THE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA
In this chapter I propose to take, as far as I am able, the standpoint
of a progressive and public-spirited Chinese, and consider what reforms,
in what order, I should advocate in that case.
To begin with, it is clear that China must be saved by her own efforts,
and cannot rely upon outside help. In the international situation, China
has had both good and bad fortune. The Great War was unfortunate,
because it gave Japan temporarily a free hand; the collapse of Tsarist
Russia was fortunate, because it put an end to the secret alliance of
Russians and Japanese; the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was unfortunate,
because it compelled us to abet Japanese aggression even against our own
economic interests; the friction between Japan and America was
fortunate; but the agreement arrived at by the Washington Conference,
though momentarily advantageous as regards Shantung, is likely, in the
long run, to prove unfortunate, since it will make America less willing
to oppose Japan. For reasons which I set forth in Chap. X., unless China
becomes strong, either the collapse of Japan or her unquestioned
ascendency in the Far East is almost certain to prove disastrous to
China; and one or other of these is very likely to come about. All the
Great Powers, without exception, have interests which are incompatible,
in the long run, with China's welfare and with the best development of
Chinese civilization. Therefore the Chinese must seek salvation in their
own energy, not in the benevolence of any outside Power.
The problem is not merely one of _political_ independence; a certain
cultural independence is at least as important. I have tried to show in
this book that the Chinese are, in certain ways, superior to us, and it
would not be good either for them or for us if, in these ways, they had
to descend to our level in order to preserve their existence as a
nation. In this matter, however, a compromise is necessary. Unless they
adopt some of our vices to some extent, we shall not respect them, and
they will be increasingly oppressed by foreign nations. The object must
be to keep this process within the narrowest limits compatible with
safety.
First of all, a patriotic spirit is necessary--not, of course, the
bigoted anti-foreign spirit of the Boxers, but the enlightened attitude
which is willing to learn from other nations while not willing to allow
them to dominate. This attitude has been generated among educated
Chinese, and to a great extent in the merchant class, by the brutal
tuition of Japan. The danger of patriotism is that, as soon as it has
proved strong enough for successful defence, it is apt to turn to
foreign aggression. China, by her resources and her population, is
capable of being the greatest Power in the world after the United
States. It is much to be feared that, in the process of becoming strong
enough to preserve their independence, the Chinese may become strong
enough to embark upon a career of imperialism. It cannot be too
strongly urged that patriotism should be only defensive, not aggressive.
But with this proviso, I think a spirit of patriotism is absolutely
necessary to the regeneration of China. Independence is to be sought,
not as an end in itself, but as a means towards a new blend of Western
skill with the traditional Chinese virtues. If this end is not achieved,
political independence will have little value.
The three chief requisites, I should say, are: (1) The establishment of
an orderly Government; (2) industrial development under Chinese control;
(3) The spread of education. All these aims will have to be pursued
concurrently, but on the whole their urgency seems to me to come in the
above order. We have already seen how large a part the State will have
to take in building up industry, and how impossible this is while the
political anarchy continues. Funds for education on a large scale are
also unobtainable until there is good government. Therefore good
government is the prerequisite of all other reforms. Industrialism and
education are closely connected, and it would be difficult to decide the
priority between them; but I have put industrialism first, because,
unless it is developed very soon by the Chinese, foreigners will have
acquired such a strong hold that it will be very difficult indeed to
oust them. These reasons have decided me that our three problems ought
to be taken in the above order.
1. _The establishment of an orderly government_.--At the moment of
writing, the condition of China is as anarchic as it has ever been. A
battle between Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu is imminent; the former is
usually considered, though falsely according to some good authorities,
the most reactionary force in China; Wu-Pei-Fu, though _The Times_ calls
him "the Liberal leader," may well prove no more satisfactory than
"Liberal" leaders nearer home. It is of course possible that, if he
wins, he may be true to his promises and convoke a Parliament for all
China; but it is at least equally possible that he may not. In any case,
to depend upon the favour of a successful general is as precarious as to
depend upon the benevolence of a foreign Power. If the progressive
elements are to win, they must become a strong organized force.
So far as I can discover, Chinese Constitutionalists are doing the best
thing that is possible at the moment, namely, concerting a joint
programme, involving the convoking of a Parliament and the cessation of
military usurpation. Union is essential, even if it involves sacrifice
of cherished beliefs on the part of some. Given a programme upon which
all the Constitutionalists are united, they will acquire great weight in
public opinion, which is very powerful in China. They may then be able,
sooner or later, to offer a high constitutional position to some
powerful general, on condition of his ceasing to depend upon mere
military force. By this means they may be able to turn the scales in
favour of the man they select, as the student agitation turned the
scales in July 1920 in favour of Wu-Pei-Fu against the An Fu party. Such
a policy can only be successful if it is combined with vigorous
propaganda, both among the civilian population and among the soldiers,
and if, as soon as peace is restored, work is found for disbanded
soldiers and pay for those who are not disbanded. This raises the
financial problem, which is very difficult, because foreign Powers will
not lend except in return for some further sacrifice of the remnants of
Chinese independence. (For reasons explained in Chap. X., I do not
accept the statement by the American consortium bankers that a loan from
them would not involve control over China's internal affairs. They may
not mean control to be involved, but I am convinced that in fact it
would be.) The only way out of this difficulty that I can see is to
raise an internal loan by appealing to the patriotism of Chinese
merchants. There is plenty of money in China, but, very naturally, rich
Chinese will not lend to any of the brigands who now control the
Government.
When the time comes to draft a permanent Constitution, I have no doubt
that it will have to be federal, allowing a very large measure of
autonomy to the provinces, and reserving for the Central Government few
things except customs, army and navy, foreign relations and railways.
Provincial feeling is strong, and it is now, I think, generally
recognized that a mistake was made in 1912 in not allowing it more
scope.
While a Constitution is being drafted, and even after it has been agreed
upon, it will not be possible to rely upon the inherent prestige of
Constitutionalism, or to leave public opinion without guidance. It will
be necessary for the genuinely progressive people throughout the country
to unite in a strongly disciplined society, arriving at collective
decisions and enforcing support of those decisions upon all its members.
This society will have to win the confidence of public opinion by a very
rigid avoidance of corruption and political profiteering; the slightest
failure of a member in this respect must be visited by expulsion. The
society must make itself obviously the champion of the national
interests as against all self-seekers, speculators and toadies to
foreign Powers. It will thus become able authoritatively to commend or
condemn politicians and to wield great influence over opinion, even in
the army. There exists in Young China enough energy, patriotism and
honesty to create such a society and to make it strong through the
respect which it will command. But unless enlightened patriotism is
organized in some such way, its power will not be equal to the political
problems with which China is faced.
Sooner or later, the encroachments of foreign Powers upon the sovereign
rights of China must be swept away. The Chinese must recover the Treaty
Ports, control of the tariff, and so on; they must also free themselves
from extra-territoriality. But all this can probably be done, as it was
in Japan, without offending foreign Powers (except perhaps the
Japanese). It would be a mistake to complicate the early stages of
Chinese recovery by measures which would antagonize foreign Powers in
general. Russia was in a stronger position for defence than China, yet
Russia has suffered terribly from the universal hostility provoked by
the Bolsheviks. Given good government and a development of China's
resources, it will be possible to obtain most of the needed concessions
by purely diplomatic means; the rest can wait for a suitable
opportunity.
2. _Industrial development._--On this subject I have already written in
Chap. XIV.; it is certain general aspects of the subject that I wish to
consider now. For reasons already given, I hold that all railways ought
to be in the hands of the State, and that all successful mines ought to
be purchased by the State at a fair valuation, even if they are not
State-owned from the first. Contracts with foreigners for loans ought to
be carefully drawn so as to leave the control to China. There would not
be much difficulty about this if China had a stable and orderly
government; in that case, many foreign capitalists would be willing to
lend on good security, without exacting any part in the management.
Every possible diplomatic method should be employed to break down such a
monopoly as the consortium seeks to acquire in the matter of loans.
Given good government, a large amount of State enterprise would be
desirable in Chinese industry. There are many arguments for State
Socialism, or rather what Lenin calls State Capitalism, in any country
which is economically but not culturally backward. In the first place,
it is easier for the State to borrow than for a private person; in the
second place, it is easier for the State to engage and employ the
foreign experts who are likely to be needed for some time to come; in
the third place, it is easier for the State to make sure that vital
industries do not come under the control of foreign Powers. What is
perhaps more important than any of these considerations is that, by
undertaking industrial enterprise from the first, the State can prevent
the growth of many of the evils of private capitalism. If China can
acquire a vigorous and honest State, it will be possible to develop
Chinese industry without, at the same time, developing the overweening
power of private capitalists by which the Western nations are now both
oppressed and misled.
But if this is to be done successfully, it will require a great change
in Chinese morals, a development of public spirit in place of the family
ethic, a transference to the public service of that honesty which
already exists in private business, and a degree of energy which is at
present rare. I believe that Young China is capable of fulfilling these
requisites, spurred on by patriotism; but it is important to realize
that they are requisites, and that, without them, any system of State
Socialism must fail.
For industrial development, it is important that the Chinese should
learn to become technical experts and also to become skilled workers. I
think more has been done towards the former of these needs than towards
the latter. For the latter purpose, it would probably be wise to import
skilled workmen--say from Germany--and cause them to give instruction to
Chinese workmen in any new branch of industrial work that it might be
desired to develop.
3. _Education._--If China is to become a democracy, as most progressive
Chinese hope, universal education is imperative. Where the bulk of the
population cannot read, true democracy is impossible. Education is a
good in itself, but is also essential for developing political
consciousness, of which at present there is almost none in rural China.
The Chinese themselves are well aware of this, but in the present state
of the finances it is impossible to establish universal elementary
education. Until it has been established for some time, China must be,
in fact, if not in form, an oligarchy, because the uneducated masses
cannot have any effective political opinion. Even given good government,
it is doubtful whether the immense expense of educating such a vast
population could be borne by the nation without a considerable
industrial development. Such industrial development as already exists is
mainly in the hands of foreigners, and its profits provide warships for
the Japanese, or mansions and dinners for British and American
millionaires. If its profits are to provide the funds for Chinese
education, industry must be in Chinese hands. This is another reason why
industrial development must probably precede any complete scheme of
education.
For the present, even if the funds existed, there would not be
sufficient teachers to provide a schoolmaster in every village. There
is, however, such an enthusiasm for education in China that teachers are
being trained as fast as is possible with such limited resources; indeed
a great deal of devotion and public spirit is being shown by Chinese
educators, whose salaries are usually many months in arrears.
Chinese control is, to my mind, as important in the matter of education
as in the matter of industry. For the present, it is still necessary to
have foreign instructors in some subjects, though this necessity will
soon cease. Foreign instructors, however, provided they are not too
numerous, do no harm, any more than foreign experts in railways and
mines. What does harm is foreign management. Chinese educated in mission
schools, or in lay establishments controlled by foreigners, tend to
become de-nationalized, and to have a slavish attitude towards Western
civilization. This unfits them for taking a useful part in the national
life, and tends to undermine their morals. Also, oddly enough, it makes
them more conservative in purely Chinese matters than the young men and
women who have had a modern education under Chinese auspices. Europeans
in general are more conservative about China than the modern Chinese
are, and they tend to convey their conservatism to their pupils. And of
course their whole influence, unavoidably if involuntarily, militates
against national self-respect in those whom they teach.
Those who desire to do research in some academic subject will, for some
time to come, need a period of residence in some European or American
university. But for the great majority of university students it is far
better, if possible, to acquire their education in China. Returned
students have, to a remarkable extent, the stamp of the country from
which they have returned, particularly when that country is America. A
society such as was foreshadowed earlier in this chapter, in which all
really progressive Chinese should combine, would encounter difficulties,
as things stand, from the divergencies in national bias between students
returned from (say) Japan, America and Germany. Given time, this
difficulty can be overcome by the increase in purely Chinese university
education, but at present the difficulty would be serious.
To overcome this difficulty, two things are needed: inspiring
leadership, and a clear conception of the kind of civilization to be
aimed at. Leadership will have to be both intellectual and practical. As
regards intellectual leadership, China is a country where writers have
enormous influence, and a vigorous reformer possessed of literary skill
could carry with him the great majority of Young China. Men with the
requisite gifts exist in China; I might mention, as an example
personally known to me, Dr. Hu Suh.[110] He has great learning, wide
culture, remarkable energy, and a fearless passion for reform; his
writings in the vernacular inspire enthusiasm among progressive Chinese.
He is in favour of assimilating all that is good in Western culture, but
by no means a slavish admirer of our ways.
The practical political leadership of such a society as I conceive to be
needed would probably demand different gifts from those required in an
intellectual leader. It is therefore likely that the two could not be
combined in one man, but would need men as different as Lenin and Karl
Marx.
The aim to be pursued is of importance, not only to China, but to the
world. Out of the renaissance spirit now existing in China, it is
possible, if foreign nations can be prevented from working havoc, to
develop a new civilization better than any that the world has yet known.
This is the aim which Young China should set before itself: the
preservation of the urbanity and courtesy, the candour and the pacific
temper, which are characteristic of the Chinese nation, together with a
knowledge of Western science and an application of it to the practical
problems of China. Of such practical problems there are two kinds: one
due to the internal condition of China, and the other to its
international situation. In the former class come education, democracy,
the diminution of poverty, hygiene and sanitation, and the prevention of
famines. In the latter class come the establishment of a strong
government, the development of industrialism, the revision of treaties
and the recovery of the Treaty Ports (as to which Japan may serve as a
model), and finally, the creation of an army sufficiently strong to
defend the country against Japan. Both classes of problems demand
Western science. But they do not demand the adoption of the Western
philosophy of life.
If the Chinese were to adopt the Western philosophy of life, they would,
as soon as they had made themselves safe against foreign aggression,
embark upon aggression on their own account. They would repeat the
campaigns of the Han and Tang dynasties in Central Asia, and perhaps
emulate Kublai by the invasion of Japan. They would exploit their
material resources with a view to producing a few bloated plutocrats at
home and millions dying of hunger abroad. Such are the results which the
West achieves by the application of science. If China were led astray by
the lure of brutal power, she might repel her enemies outwardly, but
would have yielded to them inwardly. It is not unlikely that the great
military nations of the modern world will bring about their own
destruction by their inability to abstain from war, which will become,
with every year that passes, more scientific and more devastating. If
China joins in this madness, China will perish like the rest. But if
Chinese reformers can have the moderation to stop when they have made
China capable of self-defence, and to abstain from the further step of
foreign conquest; if, when they have become safe at home, they can turn
aside from the materialistic activities imposed by the Powers, and
devote their freedom to science and art and the inauguration of a better
economic system--then China will have played the part in the world for
which she is fitted, and will have given to mankind as a whole new hope
in the moment of greatest need. It is this hope that I wish to see
inspiring Young China. This hope is realizable; and because it is
realizable, China deserves a foremost place in the esteem of every lover
of mankind.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 110: An account of a portion of his work will be found in
Tyau, op. cit. pp. 40 ff.]
APPENDIX
While the above pages were going through the Press, some important
developments have taken place in China. Wu-Pei-Fu has defeated
Chang-tso-lin and made himself master of Peking. Chang has retreated
towards Manchuria with a broken army, and proclaimed the independence of
Manchuria. This might suit the Japanese very well, but it is hardly to
be supposed that the other Powers would acquiesce. It is, therefore, not
unlikely that Chang may lose Manchuria also, and cease to be a factor in
Chinese politics.
For the moment, Wu-Pei-Fu controls the greater part of China, and his
intentions become important. The British in China have, for some years,
befriended him, and this fact colours all Press telegrams appearing in
our newspapers. According to _The Times_, he has pronounced in favour of
the reassembling of the old all-China Parliament, with a view to the
restoration of constitutional government. This is a measure in which the
South could concur, and if he really adheres to this intention he has it
in his power to put an end to Chinese anarchy. _The Times_ Peking
correspondent, telegraphing on May 30, reports that "Wu-Pei-Fu declares
that if the old Parliament will reassemble and work in national
interests he will support it up to the limit, and fight any
obstructionists."
On May 18, the same correspondent telegraphed that "Wu-Pei-Fu is lending
his support to the unification movements, and has found common ground
for action with Chen Chiung Ming," who is Sun's colleague at Canton and
is engaged in civil war with Sun, who is imperialistic and wants to
conquer all China for his government, said to be alone constitutional.
The programme agreed upon between Wu and Chen Chiung Ming is given in
the same telegram as follows:
Local self-government shall be established and magistrates shall
be elected by the people; District police shall be created under
District Boards subject to Central Provincial Boards; Civil
governors shall be responsible to the Central Government, not to
the Tuchuns; a national army shall be created, controlled and
paid by the Central Government; Provincial police and
_gendarmerie_, not the Tuchuns or the army, shall be responsible
for peace and order in the provinces; the whole nation shall
agree to recall the old Parliament and the restoration of the
Provisional Constitution of the first year of the Republic; Taxes
shall be collected by the Central Government, and only a
stipulated sum shall be granted to each province for expenses,
the balance to be forwarded to the Central Government as under
the Ching dynasty; Afforestation shall be undertaken, industries
established, highways built, and other measures taken to keep the
people on the land.
This is an admirable programme, but it is impossible to know how much of
it will ever be carried out.
Meanwhile, Sun Yat Sen is still at war with Wu-Pei-Fu. It has been
stated in the British Press that there was an alliance between Sun and
Chang, but it seems there was little more than a common hostility to Wu.
Sun's friends maintain that he is a genuine Constitutionalist, and that
Wu is not to be trusted, but Chen Chiung Ming has a better reputation
than Sun among reformers. The British in China all praise Wu and hate
Sun; the Americans all praise Sun and decry Wu. Sun undoubtedly has a
past record of genuine patriotism, and there can be no doubt that the
Canton Government has been the best in China. What appears in our
newspapers on the subject is certainly designed to give a falsely
unfavourable impression of Canton. For example, in _The Times_ of May
15, a telegram appeared from Hong-Kong to the following effect:
I learn that the troops of Sun Yat Sen, President of South China,
which are stated to be marching north from Canton, are a rabble.
Many are without weapons and a large percentage of the uniforms
are merely rags. There is no discipline, and gambling and
opium-smoking are rife.
Nevertheless, on May 30, _The Times_ had to confess that this army had
won a brilliant victory, capturing "the most important stronghold in
Kiangsi," together with 40 field guns and large quantities of munitions.
The situation must remain obscure until more detailed news has arrived
by mail. It is to be hoped that the Canton Government, through the
victory of Chen Chiung Ming, will come to terms with Wu-Pei-Fu, and will
be strong enough to compel him to adhere to the terms. It is to be hoped
also that Chang's proclamation of the independence of Manchuria will not
be seized upon by Japan as an excuse for a more complete absorption of
that country. If Wu-Pei-Fu adheres to the declaration quoted above,
there can be no patriotic reason why Canton should not co-operate with
him; on the other hand, the military strength of Canton makes it more
likely that Wu will find it prudent to adhere to his declaration. There
is certainly a better chance than there was before the defeat of Chang
for the unification of China and the ending of the Tuchuns' tyranny. But
it is as yet no more than a chance, and the future is still
problematical.
_June_ 21, 1922.
INDEX
Academy, Imperial, 44
Adams, Will, 94
Afghanistan, 175
Ainu, 117
America, 17, 54, 63, 69, 134, 136, 145 ff., 159 ff
and naval policy, 161-2
and trade with Russia, 162-3
and Chinese finance, 163-5, 244
and Japan, 167 ff.
Americanism, 221
Ancestor-worship, 39
An Fu Party, 145, 205, 243
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 120, 123, 133, 137, 149, 175
Annam, 52
Arnold, Julean, 231
Art, 11, 12, 28, 189
Australia, 181
Backhouse, 49
Balfour, 152, 153
Benthamites, 80
Birth-rate--
in China, 73
in Japan, 116
Bismarck, 112, 130
Bland, 49, 77 n, 107
Bolsheviks, 17, 18, 128, 136, 143, 146 ff., 175 ff., 245
Bolshevism, 82
in China, 175, 194, 204
Books, burning of, 24 ff.
Boxer rising, 53, 54, 227
indemnity, 54, 217
Brailsford, 166
Buddhism, 27, 31, 48, 190
in Japan, 86 ff., 91, 105, 169
Burma, 52
Bushido, 172
Canada, 181
Canton, 50, 68, 71, 75, 207
Capitalism, 179
Cassel agreement, 69
Chamberlain, Prof. B.H., 103, 105
Changchun, 124
Chang-tso-lin, 68, 71, 77,242, 253
Chao Ki, 40
Chen Chiung Ming, 68, 253-5
Chen, Eugene, 133 n.
Cheng, S.G., 55 n., 65, 134 n., 139 n., 232
Chien Lung, Emperor, 49 ff.
Chi Li, Mr., 37
China--
early history, 21 S ff.
derivation of name, 24
population, 31-4
Year Book, 32
produce, 72
influence on Japan, 86 ff.,104
and the war, 134 ff.
Post Offices, 150
Chinese--
character of, 199-213
love of laughter, 188-9, 200
dignity, 202
pacifism, 195, 213
callousness, 209
cowardice, 210
avarice, 211
patience, 206
excitability, 212
Chingkiang, 60
Chinlingchen mine, 234
Chita, 146, 154
Choshu, 99, 101, 102, 106
Chou dynasty, 22
Christianity in Japan, 92 ff.
Chuang Tze, 8, 82, 188, 192
Chu Fu Tze, 43
Chu Hsi, 46
Civilization--
alphabetical, 37
Chinese, 187 ff.
European, 186
Coal in China, 132 n., 231 ff.
Coleman, 77 n., 110, 132 n., 133 n.
Colour prejudice, 168, 173
and labour, 181 ff.
Confucius, 21, 22, 24, 38, 187, 208
Confucianism, 34, 38 ff., 190
in Japan, 118
Consortium, 14, 163 ff., 179, 244
Cordier, Henri, 24 n., 25, 27 n., 28, 30 n., 31 n., 187 n.
Cotton, 76, 235
industry in Osaka, 114
Customs--
Chinese, 55 ff.,
on exports, 56
internal, 56-7
Dairen, 123
Conference at, 154 ff.
Denison, 129
Dewey, Professor, 69, 224
Mrs., 224
Diet, Japanese, 109 ff.
Dutch in Japan, 94 ff., 100
Education, 44 ff., 76 ff., 193, 214-225, 247 ff.
statistics of, 215
classical, 215-7
European and American, 217-21
modern Chinese, 221 ff.
of women, 223-4
Efficiency, creed of, 17
"Eight Legs," 45, 46
Emperor of China 22 ff, 39, 83, 88, 205
"First," 24 ff.
Empress Dowager, 52 n.
Examination, competitive, 34, 44 ff, 76
"Face," 204
Famines in China, 72, 210
Far Eastern Republic, 140, 154
Federalism in China, 70, 244
Feudalism--
in China, 24, 26
in Japan, 89 ff.
Filial Piety, 39 ff., 61
and patriotism, 41
in Japan, 118, 169
Foreign Trade statistics, 236-7
Forestry, 80
Fourteen Points, 53
France, 52, 53, 123
and Shantung, 137-8
and Japan, 157
Fukien, 132
Galileo, 186
Genoa Conference, 146
Genro, the, 91, 106 ff., 128
George III, 49
Germany, 30, 53, 109, 138, 172
property in China during war, 141 ff.
Giles, Lionel, 82 n.
Giles, Professor, 23, 39, 43 n., 49 n., 187 n.
Gladstone, 157, 160
Gleason, 132 n., 134 n.
Gobi desert, 31
Gompers, 163
Great Britain--
and China, 52 ff.
and Shantung, 137
Great Wall, 24
Greeks, 186
Guam, 150
Han dynasty, 27
Hanyehping Co., 132 n., 232-3
Hart, Sir Robert, 57
Hayashi, 133 n.
Hearn, Lafcadio, 99
Heaven (in Chinese religion), 23, 43
Temple of, 23, 24
Hideyoshi, 87, 93, 94
Hirth, 22 n., 23 n., 27 n.
Hong Kong, 52, 69, 75, 207
Hsu Shi-chang, President, 44
Hughes, Premier, 181 n.
Hughes, Secretary, 152, 153
Hung Wu, Emperor, 45
Huns, 24, 27, 31
Hu Suh, 250
Ichimura, Dr., 121
Ideograms, 34 ff.
Immigration, Asiatic, 181 ff.
Imperialism. 82
India, 27, 29, 48, 119, 120
Industrialism, 186
in China, 75, 76, 212,
226-39, 245 ff.
in Japan, 114
Inouye, 88
Intelligentsia in China, 76
Iron in China, 131, 132 n., 231 ff.
Japanese control of, 232 ff.
Ishii, 135. _See_ also Lansing-Ishii
Agreement.
Ito, 88. 109 ff
lyeyasu, 91, 94, 95
Japan, 14, 15, 27, 30, 52, 53, 62, 63, 86-175
early history, 86 ff.
constitution, 109 ff.
war with China, 113, 122, 130
war with Russia, 108, 123, 130
clan loyalty, 118
loyalty to Allies, 136
hegemony in Asia, 120
loans to China in 1918, 143
Socialism in, 114, 170
Jenghis Khan, 28 ff.
Jews, 186
Kang Hsi, Emperor, 49 n.
Kara Korum, 30
Kato, 133 n.
Kiangnan Dock, 232
Kiaochow, 53, 131, 151
Kieff, 29
Koo, Mr. Wellington, 58 n., 164
Korea, 53, 86, 120, 122, 124
Kublai Khan, 29, 30
Kyoto, 96
Kyushu, 92, 94
Lama Religion, 43
Lamont, 165
Lansing, 144
Lansing-Ishii Agreement, 134, 139, 151
Lao-Tze, 43, 82, 187, 194
Legge, 22 n., 39 n., 82 n.
Lenin, 180, 250,
Lennox, Dr., 73 n.
Literati, 25, 26, 38 ff.
Li Ung Bing, 26, 45
Li Yuan Hung, President, 140 ff.
Li Yuen, 28 n.
Lloyd George, 133, 140, 157
Louis XIV., 51
Louis, Saint, 29
Macao, 62
Macartney, 49
Malthus, 73
Manchu dynasty, 30, 31, 43, 64
Manchuria, 53, 68, 120, 123, 127, 130, 146, 154, 177, 178, 207
Manila, 93
Marco Polo, 29
Marcus Aurelius, 27
Marx, 250
Masuda, 93
McLaren, 98, 103 n.
Mechanistic Outlook, 81 ff.
Merv, 29
Mikado, 87, 99, 106
worship of, 98, 103, 168-9
Militarism, 16, 42, 43 n.
Millard, 134 n., 143, 151 n.
Minamoto Yoritomo, 90
Mines, 230 ff.
Ming dynasty, 30
Missionaries, 196
Roman Catholic, 48, 49 n.
in Japan, 92 ff.
Mongol dynasty, 28 ff., 43
Mongolia, 29, 43, 120, 147, 154
Morgan, J.P., 157, 165
Morphia, 150
Moscow, 29
Mukden, 130
Murdoch, 28 n., 86 n., 101, 107 n.
Nationalism, 16
Nestorianism, 48
Nicolaievsk, 155
Nietzsche, 84, 194
Nishapur, 29
Nobunaga, 94
Northcliffe, Lord, 77 n.
Observatory, Peking, 30, 49
Okuma, 120, 122
Open Door, 55, 162, 179
Opium, 52
Panama Tolls, 162
Peking, 30, 34, 52, 72
Legation Quarter, 54
Union Medical College, 73, 219
Government University, 217 n., 222
Girls' High Normal School, 224
Penhsihu mine, 234
Perry, Commodore, 96, 100, 167
Persia, 27, 29, 175
Phonetic writing, 35
Plato, 186
Po Chui, 195
Po Lo, 83
Pooley, 120 n., 121, 124, 128, 133 n.
Pope, The, 29, 169
Port Arthur, 54, 123, 130, 150, 175
Portsmouth, Treaty of, 108-9, 125
Portuguese, 92 ff.
Progress, 13, 196, 202
Putnam Weale, 32, 33, 65, 143 n., 165, 228
Railways, 226 ff.
nationalization of, 228 ff.
statistics of, 230
Chinese Eastern, 123, 126, 143, 146, 227
Fa-ku-Men, 124
Hankow-Canton, 227
Peking-Kalgan, 227, 229
Peking-Hankow, 227
Shantung, 151 ff., 227
Siberian, 146, 227
South Manchurian, 124, 125, 126
Tientsin-Pukow, 227
Reid, Rev. Gilbert, 134 n., 139 n. 142
Reinsch, 134 n., 135, 136
Restoration in Japan, 87, 97 8.
Revolution of 1911, 30, 65 ff.
and Japan, 128 ff.
Rockefeller Hospital, 218
Rome, 27, 51
Roosevelt, 108
Rousseau, 42
Russia, 15, 18-20, 29, 53, 108, 119, 127, 146 ff., 175 ff.
war with Japan, 108,123, 130
secret treaty with Japan, 136
and Shantung, 138-9
Salt tax, 59, 60
_San Felipe_, 93
Sato, Admiral, 172
Satsuma, 94, 99, 101, 102, 106
Science, 51, 80, 81, 186, 193
Shank, Mr., 69
Shantung, 53, 127, 131 ff., 178
secret treaties concerning, 137
in Versailles Treaty, 144
and Washington Conference, 145, 151 ff.
Shaw, Bernard, 160
Sherfesee, 80
Shih Huang Ti, _See_ Emperor, "First"
Shi-King, 25
Shinto, 87 ff., 103, 105, 169
Shogun, The, 90, 99 ff.
Shu-King, 21, 22 n., 25
Simpson, Lennox. _See_ Putnam Weale
Socialism, 64, 181 ff.
State, 180, 246
in Japan, 114, 170
in China, 222, 236
Soyeda, 144 n.
Spaniards in Japan, 93
Student Movement, 223, 243
Students--
returned, 17, 193, 219
statistics of, 220 n.
Summer Palace, 52
Sung dynasty, 30, 45
Sun Yat Sen, 65, 68, 128, 140, 253-6
Supreme Ruler. _See_ Heaven
Taiping Rebellion, 32, 56, 65
Tai-tsung, 28 n.
Tang dynasty, 28, 44
Taochung iron mine, 234
Taoism, 43, 187 ff.
Tartars, 27, 31
Tayeh mines, 231 n., 232-3
Teachers' strike, 206, 225
Tenny, Raymond P., 33
Tibet, 31, 43
Ting, Mr. V.K., 73 n.
Tokugawa, 99
Tong, Hollington K., 143 n., 204 n.
Trade Unionism, 180-1
in Japan, 114-5
Treaty Ports, 74
Tsing-hua College, 217
Tsing-tau, 131, 151
Tuan Chih-jui, 140 ff.
Tuangkuan Shan mines, 233
Tuchuns, 61, 67, 71, 76, 203, 206
Twenty-one Demands, 131 ff., 233, 234
Tyau, M.T.Z., 144 n., 215, 220 n., 223, 226 n., 230, 235
United States. _See_ America.
Versailles Treaty, 53, 142, 144,151
Vladivostok, 146, 154
Volga, 18
Voltaire, 221
Waley, 84, 195
War, Great, idealistic aims of, 141 ff.
Washington Conference, 16, 55 n., 61, 63, 127, 145, 149 ff., 178
Wei-hai-wei, 54, 149
White men, virtues of, 121
William II., 122
Wilson, President, 140, 142
Women, position of, in China, 223-4
Woosung College, 239
Wu-Pei-Fu, 42, 60, 68, 71, 242, 253-3
Yamagata, Prince, 115 n.
Yangtze, 52, 132
Yao and Shun, 21, 22
Yellow River, 21, 187
Y.M.C.A., 82, 83, 222
Young China, 26, 61, 77 ff., 144, 145, 167, 193, 247, 250
Yü, 22
Yuan Shi-k'ai, 65 ff., 129, 135