INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION.

"We may define the inductive method as the process of

discovering laws and rules from facts, and causes from effects;

and the deductive, as the method of deriving facts from laws,

and effects from their causes."

There is a valuable paragraph on anticipation and its uses--there is a

power and desire of the mind to project itself from the known into the

unknown, in the expectation of finding what it is in search of.

"This power of divination, this sagacity, which is the mother of

all science, we may call anticipation. The intellect, with a

dog-like instinct, will not hunt until it has found the scent.

It must have some presage of the result before it will turn its

energies to its attainment. The system of anatomy which has

immortalized the name of Oken, is the consequence of a _flash of

anticipation_, which glanced through his mind when he picked up,

in a chance walk, the skull of a deer, bleached by the weather,

and exclaimed--'_It is a vertebral column!_'"

"The man of science possesses principles--the man of art, not

the less nobly gifted, is possessed and carried away by them.

The principles which art _involves_, science _evolves_. The

truths on which the success of art depends lurk in the artist's

mind in an undeveloped state, guiding his hand, stimulating his

invention, balancing his judgment, but not appearing in regular

propositions." "An art (that of medicine for instance) will of

course admit into its limits, everything (_and nothing else_)

which can conduce to the performance of _its own proper work_;

it recognizes no other principles of selection."

"He who reads a book on logic, probably thinks no better when he

rises up than when he sat down, but if any of the principles

there unfolded cleave to his memory, and he afterwards, perhaps

unconsciously, shapes and corrects his thoughts by them, no

doubt the whole powers of his reasoning receive benefit. In a

word, every art, from reasoning to riding and rowing, is learned

by assiduous practice, and if principles do any good, it is

proportioned to the readiness with which they can be converted

into rules, and the patient constancy with which they are

applied in all our attempts at excellence."

"_A man can teach names to another man, but he cannot plant in

another's mind that far higher gift--the power of naming._"

"_Language is not only the vehicle of thought, it is a great and

efficient instrument in thinking._"

"The whole of every _science_ may be made the subject of

teaching. Not so with _art_; much of it is not teachable."

Coleridge's profound and brilliant, but unequal, and often somewhat

nebulous _Essay on Method_, is worth reading over, were it only as an

exercitation, and to impress on the mind the meaning and value of

_method_. Method is the road by which you reach, or hope to reach, a

certain end; it is a process. It is the best direction for the search

after truth. System, again, which is often confounded with it, is a

mapping out, a circumscription of knowledge, either already gained, or

theoretically laid down as probable. Aristotle had a system which did

much good, but also much mischief. Bacon was chiefly occupied in

preparing and pointing out the way--the only way--of procuring

knowledge. He left to others to systematize the knowledge after it was

got; but the pride and indolence of the human spirit lead it constantly

to build systems on imperfect knowledge. It has the trick of filling up

out of its own fancy what it has not the diligence, the humility, and

the honesty, to seek in nature; whose servant, and articulate voice, it

ought to be.

Descartes' little tract on Method is, like everything the lively and

deep-souled Breton did, full of original and bright thought.

Sir John Herschel's volume needs no praise. We know no work of the sort,

fuller of the best moral worth, as well as the highest philosophy. We

fear it is more talked of than read.

We would recommend the article in the _Quarterly Review_ as first-rate,

and written with great eloquence and grace.

SYDNEY SMITH'S _Sketches of Lectures on Moral Philosophy_.

Second Edition.

SEDGWICK'S _Discourse on the Studies at Cambridge, with a

Preface and Appendix_. Sixth Edition.

We have put these two worthies here, not because we had forgotten

them,--much less because we think less of them than the others,

especially Sydney. But because we bring them in at the end of our small

entertainment, as we hand round a liqueur--be it Curacoa, Kimmel, or old

Glenlivet--after dinner, and end with the heterogeneous

plum-pudding--that most English of realized ideas. Sydney Smith's book

is one of rare excellence, and well worthy of the study of men and

women, though perhaps not transcendental enough for our modern

philosophers, male and female. It is really astonishing how much of the

best of everything, from patriotism to nonsense, is to be found in this

volume of sketches. You may read it through, if your sides can bear such

an accumulation of laughter, with great benefit; and if you open it

anywhere, you can't read three sentences without coming across some, it

may be common thought, and often original enough, better expressed and

_put_ than you ever before saw it. The lectures on the Affections, the

Passions and Desires, and on Study, we would have everybody to read and

enjoy.

Sedgwick is a different, and, as a whole, an inferior man; but a _man_

every inch of him, and an Englishman too, in his thoughts, and in his

fine mother wit and tongue. He has, in the midst of all his confusion

and passionateness, the true instinct of philosophy--the true venatic

sense of objective truth. We know nothing better in the main, than his

demolition of what is untrue, and his reduction of what is absurd, and

his taking the wind out of what is tympanitic, in the notorious

_Vestiges_; we don't say he always does justice to what is really good

in it; his mission is to execute justice _upon it_, and that he does.

His remarks on Oken and Owen, and his quotations from Dr. Clarke's

admirable paper on the _Development of the Foetus_, in the _Cambridge

Philosophical Transactions_, we would recommend to our medical friends.

The very confusion of Sedgwick is the free outcome of a deep and racy

nature; it puts us in mind of what happened, when an Englishman was

looking with astonishment and disgust at a Scotchman eating a singed

sheep's head, and was asked by the eater what he thought of that dish?

"_Dish_, sir, do you call that a dish?" "Dish or no dish," rejoined the

Caledonian, "there's a deal o' fine confused feedin' aboot it, let me

tell you."

We conclude these rambling remarks with a quotation from Arnauld, the

friend of Pascal, and the intrepid antagonist of the Vatican and the

Grand Monarque; one of the noblest, freest, most untiring and honest

intellects, our world has ever seen. "Why don't you rest sometimes?"

said his friend Nicole to him. "Rest! why should I rest here? haven't I

an eternity to rest in?" The following sentence from his "_Port-Royal

Logic_," so well introduced and translated by Mr. Baynes, contains the

gist of all we have been trying to say. It should be engraven on the

tablets of every young student's heart--for the heart has to do with

study as well as the head.

"There is nothing more desirable than _good sense and justness

of mind_,--all other qualities of mind are of limited use, but

exactness of judgment is of general utility in every part and in

all employments of life.

"_We are too apt to employ reason merely as an instrument for

acquiring the sciences, whereas we ought to avail ourselves of

the sciences, as an instrument for perfecting our reason_;

justness of mind being infinitely more important than all the

speculative knowledge which we can obtain by means of sciences

the most solid. This ought to lead wise men to make their

sciences _the exercise and not the occupation of their mental

powers_. Men are not born to employ all their time in measuring

lines, in considering the various movements of matter: their

minds are too great, and their life too short, their time too

precious, to be so engrossed; but they are born to be just,

equitable, and prudent, in all their thoughts, their actions,

their business; to these things they ought especially to train

and discipline themselves."

So, young friends, bring _Brains_ to your work, and mix everything with

them, and them with everything. _Arma virumque_, tools and a man to use

them. Stir up, direct, and give free scope to Sir Joshua's "_that_," and

try again, and again; and look, _oculo intento, acie acerrima_. Looking

is a voluntary act,--it is the man within coming to the window; seeing

is a state,--passive and receptive, and, at the best, little more than

registrative.

Since writing the above, we have read with great satisfaction Dr.

Forbes' Lecture delivered before the Chichester Literary Society and

Mechanics' Institute, and published at their request. Its subject is,

Happiness in its relation to Work and Knowledge. It is worthy of its

author, and is, we think, more largely and finely imbued with his

personal character, than any one other of his works that we have met

with. We could not wish a fitter present for a young man starting on the

game of life. It is a wise, cheerful manly, and warm-hearted discourse

on the words of Bacon,--"He that is wise, let him pursue some desire or

other: for he that doth not affect some one thing in chief, unto him all

things are distasteful and tedious." We will not spoil this little

volume by giving any account of it. Let our readers get it, and read it.

The extracts from his Thesis, _De Mentis Exercitatione et Felicitate

exinde derivanda_, are very curious--showing the native vigor and bent

of his mind, and indicating also, at once the identity and the growth of

his thoughts during the lapse of thirty-three years.

We give the last paragraph, the sense and the filial affection of which

are alike admirable. Having mentioned to his hearers that they saw in

himself a living illustration of the truth of his position, that

happiness is a necessary result of knowledge and work, he thus

concludes:--

"If you would further desire to know to what besides I am

chiefly indebted for so enviable a lot, I would say:--1st,

Because I had the good fortune to come into the world with a

healthful frame, and with a sanguine temperament. 2d, Because I

had no patrimony, and was therefore obliged to trust to my own

exertions for a livelihood. 3d, Because I was born in a land

where instruction is greatly prized and readily accessible. 4th,

Because I was brought up to a profession which not only

compelled mental exercise, but supplied for its use materials of

the most delightful and varied kind. _And lastly and

principally, because the good man to whom I owe my existence,

had the foresight to know what would be best for his children.

He had the wisdom, and the courage, and the exceeding love, to

bestow all that could be spared of his worldly means, to

purchase for his sons, that which is beyond price_, EDUCATION;

well judging that the means so expended, if hoarded for future

use, would be, if not valueless, certainly evanescent, while the

precious treasure for which they were exchanged, a cultivated

and instructed mind, would not only last through life, but might

be the fruitful source of treasures far more precious than

itself. So equipped he sent them forth into the world to fight

Life's battle, leaving the issue in the hand of God; confident,

however, that though they might fail to achieve renown or to

conquer Fortune, they possessed _that_ which, if rightly used,

could win for them the yet higher prize of HAPPINESS."

* * * * *

Since this was written, many good books have appeared, but we would

select three, which all young men should read and get--Hartley

Coleridge's _Lives of Northern Worthies_, Thackeray's _Letters of Brown

the Elder_, and _Tom Brown's School-days_--in spirit and in expression,

we don't know any better models for manly courage, good sense, and

feeling, and they are as well written as they are thought.

There are the works of another man, one of the greatest, not only of

our, but of any time, to which we cannot too earnestly draw our young

readers. We mean the philosophical writings of Sir William Hamilton. We

know no more invigorating, quickening, rectifying kind of exercise, than

reading with a will, anything he has written upon permanently important

subjects. There is a greatness and simplicity, a closeness of thought, a

glance keen and wide, a play of the entire nature, and a truthfulness

and downrightness, with an amount, and accuracy, and vivification of

learning, such as we know of in no one other writer, ancient or

modern--not even Leibnitz; and we know no writings which so wholesomely

at once exalt and humble the reader, make him feel what is in him, and

what he can and may, as well as what he cannot, and need never hope to

know. In this respect, Hamilton is as grand as Pascal, and more simple;

he exemplifies everywhere his own sublime adaptation of

Scripture--unless a man become a little child, he cannot enter into the

kingdom; he enters the temple stooping, but he presses on, intrepid and

alone, to the inmost _adytum_, worshipping the more the nearer he gets

to the inaccessible shrine, whose veil no mortal hand has ever rent in

twain. And we name after him, the thoughtful, candid, impressive little

volume of his pupil, his friend, and his successor, Professor Fraser.

The following passage from Sir William Hamilton's _Dissertations_,

besides its wise thought, sounds in the ear like the pathetic and

majestic sadness of a symphony by Beethoven:--

"There are two sorts of ignorance: we philosophize to escape

ignorance, and the consummation of our philosophy is ignorance;

we start from the one, we repose in the other; they are the

goals from which, and to which, we tend; and the pursuit of

knowledge is but a course between two ignorances, as human life

is itself only a travelling from grave to grave.

{Tis bios?--Ek tymboio thoron, eti tymbon hodeuo.}

The highest reach of human science is the scientific recognition

of human ignorance; 'Qui nescit ignorare, ignorat scire.' This

'learned ignorance' is the rational conviction by the human mind

of its inability to transcend certain limits; it is the

knowledge of ourselves,--the science of man. This is

accomplished by a demonstration of the disproportion between

what is to be known, and our faculties of knowing,--the

disproportion, to wit, between the infinite and the finite. In

fact, the recognition of human ignorance, is not only the one

highest, but the one true, knowledge; and its first-fruit, as

has been said, is humility. Simple nescience is not proud;

consummated science is positively humble. For this knowledge it

is not, which 'puffeth up;' but its opposite, the conceit of

false knowledge,--the conceit, in truth, as the apostle notices,

of an ignorance of the very nature of knowledge:--

'Nam nesciens quid scire sit,

Te scire cuncta jactitas.'

"But as our knowledge stands to Ignorance, so stands it also to

Doubt. Doubt is the beginning and the end of our efforts to

know; for as it is true,--'Alte dubitat qui altius credit,' so

it is likewise true,--'Quo magis quaerimus magis dubitamus.'

"The grand result of human wisdom is thus only a consciousness

that what we know is as nothing to what we know not, ('Quantum

est quod nescimus!')--an articulate confession, in fact, by our

natural reason, of the truth declared in revelation, that '_now_

we see through a glass, darkly.'"

His pupil writes in the same spirit and to the same end:--"A discovery,

by means of reflection and mental experiment, of the _limits_ of

knowledge, is the highest and most universally applicable discovery of

all; it is the one through which our intellectual life most strikingly

blends with the moral and practical part of human nature. Progress in

knowledge is often paradoxically indicated by a diminution in the

_apparent bulk_ of what we know. Whatever helps to work off the dregs of

false opinion, and to purify the intellectual mass--whatever deepens our

conviction of our infinite ignorance--really adds to, although it

sometimes seems to diminish, the rational possessions of man. This is

the highest kind of merit that is claimed for Philosophy, by its

earliest as well as by its latest representatives. It is by this

standard that Socrates and Kant measure the chief results of their

toil."

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