CHAPTER XII

THE CHINESE CHARACTER

There is a theory among Occidentals that the Chinaman is inscrutable,

full of secret thoughts, and impossible for us to understand. It may be

that a greater experience of China would have brought me to share this

opinion; but I could see nothing to support it during the time when I

was working in that country. I talked to the Chinese as I should have

talked to English people, and they answered me much as English people

would have answered a Chinese whom they considered educated and not

wholly unintelligent. I do not believe in the myth of the "Subtle

Oriental": I am convinced that in a game of mutual deception an

Englishman or American can beat a Chinese nine times out of ten. But as

many comparatively poor Chinese have dealings with rich white men, the

game is often played only on one side. Then, no doubt, the white man is

deceived and swindled; but not more than a Chinese mandarin would be in

London.

One of the most remarkable things about the Chinese is their power of

securing the affection of foreigners. Almost all Europeans like China,

both those who come only as tourists and those who live there for many

years. In spite of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, I can recall hardly a

single Englishman in the Far East who liked the Japanese as well as the

Chinese. Those who have lived long among them tend to acquire their

outlook and their standards. New arrivals are struck by obvious evils:

the beggars, the terrible poverty, the prevalence of disease, the

anarchy and corruption in politics. Every energetic Westerner feels at

first a strong desire to reform these evils, and of course they ought to

be reformed.

But the Chinese, even those who are the victims of preventable

misfortunes, show a vast passive indifference to the excitement of the

foreigners; they wait for it to go off, like the effervescence of

soda-water. And gradually strange hesitations creep into the mind of the

bewildered traveller; after a period of indignation, he begins to doubt

all the maxims he has hitherto accepted without question. Is it really

wise to be always guarding against future misfortune? Is it prudent to

lose all enjoyment of the present through thinking of the disasters that

may come at some future date? Should our lives be passed in building a

mansion that we shall never have leisure to inhabit?

The Chinese answer these questions in the negative, and therefore have

to put up with poverty, disease, and anarchy. But, to compensate for

these evils, they have retained, as industrial nations have not, the

capacity for civilized enjoyment, for leisure and laughter, for pleasure

in sunshine and philosophical discourse. The Chinese, of all classes,

are more laughter-loving than any other race with which I am acquainted;

they find amusement in everything, and a dispute can always be softened

by a joke.

I remember one hot day when a party of us were crossing the hills in

chairs--the way was rough and very steep, the work for the coolies very

severe. At the highest point of our journey, we stopped for ten minutes

to let the men rest. Instantly they all sat in a row, brought out their

pipes, and began to laugh among themselves as if they had not a care in

the world. In any country that had learned the virtue of forethought,

they would have devoted the moments to complaining of the heat, in order

to increase their tip. We, being Europeans, spent the time worrying

whether the automobile would be waiting for us at the right place.

Well-to-do Chinese would have started a discussion as to whether the

universe moves in cycles or progresses by a rectilinear motion; or they

might have set to work to consider whether the truly virtuous man shows

_complete_ self-abnegation, or may, on occasion, consider his own

interest.

One comes across white men occasionally who suffer under the delusion

that China is not a civilized country. Such men have quite forgotten

what constitutes civilization. It is true that there are no trams in

Peking, and that the electric light is poor. It is true that there are

places full of beauty, which Europeans itch to make hideous by digging

up coal. It is true that the educated Chinaman is better at writing

poetry than at remembering the sort of facts which can be looked up in

_Whitaker's Almanac_. A European, in recommending a place of residence,

will tell you that it has a good train service; the best quality he can

conceive in any place is that it should be easy to get away from. But a

Chinaman will tell you nothing about the trains; if you ask, he will

tell you wrong. What he tells you is that there is a palace built by an

ancient emperor, and a retreat in a lake for scholars weary of the

world, founded by a famous poet of the Tang dynasty. It is this outlook

that strikes the Westerner as barbaric.

The Chinese, from the highest to the lowest, have an imperturbable quiet

dignity, which is usually not destroyed even by a European education.

They are not self-assertive, either individually or nationally; their

pride is too profound for self-assertion. They admit China's military

weakness in comparison with foreign Powers, but they do not consider

efficiency in homicide the most important quality in a man or a nation.

I think that, at bottom, they almost all believe that China is the

greatest nation in the world, and has the finest civilization. A

Westerner cannot be expected to accept this view, because it is based on

traditions utterly different from his own. But gradually one comes to

feel that it is, at any rate, not an absurd view; that it is, in fact,

the logical outcome of a self-consistent standard of values. The typical

Westerner wishes to be the cause of as many changes as possible in his

environment; the typical Chinaman wishes to enjoy as much and as

delicately as possible. This difference is at the bottom of most of the

contrast between China and the English-speaking world.

We in the West make a fetish of "progress," which is the ethical

camouflage of the desire to be the cause of changes. If we are asked,

for instance, whether machinery has really improved the world, the

question strikes us as foolish: it has brought great changes and

therefore great "progress." What we believe to be a love of progress is

really, in nine cases out of ten, a love of power, an enjoyment of the

feeling that by our fiat we can make things different. For the sake of

this pleasure, a young American will work so hard that, by the time he

has acquired his millions, he has become a victim of dyspepsia,

compelled to live on toast and water, and to be a mere spectator of the

feasts that he offers to his guests. But he consoles himself with the

thought that he can control politics, and provoke or prevent wars as may

suit his investments. It is this temperament that makes Western nations

"progressive."

There are, of course, ambitious men in China, but they are less common

than among ourselves. And their ambition takes a different form--not a

better form, but one produced by the preference of enjoyment to power.

It is a natural result of this preference that avarice is a widespread

failing of the Chinese. Money brings the means of enjoyment, therefore

money is passionately desired. With us, money is desired chiefly as a

means to power; politicians, who can acquire power without much money,

are often content to remain poor. In China, the _tuchuns_ (military

governors), who have the real power, almost always use it for the sole

purpose of amassing a fortune. Their object is to escape to Japan at a

suitable moment; with sufficient plunder to enable them to enjoy life

quietly for the rest of their days. The fact that in escaping they lose

power does not trouble them in the least. It is, of course, obvious that

such politicians, who spread devastation only in the provinces committed

to their care, are far less harmful to the world than our own, who ruin

whole continents in order to win an election campaign.

The corruption and anarchy in Chinese politics do much less harm than

one would be inclined to expect. But for the predatory desires of the

Great Powers--especially Japan--the harm would be much less than is

done by our own "efficient" Governments. Nine-tenths of the activities

of a modern Government are harmful; therefore the worse they are

performed, the better. In China, where the Government is lazy, corrupt,

and stupid, there is a degree of individual liberty which has been

wholly lost in the rest of the world.

The laws are just as bad as elsewhere; occasionally, under foreign

pressure, a man is imprisoned for Bolshevist propaganda, just as he

might be in England or America. But this is quite exceptional; as a

rule, in practice, there is very little interference with free speech

and a free Press.[96] The individual does not feel obliged to follow the

herd, as he has in Europe since 1914, and in America since 1917. Men

still think for themselves, and are not afraid to announce the

conclusions at which they arrive. Individualism has perished in the

West, but in China it survives, for good as well as for evil.

Self-respect and personal dignity are possible for every coolie in

China, to a degree which is, among ourselves, possible only for a few

leading financiers.

The business of "saving face," which often strikes foreigners in China

as ludicrous, is only the carrying-out of respect for personal dignity

in the sphere of social manners. Everybody has "face," even the humblest

beggar; there are humiliations that you must not inflict upon him, if

you are not to outrage the Chinese ethical code. If you speak to a

Chinaman in a way that transgresses the code, he will laugh, because

your words must be taken as spoken in jest if they are not to constitute

an offence.

Once I thought that the students to whom I was lecturing were not as

industrious as they might be, and I told them so in just the same words

that I should have used to English students in the same circumstances.

But I soon found I was making a mistake. They all laughed uneasily,

which surprised me until I saw the reason. Chinese life, even among the

most modernized, is far more polite than anything to which we are

accustomed. This, of course, interferes with efficiency, and also (what

is more serious) with sincerity and truth in personal relations. If I

were Chinese, I should wish to see it mitigated. But to those who suffer

from the brutalities of the West, Chinese urbanity is very restful.

Whether on the balance it is better or worse than our frankness, I shall

not venture to decide.

The Chinese remind one of the English in their love of compromise and in

their habit of bowing to public opinion. Seldom is a conflict pushed to

its ultimate brutal issue. The treatment of the Manchu Emperor may be

taken as a case in point. When a Western country becomes a Republic, it

is customary to cut off the head of the deposed monarch, or at least to

cause him to fly the country. But the Chinese have left the Emperor his

title, his beautiful palace, his troops of eunuchs, and an income of

several million dollars a year. He is a boy of sixteen, living peaceably

in the Forbidden City. Once, in the course of a civil war, he was

nominally restored to power for a few days; but he was deposed again,

without being in any way punished for the use to which he had been put.

Public opinion is a very real force in China, when it can be roused. It

was, by all accounts, mainly responsible for the downfall of the An Fu

party in the summer of 1920. This party was pro-Japanese and was

accepting loans from Japan. Hatred of Japan is the strongest and most

widespread of political passions in China, and it was stirred up by the

students in fiery orations. The An Fu party had, at first, a great

preponderance of military strength; but their soldiers melted away when

they came to understand the cause for which they were expected to fight.

In the end, the opponents of the An Fu party were able to enter Peking

and change the Government almost without firing a shot.

The same influence of public opinion was decisive in the teachers'

strike, which was on the point of being settled when I left Peking. The

Government, which is always impecunious, owing to corruption, had left

its teachers unpaid for many months. At last they struck to enforce

payment, and went on a peaceful deputation to the Government,

accompanied by many students. There was a clash with the soldiers and

police, and many teachers and students were more or less severely

wounded. This led to a terrific outcry, because the love of education in

China is profound and widespread. The newspapers clamoured for

revolution. The Government had just spent nine million dollars in

corrupt payments to three Tuchuns who had descended upon the capital to

extort blackmail. It could not find any colourable pretext for refusing

the few hundred thousands required by the teachers, and it capitulated

in panic. I do not think there is any Anglo-Saxon country where the

interests of teachers would have roused the same degree of public

feeling.

Nothing astonishes a European more in the Chinese than their patience.

The educated Chinese are well aware of the foreign menace. They realize

acutely what the Japanese have done in Manchuria and Shantung. They are

aware that the English in Hong-Kong are doing their utmost to bring to

naught the Canton attempt to introduce good government in the South.

They know that all the Great Powers, without exception, look with greedy

eyes upon the undeveloped resources of their country, especially its

coal and iron. They have before them the example of Japan, which, by

developing a brutal militarism, a cast-iron discipline, and a new

reactionary religion, has succeeded in holding at bay the fierce lusts

of "civilized" industrialists. Yet they neither copy Japan nor submit

tamely to foreign domination. They think not in decades, but in

centuries. They have been conquered before, first by the Tartars and

then by the Manchus; but in both cases they absorbed their conquerors.

Chinese civilization persisted, unchanged; and after a few generations

the invaders became more Chinese than their subjects.

Manchuria is a rather empty country, with abundant room for

colonization. The Japanese assert that they need colonies for their

surplus population, yet the Chinese immigrants into Manchuria exceed the

Japanese a hundredfold. Whatever may be the temporary political status

of Manchuria, it will remain a part of Chinese civilization, and can be

recovered whenever Japan happens to be in difficulties. The Chinese

derive such strength from their four hundred millions, the toughness of

their national customs, their power of passive resistance, and their

unrivalled national cohesiveness--in spite of the civil wars, which

merely ruffle the surface--that they can afford to despise military

methods, and to wait till the feverish energy of their oppressors shall

have exhausted itself in internecine combats.

China is much less a political entity than a civilization--the only one

that has survived from ancient times. Since the days of Confucius, the

Egyptian, Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian, and Roman Empires have

perished; but China has persisted through a continuous evolution. There

have been foreign influences--first Buddhism, and now Western science.

But Buddhism did not turn the Chinese into Indians, and Western science

will not turn them into Europeans. I have met men in China who knew as

much of Western learning as any professor among ourselves; yet they had

not been thrown off their balance, or lost touch with their own people.

What is bad in the West--its brutality, its restlessness, its readiness

to oppress the weak, its preoccupation with purely material aims--they

see to be bad, and do not wish to adopt. What is good, especially its

science, they do wish to adopt.

The old indigenous culture of China has become rather dead; its art and

literature are not what they were, and Confucius does not satisfy the

spiritual needs of a modern man, even if he is Chinese. The Chinese who

have had a European or American education realize that a new element, is

needed to vitalize native traditions, and they look to our civilization

to supply it. But they do not wish to construct a civilization just like

ours; and it is precisely in this that the best hope lies. If they are

not goaded into militarism, they may produce a genuinely new

civilization, better than any that we in the West have been able to

create.

So far, I have spoken chiefly of the good sides of the Chinese

character; but of course China, like every other nation, has its bad

sides also. It is disagreeable to me to speak of these, as I experienced

so much courtesy and real kindness from the Chinese, that I should

prefer to say only nice things about them. But for the sake of China, as

well as for the sake of truth, it would be a mistake to conceal what is

less admirable. I will only ask the reader to remember that, on the

balance, I think the Chinese one of the best nations I have come across,

and am prepared to draw up a graver indictment against every one of the

Great Powers. Shortly before I left China, an eminent Chinese writer

pressed me to say what I considered the chief defects of the Chinese.

With some reluctance, I mentioned three: avarice, cowardice and

callousness. Strange to say, my interlocutor, instead of getting angry,

admitted the justice of my criticism, and proceeded to discuss possible

remedies. This is a sample of the intellectual integrity which is one of

China's greatest virtues.

The callousness of the Chinese is bound to strike every Anglo-Saxon.

They have none of that humanitarian impulse which leads us to devote one

per cent. of our energy to mitigating the evils wrought by the other

ninety-nine per cent. For instance, we have been forbidding the

Austrians to join with Germany, to emigrate, or to obtain the raw

materials of industry. Therefore the Viennese have starved, except those

whom it has pleased us to keep alive from philanthropy. The Chinese

would not have had the energy to starve the Viennese, or the

philanthropy to keep some of them alive. While I was in China, millions

were dying of famine; men sold their children into slavery for a few

dollars, and killed them if this sum was unobtainable. Much was done by

white men to relieve the famine, but very little by the Chinese, and

that little vitiated by corruption. It must be said, however, that the

efforts of the white men were more effective in soothing their own

consciences than in helping the Chinese. So long as the present

birth-rate and the present methods of agriculture persist, famines are

bound to occur periodically; and those whom philanthropy keeps alive

through one famine are only too likely to perish in the next.

Famines in China can be permanently cured only by better methods of

agriculture combined with emigration or birth-control on a large scale.

Educated Chinese realize this, and it makes them indifferent to efforts

to keep the present victims alive. A great deal of Chinese callousness

has a similar explanation, and is due to perception of the vastness of

the problems involved. But there remains a residue which cannot be so

explained. If a dog is run over by an automobile and seriously hurt,

nine out of ten passers-by will stop to laugh at the poor brute's howls.

The spectacle of suffering does not of itself rouse any sympathetic pain

in the average Chinaman; in fact, he seems to find it mildly agreeable.

Their history, and their penal code before the revolution of 1911, show

that they are by no means destitute of the impulse of active cruelty;

but of this I did not myself come across any instances. And it must be

said that active cruelty is practised by all the great nations, to an

extent concealed from us only by our hypocrisy.

Cowardice is prima facie a fault of the Chinese; but I am not sure that

they are really lacking in courage. It is true that, in battles between

rival tuchuns, both sides run away, and victory rests with the side that

first discovers the flight of the other. But this proves only that the

Chinese soldier is a rational man. No cause of any importance is

involved, and the armies consist of mere mercenaries. When there is a

serious issue, as, for instance, in the Tai-Ping rebellion, the Chinese

are said to fight well, particularly if they have good officers.

Nevertheless, I do not think that, in comparison with the Anglo-Saxons,

the French, or the Germans, the Chinese can be considered a courageous

people, except in the matter of passive endurance. They will endure

torture, and even death, for motives which men of more pugnacious races

would find insufficient--for example, to conceal the hiding-place of

stolen plunder. In spite of their comparative lack of _active_ courage,

they have less fear of death than we have, as is shown by their

readiness to commit suicide.

Avarice is, I should say, the gravest defect of the Chinese. Life is

hard, and money is not easily obtained. For the sake of money, all

except a very few foreign-educated Chinese will be guilty of corruption.

For the sake of a few pence, almost any coolie will run an imminent risk

of death. The difficulty of combating Japan has arisen mainly from the

fact that hardly any Chinese politician can resist Japanese bribes. I

think this defect is probably due to the fact that, for many ages, an

honest living has been hard to get; in which case it will be lessened as

economic conditions improve. I doubt if it is any worse now in China

than it was in Europe in the eighteenth century. I have not heard of any

Chinese general more corrupt than Marlborough, or of any politician more

corrupt than Cardinal Dubois. It is, therefore, quite likely that

changed industrial conditions will make the Chinese as honest as we

are--which is not saying much.

I have been speaking of the Chinese as they are in ordinary life, when

they appear as men of active and sceptical intelligence, but of somewhat

sluggish passions. There is, however, another side to them: they are

capable of wild excitement, often of a collective kind. I saw little of

this myself, but there can be no doubt of the fact. The Boxer rising was

a case in point, and one which particularly affected Europeans. But

their history is full of more or less analogous disturbances. It is this

element in their character that makes them incalculable, and makes it

impossible even to guess at their future. One can imagine a section of

them becoming fanatically Bolshevist, or anti-Japanese, or Christian, or

devoted to some leader who would ultimately declare himself Emperor. I

suppose it is this element in their character that makes them, in spite

of their habitual caution, the most reckless gamblers in the world. And

many emperors have lost their thrones through the force of romantic

love, although romantic love is far more despised than it is in the

West.

To sum up the Chinese character is not easy. Much of what strikes the

foreigner is due merely to the fact that they have preserved an ancient

civilization which is not industrial. All this is likely to pass away,

under the pressure of the Japanese, and of European and American

financiers. Their art is already perishing, and being replaced by crude

imitations of second-rate European pictures. Most of the Chinese who

have had a European education are quite incapable of seeing any beauty

in native painting, and merely observe contemptuously that it does not

obey the laws of perspective.

The obvious charm which the tourist finds in China cannot be preserved;

it must perish at the touch of industrialism. But perhaps something may

be preserved, something of the ethical qualities in which China is

supreme, and which the modern world most desperately needs. Among these

qualities I place first the pacific temper, which seeks to settle

disputes on grounds of justice rather than by force. It remains to be

seen whether the West will allow this temper to persist, or will force

it to give place, in self-defence, to a frantic militarism like that to

which Japan has been driven.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 96: This vexes the foreigners, who are attempting to establish

a very severe Press censorship in Shanghai. See "The Shanghai Printed

Matter Bye-Law." Hollington K. Tong, _Review of the Far East,_ April 16,

1922.]

The Problem of China · 第 12 / 15 章