THE BATTLES OF THE SOMME AND ANCRE
On July 1, 1916, the battle of the Somme opened with a successful
advance on the British right between Maricourt and Ovillers, and a
check on the British left between Ovillers and Gommecourt. From that
day on to the commencement of the battle of the Ancre, in November,
no further attempt was made to push forward the British left, all
available troops being required to maintain the forward movement of the
right flank.
The ground which separates the rivers Somme and Ancre is split up
into valleys by pronounced ridges, most of which form natural lines
of defence for an enemy and could, in 1916, only be stormed after
having been subjected to a heavy artillery bombardment. The ground had
consequently become severely “crumped” in places; but as the weather,
up to September 15, had been fine and dry, it offered no insuperable
difficulty to the movement of the tanks, which were allotted to the
Fourth and Reserve Armies as follows:
Fourth Army, XIVth Corps “C” Company (less 1 Section) 17 tanks
„ „ XVth „ “D” Company (less 1 Section) 17 „
„ „ IIIrd „ 1 Section “D” Company 8 „
Reserve Army 1 Section “C” Company 7 „
In G.H.Q. Reserve (all mechanically unfit) 10 „
On September 11 operation orders were received from the Fourth Army,
and on the 13th a conference was held, at which Lieutenant-Colonel
Bradley attended, to discuss the forthcoming attack. During the 14th
“A” Company arrived at Yvrench, and at 4.30 p.m. on that day the
headquarters of “C” Company moved to the Briquetterie near Trones
Wood, and the headquarters of “D” Company to Green Dump.
The frontage of the Fourth Army attack extended between the Combles
ravine and Martinpuich, the intention being to break through the
enemy’s defensive system and occupy Morval, Les Bœufs, Gueudecourt,
and Flers. Simultaneously with this attack the Reserve Army was to
attack on the left of the IIIrd Corps, and the French on the right
of the XIVth Corps. The attack was to be pushed with the utmost
vigour, and was to be followed by the advance of the Cavalry Corps,
which was to seize the high ground about Rocquigny-Villers au
Flos-Riencourt-lez-Bapaume.
The general idea governing tank movements, on this the first occasion
of their use, was that they should be employed in sub-sections of two
or three machines against “strong points.” Considerable apprehension
existed as to the likelihood on the one hand of tanks, if they started
too soon, drawing prematurely the enemy’s fire, and on the other of
their reaching their objective too late to be an assistance to the
infantry. It was finally decided that they should start in sufficient
time to reach the first objective five minutes before the infantry got
there, and thus risk drawing hostile fire. Our own artillery barrages,
stationary and creeping, were to be brought down at zero, leaving lanes
free from fire through which the tanks were to advance.
The tanks moved up from their positions of assembly to their
starting-points during the night of September 14-15. Of the
forty-nine machines allotted for the attack, thirty-two reached their
starting-points in time for the battle, the remainder failing to
arrive through becoming ditched on the way, or breaking down through
mechanical trouble.
The tanks working with the Reserve Army and the IIIrd and XIVth Corps
were not a great success; the operations of those with the XVth Corps
were as follows:
The tanks allotted to this Corps assembled on the night of September
13-14 at the Green Dump, where the machines were tuned up for battle,
and where stores of petrol and oil had been collected. On the night of
the 14-15th the tanks moved up to their starting-points round Delville
Wood. Every tank was given the route it had to follow, and the time it
was to leave the starting-point; this was in most cases about half an
hour before zero (dawn), and was intended to be arranged so that the
tanks should reach the German trenches a few minutes ahead of our own
infantry. Briefly, the orders were for eight tanks to advance on the
west of Flers, and six on the east of that village, their destination
being Gueudecourt and the sunken road to the west of it. The tanks were
to attack all strong points on their routes, and to assist the infantry
whenever held up.
Of the seventeen tanks which moved off, twelve reached their
starting-points; eleven of these crossed the German trenches and
did useful work. One in particular gave great assistance where the
attacking infantry were held up in front of the Flers line by wire
and machine-gun fire; the tank commander placed his machine astride
the trench and enfiladed it; the tank then travelled along behind the
trench, and 300 Germans surrendered and were taken prisoners. Another
tank entered Gueudecourt, attacked a German battery and destroyed one
77 mm. field-gun with its 6-pounders; the tank was then hit by a shell
and caught fire; only two of its crew got back to our lines.
This attack on September 15, from the point of view of tank operations,
was not a great success. Of the forty-nine tanks employed, only
thirty-two reached their starting-points; nine pushed ahead of the
infantry and caused considerable loss to the enemy, and nine others,
though they never caught up with the infantry, did good work in
clearing up points where the enemy was still holding out. Of the
remaining fourteen, nine broke down from mechanical trouble, and five
became ditched.
The casualties amongst the tank personnel were insignificant. Of the
machines ten were hit in action and temporarily rendered useless, and
seven were slightly damaged, but not sufficiently so as to prevent them
returning in safety.
The next occasion upon which tanks were used was during the attacks of
September 25 and 26, five being allotted to the Fourth Army, and eight
to the Reserve Army. Of these thirteen tanks nine stuck in shell-holes,
two worked their way into Thiepval, and after rendering assistance to
the infantry met a similar fate, and one, working with the XVth Corps,
carried out the first “star” turn in the history of tank tactics, which
in the report of the XVth Corps is described as follows:
“On September 25, the 64th Brigade, 21st Division, attack on Gird
trench was hung up and unable to make any progress. A footing had
been obtained in Gird trench at N.32 d.9.1,[18] and our troops
held the trench from N.26 c.4.5, northwards. Between these two
points there remained approximately 1,500 yards of trench, very
strongly held by Germans, well wired, the wire not having been cut.
Arrangements were made for a tank (female) to move up from here for
an attack next morning. The tank arrived at 6.30 a.m. followed by
bombers. It started moving south-eastwards along the Gird trench,
firing its machine-guns. As the trench gradually fell into our
hands, strong points were made in it by two companies of infantry,
which were following in the rear for that purpose. No difficulty
was experienced. The enemy surrendered freely as the tank moved
down the trench. They were unable to escape owing to our holding
the trench at the southern end at N.32 d.9.1. By 8.30 a.m. the
whole length of the trench had been cleared, and the 15th Durham
Light Infantry moved over the open and took over the captured
trench. The infantry then advanced to their final objective, when
the tank rendered very valuable assistance. The tank finally ran
short of petrol south-east of Gueudecourt. In the capture of
the Gird trench, eight officers and 362 other ranks were made
prisoners, and a great many Germans were killed. Our casualties
only amounted to five. Nearly 1,500 yards of trench were captured
in less than an hour. What would have proved a very difficult
operation, involving probably heavy losses, was taken with greatest
ease entirely owing to the assistance rendered by the tank.”
The last occasion upon which tanks were used during 1916 was on
November 13 and 14, in the battle of the Ancre, which completed the
Somme operations for the year. Heavy rain had fallen, and the difficult
ground along the river Ancre had been converted into a morass of mud.
For this attack complete tank preparations were made, reconnaissances
were carried out, and a tankodrome (Tank Park) was established at
Acheux.
On account of the bad weather the original plan, namely, to use twenty
tanks, was abandoned, and a much more modest scheme was evolved. Three
tanks were to operate with the 39th Division opposite St. Pierre
Divion. On November 13 these moved forward, and eventually all three
stuck in the mud. North of the river Ancre two tanks were sent against
Beaumont Hamel; these also became ditched. Next morning three more
tanks were sent out to clear up a strong point just south of the
last-named village. One of these was hit by a shell, and the remaining
two, on reaching the German front line, became ditched. These two tanks
were, however, able to bring their 6-pounders and machine-guns to bear
on the strong point, and their fire proved so effective that after a
short time the Germans holding it surrendered, and 400 prisoners were
rounded up by the tank crews--2 officers and 14 other ranks.
From the point of view of the general observer it might be said that,
except for one or two small and brilliant operations, the tank during
the battle of the Somme had not proved its value. The general observer,
however, is seldom the best judge, and when the actual conditions under
which tanks were used, during the autumn of 1916, are weighed and the
lessons sorted, history’s verdict, it is thought, will be, that they
had so far proved their value that September 15, 1916, will in future
be noted not so much for the successes gained on that day, but as the
birthday of a new epoch in the history of war.
What were these lessons?
(i) That the machine in principle was absolutely sound, and that all it
required were certain mechanical improvements.
(ii) That it had not been given a fair trial. It had been constructed
for good going and fine weather; it had been, unavoidably, used on
pulverised soil, often converted by rain into a pudding of mud.
(iii) That, on account of the secrecy it was necessary to maintain,
commanders had little or no conception of the tactics to apply to its
use.
(iv) That sufficient time had not been obtainable wherein to give the
crews a thorough and careful training.
(v) That tank operations require the most careful preparation and
minute reconnaissances in order to render them successful.
(vi) That tanks require leading and controlling in battle, and
consequently that a complete system of communication is essential.
(vii) That tanks, like every other arm, require a separate supply
organisation to maintain them whilst fighting.
(viii) That tanks draw away much fire from the infantry, and have
as great an encouraging effect on our own troops as they have a
demoralising one on the enemy’s.
These are the main lessons which were learnt from the tank operations
which took place during the battles of the Somme and the Ancre, and
the mere fact of having learnt them justifies the employment of tanks
during these operations. Further it must be remembered that, whatever
tests are carried out under peace conditions, the only true test of
efficiency is war, consequently the final test a machine or weapon
should get is its first battle, and until this test has been undergone,
no guarantee can be given of its real worth, and no certain deductions
can be made as to its future improvement.