MODERN JAPAN
The modern Japanese nation is unique, not only in this age, but in the
history of the world. It combines elements which most Europeans would
have supposed totally incompatible, and it has realized an original plan
to a degree hardly known in human affairs. The Japan which now exists is
almost exactly that which was intended by the leaders of the Restoration
in 1867. Many unforeseen events have happened in the world: American has
risen and Russia has fallen, China has become a Republic and the Great
War has shattered Europe. But throughout all these changes the leading
statesmen of Japan have gone along the road traced out for them at the
beginning of the Meiji era, and the nation has followed them with
ever-increasing faithfulness. One single purpose has animated leaders
and followers alike: the strengthening and extension of the Empire. To
realize this purpose a new kind of policy has been created, combining
the sources of strength in modern America with those in Rome at the time
of the Punic Wars, uniting the material organization and scientific
knowledge of pre-war Germany with the outlook on life of the Hebrews in
the Book of Joshua.
The transformation of Japan since 1867 is amazing, and people have been
duly amazed by it. But what is still more amazing is that such an
immense change in knowledge and in way of life should have brought so
little change in religion and ethics, and that such change as it has
brought in these matters should have been in a direction opposite to
that which would have been naturally expected. Science is supposed to
tend to rationalism; yet the spread of scientific knowledge in Japan has
synchronized with a great intensification of Mikado-Worship, the most
anachronistic feature in the Japanese civilization. For sociology, for
social psychology, and for political theory, Japan is an extraordinarily
interesting country. The synthesis of East and West which has been
effected is of a most peculiar kind. There is far more of the East than
appears on the surface; but there is everything of the West that tends
to national efficiency. How far there is a genuine fusion of Eastern and
Western elements may be doubted; the nervous excitability of the people
suggests something strained and artificial in their way of life, but
this may possibly be a merely temporary phenomenon.
Throughout Japanese politics since the Restoration, there are two
separate strands, one analogous to that of Western nations, especially
pre-war Germany, the other inherited from the feudal age, which is more
analogous to the politics of the Scottish Highlands down to 1745. It is
no part of my purpose to give a history of modern Japan; I wish only to
give an outline of the forces which control events and movements in that
country, with such illustrations as are necessary. There are many good
books on Japanese politics; the one that I have found most informative
is McLaren's _Political History of Japan during the Meiji Era_
1867-1912 (Allen and Unwin, 1916). For a picture of Japan as it appeared
in the early years of the Meiji era, Lafcadio Hearn is of course
invaluable; his book _Japan, An Interpretation_ shows his dawning
realization of the grim sides of the Japanese character, after the
cherry-blossom business has lost its novelty. I shall not have much to
say about cherry-blossom; it was not flowering when I was in Japan.
Before, 1867, Japan was a feudal federation of clans, in which the
Central Government was in the hands of the Shogun, who was the head of
his own clan, but had by no means undisputed sway over the more powerful
of the other clans. There had been various dynasties of Shoguns at
various times, but since the seventeenth century the Shogunate had been
in the Tokugawa clan. Throughout the Tokugawa Shogunate, except during
its first few years, Japan had been closed to foreign intercourse,
except for a strictly limited commerce with the Dutch. The modern era
was inaugurated by two changes: first, the compulsory opening of the
country to Western trade; secondly, the transference of power from the
Tokugawa clan to the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, who have governed
Japan ever since. It is impossible to understand Japan or its politics
and possibilities without realizing the nature of the governing forces
and their roots in the feudal system of the former age. I will therefore
first outline these internal movements, before coming to the part which
Japan has played in international affairs.
What happened, nominally, in 1867 was that the Mikado was restored to
power, after having been completely eclipsed by the Shogun since the end
of the twelfth century. During this long period, the Mikado seems to
have been regarded by the common people with reverence as a holy
personage, but he was allowed no voice in affairs, was treated with
contempt by the Shogun, was sometimes deposed if he misbehaved, and was
often kept in great poverty.
Of so little importance was the Imperial person in the days of
early foreign intercourse that the Jesuits hardly knew of the
Emperor's existence. They seem to have thought of him as a
Japanese counterpart of the Pope of Rome, except that he had no
aspirations for temporal power. The Dutch writers likewise were
in the habit of referring to the Shogun as "His Majesty," and on
their annual pilgrimage from Dashima to Yedo, Kyoto (where the
Mikado lived) was the only city which they were permitted to
examine freely. The privilege was probably accorded by the
Tokugawa to show the foreigners how lightly the Court was
regarded. Commodore Perry delivered to the Shogun in Yedo the
autograph letter to the Emperor of Japan, from the President of
the United States, and none of the Ambassadors of the Western
Powers seem to have entertained any suspicion that in dealing
with the authorities in Yedo they were not approaching the
throne.
In the light of these facts, some other explanation of the
relations between the Shogunate and the Imperial Court must be
sought than that which depends upon the claim now made by
Japanese historians of the official type, that the throne,
throughout this whole period, was divinely preserved by the
Heavenly Gods.[46]
What happened, in outline, seems to have been a combination of very
different forces. There were antiquarians who observed that the Mikado
had had real power in the tenth century, and who wished to revert to the
ancient customs. There were patriots who were annoyed with the Shogun
for yielding to the pressure of the white men and concluding commercial
treaties with them. And there were the western clans, which had never
willingly submitted to the authority of the Shogun. To quote McLaren
once more (p. 33):--
The movement to restore the Emperor was coupled with a form of
Chauvinism or intense nationalism which may be summed up in the
expression "Exalt the Emperor! Away with the barbarians!" (Kinno!
Joi!) From this it would appear that the Dutch scholars' work in
enlightening the nation upon the subject of foreign scientific
attainments was anathema, but a conclusion of that kind must not
be hastily arrived at. The cry, "Away with the barbarians!" was
directed against Perry and the envoys of other foreign Powers,
but there was nothing in that slogan which indicates a general
unwillingness to emulate the foreigners' achievements in
armaments or military tactics. In fact, for a number of years
previous to 1853, Satsuma and Choshu and other western clans had
been very busily engaged in manufacturing guns and practising
gunnery: to that extent, at any rate, the discoveries of the
students of European sciences had been deliberately used by those
men who were to be foremost in the Restoration.
This passage gives the key to the spirit which has animated modern Japan
down to the present day.
The Restoration was, to a greater extent than is usually realized in the
West, a conservative and even reactionary movement. Professor Murdoch,
in his authoritative _History of Japan,_[47] says:--
In the interpretation of this sudden and startling development
most European writers and critics show themselves seriously at
fault. Even some of the more intelligent among them find the
solution of this portentous enigma in the very superficial and
facile formula of "imitation." But the Japanese still retain
their own unit of social organization, which is not the
individual, as with us, but the _family_. Furthermore, the
resemblance of the Japanese administrative system, both central
and local, to certain European systems is not the result of
imitation, or borrowing, or adaptation. Such resemblance is
merely an odd and fortuitous resemblance. When the statesmen who
overthrew the Tokugawa régime in 1868, and abolished the feudal
system in 1871, were called upon to provide the nation with a new
equipment of administrative machinery, they did not go to Europe
for their models. They simply harked back for some eleven or
twelve centuries in their own history and resuscitated the
administrative machinery that had first been installed in Japan
by the genius of Fujiwara Kamatari and his coadjutors in 645
A.D., and more fully supplemented and organized in the succeeding
fifty or sixty years. The present Imperial Cabinet of ten
Ministers, with their departments and departmental staff of
officials, is a modified revival of the Eight Boards adapted from
China and established in the seventh century.... The present
administrative system is indeed of alien provenance; but it was
neither borrowed nor adapted a generation ago, nor borrowed nor
adapted from Europe. It was really a system of hoary antiquity
that was revived to cope with pressing modern exigencies.
The outcome was that the clans of Satsuma and Choshu acquired control of
the Mikado, made his exaltation the symbol of resistance to the
foreigner (with whom the Shogun had concluded unpopular treaties), and
secured the support of the country by being the champions of
nationalism. Under extraordinarily able leaders, a policy was adopted
which has been pursued consistently ever since, and has raised Japan
from being the helpless victim of Western greed to being one of the
greatest Powers in the world. Feudalisim was abolished, the Central
Government was made omnipotent, a powerful army and navy were created,
China and Russia were successively defeated, Korea was annexed and a
protectorate established over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, industry and
commerce were developed, universal compulsory education instituted; and
worship of the Mikado firmly established by teaching in the schools and
by professorial patronage of historical myths. The artificial creation
of Mikado-worship is one of the most interesting features of modern
Japan, and a model to all other States as regards the method of
preventing the growth of rationalism. There is a very instructive little
pamphlet by Professor B.H. Chamberlain, who was Professor of Japanese
and philosophy at Tokyo, and had a knowledge of Japanese which few
Europeans had equalled. His pamphlet is called _The Invention of a New
Religion_, and is published by the Rationalist Press Association. He
points out that, until recent times, the religion of Japan was Buddhism,
to the practical exclusion of every other. There had been, in very
ancient times, a native religion called Shinto, and it had lingered on
obscurely. But it is only during the last forty years or so that Shinto
has been erected into a State religion, and has been reconstructed so as
to suit modern requirements.[48] It is, of course, preferable to
Buddhism because it is native and national; it is a tribal religion, not
one which aims at appealing to all mankind. Its whole purpose, as it has
been developed by modern statesmen, is to glorify Japan and the Mikado.
Professor Chamberlain points out how little reverence there was for the
Mikado until some time after the Restoration:--
The sober fact is that no nation probably has ever treated its
sovereigns more cavalierly than the Japanese have done, from the
beginning of authentic history down to within the memory of
living men. Emperors have been deposed, emperors have been
assassinated; for centuries every succession to the throne was
the signal for intrigues and sanguinary broils. Emperors have
been exiled; some have been murdered in exile.... For long
centuries the Government was in the hands of Mayors of the
Palace, who substituted one infant sovereign for another,
generally forcing each to abdicate as he approached man's estate.
At one period, these Mayors of the Palace left the Descendant of
the Sun in such distress that His Imperial Majesty and the
Imperial Princes were obliged to gain a livelihood by selling
their autographs! Nor did any great party in the State protest
against this condition of affairs. Even in the present reign
(that of Meiji)--the most glorious in Japanese history--there
have been two rebellions, during one of which a rival Emperor was
set up in one part of the country, and a Republic proclaimed in
another.
This last sentence, though it states sober historical fact, is scarcely
credible to those who only know twentieth-century Japan. The spread of
superstition has gone _pari passu_ with the spread of education, and a
revolt against the Mikado is now unthinkable. Time and again, in the
midst of political strife, the Mikado has been induced to intervene, and
instantly the hottest combatants have submitted abjectly. Although there
is a Diet, the Mikado is an absolute ruler--as absolute as any sovereign
ever has been.
The civilization of Japan, before the Restoration, came from China.
Religion, art, writing, philosophy and ethics, everything was copied
from Chinese models. Japanese history begins in the fifth century A.D.,
whereas Chinese history goes back to about 2,000 B.C., or at any rate to
somewhere in the second millennium B.C. This was galling to Japanese
pride, so an early history was invented long ago, like the theory that
the Romans were descended from Æneas. To quote Professor Chamberlain
again:--
The first glimmer of genuine Japanese history dates from the
fifth century _after_ Christ, and even the accounts of what
happened in the sixth century must be received with caution.
Japanese scholars know this as well as we do; it is one of the
certain results of investigation. But the Japanese bureaucracy
does not desire to have the light let in on this inconvenient
circumstance. While granting a dispensation _re_ the national
mythology, properly so called, it exacts belief in every iota of
the national historic legends. Woe to the native professor who
strays from the path of orthodoxy. His wife and children (and in
Japan every man, however young, has a wife and children) will
starve. From the late Prince Ito's grossly misleading _Commentary
on the Japanese Constitution_ down to school compendiums, the
absurd dates are everywhere insisted upon.
This question of fictitious early history might be considered
unimportant, like the fact that, with us, parsons have to pretend to
believe the Bible, which some people think innocuous. But it is part of
the whole system, which has a political object, to which free thought
and free speech are ruthlessly sacrificed. As this same pamphlet says:--
Shinto, a primitive nature cult, which had fallen into discredit,
was taken out of its cupboard and dusted. The common people, it
is true, continued to place their affections on Buddhism, the
popular festivals were Buddhist; Buddhist also the temples where
they buried their dead. The governing class determined to change
all this. They insisted on the Shinto doctrine that the Mikado
descends in direct succession from the native Goddess of the Sun,
and that He himself is a living God on earth who justly claims
the absolute fealty of his subjects. Such things as laws and
constitutions are but free gifts on His part, not in any sense
popular rights. Of course, the ministers and officials, high and
low, who carry on His government, are to be regarded not as
public servants, but rather as executants of supreme--one might
say supernatural--authority. Shinto, because connected with the
Imperial family, is to be alone honoured.
All this is not mere theorizing; it is the practical basis of Japanese
politics. The Mikado, after having been for centuries in the keeping of
the Tokugawa Shoguns, was captured by the clans of Satsuma and Choshu,
and has been in their keeping ever since. They were represented
politically by five men, the Genro or Elder Statesmen, who are sometimes
miscalled the Privy Council. Only two still survive. The Genro have no
constitutional existence; they are merely the people who have the ear of
the Mikado. They can make him say whatever they wish; therefore they are
omnipotent. It has happened repeatedly that they have had against them
the Diet and the whole force of public opinion; nevertheless they have
invariably been able to enforce their will, because they could make the
Mikado speak, and no one dare oppose the Mikado. They do not themselves
take office; they select the Prime Minister and the Ministers of War and
Marine, and allow them to bear the blame if anything goes wrong. The
Genro are the real Government of Japan, and will presumably remain so
until the Mikado is captured by some other clique.
From a patriotic point of view, the Genro have shown very great wisdom
in the conduct of affairs. There is reason to think that if Japan were
a democracy its policy would be more Chauvinistic than it is. Apologists
of Japan, such as Mr. Bland, are in the habit of telling us that there
is a Liberal anti-militarist party in Japan, which is soon going to
dominate foreign policy. I see no reason to believe this. Undoubtedly
there is a strong movement for increasing the power of the Diet and
making the Cabinet responsible to it; there is also a feeling that the
Ministers of War and Marine ought to be responsible to the Cabinet and
the Prime Minister, not only to the Mikado directly.[49] But democracy
in Japan does not mean a diminution of Chauvinism in foreign policy.
There is a small Socialist party which is genuinely anti-Chauvinist and
anti-militarist; this party, probably, will grow as Japanese
industrialism grows. But so-called Japanese Liberals are just as
Chauvinistic as the Government, and public opinion is more so. Indeed
there have been occasions when the Genro, in spite of popular fury, has
saved the nation from mistakes which it would certainly have committed
if the Government had been democratic. One of the most interesting of
these occasions was the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth, after
the Sino-Japanese war, which deserves to be told as illustrative of
Japanese politics.[50]
In 1905, after the battles of Tsushima and Mukden, it became clear to
impartial observers that Russia could accomplish nothing further at sea,
and Japan could accomplish nothing further on land. The Russian
Government was anxious to continue the war, having gradually accumulated
men and stores in Manchuria, and greatly improved the working of the
Siberian railway. The Japanese Government, on the contrary, knew that it
had already achieved all the success it could hope for, and that it
would be extremely difficult to raise the loans required for a
prolongation of the war. Under these circumstances, Japan appealed
secretly to President Roosevelt requesting his good offices for the
restoration of peace. President Roosevelt therefore issued invitations
to both belligerents to a peace conference. The Russian Government,
faced by a strong peace party and incipient revolution, dared not refuse
the invitation, especially in view of the fact that the sympathies of
neutrals were on the whole with Japan. Japan, being anxious for peace,
led Russia to suppose that Japan's demands would be so excessive as to
alienate the sympathy of the world and afford a complete answer to the
peace party in Russia. In particular, the Japanese gave out that they
would absolutely insist upon an indemnity. The Government had in fact
resolved, from the first, not to insist on an indemnity, but this was
known to very few people in Japan, and to no one outside Japan. The
Russians, believing that the Japanese would not give way about the
indemnity, showed themselves generous as regards all other Japanese
demands. To their horror and consternation, when they had already packed
up and were just ready to break up the conference, the Japanese
announced (as they had from the first intended to do) that they accepted
the Russian concessions and would waive the claim to an indemnity. Thus
the Russian Government and the Japanese people were alike furious,
because they had been tricked--the former in the belief that it could
yield everything except the indemnity without bringing peace, the latter
in the belief that the Government would never give way about the
indemnity. In Russia there was revolution; in Japan there were riots,
furious diatribes in the Press, and a change of Government--of the
nominal Government, that is to say, for the Genro continued to be the
real power throughout. In this case, there is no doubt that the decision
of the Genro to make peace was the right one from every point of view;
there is also very little doubt that a peace advantageous to Japan could
not have been made without trickery.
Foreigners unacquainted with Japan, knowing that there is a Diet in
which the Lower House is elected, imagine that Japan is at least as
democratic as pre-war Germany. This is a delusion. It is true that
Marquis Ito, who framed the Constitution, which was promulgated in 1889,
took Germany for his model, as the Japanese have always done in all
their Westernizing efforts, except as regards the Navy, in which Great
Britain has been copied. But there were many points in which the
Japanese Constitution differed from that of the German Empire. To begin
with, the Reichstag was elected by manhood suffrage, whereas in Japan
there is a property qualification which restricts the franchise to about
25 per cent of the adult males. This, however, is a small matter
compared to the fact that the Mikado's power is far less limited than
that of the Kaiser was. It is true that Japan does not differ from
pre-war Germany in the fact that Ministers are not responsible to the
Diet, but to the Emperor, and are responsible severally, not
collectively. The War Minister must be a General, the Minister of Marine
must be an Admiral; they take their orders, not from the Prime Minister,
but from the military and naval authorities respectively, who, of
course, are under the control of the Mikado. But in Germany the
Reichstag had the power of the purse, whereas in Japan, if the Diet
refuses to pass the Budget, the Budget of the previous year can be
applied, and when the Diet is not sitting, laws can be enacted
temporarily by Imperial decree--a provision which had no analogue in the
German Constitution.
The Constitution having been granted by the Emperor of his free grace,
it is considered impious to criticize it or to suggest any change in it,
since this would imply that His Majesty's work was not wholly perfect.
To understand the Constitution, it is necessary to read it in
conjunction with the authoritative commentary of Marquis Ito, which was
issued at the same time. Mr. Coleman very correctly summarizes the
Constitution as follows[51]:--
Article I of the Japanese Constitution provides that "The Empire
of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors
unbroken for ages eternal."
"By reigned over and governed," wrote Marquis Ito in his
_Commentaries on the Constitution of Japan_, "it is meant that
the Emperor on His Throne combines in Himself the Sovereignty of
the State and the Government of the country and of His subjects."
Article 3 of the Constitution states that "the Emperor is sacred
and inviolate." Marquis Ito's comment in explanation of this is
peculiarly Japanese. He says, "The Sacred Throne was established
at the time when the heavens and earth became separated. The
Empire is Heaven-descended, divine and sacred; He is pre-eminent
above all His subjects. He must be reverenced and is inviolable.
He has, indeed, to pay due respect to the law, but the law has no
power to hold Him accountable to it. Not only shall there be no
irreverence for the Emperor's person, but also shall He neither
be made a topic of derogatory comment nor one of discussion."
Through the Constitution of Japan the Japanese Emperor exercises
the legislative power, the executive power, and the judiciary
power. The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes,
prorogues, and dissolves it. When the Imperial Diet is not
sitting, Imperial ordinances may be issued in place of laws. The
Emperor has supreme control of the Army and Navy, declares war,
makes peace, and concludes treaties; orders amnesty, pardon and
commutation of punishments.
As to the Ministers of State, the Constitution of Japan, Article
55, says: "The respective Ministers of State shall give their
advice to the Emperor and be responsible for it."
Ito's commentary on this article indicates his intention in
framing it. "When a Minister of State errs in the discharge of
his functions, the power of deciding upon his responsibilities
belongs to the Sovereign of the State: he alone can dismiss a
Minister who has appointed him. Who then is it, except the
Sovereign, that can appoint, dismiss, and punish a Minister of
State? The appointment and dismissal of them having been included
by the Constitution in the sovereign power of the Emperor, it is
only a legitimate consequence that the power of deciding as to
the responsibility of Ministers is withheld from the Diet. But
the Diet may put questions to the Ministers and demand open
answers from them before the public, and it may also present
addresses to the Sovereign setting forth its opinions.
"The Minister President of State is to make representations to
the Emperor on matters of State, and to indicate, according to
His pleasure, the general course of the policy of the State,
every branch of the administration being under control of the
said Minister. The compass of his duties is large, and his
responsibilities cannot but be proportionately great. As to the
other Ministers of State, they are severally held responsible for
the matters within their respective competency; there is no joint
responsibility among them in regard to such matters. For, the
Minister President and the other Ministers of State, being alike
personally appointed by the Emperor, the proceedings of each one
of them are, in every respect, controlled by the will of the
Emperor, and the Minister President himself has no power of
control over the posts occupied by other Ministers, while the
latter ought not to be dependent upon the former. In some
countries, the Cabinet is regarded as constituting a corporate
body, and the Ministers are not held to take part in the conduct
of the Government each one in an individual capacity, but joint
responsibility is the rule. The evil of such a system is that the
power of party combination will ultimately overrule the supreme
power of the Sovereign. Such a state of things can never be
approved of according to our Constitution."
In spite of the small powers of the Diet, it succeeded, in the first
four years of its existence (1890-94), in causing some annoyance to the
Government. Until 1894, the policy of Japan was largely controlled by
Marquis Ito, who was opposed to militarism and Chauvinism. The statesmen
of the first half of the Meiji era were concerned mainly with
introducing modern education and modern social organization; they wished
to preserve Japanese independence _vis-à-vis_ the Western Powers, but
did not aim, for the time being, at imperialist expansion on their own
account. Ito represented this older school of Restoration statesmen.
Their ideas of statecraft were in the main derived from the Germany of
the 'eighties, which was kept by Bismarck from undue adventurousness.
But when the Diet proved difficult to manage, they reverted to an
earlier phase of Bismarck's career for an example to imitate. The
Prussian Landtag (incredible as it may seem) was vigorously obstreperous
at the time when Bismarck first rose to power, but he tamed it by
glutting the nation with military glory in the wars against Austria and
France. Similarly, in 1894, the Japanese Government embarked on war
against China, and instantly secured the enthusiastic support of the
hitherto rebellious Diet. From that day to this, the Japanese Government
has never been vigorously opposed except for its good deeds (such as the
Treaty of Portsmouth); and it has atoned for these by abundant
international crimes, which the nation has always applauded to the echo.
Marquis Ito was responsible for the outbreak of war in 1894. He was
afterwards again opposed to the new policy of predatory war, but was
powerless to prevent it.[52] His opposition, however, was tiresome,
until at last he was murdered in Korea.
Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894, Japan has pursued a
consistent career of imperialism, with quite extraordinary success. The
nature and fruits of that career I shall consider in the next two
chapters. For the time being, it has arrested whatever tendency existed
towards the development of democracy; the Diet is quite as unimportant
as the English Parliament was in the time of the Tudors. Whether the
present system will continue for a long time, it is impossible to guess.
An unsuccessful foreign war would probably destroy not only the existing
system, but the whole unity and _morale_ of the nation; I do not believe
that Japan would be as firm in defeat as Germany has proved to be.
Diplomatic failure, without war, would probably produce a more Liberal
regime, without revolution. There is, however, one very explosive
element in Japan, and that is industrialism. It is impossible for Japan
to be a Great Power without developing her industry, and in fact
everything possible is done to increase Japanese manufactures. Moreover,
industry is required to absorb the growing population, which cannot
emigrate to English-speaking regions, and will not emigrate to the
mainland of Asia because Chinese competition is too severe. Therefore
the only way to support a larger population is to absorb it into
industrialism, manufacturing goods for export as a means of purchasing
food abroad. Industrialism in Japan requires control of China, because
Japan contains hardly any of the raw materials of industry, and cannot
obtain them sufficiently cheaply or securely in open competition with
America and Europe. Also dependence upon imported food requires a strong
navy. Thus the motives for imperialism and navalism in Japan are very
similar to those that have prevailed in England. But this policy
requires high taxation, while successful competition in neutral markets
requires--or rather, is thought to require--starvation wages and long
hours for operatives. In the cotton industry of Osoka, for example, most
of the work is done by girls under fourteen, who work eleven hours a day
and got, in 1916, an average daily wage of 5d.[53] Labour organization
is in its infancy, and so is Socialism;[54] but both are certain to
spread if the number of industrial workers increases without a very
marked improvement in hours and wages. Of course the very rigidity of
the Japanese policy, which has given it its strength, makes it incapable
of adjusting itself to Socialism and Trade Unionism, which are
vigorously persecuted by the Government. And on the other hand Socialism
and Trade Unionism cannot accept Mikado-worship and the whole farrago of
myth upon which the Japanese State depends.[55] There is therefore a
likelihood, some twenty or thirty years hence--assuming a peaceful and
prosperous development in the meantime--of a very bitter class conflict
between the proletarians on the one side and the employers and
bureaucrats on the other. If this should happen to synchronize with
agrarian discontent, it would be impossible to foretell the issue.
The problems facing Japan are therefore very difficult. To provide for
the growing population it is necessary to develop industry; to develop
industry it is necessary to control Chinese raw materials; to control
Chinese raw materials it is necessary to go against the economic
interests of America and Europe; to do this successfully requires a
large army and navy, which in turn involve great poverty for
wage-earners. And expanding industry with poverty for wage-earners
means growing discontent, increase of Socialism, dissolution of filial
piety and Mikado-worship in the poorer classes, and therefore a
continually greater and greater menace to the whole foundation on which
the fabric of the State is built. From without, Japan is threatened with
the risk of war against America or of a revival of China. From within,
there will be, before long, the risk of proletarian revolution.
From all these dangers, there is only one escape, and that is a
diminution of the birth-rate. But such an idea is not merely abhorrent
to the militarists as diminishing the supply of cannon-fodder; it is
fundamentally opposed to Japanese religion and morality, of which
patriotism and filial piety are the basis. Therefore if Japan is to
emerge successfully, a much more intense Westernizing must take place,
involving not only mechanical processes and knowledge of bare facts, but
ideals and religion and general outlook on life. There must be free
thought, scepticism, diminution in the intensity of herd-instinct.
Without these, the population question cannot be solved; and if that
remains unsolved, disaster is sooner or later inevitable.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 46: McLaren, op. cit. p. 19.]
[Footnote 47: Kegan Paul, 1910, vol. i. p. 20.]
[Footnote 48: "What _popular_ Shinto, as expounded by its village
priests in the old time, was we simply do not know. Our carefully
selected and edited official edition of Shinto is certainly not true
aboriginal Shinto as practised in Yamato before the introduction of
Buddhism and Chinese culture, and many plausible arguments which
disregard that indubitable fact lose much of their weight." (Murdoch, I,
p. 173 n.)]
[Footnote 49: The strength of this movement may, however, be doubted.
Murdoch (op. cit. i, p. 162) says: "At present, 1910, the War Office and
Admiralty are, of all Ministries, by far the strongest in the Empire.
When a party Government does by any strange hap make its appearance on
tho political stage, the Ministers of War and of Marine can afford to
regard its advent with the utmost insouciance. For tho most extreme of
party politicians readily and unhesitatingly admit that the affairs of
the Army and Navy do not fall within the sphere of party politics, but
are the exclusive concern of the Commander-in-Chief, his Imperial
Majesty the Emperor of Japan. On none in the public service of Japan are
titles of nobility, high rank, and still more substantial emoluments
showered with a more liberal hand than upon the great captains and the
great sailors of the Empire. In China, on the other hand, the military
man is, if not a pariah, at all events an exceptional barbarian, whom
policy makes it advisable to treat with a certain amount of gracious,
albeit semi-contemptuous, condescension."]
[Footnote 50: The following account is taken from McLaren, op. cit.
chaps, xii. and xiii.]
[Footnote 51: _The Far East Unveiled_, pp. 252-58.]
[Footnote 52: See McLaren, op. cit. pp. 227, 228, 289.]
[Footnote 53: Coleman, op. cit. chap. xxxv.]
[Footnote 54: See an invaluable pamphlet, "The Socialist and Labour
Movements in Japan," published by the _Japan Chronicle_, 1921, for an
account of what is happening in this direction.]
[Footnote 55: _The Times_ of February 7, 1922, contains a telegram from
its correspondent in Tokyo, _à propos_ of the funeral of Prince
Yamagata, Chief of the Genro, to the following effect:--
"To-day a voice was heard in the Diet in opposition to the grant of
expenses for the State funeral of Prince Yamagata. The resolution, which
was introduced by the member for Osaka constituency, who is regarded as
the spokesman of the so-called Parliamentary Labour Party founded last
year, states that the Chief of the Genro (Elder Statesmen) did not
render true service to the State, and, although the recipient of the
highest dignities, was an enemy of mankind and suppressor of democratic
institutions. The outcome was a foregone conclusion, but the fact that
the introducer could obtain the necessary support to table the
resolution formally was not the least interesting feature of the
incident."]