THE BATTLE OF MESSINES
The situation at the end of April 1917 was a difficult one for the
Allies. The failure to penetrate the Drocourt-Queant line had rendered
the whole plan of the British attack east of Arras abortive; this was
bad enough, but indeed a minor incident when compared with the failure
of the great French attack in Champagne. It was towards making good
this failure that the rest of the year’s operations had to be directed.
The ambitious plan of cutting off the Arras-Soissons-Reims salient
having failed, the next blow was to be directed against the German
right flank. The object of this attack was to drive this flank back
sufficiently far to deprive the Germans of the coast line between
Nieuport and the Dutch frontier, and to render their position about
Lille sufficiently insecure to force them to evacuate it and so open
the road to Antwerp and Brussels.
The possibility of such an operation as this had long been
contemplated, and, as early as the summer of 1916, preparations for it
had been taken in hand by the British Second Army. By May 1917 these
were completed, including the construction of an extensive system of
railways in the Ypres area and the mining of most of the western flank
of the Messines-Wytschaete ridge.
The operation was to be divided into two main phases, firstly the
taking of the Messines-Wytschaete ridge so as to secure the right
flank of the second phase and to deny the enemy important points of
observation, and secondly the attack north of this ridge with the
object of occupying the coast line and of pushing forward towards
Ghent. The first phase constituted the battle of Messines, the subject
of this chapter, and the second the Third Battle of Ypres.
It had been foreseen early in the year that such an attack was
possible, and that in all probability tanks would be called upon to
take part in it, consequently, as early as March 1917, reconnaissances
of the whole of the Ypres area had been taken in hand by the Heavy
Branch. In April this surmise proved correct, and the 2nd Brigade,
consisting of A and B Battalions, was selected for this operation. In
May these two battalions were equipped with thirty-six Mark IV tanks
each.
Railheads were selected at Ouderdom and at Clapham Junction (one mile
south of Dranoutre), and though they were within the shelled area,
they fulfilled most of the requirements demanded of a tank railhead.
Advanced parties began arriving at these stations on May 14, and
between May 23 and 27, A and B Battalions followed them. Supply dumps
were then formed, and arrangements were made to carry forward one
complete fill for all tanks operating by means of Supply Tanks, which
were first used in this battle. These tanks consisted of discarded Mark
I machines with specially made supply sponsons fitted to them.
The positions of assembly were selected quite close to railheads, B
Battalion tanks being hidden away in a wood, and A Battalion’s in
specially built shelters representing huts. The spoor left by the
tanks, as they moved to these positions, was obliterated by means of
harrows so that no enemy’s aeroplane happening to cross over our lines
this way would notice anything suspicious on the ground.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF MESSINES
June 7th 1917.]
The object of the Second Army’s operations was firstly to capture the
Messines-Wytschaete ridge and secondly to capture the Oosttaverne line,
a line of trenches running north and south a mile to a mile and a half
east of the ridge. Three Corps were to participate in this attack--the
Xth and IXth Corps, and the IInd Anzac Corps. To these Corps tanks were
allotted as follows: 12 tanks to the Xth Corps, 28 tanks to the IXth
Corps, 16 for the ridge, and 12 for the Oosttaverne line, and 32 tanks
to the IInd Anzac Corps, 20 for the ridge and 12 for the Oosttaverne
line. Each battalion had two spare tanks and 6 supply tanks. The
total number of tanks used was, therefore, 76 Mark IV tanks and 12 Mark
I and II Supply Tanks.
The tank operations were planned to be entirely subsidiary to the
infantry attack, in fact the whole attack, being limited to a very
short advance, was based on the power of our artillery and the moral
effect produced by exploding some twenty mines simultaneously at zero
hour.
For three weeks the weather had been dry and fine, and had this not
been the case, there would have been little hope of ever being able
to move the tanks forward over the pulverised ground. The artillery
bombardment opened on May 28, June 7 being fixed for the attack. It was
a terrific cannonade, watching it from Kemmel hill or the Scherpenberg,
to-day almost blasted out of recognition themselves, one could see the
Grand bois, Wytschaete wood, and the green fields along the valleys
of the Steenbeek and Wytschaetebeek being slowly converted into a
dun-coloured area which the first heavy fall of rain would convert into
a porridge of mud. Some shells as they exploded would throw up great
fan-shaped masses of debris and smoke, others would burst into vortex
rings, whilst others again shot up into the air great feathers of fine
brown dust. Day and night the bombardment continued except for a short
pause now and then to mislead the enemy as to the hour the infantry
would “top the parapet.”
At zero hour (dawn) 40 tanks were launched; of these 27 reached the
first infantry objective, known as the Blue Line, and, of these 27, 26
went on to the second objective, the Black Line, and 25 reached it.
The artillery bombardment and creeping barrage proved so effective
that few of these tanks were ever called upon to come into action
except round the ruins of Wytschaete village, where some snipers
and machine-guns were silenced by them, and at Fanny's farm, near
Messines, where our infantry were held up by machine-gun fire. One
tank operating with the Anzac Corps got across the enemy's trenches
at a very rapid rate and reached its objective on the Black Line, a
distance of about 3,000 yards, in 1 hour and 40 minutes, having engaged
an enemy’s machine-gun on the way. Another tank, rather aptly named the
“Wytschaete Express,” led the infantry into the village of Wytschaete
and helped to persuade the Germans defending it to surrender, which
they did in large numbers.
At 10.30 a.m. the 24 reserve tanks were moved up to points behind our
original front line, and 22 of these started with the infantry at 3.10
p.m. in the attack on the Oosttaverne line, which constituted the final
objective. During this phase of the battle the tanks rendered very
great assistance to the infantry by occupying the ground beyond the
Oosttaverne line before the infantry arrived, and so disorganising the
enemy’s defence.
At a place named Joye farm an interesting incident occurred. Two tanks
became ditched here, but, in spite of this and approaching darkness,
these machines were in a position to repel any hostile counter-attack
coming up the Wambeke valley, so it was decided to stand by in the
tanks and resume unditching work at daybreak.
At about 4 a.m. unditching was started again, and one tank was got
out successfully, but unfortunately broke its track soon afterwards
in trying to cross the railway to advance against an enemy’s
counter-attack which was developing. An hour later the enemy was
observed to be massing in the Wambeke valley. The position of the tanks
only allowed of a pair of 6-pounders being trained in the direction
of the enemy, so the remainder of the crews, under their officers,
took up positions in shell-holes with their Lewis guns. Word was sent
to the infantry to warn them and ask for co-operation, and on a reply
being received that they were short of Lewis-gun ammunition, some was
supplied to them from the tanks.
From 6.30 a.m. onwards the enemy made repeated attempts to advance,
shooting at the tanks with a large number of armour-piercing bullets
which failed to penetrate. They were driven off in every case with
heavy casualties, until at 11.30 a.m. our artillery barrage opened and
dispersed them.
The battle of Messines, one of the shortest and best mounted limited
operations of the war, was in no sense a tank battle. Tanks took but
a small part in it, except in its final stages, nevertheless many
useful lessons were learnt, the chief of which were: the necessity of
some special form of unditching gear; the advisability of selecting
starting-points well behind our front line (in this battle they were
chosen too close behind it, with the result that as it was still
dark at zero hour several tanks got ditched in “No Man’s Land”); the
advisability of selecting rallying-points well behind objectives, so
that when tanks have finished their work their crews may gain as much
rest as possible.