A FORECAST OF WHAT TANKS MAY DO
Accepting war as a science and an art, that it is founded on definite
principles which are applied according to the conditions of the moment,
we may scientifically reduce it to its component elements, which are:
Men, weapons, and movement. A combination of these three is an army, a
body of men which can fight and move.
Tactics, or the art of moving armed men on the battlefield, change
directly in accordance with the nature of the weapons themselves and
the mobility of the means of transport. Each new or improved weapon or
method of movement demands a corresponding change in the art of war.
Tools, or weapons, if only the right ones can be discovered, form
99 per cent. of victory. Strategy, command, leadership, courage,
discipline, supply, organisation, and all the moral and physical
paraphernalia of war are as nothing to a high superiority of weapons;
at most they go to form the 1 per cent. which makes the whole possible.
Indeed, as Carlyle writes, “Savage animalism is nothing, inventive
spiritualism is all.”
To-day the introduction of the tank on the battlefield entirely
revolutionises the art of war in that:
(i) It increases mobility by replacing muscular force by mechanical
power.
(ii) It increases security by rendering innocuous the effect of bullets
through the feasibility of carrying armour plate.
(iii) It increases offensive power by relieving the man from carrying
his weapons or the horse from dragging them, and by facilitating
ammunition supply it increases the destructive power of the weapons it
carries.
In other words, an army moved by petrol can obtain a greater effect
from its weapons in a given time with less loss to itself than one
which relies on muscular energy as its motive force. Whilst securing
its crew dynamically a tank enables it to fight statically, it is in
every respect the “landship” it was first called.
These are our premises and from them we may deduce the following
all-important fact: That in all wars, and especially modern wars--wars
in which weapons change rapidly--no army of fifty years before any date
selected would stand a “dog’s chance” against the army existing at this
date, not even if it were composed entirely of Winkelrieds and Marshal
Neys. Consider the following examples:
(i) Napoleon was an infinitely greater general than Lord Raglan; yet
Lord Raglan would, in 1855, have beaten any army Napoleon, in 1805,
could have led against him, because Lord Raglan’s men were armed with
the Minie rifle.
(ii) Eleven years after Inkerman, Moltke would have beaten Lord
Raglan’s army hollow, not because he was a greater soldier than Lord
Raglan, but because his men were armed with the needle gun.
From this we may deduce the fact, which has already been stated,
namely, that weapons form 99 per cent. of victory, consequently
the General Staff of every army should be composed of mechanical
clairvoyants, seers of new conditions, new fields of war to exploit,
and new tools to assist in this exploitation. Had Napoleon, in 1805,
offered a prize of £1,000,000 for a weapon 100 per cent. more efficient
than the “Brown Bess,” it is almost a certainty that, by 1815, he would
have got it; for the want of a little foresight and for the want of the
understanding that progress in weapons of war is a similar problem to
progress of tools in manufacture, he might have saved his Empire and
ended his days as supreme tyrant of Europe.
The whole history of the evolution of machine tools is that of the
elimination of the workman and the replacement of muscular energy by
steam, electricity, or some other form of power. “Fewer men, more
machines, higher output” has during the last hundred years been
the motto of every progressive workshop. Likewise we believe that
from now onwards in every progressive army will a similar motto be
adopted. Further than this, we believe that those nations which have
proved their ability in the past as leaders of science and mechanical
engineering will in the future be those which will produce the most
efficient armies, for these armies will be based on the foundations of
the commercial sciences.
Accepting that the main factor in future warfare will be the replacing
of man-power by machine-power, the logical deduction is that the ideal
army to aim at is _one_ man, not a conscripted nation, not even a
super-scientist, but one man who can press a button or pull a plug
and so put into operation war-machines evolved by the best brains of
the nation during peacetime. Such an army need not even occupy the
theatre of operations in which the war is to be fought; _he_ may be
ensconced thousands of miles away, perhaps in Kamtchatka, fighting a
battle on the Western Front. Is this impossible? Not at all; even in
the late war we can picture to ourselves a one-armed cripple sitting
in Muravieff-Amourski and electrically discharging gas against the
Hindenburg Line directly his indicator announces a favourable wind.
So far the chemist, but is man going to be controlled by gas, are human
destinies to be limited by a “whiff of phosgene”?
“Certainly not,” answers the soldier mechanic. “It is true that the
future may produce many unknown gases which, as long as they remain
unknown to the opposing side, are unlikely to be rendered innocuous by
means of a respirator; I, however, will scrap the respirator and place
my men in gas-proof tanks, and whenever my indicator denotes impure
air, the crews will batten down their hatches, their engines will
be run off accumulators, and they themselves will live on oxygen or
compressed air. I will apply to land-warfare naval methods undreamt of
before, I will produce a land machine which will, so to speak, submerge
itself when the gas cloud approaches, just as a submarine submerges in
the sea when a destroyer draws near.”
There is an answer to every weapon, and that side which has most
thoroughly thought these answers out during days of peace is the one
which is most likely to produce a steel-shod Achilles for days of war.
Without journeying so far as Amourski let us imagine that war was to
break out again three years hence and that we were equipped with a
tank 200 per cent. superior to our at present best type--a machine
travelling at fifteen miles an hour in place of five, and that the
Germans sitting behind their Hindenburg Line were still backing
personnel against matériel, numbers of men against perfection of
weapons.
An army is an organisation, comparable, like all other organisations,
very closely with the human body. It possesses a body and a brain; its
fighting troops are the former, its headquarters staffs the latter. In
the past the usual process of tactics has been to wage a body warfare:
one body is moved up against the other body and like two boxers they
pummel each other until one is knocked out. But suppose that boxer
“A” could by some simple operation paralyse the brain of boxer “B,”
what use would all boxer “B’s” muscular strength be to him, even if it
rivalled that of Samson and Goliath combined? No use at all, as David
proved!
Now apply this process to the battle of 1923. The tank fleets, under
cover of dense clouds of smoke, or at night-time, move forward, not
against the body of the enemy’s army but against his brains; their
objectives are not the enemy’s infantry or the enemy’s guns, not
positions or tactical localities, but the billets of the German
headquarters staffs--the Army, Corps, and Divisional headquarters.
These they capture, destroy or disperse; what then is the body going
to do, for its brain is paralysed? Who is going to control it, feed it
with reserves, ammunition, and supplies? Who is going to manœuvre it to
give it foot play? Either it will stand still and be knocked out, or,
much more likely, it will be seized by panic and become paralysed to
action.
What is the answer to this type of brain warfare? The answer is the
tank; the brains will get into metal skulls or boxes, the bodies will
get into the same, and land fleet will manœuvre against land fleet.
The growth of these tactics may be slow, but eventually they will
become imperative. It may be urged that the field gun is master of the
tank in the open, just as a land battery is master of a ship at sea.
This is only true as long as the gunner can see his target, and no
known means at present exist whereby sight can penetrate a dense cloud
of smoke. It may also be urged that a heavy machine gun will enable
the infantry to protect themselves against tanks. But to be mobile
the weight of the machine gun is limited to the carrying power of two
men--about 80 lb., and there is no known reason why a tank should not
be armoured to withstand the bullets of such a weapon. If a heavier
machine gun is made it will be forced to take to a mounting, and for
choice to a mechanical one; it will in fact become a tank or a tank
destroyer.
The necessity of armour in war has always been recognised, and its
general disuse only dates from the sixteenth century onwards. When
armour could not be used other means of protection, all makeshifts,
were sought after--earth-works, entrenchments, use of ground, manœuvre,
and covering fire, and as regards the last-named substitute it is
interesting to go back a little into history, for, even from a cursory
study, we may better understand the present and foresee the future.
In the days of our Henry VIII a body of arquebusiers had to stand
twenty-five ranks deep in order to obtain continuity of fire; that is
to say, that once the first rank had fired and doubled to the rear it
would only be ready loaded again when the twenty-fifth rank was about
to discharge its pieces. By the days of Gustavus Adolphus, the art
of musketry and the musket had so far improved as to permit of these
twenty-five ranks being reduced to eight. As improvement went apace we
find Frederick the Great reducing them to three, and Wellington in the
Peninsula to two. Even in the early period of the revolutionary wars
it was found necessary for light infantry to reduce the human target
they offered to the enemy’s fire by making use of extensions. In 1866
extensions became more feasible on account of the Prussians being armed
with a breach-loading rifle; in 1870 they became more general; in 1899
they have grown to between ten and fifteen paces, which may be taken
as the maximum for a man, armed with the magazine rifle, to deliver
one round per yard of front each minute. In 1904 trenches are made use
of on an extensive scale, for as extensions cannot be increased if
fire effect is to be maintained, some other form of protection must
be sought, and men, not being able to carry armour, must carry spades
instead and so still further immobilise themselves. In 1914, after a
brief hurry-scurry of open warfare, all sides take to earth and the
spade reigns supreme.
Then comes the reintroduction of armour with the tank, and what do we
see? Not only mobility and direct protection, but the reinstitution of
the firing line, not now morcelated at fifteen paces interval between
the men composing it, but at 150 to 300 paces between the tanks, the
mechanical skirmishing fortresses of which it is built up. A tank with
a crew of 6 men can deliver fire at the rate of 300 rounds a minute, or
equivalent to 30 riflemen at a South African War extension, and being
armoured they suffer practically no loss and can consequently challenge
not only 30 riflemen but 300, any number, in fact, who are sent against
them. The logical conclusion to be drawn from this is that extensions
are useless, trenches at best but static makeshifts, the infantryman
must don armour and, as he has not the strength to carry it, he must
get into a tank. If this is common sense, let us attempt to visualise
what a tank war of the future may entail.
In the mechanical wars of the future we must first of all recognise
the fact that the earth is a solid sea as easily traversable in
all directions by a tractor as a sheet of ice is by a skater; the
battles in these wars will therefore more and more approximate to
naval actions. As trenches, as we know them, and the ordinary field
obstacles now constructed will be useless, it may become necessary
during peacetime to turn the great strategical centres--manufactories,
railways, stores, seats of government, etc., into defended land-ports
or protected power, fuel, and control stations. The fortifications
of these will probably consist of immense dry moats and extensive
minefields which will constitute a direct protection against tank
attacks. Water obstacles will be useless, for the tank of a few years
hence will undoubtedly be of an amphibious nature. To protect these
centres from the air, barracks, storehouses, mobilisation stores,
tankodromes and aerodromes will all have to be constructed well
beneath the surface of the ground--in fact, the future fortress will
approximate closely to a gigantic dugout surrounded by a field of land
mines electrically manipulated.
Near the frontier these defended ports will probably be equipped
with and linked up by lethal gas works--gas-producing and storage
plants, lodged below the surface, which on war being declared can
instantaneously be set operating electrically by one man stationed
hundreds of miles away if needs be. When this type of warfare is
instituted, mobilisation will not consist in equipping with weapons
a small section of the community, but in providing such of the civil
population as cannot be rapidly evacuated from the area it is proposed
to inundate, or placed in gastight shelters safely underground, with
anti-gas appliances. Under these circumstances the defence of frontiers
will be organised according to prevailing winds, and signs of war will
be looked for not amongst military but civil movements.
As the gas-storage tanks are opened and the gas-producing plants
set operating, fleets of fast-moving tanks, equipped with tons of
liquid gas, against which the enemy will probably have no means of
protection,[39] will cross the frontier and obliterate every living
thing in the fields and farms, the villages and cities of the enemy’s
country. Whilst life is being swept away around the frontier fleets
of aeroplanes will attack the enemy’s great industrial and governing
centres. All these attacks will be made, at first, not against the
enemy’s army, which will be mobilising underground, but against the
civil population in order to compel it to accept the will of the
attacker.
If the enemy will not accept peace terms forthwith, then wars in
the air and on the earth will take place between machines to gain
superiority. Tank will meet tank, and, commanded from the air, fleets
of these machines will manœuvre between the defended ports seeking
each other out and exterminating each other in orthodox naval fashion.
Whilst these small forces of men, representing perhaps 0·5 per cent.
or 1 per cent. of the entire population of the country, strong through
machinery, are at death-grips with their enemy, their respective
nations will be producing weapons for them; so, in the future, as
military fighting man-power dwindles must we expect to see military
manufacturing man-power increase.
Are we safe in this little island of ours against the future? If
at times, during the “alchemical” period of warfare, we have been
threatened and invaded, we may be certain that during the scientific
period we shall be less secure than we have been in the past.
From the present-day tank to one which can plunge into the Channel
at Calais at 4 in the morning, land at Dover at six o’clock, and be
outside Buckingham Palace for an early lunch will not probably require
as many as the fifty-two years which have separated the _Merrimac_
from the _Tiger_ or the _Queen Elizabeth_. If this is too remote a
period for the present generation to grow anxious about, there is no
reason why four or five years hence ships should not be constructed
as tank-carriers, these machines being conveyed across the ocean and
launched into the sea near the coast carrying sufficient fuel to move
them 300 or 400 miles inland. From ships as carriers it is but one step
to aeroplanes as suppliers and lifters, and another to aeroplanes as
tanks themselves.
If the evolution of war, in the past, has been slow, do not let us
flatter ourselves that it is likely to remain so in the future. From
the gliders of the Wright Brothers the aeroplane rapidly evolved,
and from a 40 H.P. engine of ten or twelve years back to-day the
Porte “Super-Baby” triplane carries five engines of 400 H.P. each
and the Tarrant triplane has a span of 131 feet and to drive it
six Napier “Lion” engines are used, developing no less than 3,000
horse-power. The tank is still in its infancy, but it will grow
and one day in mechanical perfection and efficiency catch up with
the super-Dreadnought and the Handley Page, and what then? A close
co-operation between the great mechanical weapons, the seaship, the
airship, and the landship--or, if preferred, of boat, aeroplane, and
tank--will take place. These weapons will approximate and unify,
evolving one arm and not three arms, which will require one defence
force and not three. This, even to-day, is becoming more and more
apparent, and the sooner the brains of the future Defence Force are
developed the better for this nation, for to-day we are thinking, like
mediæval magicians, in separate terms of air, water, and earth, and
some of us in those of gabions, lances, and blunderbusses.
If great wars can be restricted or abolished by word of mouth or
written agreement, the above gropings into the future, even if
possible, may never materialise; but even if this be so, many small
wars lie in front of us, for Europe politically, since 1914, has
practically gone back 400 years, the frontiers of the smaller nations
approximating closely to those of the later Middle Ages. The more
nations there are in the world the more wars there will be in the
making, and as half the smaller nations of central and eastern Europe
consider war a national sport there is little likelihood of agreements
being kept or peace being maintained; in fact, all agreements which
cannot be compelled by brute force are likely to be treated as “scraps
of paper.”
To enforce peace, power and the means of applying it will be needed by
the greater nations who by law will never quarrel; here the mechanic
steps forward and presents the nations concerned with the tank and the
aeroplane as a means towards this end. He is perfectly right; the
general introduction of mechanical weapons must bring with it the end
of small wars if not also of civil disturbances.
Take the case of the defence of India. What has always been the great
difficulty in our frontier expeditions? Not our enemy or his weapons,
but the country which enables the Afghan to evade our columns and
impede our advance. It is the resistance offered by natural obstacles
which we have to overcome and not those imposed upon us by weapons
which generally are vastly inferior to those with which our men are
equipped.
Take the case of a punitive expedition starting from Peshawer and
proceeding to Kabul. The force will consist of three bodies of
troops--a small fighting advanced guard, a large main body protecting
the transport, and strong flank guards protecting the main body.
On account of the tactics which have to be adopted the advance is
excessively slow. The main body proceeding along the roads, which
almost inevitably coincide with the bottoms of the valleys, has to be
kept out of rifle shot, consequently the flank guards have usually
to “crown the heights” on each side of the road, which necessitates
much climbing and loss of time. If the advance were over an open veldt
land, as in South Africa, in place of in a hilly country, movement
would be simplified, but still will the flank guards have to be thrown
out because the main body, consisting of men and animals, is pervious
to bullets. This perviousness to bullets is the basis of the whole
trouble, and unless bullet-proof armour can be carried, when it does
not matter whether the rifle is fired at a range of two yards or two
miles, the only means of denying effect to the rifle is to keep it out
of range of its target.
Though up to a short time ago the carrying of armour was not a
feasible proposition, now it is, and there are few more difficulties
in advancing up or down the Khyber with a well-constructed tank than
across the open. Armour, by rendering flesh impervious to bullets,
does away with the necessity of flank guards and long straggling
supply columns, and our punitive expedition equipped with tanks can
reach Kabul in a few days, and not only reach it but abandon its
communications, as they will require no protection. If tank supply
columns, which are self-protecting, are considered too slow, once the
force has reached Kabul its supply and the evacuation of its sick
(there will be but few wounded) can be carried out by aeroplane. The
whole operation becomes too simple to be classed as an operation
of war. Once impress upon the Afghan the hopelessness of facing a
mechanical punitive force and he will give up rendering such forces
necessary.
In our many small wars of the past we have frequently been faced with
desert warfare, a warfare even more difficult than hill and mountain
fighting. Here again the chief difficulty is a natural one--want of
water, and not an artificial one--superiority of the enemy’s weapons.
In 1885 Sir Henry Stewart started from Korti on the Nile to relieve
General Gordon: his difficulties were supply difficulties, and it
took him twenty-one days to reach Gubat, a distance of 180 miles.
A tank moving at an average pace of ten miles an hour could have
accomplished the journey in two days, and being supplied by aeroplane
could have reached Khartum a few days later. One tank would have won
Maiwand, Isandhlwana, and El Teb; one tank can meet any quantity of
Tower muskets, or Mauser rifles for aught that; one tank, costing say
£10,000, can not only win a small war normally costing £2,000,000, but
render such wars in the future highly improbable if not impossible. The
moral, therefore, is--get the tank.
From small wars to internal Imperial Defence is but one step. Render
rebellion hopeless and it will not take place. In India we lock up in
an unremunerative army 75,000 British troops and 150,000 Indian. Both
these forces can be done away with and order maintained, and maintained
with certainty, by a mechanical police force of 20,000 to 25,000 men.
What now is the great lesson to be learnt from the above examples?
That war will be eliminated by weapons, not by words or treaties or
leagues of nations; by weapons--leagues of tanks, aeroplanes, and
submarines--which will render opposition hopeless or retribution so
terrible that nations will think not once or twice but many times
before going to war. If the civilian population of a country know that
should they demand war they may be killed in a few minutes by the tens
of thousands, they will not only cease to demand it but see beforehand
that they are well prepared by superiority of weapons to terrify their
neighbours out of declaring war against them.
Weapons we, therefore, see are, if not a means of ending war and
ridding the world of this dementia, a means of maintaining peace on a
far firmer footing than hitherto it has been maintained by muscular
power. To limit the evolution of weapons is therefore to limit the
periods of peace. An Army cannot stand still, it must develop with the
civilisation of which it forms part or become barbaric. To equip our
Army to-day with bows and arrows would not reduce the frequency of
war, it would actually increase it, for according to his tools, so is
man himself, and as an Army is built up of men, if these men are armed
with bows and arrows they will in nature closely approximate to the age
which produced these weapons, the age which burnt Joan of Arc. Equally
so will the Army of to-day, if in equipment it be not allowed to keep
pace with scientific progress, develop into a band of brigands, for in
2019 the rifle and gun of to-day, and the civilisation which produced
them, will be as uncouth as the arquebus, the carronade, and the
manners of the sixteenth century.
If a millennium is ever to be ushered in upon earth it will be
accomplished through the development of brain-power and not through it
becoming atrophied. If war is to be rendered impossible the process
will be a slow evolutionary one, the desire of war gradually slowing
down, and its motive force energising some other ideal. To restrict
war by maintaining soldiers as ill-armed barbarians is to prevent it
working out its destined course. Human nature, in spite of Benjamin
Kidd, does not change in a generation, and the tendencies which beget
war will out until human nature has outgrown them. The world has a
soul, and like that of a man it must pass through years of love, hate,
striving and ambition before attaining those of wisdom and decay.
There may yet be many wars ahead of us, but one thing would appear to
be certain, and this is that small wars will disappear and great ones
become less frequent, science rendering them too terrible to be entered
upon lightly.
To-day we stand upon the threshold of a new epoch in the history of the
world--war based on petrol, the natural sequent of an industry based
on steam. That we have attained the final step on the evolutionary
ladder of war is most unlikely, for mechanical and chemical weapons may
disappear and be replaced by others still more terrible. Electricity
has scarcely yet been touched upon and it is not impossible that
mechanical warfare will be replaced by one of a wireless nature,
and that not only the elements, but man’s flesh and bones, will be
controlled by the “fluid” which to-day we do not even understand. This
method of imposing the will of one man on another may in its turn be
replaced by a purely psychological warfare, wherein weapons are not
even used or battlefields sought or loss of life or limb aimed at; but,
in place, the corruption of the human reason, the dimming of the human
intellect, and the disintegration of the moral and spiritual life of
one nation by the influence of the will of another is accomplished.
Be all these as they may, one fact stands out supreme in all types and
conditions of war, and this is, that the strongest and most efficient
brain wins, which applies equally to all nations as it does to all
individuals.
Animal superiority over animal is based on muscle, human superiority
over human is based on brain. The nation with the supreme brain will
eventually rule the world, and so long as war continues the Army with
the best brains (which also means the best weapons) will accomplish
victory with the least loss. Our Army from to-day must step forward;
“to advance is to conquer,” and this applies in greater force to
brain-power than to muscle-power, for brains control muscles. To stand
still is to retrogress; to glance backwards is to lose time, and if
we pause now we are lost in the future. Do not, therefore, let us
mark time on our own graves, do not let us hark back to 1914 with its
rifles and its ammunition boots, its sabres and its horseshoes, and
all its muscular barbarism; let us plan and let us think, thus shall
we penetrate the veil of the future, thus shall we learn how to equip
our Army with a brain and with a body which united, if war be ever
again forced upon us, will compel victory at the smallest possible
cost. Surely this is an ideal worthy of a great nation and of a great
Army, the object of which is to prevent war and to maintain peace, to
prevent war by science and not by nescience, by progress and not by
retrogression.
[Illustration]
INDEX
Abancourt, 206, 231
Abbas Ridge, 100
Abbé, Bois de l’, 201
Abbeville, 34
Abelard, xv
Acheux, 58
Achicourt, 84, 105, 257
Achiet-le-Grand, 84, 176, 255
Achiet-le-Petit, 176, 292
Acq, 84
Adelpare, 208, 210
Admiralty, the, 18-20, 22, 25, 27-33
Agincourt, 2
Aillette, the, 196
Aisne, the, 14, 81, 189, 196-7, 215
Albert, 71, 175, 252-4
Alberta, 121-2
Aldershot, 9-11
Alexandria, 134
Ali El Muntar, 101, 130
Allen, Major G. W. G., M.C., xii
Alleux, Bois des, 173
Alvinzi, xiv
American Army, 270-2, 275, 277-84, 290
_American Machinist, The_, xii, 4
American Tank Corps, 268, 271-2, 274, 277-82, 284
Amervalles, 284
Amiens, 169, 217-29, 237, 243, 245, 247, 290
Ancre, the, 54, 57-9, 176, 196
Anneux, 150
Anti-tank tactics, 87-8, 260-5
Antwerp, 198
Applegarth tractor, 10
Aquenne, Bois d’, 202
Archdale, Captain O. A., xii
Archery in warfare, 2
Archinger, 4
Ardennes, the, 1
Argonne, the, 280
Armentières, 200
Arnold, Captain A. E., M.C., 235
Arnold, Lieutenant C. B., D.S.O., xiii, 235
Arrachis, Bois des, 208, 210
Arras, 81-9, 105, 108, 114, 144, 166, 250-3, 257-9
Arrol, Messrs. William, 28
Atawineh Ridge, 100
Atkin-Berry, Major H. C., D.S.O., M.C., xv
Australia Hill, 101
Australian Corps, 87, 99, 101, 109-10, 130, 203, 205, 207, 215, 217-9,
221-3, 226, 231-2, 252, 254-5, 267, 270-1, 274, 289, 290-2, 304
Aveluy, 71, 175-6
Avesnes, 257
Avonmouth, 98
Awoingt, 274
Bacon, Admiral Sir Reginald, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., D.S.O., 21-2, 66
Bailleul, 83
Bailleulval, 200
Baker, Colonel C. B., 277
Baker Carr, Brig.-Gen. C.D’A. B.S., C.M.G., D.S.O., xvi, 62
Balfour, Right Hon. A. J., 25
Bancourt, 258
Bank Farm, 121
Banteux, 138-9
Bapaume, 55, 144, 175-6, 215, 243, 247, 250-2, 293
Barastre, 175
Barry, John Richard, 9
Batter tractor, 10-13, 303
Bayonvillers, 231-2
Bazentin, 175
Bazuel, 282
Beach Post, 131
Beaucamp, 269
Beaucourt-sur-Ancre, 176, 251
Beaufort, 225
Beaumont Hamel, 58
Beauquesne, 61
Beaurains, 91
Beaurevoir, 144-5, 273, 281
Beauval, 203
Beersheba, 99-100, 130
Behagnies, 235
Belah, 101
Bellenglise, 270
Bellicourt, 272, 281
Belloy, 290
Berliet, 186
Bermicourt, 61-2, 71, 127, 141, 168, 252
Berthen, 200
Bertincourt, 143
Beugny, 174, 258
Biefvillers, 256
Big Willie, 267, 303
Bihucourt, 255
Bird, Colonel, 25
Bisley, 31, 159-61
Blangy, 62, 71, 200
Blecourt, 273
Boescheppe, 200
Bois des Bœufs, 85
Bois d’Olhain, 173
Bois l’Evêque, 282
Bony, 249, 293
Boulogne, 4
Bourg, 279
Bourgon, General de, 209
Bourlon Wood, 144-6, 149, 150-1, 156, 269
Bovington Camp, _see_ Wool
Boyd-Rochfort, Major H., D.S.O., M.C., xv
Boydell engine, 9
Boyeffles, 173
Bradley, Lieut.-Colonel D. W., D.S.O., xii, 34, 54, 154, 162
Bramond, Frank, 11
Brancourt, 281
Bray-sur-Somme, 34, 172, 175-6, 218, 225-6, 252, 254, 257
Brie Bridge, 175
Briquetterie, the, 54
Brock, Commander, 165
Broodseinde Ridge, 119
Brough, Lieut.-Colonel, C.M.G., 34, 161-2
Bruay, 200
Brussels, 108
Bucquoy, 204, 292
Buire Wood, 172
Bullecourt, 86-8, 205, 207, 213, 261
Bullhouse Farm, 159
Burnett-Stuart, Brig.-Gen., 162
Bus, 175
Bus les Artois, 209
Busnes, 200
Butler, Major-Gen., 162
Buzancy, 193
Byng, General Sir Julian (afterwards Lord), xvi, 139
Cachy, 201-2, 274
Caix, 218
California Trench, 122
Cambrai, xvi, 15, 64, 82, 129, 138-53, 155-8, 165, 167, 173, 181, 186,
215, 217, 219, 237, 242, 250, 273-6, 304
Canadian Corps, 85, 163-5, 169, 203, 218-21, 223, 257-8, 269, 273
Cantigny, 188
Capper, Major-Gen. Sir John, K.C.B., 63
Capricorn Keep, 121
Carney, Driver, 234-5
Carter, Lieut.-Colonel E. J., xiii, 289-90, 294
Cassel, 119
Castel, 218
Catillon, 282, 285
Cavalry Corps, 219-20, 225, 230
Cavillon, 224
Cayeux Wood, 224
Cercottes, 184, 186
Chacrise, 193
Champlieu, 185
Charleroi, 241, 295
Charteris, Capt. the Hon. Evan, xi, xii, xv
Château-Thierry, 189, 195,290
Chaufours Wood, 248
Chaulnes, 176, 235
Chaumont, 279
Chaussée Brunehaut, 193
Chedeville, Colonel, 190
Chemin des Dames, 186-7
Chinese Labour Company, 51st, 128-9
Chipilly, 169, 224-5
Chuignolles, 252, 254, 292
Churchill, Right Hon. Winston, 18-20, 22, 24-5, 27-8, 32-3
Clapham Junction, 109
Cléry, 175
Cockcroft, the, 122
Cojeul, 92
Colincamps, 176
Cologne, 295
Cologne, river, 174-5
Combles, 55
Comines, 116
Concrois Wood, 193
Connaught Rangers, 173
Contalmaison, 176
Conty, 289-90
Courage, Brig.-Gen. A., D.S.O., M.C., xvi, 62
Courcelles, 295
Courchamps, 194
Craonne, 82, 186-7
Crested Rock, 131-2
Crèvecœur, 138-9, 144-6
Cricket Valley, 131, 133
Crinchon, river, 84
Croisilles, 94-5, 256
Crompton, Col., R.E., 23
Cugnot, 8-9
Cuvillers, 273
Cyrus, 142
Dalby-Jones, Lieut.-Colonel W., 29
Dale-Bussell, P., 23, 32-3
Debeney, General, 211
Deir el Belah, 99-100, 130-1, 133
Deligny Hill, 269
Delville Wood, 56
Dermicourt, 259
Desert Column, 130
Dessart Wood, 143, 146
Devonport, 98
D’Eyncourt, Sir Eustace Tennyson, K.C.B., xii, 22-3, 30-4, 66
Diplock, Mr., 24
Dixmude, 119
Doignies, 173-4
Doingt Wood, 172
Dolls’ House, 204
Doon Copse, 273
Dormans, 189, 195
Douai, 82
Doucet, Lieut.-Colonel L. C. A. de B., xiii
Doullens, 174
Dranoutre, 109
Drocourt-Queant Line, 82, 84, 108, 258, 293
Druid Ridge, 100
Dumble, Colonel, 23
Dunajec, the, 15, 300, 301
Dundas, Major R. W., M.C., xv
Dunlop, Andrew, 9
Durham Light Infantry, 15th, 57
Earle, Captain A., 66
Eclimeux, 62
Edgeworth, Richard Lovell, 9
El Arish, 98-9, 101, 131-3
El Burs, 101
Elles, Major-Gen. H. J., C.B., D.S.O., xiii, xiv, xvi, 28, 61, 64, 66,
147-8, 288
El Sire, 101
Elveden, 31, 160-2
_Engineer, The_, xii, 9
Epehy, 174, 250, 266-72
Eppé-Sauvage, 294
Erin, 62, 70-1, 127, 180
Ervillers, 255
Escaut, the, 138
Esclairvillers Wood, 173
Espilly, 195
Estaires, 200
Estienne, General, 184-6, 198
Etricourt, 272
Ex-Crown Prince, the, 188, 217
Ex-Kaiser, the, 188
Experiments Committee, 26
Fampoux, 83
Fanny’s Farm, 111
Favreuil, 257
Fayolles, General, 290
Fender, Guillaume, 9
Ferdinand’s Farm, 121
Fère-en-Tardenois, 290
Festubert, 200
Feuchy, 85
Feuchy-Chapel, 86-87
Flers, 55-6
Flesquières, 144-9, 155, 262, 269
Flos, 55
Foch, Marshal, 200, 217
Fonsomme, 273
Fontaine-au-Bois, 282
Fontaine-Notre-Dame, 150-1, 262
Fontana, 4
Foot, Major S. H., D.S.O., xii
Forsyth-Major, Major O. A., xii, 98 _note_
Foster, Messrs. William, 24
Foster-Daimler tractor, 22, 39
Foucaucourt, 291
Fouilloy, 206
Fowke, Major-Gen. G. H., 21
Fraicourt, 275
Framerville, 225, 291
Frechencourt, 200
Frederick the Great, 14
Freiburg, 235
Fremicourt, 172, 258
French, Field-Marshal Sir John (afterwards Lord), 21
French Tank Corps, 184-98
Fresnoy-le-Petit, 267
Frezenberg, 121
Fricourt, xv, 175, 242
Fuller, Brevet-Colonel J. F. C., D.S.O., xi, 66, 299 _note_
Furse, Major-Gen. Sir William, K.C.B., D.S.O., 66
Gallipoli, 123
Gas, Poison, 17, 30, 314-5
Gauche Wood, 152
Gavrelle, 88
Gaza, 98-102, 130-4
Geninwell Copse, 173
George V, His Majesty King, 161, 165
German, Thomas, 9
German Tank Corps, 201, 212-6, 241
Gheluvelt, 119
Ghent, 108
Gilban, 98
Gird Trench, 57
Givenchy, 200
Glasgow, Brig.-Gen. W., C.H.G., 63, 67
Glencorse Wood, 261
Gommecourt, 17, 81-2, 255
Gonnelieu, 270
Gordon, General, 318
Gore-Anley, Brig.-Gen. F., D.S.O., 62-3
Gouzeaucourt, 143, 146, 266, 268-9
Graincourt, 146, 149
Grand Bois, 110
Grand Ravin, 149-50
Grand Rozoy, 196
Grandecourt, 110, 176
Green, Major G. A., M. C., xiv
Green Dump, 55
Green Hill, 101-2
Grevillers, 256
Grivesnes, 188
Grose, Francis, 4
Guards’ Division, 152, 255, 257
Guemappe, 257
Guest, Major, 26
Gueudecourt, 55-7, 260
Guillaucourt, 224, 231
Guillemont, 267-70
Guise, 198
Gun Hill, 131, 133
Gunpowder, introduction of, 2
Haig, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas (afterwards Earl), 28, 32, 287-8
Ham, 220
Hamel, xvi, 168, 217, 204-5, 207, 244, 262, 304-5
Hamelet, 206
Hamelincourt, 256
Hamencourt, 174
Hangard, Bois de, 201-2
Haplincourt, 258
Happegarbes, 285
Happy Valley, 254, 257
Harbonnières, 224, 232, 235
Hardress Lloyd, Brig.-Gen. J., D.S.O., xvi, 63
Hareira, 95, 130
Hargicourt, 267
Harp, The, 83, 85-6
Harpon, Bois de, 208, 210
Hartennes Wood, 193
Haslam, Lieut., 246
Hatfield, 30-1
Havre, 127
Havrincourt Wood, 143, 145-7, 149
Heart Hill, 100
Heavy Section Machine Gun Corps, 31, 159
Hebuterne, 176, 304
Hecq, 286
Hendecourt, 87
Henincourt, 172
Heninel, 82, 85-6, 256
Henin-sur-Cojeul, 83, 256
Herleville, 252
Hermies, 259
Hervilly, 174
Hervin Farm, 85
Hesdin, 127
Hetherington, Major T. G., 22-4
Heudicourt, 143
Hillock Farm, 122
Hindenburg, Marshal, xiv, 188, 241
Hindenburg Line, 82, 83, 86, 87, 94-5, 141, 145, 250, 256, 267, 270-2,
275, 281
Hindenburg Support Line, 145
Holden, Colonel, 25
Holdford-Walker, Major, 162
Holnon, 266
Holt caterpillar tractor, 11, 22
Holzschuher, 6-7
Honnechy, 275, 293-4
Honnecourt, 151
Hooge, 119, 121
Hornihan Roy, xvii
Hornsby tractor, 11
Hotblack, Major F. E., D.S.O., M.C., xiii, xv, 61
Houthulst Forest, 120
Humières, 62, 200
Humerœuil, 70
Imperial Defence Committee, 26
Inchy, 144
India, defence of, 317-8
Indian Cavalry Division, 130
In Seirat, 100
Inter-Allied Tank Committee, 65
Island Wood, 131
Italian Army, 130
Iveagh, Lord, 160-1
Iwuy, 144
Joffre, Marshal, 185
Joint Naval and Military Committee, 22, 25
Joly de Maizeroy, 298
Joncourt, 273
Jones, Paul, xiii
Joye Farm, 111
Kantara, 98
Kemmel, Mount, 110, 119
Kemmelbeek, the, 117
Khan Yunus, 99
Kidd, Benjamin, 319
Kirbet El Sihan, 101, 102
Kitchener, Field-Marshal Lord, 24, 30, 32
Knoll, The, 267-70
Knothe, Major H., M.C., 161
Kurd Hill, 100-2
Kurd Valley, 99
Kyeser, Conrad, 4
La Belle Etoile, 144
Labyrinth, the, 101
La Cauchie, 200
La Fère, 173
Laffaux Hill, 187
La Folie, 151
Lagash, 300
Lagnicourt, 83, 258
La Maisonette, 176
Landrecies, 170, 285-6
Landships Committee, 23-5, 28
Langemarck, 119
Lateau Wood, 148
La Vacquerie, 148
Le Bosquet, 139
Le Cateau, 282
Le Catelet, 272, 283-4
Le Quesnel, 224
Lees Hill, 101-2
Leigh-Mallory, Major T., D.S.O., xiii
Lenclos, Ninon de, xv
Leonardo da Vinci, 5, 7
Les-Trois-Bouqueteaux, 208, 210
Lestren, 200
Leuvrigny, Bois de, 195
Liessies, 294
Lihons, 225-6
Lille, 108
Little Willie, 26
Lloyd George, Right Hon. D., 25, 30, 161
Lombartbeek, the, 117
Loop, the, 34
Luce, the, 169
Ludendorff, General, xiv, 188, 218, 222-3, 237-8, 263
Lulworth, 162
Lys, the, 199
Magdhaba, 131
Macdonald’s Wood, 121
McKenna, Right Hon. Reginald, 30
Mackensen, Field-Marshal von, 15
Maclean, J. B., 66
Magny, 272
Mailly Poivres, 185
Maistre, General, 203
Malmaison, 187
Malmédy, 295
Manchester, H. H., 4 _note_, 8
Manchester Regiment, 273
Mangin, General, 189
Mansara, 99-100
Maquion, 269
Marcoing, 82, 139, 144-6, 148-50, 180
Maretz, 293
Marfaux, 195
Maricourt, 54, 175-6
Marly-le-Roi, 184
Marne, the, 14, 190, 195
Martel, Major G. le Q., D.S.O., M.C., xv, 61, 161
Martigny, 185
Martinpuich, 55
Marwitz, General von der, 151
Masnières, 139, 144-6, 149-51
Massenbach, 298
Mathew-Lannowe, Brig.-Gen. E. B., C.M.G., D.S.O., xii, 62, 66
Maubeuge, 250, 285-8
Maurice de Saxe, 298
Maurois, 275, 293
Maximilian I, 7
Mazar Trench, 101
Meaulte, 254
Menin, 276
Mercatel, 83, 92
Mercedes tractor, 11
Mericourt, 218, 225
Merlimont, 72, 200, 245, 289
Mers, 70, 289
Merville, 200, 304
Messines, 108, 113-4, 166, 180, 242, 261
Metropolitan Carriage, Wagon and Finance Co., 28
Meuse, the, 197
Mézières, 81
Miette, the, 187
_Military Antiquities_, 4
Miraumont, 176
Mœuvres, 269
Moislains, 174-5
Molesworth, Lieut.-Colonel J. D. M., M.C., xiii, 180
Molinghem, 200
Monchy le Preux, 82-4, 88, 257-8
Moncrieff, Major-Gen. Sir George Scott-, 22, 25
Mon du Hibou, 122
Money Hill, 99-100
Montauban, xv, 175-6
Montbrehain, 273-4, 281
Montdidier, 188, 196
Montenescourt, xvi, 84
Monument, the, 202
Morchies, 174, 258
Moreuil, xvi, 204, 207-8, 258
Morlancourt, 206
Mormal, Forest of, 284-6
Morval, 55
Mory Copse, 256-7
_Motor Cycle, The_, 159
Mount Pleasant Wood, 95-7
Moustier, 294-5
Moyenneville, 251, 257
Munitions, Ministry of, 25, 30-4
Murat, xvi
Musketry, art of, 312-3
Nancy, 81
Napoleon, xiv, 8, 104, 170-1, 309
Nauroy, 272
Nepal Trench, 92
Neuville St. Vaast, 84
Neuville-Vitasse, 83, 85, 86, 91, 257
Neuvilly, 284
New Zealand Division, 258, 292-3
Newburn, John, 9
Newbury, 127
Ney, Marshal, xv
Nieppe, 200
Nieuport, 15, 108
Nine Wood, 146, 149
Nord, Canal du, 144, 268-9
Noyelles, 149
Noyon, 81, 188, 229
Nutt, Major N., 98
Oise, the, 138, 172, 285
Oosthoek, 117
Oosttaverne, 109, 111, 115
Ostend, 81
Ouderdom, 109, 117
Ourcq, the, 189-90, 290
Outpost Hill, 101-2, 130
Ovillers, 54
Paillencourt, 144
Pailleul, 144
Palmer, William, 9
Palmer gunsight, 164
Parker, Lieut.-Colonel H., 277-8
Parvillers, 226
Passchendaele, 287
Patten, Colonel G. S., 279
Pedrail Co., 24, 27-8
Peizière, 173
Péronne, 229
Perry, Sir Percival, 66
Pershing, General, 279
Pierremont, 62
Pissy, 289
Ploegsteert, 200
Poelcappelle, 122-4
Point du Jour, 83
Polygonveld, 120
Poperinghe, 117, 289
Porte triplane, 316
Pozières, 176
Premont, 275
Premy Chapel, 269
Preux, 286
Proyart, 226, 292
Pusieux, 250
Quadrilateral, the, 267
Queen’s Hill, 101-2
Quennemont Farm, 268-9, 271
Rafa Trench, 99-101, 131-3
Raglan, Lord, 309
Raillencourt, 270
Ralston, W., 303
Ramicourt, 273
Ramousies, 294
Ramsey, David, 8
Ravenel, 290
Rawlinson, General Sir Henry (afterwards Lord), 227, 305
Reims, 81-2, 108, 188-90, 195, 215, 217
Reincourt, 87
Renuart Farm, 281
Ribbans, Gunner, 231, 233-4
Ribecourt, 138-9
Ricardo engine, 42
Richborough, 127
Riencourt, 55
Riguerval Wood, 275
Robersart, 282
Roberts tractor, 11
Robertson, General Sir William, 32, 161
Rochet-Schneider tractor, 11
Rockenbach, Colonel, 278-9
Roclincourt, 83-5
Rocquigny-Villers, 55
Rœux, 88, 95-7
Roisel, 172-4
Romani Trench, 99
Ronchères, 290
Ronssoy Wood, 173, 267
Rosières, 225, 246
Roulers, 197
Royal Air Force, 239, 242-9
Royal Engineers, 284
Royal Flying Corps, 61
Royal Munster Fusiliers, 173
Royal Naval Air Service, 29-30
Roye, 82, 196, 229
Rumilly, 145, 148-9
Ruyaulcourt, 143
Rycroft, Major, 232
St. Aubert, 215
St. Emilie, 173
St. Julien, 121-4
St. Leger, 256
St. Martin-Église, 62
St. Mihiel, 196-7, 279
St. Olle, 270
St. Omer, 119
St. Pierre-Divion, 58
St. Quentin, 138, 197-8, 250
St. Quentin Canal, 270
St. Ribert, Bois de, 208, 210
St. Souplet, 281, 283
Salisbury Plain, 28
Salonika, 197
Sambre, the, 284
Sampson Ridge, 101
Sancourt, 273
Sapignies, 255-7
Sautrecourt, 62
Sauvillers, 188, 204, 207-8
Sayer, Major H. S., xii
Scarpe, the, 83, 85, 138, 172-3, 250
Scheldt Canal, 284
Scherpenberg, 110
Scheuch, General, 240-1
Schott, Caspar, 8
Sea Post, 131, 133
Searle, Colonel F., C.B.E., D.S.O., xiv
Seely, Major-Gen. Right Hon. J. E. B. 66
Selle, the, 250, 281, 283-5
Sénécat Wood, 188
Senlis, 290
Sensée, the, 144, 268
Sensée Valley, 258
Sequehart, 273
Serain, 249, 275
Seranvillers, 145, 148
Serre, 17, 176, 250
Sforza, Ludovico, 5
Sheikh Abbas, 99-100
Sheikh Hasan, 131-3
Sheikh Nebhan, 100, 130
Sheikh Redwam, 101
Shekia, 99
Simencourt, 200
Simmonds, 2nd Lieutenant, 254
Smith, Geoffrey, 159
Smythe, Sir John, xvii
Soissons, 82, 108, 195, 197-8, 217
Somme, the, 16-7, 33-4, 54, 58-9, 81, 98, 134, 166, 169, 172-7,
199-201, 205-6, 212, 223, 225-6, 251-2, 287, 303-4
Sorel, 143
South African Brigade, 293
Spencer, Major R., M.C., xiii
Spree Farm, 121
Springfield, 122
Steenbeek, the, 110, 119, 121
Steenwerck, 200
Stephenson, George, xvii, 303
Stern, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Albert, K.B.E., C.M.G., 23, 30-1, 33-4, 63,
66
Stevin, Simon, 7-8
Stewart, Sir Henry, 318
Stewart, Captain Ian M., M.C., xv
Stothert & Pitt, Messrs., 28
Strahan, Captain, 232
Suez Canal, 98
Summers, Major, 162
Swanage, 164
Swinton, Major-Gen. E. D., C.B., D.S.O., xii, 18, 20-2, 26, 29, 31,
50-3, 66, 72 _note_, 159-60, 162
Symes, Lieut. K. P., 32
Tandy, Major, 161
Tank Armoured Car Battalion, Seventeenth, xiii, 289-96
Tank Corps: _esprit-de-corps_, xvi, 68-72;
Headquarters Staff, xiv-xv, 60-2, 65, 103-7, 113, 174, 199, 218, 270;
formation of first unit, 31;
first appearance in action, 54-6;
capture of the Gird Trench, 57;
reorganisation, 62-7;
training centres, 62, 66-7, 159-65;
methods of training, 67-71;
mobile canteens, 72;
tank tactics, 73-80, 87, 89, 104-7, 111-6, 136-43, 252-3, 276-8;
at the battle of Arras, 81-97;
at the Second Battle of Gaza, 98-102;
at the battle of Messines, 108-12;
at the Third Battle of Ypres, 117-24;
mechanical engineering side, 125-9;
at the Third Battle of Gaza, 130-4;
at the battle of Cambrai, 140-53;
issue of “Battle Notes,” 154;
growth in numbers, 172-3;
at the Second Battle of the Somme, 173-7;
reduction in numbers, 199;
first encounter with German tanks, 201;
preparations for the Great Offensive, 202-3;
first experience of night warfare, 204;
at the battle of Hamel, 204-7, 304-5;
operations with the French Army at the battle of Moreuil, 207-11;
at the battle of Amiens, 218-29;
exploits of Whippet Tank “Musical Box,” 230-5;
co-operation with the Royal Air Force, 242-9;
at the battle of Bapaume, 250-7;
at the Second Battle of Arras, 257-9;
at the battle of Epehy, 266-7;
at the battle of Cambrai--St. Quentin, 268-75, 304;
heavy casualties, 276, 287;
at the battle of the Selle, 283-5;
at the battle of Maubeuge, 285;
last action of the War, 286;
tribute from Sir Douglas (now Earl) Haig, 287-8
First Tank Brigade, xvi, 62, 117-22, 146, 150-1, 168, 173, 200,
218, 220, 242-4, 250-1, 256-8, 266-9
Second Tank Brigade, xvi, 62, 109, 117-22, 146, 150-2, 172-3, 200,
220, 251, 266
Third Tank Brigade, 63, 117-23, 139, 146, 172, 175, 200-2, 208-11,
219-20, 222, 225-7, 243-4, 251, 256-8, 266, 271-4
Fourth Tank Brigade, 168, 172, 174-6, 199-200, 219-21, 225-7,
251-2, 256-8, 266-9, 271-4, 283-6
Fifth Tank Brigade, 168, 172, 200, 205, 208, 216, 219, 222, 226-7,
243-6, 251-2, 254, 266, 271-4
Tank Gun Carrier Companies, xii, 168-71
Tank Park, 58
Tank Signal Companies, 178-83
Tank Supply Companies, 33-4, 109-10, 166-71, 286
Tanks: their early origin, 1-2;
armoured knights as living tanks, 2;
fifteenth- and sixteenth-century battle-cars, 2-8;
Cugnot steam car, 8;
endless chain, 9-13;
invention of the landship, 18-29;
how the name “tank” was chosen, 29;
first official trial, 30;
taken over by the War Office from the Admiralty, 31;
order placed for the first hundred, 32;
their first appearance in action, 54-6;
more successful on their second appearance, 56-7;
lessons learnt from their early operations, 58-9;
limitations of early tanks, 105;
first use of supply tanks, 109;
introduction of cloud-smoke apparatus, 165;
French tanks, 184-98;
German tanks, 212-6;
not successful when attached to cavalry, 228-9;
how they impressed the Germans, 236-41;
their co-operation with aeroplanes, 242;
German defence against, 260;
American tanks, 279-82;
retrospect of what they have accomplished, 297-307;
forecast of what they may do, 308, 321
Mark I Tanks, 35-7, 44, 49-53, 63, 82, 89, 102, 105, 109-10, 166,
185, 203, 213, 261
Mark II, 37, 63, 89, 102, 110
Mark III, 37, 63, 82
Mark IV, 37-41, 44, 63, 109-10, 122, 130, 141, 167-8, 173, 201,
203, 212, 214, 253, 255, 258, 261, 267, 269
Mark V, 41-3, 199, 202-3, 206-7, 219, 223, 227, 231, 253, 256, 267
Mark V Star, 43, 219, 227, 253, 267
Mark VIII, 279
Mark IX, 167-8
Medium Mark A (“Chaser” or “Whippet”), 10, 44-7, 164, 173, 176,
201-2, 219, 223-4, 226-9, 244, 253, 255, 258
Daimler Type A.7.V., 212-3
Renault, 185-6, 279
St. Chamond, 184-5
Schneider, 184-6
Tank No. 505, 90-1;
No. 716, 95-6;
No. 770, 91-2;
No. 783, 92-3;
No. 784, 93-4;
“Mabel,” 254-5;
“Musical Box,” 230-5;
“Tiger,” 101;
“Wytschaete Express,” 111
Tapper, Captain H. J., 61
Tara Hill, 254
Tarrant triplane, 316
Telegraph Hill, 83, 91
Tel El Ajjul, 99
Tel El Nujeid, 100
Templeux la Fosse, 172
Teneur, 127-8
Thelus, 83
Thetford, 34
Thielt, 197
Thiepval, 57
Thilloy, 172, 257-8
Tigny, 193
Tilloy les Mafflaines, 83-5, 273
Tilly-Capelle, 62
Tortoise Hill, 133
Toutencourt, 200
Trench Warfare Department, 28-9
Trescault, 269
Triangle Farm, 122-3
Tritton, Sir William, 24-6, 31
Trones Wood, 55
Tulloch, Captain T. G., 18, 20-2, 32
Tunnelling Company, 184th, 117
Umbrella Hill, 130-2
Usna Hill, 254
Uzielli, Colonel T. J., D.S.O., M.C., xiv-xv, 61
Vaire Wood, 205, 207
Valenciennes, 81, 144, 284-5
Valturio, 5
Vauban,14
Vaux-Vraucourt, 174, 258
Vaux Andigny, 283
Vaux en Amienois, 205, 209
Velu Wood, 172, 258
Vendhuile, 270
Verdrel, Bois de, 173
Verdun, 184
Vesle, the, 188
Vieille Capelle, 200
Vignacourt, 245
Villemontoire, 193
Villers-au-Flos, 55, 258
Villers-Bretonneux, 169, 201-2, 205, 215, 231, 235
Villers-Cotterets, 189, 191
Villers-Guislain, 143, 146, 151-2, 270
Villers-les-Cagnicourt, 259
Villers-Outreaux, 275
Vimy, 83-5
Vis-en-Artois, 83
Wadi El Nukhabir, 99
Wadi Ghuzze, 100
Wahl, Colonel, 187
Wailly, 71, 172, 175
Wambeke Valley, 111
Wancourt, 86, 91-2, 257
War Office, 9, 22, 25, 29-30, 32, 158-9
Wareham, 162
Warfusée, 205-6, 291
Warren, the, 101
Warvillers, 225
Waterhouse, Lieutenant, 232
Waterloo, 276
Watkins, Lieutenant, 232
Watt, James, 8, 303
Wellington, 14
Wells, H. G., 303
Wembley, 27
West, Captain, V.C., 246-7
West Indian Detachment, 130
Wheeler, Major G. L., 25, 31
Wilson, Major W. G., 25-6, 31-2, 303
Wiltje, 120
Winnipeg Cemetery, 122
Woods, Lieut.-Colonel H. K., 209
Wool Tank Corps Training Centre, xii, 62-4, 66-7, 162-5, 279-81, 289
Worgret Camp, 162
Wright Brothers, 316
Wrisberg, General von, 240
Wurmser, xiv
Wytschaete, 108-11, 119
Ypres, xvi, 14-6, 108-9, 113 _note_, 114, 117-24, 129, 138-9, 153,
166, 242, 261, 304, 306
Ytres, 143
Yunus Trench, 101, 131, 133
Yvrench, 34
Zeebrugge, 14
Zoo Trench, 92
Zowaiid Trench, 101, 131
PRINTED BY
HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD.,
LONDON AND AYLESBURY,
ENGLAND.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Previously a Tank Corps engineer officer in France.
[2] _Ibid._
[3] Previously Brigade Major, 2nd Tank Brigade, in France.
[4] Previously G.S.O.2, Intelligence Headquarters, Tank Corps.
[5] German bayonet tassels.
[6] Certain chapters of this history originally appeared in a privately
circulated series of papers entitled _Weekly Tank Notes_.
[7] _How to make Railways Pay for the War_, p. 6. By Roy Horniman.
[8] The arrow was the means of immobilising the knight by forcing him
to dismount. Horse armour was never very satisfactory. Regarding the
maces, a chronicler writes of their use by the archers at Agincourt:
“It seemed as though they were hammering upon anvils.”
[9] The idea of a mobile fortress or battle car is very old: chariots
are known to have existed in Assyria as far back as the year 3500 B.C.
The Egyptians and Israelites both adopted them from this source. In
Biblical times their tactical utility was considerable, as the Book of
Judges relates. The Chinese, as early as 1200 B.C., made use of war
cars armoured against projectiles.
[10] Much of the following information is taken from an article
entitled “The Forerunner of the Tank,” by H. H. Manchester, published
in _The American Mechanist_, vol. 49, No. 15.
[11] “The Forerunner of the Tank,” by H. H. Manchester.
[12] For Edgeworth’s invention and the short summary of the
footed-wheel, etc., which follows see _The Engineer_, August 10, 1917,
and following issues.
[13] _The Engineer, ibid._
[14] The machine constructed by the Trench Warfare Department was the
double bogey car designed by the Pedrail Company, of which it will be
remembered twelve were originally ordered by the “Landships Committee”
and eventually abandoned. The resuscitation of this machine arose as
follows:
During the summer of 1915 the Trench Warfare Department approached the
Pedrail Company concerning the design of a flame projector with the
capacity of 12,000 gallons of petrol. In order to carry this weapon
the Pedrail Company suggested their original design, which, though it
was not approved of by the “Landships Committee,” was accepted by the
Trench Warfare Department. One machine was placed on order and built
at Bath by Messrs. Stothert and Pitt, the pedrails being manufactured
by the Metropolitan Carriage, Wagon and Finance Co., Ltd., and the
frame by Messrs. William Arrol. The machine when built weighed 32
tons unloaded, was equipped with two 100 h.p. Astor engines, and when
tested out on Salisbury Plain attained a speed of 15 miles an hour.
Only one of these machines was made, as eventually the idea of using
mechanically driven flame projectors was abandoned.
[15] This is the first appearance of the word “tank” in the history
of the machine. Up to December 1915, the machines now known as
“tanks” were, in the experimental stage, called “landships” or “land
cruisers,” and also “caterpillar machine-gun destroyers.” On December
24, whilst drafting the above report of the Conference it occurred
to Colonel Swinton that the use of the above names would give away
a secret which it was important to preserve. After consultation
with Lieutenant-Colonel W. Daily-Jones, assistant secretary of the
“Committee of Imperial Defence,” the following names were suggested by
Colonel Swinton--“cistern,” “reservoir,” and “tank,” all of which were
applicable to the steel-like structure of the machines in the earlier
stages of manufacture. Because it was less clumsy and monosyllabic the
name “tank” was decided on.
[16] On February 8, 1915.
[17] The sponsons of the Mark I were only 10 mm. armour and not proof
against A.P. bullets.
[18] Map reference.
[19] The original order was for 100, this was later on increased to 150.
[20] The lighter form of tank was called “medium” because the French,
by now, had produced the light Renault tank (see Plate III).
[21] At this time, January 1917, General Swinton’s notes given in
Chapter IV were not known of at the Heavy Branch Headquarters.
[22] Major O. A. Forsyth-Major (Second in Command of the Egyptian
Tank Detachment), on whose report this chapter is based, lost all his
documents and maps at sea in May 1918 when the ship on which he was
returning to England was torpedoed and sunk, consequently some of the
dates are missing.
[23] “It is not some familiar spirit which suddenly and secretly
discloses to me what I have to say or do in a case unexpected by
others; it is reflexion, meditation.”--NAPOLEON.
[24] This chapter is extracted from a project submitted by Headquarters
Tank Corps on June 11, 1917. It correctly visualised the Third Battle
of Ypres, and the German artillery tactics adopted during it.
[25] At this time the German reserves totalled about 750,000 men.
[26] Breakdowns in the past had for the most part been due to bad
ground, not defective mechanism.
[27] The statement made in the daily press that General Elles’ order
ran--“England expects every tank to do its damnedest,” was a pure
journalistic invention and one in very bad taste.
[28] “Battle Notes” were issued from time to time by Tank Corps
Headquarters to all tank crews. Their object was to stimulate “esprit
de corps and moral.” They were human documents for the most part,
referring not only to the tank but also to other arms.
[29] From this it must not be deduced that the officers and men of the
Tank Corps would not obey orders, but that the officer in command of
the Supply Companies was a student of human nature. Why order when a
simple act like this will do the ordering?
[30] The German reports published in April asserted that tanks were
used against the British Army on March 21. As nothing is definitely
known of their effect they probably failed to come into action.
[31] General de Bourgon was a great friend of the Tank Corps; he
presented its Headquarters mess with a charming trophy.
[32] Nine heavy battalions with 324 machines and two medium battalions
with 96. Besides these tanks, there were 42 in mechanical reserve,
96 supply tanks, and 22 gun-carriers. In all, and not counting the
machines of the 9th Tank Battalion, there were 580 tanks.
[33] This was borne witness to by British troops near by.
[34] Captain of the company to which this tank belonged.
[35] This was contrary to Tank Corps “Standing Battle Orders.”
[36] This report was written by Lieut. Arnold after his return from
Germany. The tank was eventually found close to the railway on the
eastern side of the Harbonnières-Rosières road.
[37] A supply tank is armed with one Lewis gun.
[38] See “The Tactics of Penetration,” by Captain J. F. C. Fuller,
_Journal of the Royal United Services Institution_, November 1914. This
article was written in April 1914.
[39] During the war the normal system of detecting new gases was to
examine captured respirators, and from the chemicals they contained
inversely deduce the gases they would protect their wearers against. In
peacetime no such means of detection will be possible.
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant
preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.
Inconsistent hyphenation of words and names has not been changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
quotation marks retained.
Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.
The edges of some illustrations were lost in the binding by the
scanning equipment. Illustrations have been moved between paragraphs,
so some of the page numbers in the List of Illustrations no longer
match the placement in this eBook. However, in versions of this eBook
containing links, the links in those lists lead directly to the
corresponding illustrations.
Some of the plates were missing the "Plate" caption, apparently due to
cropping during the scanning process. Since other plates include that
caption, it has been restored to the ones from which it was missing.
Index not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page references.
Text uses “moral” rather than “morale”.
Page 44: The "CHARACTERISTICS" table contains 11 columns and has been
split into three parts in the Plain Text version of this eBook.
Pages 44-45: “Tyler engine” also is printed as “Tylor”.
Page 182: In the “A. D. Signals” organization chart, it was unclear
whether the lower portion was a continuation of the upper line or
subordinate to the “1st Tank Brigade”. The chart has been reproduced
here as similarly to the original as possible.
Page 213: “1·57” mm. must be a misprint for “157 mm.”
Page 218: “Noyon-Montdidier” perhaps should be “Noyon--Montdidier”.
Page 272: “2 in. trench-mortar bombs, each containing 50 lb. of ammonal”
was printed with those numbers.
Page 310: “Kamtchatka” was printed that way.