these notes on the
character of the jus naturale that it was eminently fitted for becoming
the basis of a universal ethic.
[106] Merito vero quasi prima secundum naturam habetur lex illa, quod
tibi fieri non vult, alteri ne feceris: quippe ea omneis leges societatis
sic continet ut nemo violet alienum jus, nisi quia legem hanc violat....
Manifestum quoque est finem societatis esse in eo, ut cuique suo jure
frui, absque impedimento liceat: ... debet in illis constans et perpetua
voluntas tribuendi (hoc est conservandi atque reponendi) suum cuique
jus, reperiri: ideo residere in ipsis Publicam, communemve justitiam
quasi tutricem ac vindicem juris cuiusque singularis. If this is fully
realised it follows supervacaneam publicam illam fore.... Finally, vir
vere justus non ob intentas a legibus poenas, quas exacturus magistratus
sit, sed ipsiusmet Justitiae amore reverentiaque colit, et legibus etiam
magistratibusque sublatis prorsus culturus est.
[107] _Op. cit._ 277.
[108] _v._ _Encycl. Britt._ vol. 20, p. 696 (tenth ed.).
[109] ‘neque enim est cur putemus solam justitiam esse constantem atque
perpetuam voluntatem, ut _Jurisconsulti_ definiunt’ (VI. 113).
[110] _v._ p. 237.
[111] II. 840. ‘illi naturae lumini quo nos liberos esse experimur.’
[112] ‘Cumque Aristoteles propterea admitteret solum, ut verum, complexum
eiusmodi duarum disjunctivarum enunciationum, aut erit cras bellum navale
aut non erit: Epicurus quoque hoc solum complexum admisit, ut verum,
aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet: pervidit enim, si alteram
disjunctionum veram esse admitteret, fore ut necesse esset vivere cras
Hermarchum, aut necesse non vivere: “nulla autem est,” inquit _in natura_
talis necessitas’ (II. 837).
[113] I. 316. ‘Sed demus fuisse talem materiam seu Atomorum temere
volitantium infinitatem, annon difficultas est semper quomodo in
tanta illa laxitate, et infinitate spatiorum tot Atomi convenerint
ut illico potuerint se tam valide revincire, tam concinne disponere,
absque revinciente et disponente causa? Nam quod animalia quidem adeo
exquisite formentur, id habent ex seminibus ad certas formas comparatis:
Atomi vero illa non se habuere ut semina: quatenus comparata magis ad
gignendum Mundum, quam ad quidvis aliud non fuere.’ This passage deserves
particular attention, because it shows how Gassendi sees that the
necessity for going below determinate to indeterminate matter is one with
the necessity for postulating a Creator: the Atom being nothing _may_ be
everything, but it _need_ not be anything: the necessity falls outside
the Atom as such.
[114] The justification of faith is somewhat over-subtle: ‘jam vero ista
quae per sensus comprehenduntur occasiones sunt quae nos ad formandum
de Deo Anticipationem inducunt. Cum sit autem duplex potissimum sensus,
auditus scilicet et visus,’ etc. (I. 292). To auditus pertains the
anticipatio which arises from hearing about God, _i.e._ from authority,
primarily the authority of the Bible. It should be noted that this
knowledge of God is an intuition, like that which grasps axiomatic
truths. In both cases belief is due to ‘seeing’ (intuiting) the necessity
of the conjunction of ideas expressed in the words: it is therefore
relative to the individual’s development. This argument is two-edged: for
we can either say ‘idiots do not comprehend God,’ or, ‘those who do not
comprehend God are idiots’ [ut quantumcunque aliqui hominum _mutili_ aut
nascantur aut fiunt, hoc non obstat quin homines dicantur habere ab ipsa
natura suorum membrorum integritatem ita quantumvis aliqui aut nascantur
aut fiant _Athei_, etc., I. 290.]
[115] I. 331. ‘Ad alia ut accedam, tametsi nos Deus sinit res nostras
agere: non minus idcirco illi curae sumus. Quippe qui naturâ sumus
liberi, idcirco nos, quae maxima ipsius benignitas est, frui patitur
libertate nostra, ac nos interea procul dubio versus meliora dirigit.
Etenim vices parentis gerit,’ etc.
[116] _E.g._ nec ratione loci for regione loci in the passage quoted, p.
236.
[117] Quoted below, p. 236.
[118] _v._ p. xliv.
[119] Thomas (_op. cit._ p. 24) gives two reasons for the neglect into
which Gassendi fell. The first, quoted from Brucker, is that Gassendi
was too modest: his manner was so hesitating that it failed to win the
confidence of the reader. The other is want of clearness and conciseness
in the exposition. I think the true reason is rather to be found in
the fact that the necessity of getting down to nature was not yet
fully recognised, and the ideas of system and subjectivity were more
akin to the spirit of the times than those of content and empirical
classification. Thomas is certainly right in saying that Gassendi was as
much damaged by his friends as his foes: Epicurus in one way, and Bernier
in another, combined to damage his prospects.
[120] See p. 305.
[121] I take the phrase from Kant.
[122] ‘I shall not therefore be surprised if some men imagine that I run
into the enthusiasm of Malebranche.... He asserts an absolute external
world, which I deny’ (the Second Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous).
[123] On this point Gassendi in his correspondence diverged into humour
with a translation of duo quaedam epigrammata ex Anthologia: I quote the
second:
‘Ex Atomis Epicurus ait consistere Mundum,
Alcime, quippe putans his nihil esse minus.
At si novisset Diophantum, constituisset
Ex ipso potius, qui minor est Atomis.
Aut alia ex Atomis texens, ipsas potuisset
Ex Diophanto Atomos composuisse prius.’
(VI. 160.)
[124] This question of the relations and comparative values of the
monistic and pluralistic ideals, of the One Being and the being at one,
is too big to be discussed incidentally. It has been touched upon by
Mr. F. C. S. Schiller in _The Riddles of the Sphinx_ (p. 353): ‘We may
reasonably conclude then that monism is a failure, that by assuming
_unity_ at the outset it incapacitates itself for the task of explaining
phenomenal _plurality_, and _a fortiori_ for the still higher task
of really _uniting_ the Many in a significant _union_’; p. 355: ‘And
Leibnitz might well take for granted that as the Many _do_ interact,
they must be _capable of interacting_, and that it was unnecessary to
demonstrate that what actually existed was also capable of existing.’
[125] In a letter to Valesius (VI. 111, dated 1641) Gassendi
distinguishes two kinds of philosophy, (1) quam appellare τῶν φαινομένων,
seu Historicam soleo, (2) qua intimae rerum naturae proprietatesque
cognoscantur: ... haec est quam Deo totam concedo.
[126] Cp. Lotze, _Mikrokosmus_, I. 237, ‘a constantly renewed cement.’
[127] _Mikrokosmus_, III. ch. iv. Engl. Tran. p. 360.
[128] _Ibid._ p. 35.
[129] _Mikrokosmus_, III. ch. iv. Engl. Tran. p. 52.
[130] _Ibid._ p. 74.
[131] _Ibid._ p. 83.
[132] _Ibid._ p. 79.
[133] _Mikrokosmus_, III. ch. iv. Engl. Tran. p. 532.
[134] _Ibid._ p. 535.
[135] _Ibid._ p. 536.
[136] _Ibid._ p. 548.
INDEX
Activity, 162.
Analysis, value of, 178.
Anima, 106 (_v._ Soul).
Rationalis, 142.
Animals, how classified, 99.
Appetitus, 153.
Atoms: as described by Democritus, xxi.
as hyper-sensuous, xxxii, 52.
how different, 64.
Atomism, xvii.
its origins, xix.
of Democritus, xx-xxii.
as philosophy, xxiv, 255, 274.
its revival, 245.
in Leibnitz, 276.
Attraction, 62, 119.
Avicenna, 30 n., 176.
Bacon, 11.
Causality, 57.
Cause, efficient, 55.
Chymici, 24, 51.
their elements, 177.
criticism of, 178.
Clifford, W. K., 117.
Compositio, 136.
Copernicus, 29.
Courage, 203.
Cupiditas, 157.
_Declination_, xxxi.
note on, 230.
_Democritus._
his doctrine, xx-xxiii.
referred to, 52.
Descartes, xxxix.
his logic, 11.
relation to Gassendi, 251.
Empiricism, Gassendi’s relation to, 12, 251.
Epicurus, xvii.
relation to atomism, xviii.
life and teaching, xxv-xxxvi.
Logic, xxvii, 3.
Physics, xxx.
Psychology, xxxiii, 109, 121.
on imagines, 77.
on origin of laws, 204.
referred to, 52, 56, 101, 104, 167 n., 185, 198, 225, 231.
Eternity, 46.
Experience: meaning of, 251, 253.
Faculties: nature of, 69, 115.
Gassendi: his times, xxxix, 246.
character, xxxix.
life, xl-xlv.
Logic, 1.
Physics, 19.
on plurality of worlds, 22.
on World Soul, 23, 140.
on theories of the Universe, 28.
use of categories, 29, 35, 257, 264.
on space, 34.
time, 40.
eternity, 46.
matter, 49.
the atom, 52-64.
efficient causes, 55.
pure causality, 57.
local motion, 60.
attraction, 62, 119.
qualities, 66.
nature of faculties, 69, 115.
gravity, 72.
light, 74.
visible species (imagines), 76.
Generation or Becoming, 83.
magnet, 92, 115, 119.
plants, 95.
classification of animals, 99.
teleology, 100.
de anima, 106.
the human soul, 111.
origin of soul, 113.
perception, 115, 123.
sensation, 116, 121.
mind-stuff theory, 118.
his scale of Being, 127, 263.
imagination, 129.
simple apprehension, 135.
compositio, 136.
Ratio Sensitiva, 137.
intellectus, 142.
appetitus, 153.
cupiditas, 157.
pleasure-pain, 157.
activity (vis motrix), 162.
vocal sounds, 165.
nature of life, 168.
identity and continuity, 169.
temperament, 174.
value of analysis, 178.
summum bonum, 184.
classes of goods, 191.
virtue defined, 196.
prudence, 200.
courage, 203.
temperance, 204.
justice, 204.
jus civile, 206.
jus naturale, 207.
jus gentium, 209.
natural laws, 210.
liberty, 218.
predestination, 221.
God, 224.
_Gassendi._
his position defined, 248.
character of his work, 256.
the concept of motion, 261.
Generation, 83.
God, 224.
relation to time, 47.
first cause, 56.
Guyau, quoted, 230.
Identity, 169.
Imagination, 13, 129.
Intellectus, 142.
Jus, civile, 206;
naturale, 207;
gentium, 209.
Justice, 204.
Kant: his ethics in relation to Gassendi, 214.
his influence, 274, 279.
Leibnitz: his logical standpoint, 271.
relation to Gassendi, 273.
defective idea of an organism, 275.
idea of unity, 277.
Leucippus, xvii.
development of his atomism, xviii-xx.
Liberty, 218.
Life, defined, 168.
Light: nature of, 74.
Logic.
of Epicurus, xxvii, 3.
of Gassendi, 1.
_Lotze._
his aesthetic standpoint, 283.
doing opposed to being, 284.
three moments of his philosophy, 287.
occasionalism, 287.
idealism, 288.
_Lucretius_, xvii.
on the soul, xxxiii, 121.
quoted, 23, 109 n., 226, 237.
Magnet, 92, 115, 119.
Masson, John, quoted, 117, 230.
Materialism, 249.
Matter, 49.
Mind-stuff, 118.
Motion.
as general principle, 261.
local motion, 60.
vis motrix, 162.
Natural laws, 210.
Nature, view of, 20.
Occasionalism, 288.
Perception, 115, 123.
Plants, 95.
Plato, Timaeus, quoted, 25.
Posidonius, quoted, 45, 46.
Potentiality, 266.
Potestas, 72.
Predestination, 221.
Prudence, 200.
Pythagoras, on the World Soul, 25.
Qualities, 66.
Quality: opposed to quantity, 267.
Quantity: category of, 268.
relation to quality, 66.
Ratio, kinds of, 137.
Relation, category of, 265.
Sensation, 116, 121.
Signa, 10.
Soul, 106.
human, 111.
origin of, 113.
and body, 263.
Space, 34.
Species (visible), 76.
Speech, 165.
Substance, category of, 264, 272.
Summum bonum, 184.
Teleology, 100.
Temperament, 174.
Temperance, 204.
Thomas, P. Felix, quoted, xv, xliii, 4, 160, 213.
Time, 40.
Timeless, meaning of, 46.
Ueberweg, quoted, 248.
Unity, 257, 277.
in Lotze, 291.
Virtue, 196.
Wallace, Epicureanism, quoted, xxvi, xxxv, 104.
World Soul, 23, 140.
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