Venice.
I deferred giving you any account of the Council of Ten, till I came to
mention the State Inquisitors, as the last was ingrafted on the former,
and was merely intended to strengthen the hands, and augment the power,
of that court.
The Council of Ten consists, in effect, of seventeen members; for,
besides the ten noblemen chosen annually by the Grand Council, from
whose number this court receives its name, the Doge presides, and the
six Counsellors of the Seigniory assist, when they think proper, at all
deliberations.
This court was first instituted in the year 1310, immediately after
Theipolo’s conspiracy.
It is supreme in all State crimes. It is the duty of three chiefs, chosen
every month from this court, by lot, to open all letters addressed to it;
to report the contents, and assemble the members, when they think proper.
They have the power of seizing accused persons, examining them in prison,
and taking their answers in writing, with the evidence against them;
which being laid before the court, those chiefs appear as prosecutors.
The prisoners, all this time, are kept in close confinement, deprived
of the company of relations and friends, and not allowed to receive any
advice by letters. They can have no counsel to assist them, unless one of
the Judges chooses to assume that office; in which case he is permitted
to manage their defence, and plead their cause; after which the Court
decide, by a majority of votes, acquitting the prisoner, or condemning
him to private or public execution, as they think proper; and if any
persons murmur at the fate of their relations or friends, and talk of
their innocence, and the injustice they have met with, these malcontents
are in great danger of meeting with the same fate.
I am convinced you will think, that such a court was sufficiently
powerful to answer every good purpose of government. This, it would
appear, was not the opinion of the Grand Council of Venice; who thought
proper, in the year 1501, to create the Tribunal of State Inquisitors,
which is still more despotic and brief in its manner of proceeding.
This court consists of three members, all taken from the Council of Ten;
two literally from the Ten, and the third from the Counsellors of the
Seigniory, who also make a part of that Council.
These three persons have the power of deciding, without appeal, on the
lives of every citizen belonging to the Venetian State; the highest
of the nobility, even the Doge himself, not being excepted. They keep
the keys of the boxes into which anonymous informations are thrown.
The informers who expect a recompence, cut off a little piece of their
letter, which they afterwards shew to the Inquisitor when they claim
a reward. To those three Inquisitors is given, the right of employing
spies, considering secret intelligence, issuing orders to seize all
persons whose words or actions they think reprehensible, and afterwards
trying them when they think proper. If all the three are of one opinion,
no farther ceremony is necessary; they may order the prisoner to be
strangled in prison, drowned in the Canal Orfano, hanged privately in
the night-time, between the pillars, or executed publicly, as they
please; and whatever their decision be, no farther inquisition can be
made on the subject; but if any one of the three differs in opinion from
his brethren, the cause must be carried before the full assembly of the
Council of Ten. One would naturally imagine, that by those the prisoner
would have a good chance of being acquitted; because the difference in
opinion of the three Inquisitors shews, that the case is, at least,
dubious; and in dubious cases one would expect the leaning would be to
the favourable side; but this court is governed by different maxims from
those you are acquainted with. It is a rule here to admit of smaller
presumptions in all crimes which affect the Government, than in other
cases; and the only difference they make between a crime fully proved,
and one more doubtful, is, that, in the first case, the execution is in
broad daylight; whereas, when there are doubts of the prisoner’s guilt,
he is only put to death privately. The State Inquisitors have keys to
every apartment of the Ducal palace, and can, when they think proper,
penetrate into the very bed-chamber of the Doge, open his cabinet, and
examine his papers. Of course they may command access to the house of
every individual in the State. They continue in office only one year,
but are not responsible afterwards for their conduct while they were in
authority.
Can you think you would be perfectly composed, and easy in your mind,
if you lived in the same city with three persons, who had the power of
shutting you up in a dungeon, and putting you to death when they pleased,
and without being accountable for so doing?
If, from the characters of the Inquisitors of one year, a man had nothing
to dread, still he might fear that a set, of a different character,
might be in authority the next; and although he were persuaded, that
the Inquisitors would always be chosen from among men of the most known
integrity in the State, he might tremble at the malice of informers, and
secret enemies; a combination of whom might impose on the understandings
of upright Judges, especially where the accused is excluded from his
friends, and denied counsel to assist him in his defence; for, let him
be never so conscious of innocence, he cannot be sure of remaining
unsuspected, or unaccused; nor can he be certain, that he shall not
be put to the rack, to supply a deficiency of evidence: and finally,
although a man were naturally possessed of so much firmness of character
as to feel no inquietude from any of those considerations on his own
account, he might still be under apprehensions for his children,
and other connexions, for whom some men feel more anxiety than for
themselves.
Such reflections naturally arise in the minds of those who have been
born, and accustomed to live, in a free country, where no such despotic
Tribunal is established; yet we find people apparently easy in the
midst of all those dangers; nay, we know that mankind shew the same
indifference in cities, where the Emperor, or the Bashaw, amuses himself,
from time to time, in cutting off the heads of those he happens to meet
with in his walks; and I make no doubt, that if it were usual for the
earth to open, and swallow a proportion of its inhabitants every day,
mankind would behold this with as much coolness as at present they read
the bills of mortality. Such is the effect of habit on the human mind,
and so wonderfully does it accommodate itself to those evils for which
there is no remedy.
But these confederations do not account for the Venetian nobles suffering
such Tribunals as those of the Council of Ten, or the State Inquisitors,
to exist, because these are evils which it unquestionably is in their
power to remedy; and attempts have been made, at various times, by
parties of the nobility, to remove them entirely, but without success;
the majority of the Grand Council having, upon trial, been found for
preserving these institutions.
It is believed to be owing to the attention of these courts, that the
Venetian republic has lasted longer than any other; but, in my opinion,
the chief object of a government should be, to render the people happy;
and if it fails in that, the longer it lasts, so much the worse. If they
are rendered miserable by that which is supposed to preserve the State,
they cannot be losers by removing it, be the consequence what it may;
and I fancy most people would rather live in a convenient, comfortable
house, which could stand only a few centuries, than in a gloomy gothic
fabric, which would last to the day of judgment. These despotic courts,
the State Inquisitors, and Council of Ten, have had their admirers, not
only among the Venetian nobility, but among foreigners; even among such
as have, on other occasions, professed principles very unfavourable to
arbitrary power.
I find the following passage in a letter of Bishop Burnet, relating to
Venice:
“But this leads me to say a little to you of that part of the
constitution, which is so censured by strangers, but is really both the
greatest glory, and the chief security, of this republic; which is, the
unlimited power of the Inquisitors, that extends not only to the chief of
the nobility, but to the Duke himself; who is so subject to them, that
they may not only give him severe reprimands, but search his papers,
make his process, and, in conclusion, put him to death, without being
bound to give any account of their proceedings, except to the Council
of Ten. This is the dread, not only of all the subjects, but of the
whole nobility, and all that bear office in the republic, and makes the
greatest amongst them tremble, and so obliges them to an exact conduct.”
Now, for my part, I cannot help thinking, that a Tribunal which keeps
the Doge, the nobility, and _all_ the subjects, in dread, and makes the
greatest among them tremble, can be no great blessing in any State. To
be in continual fear, is certainly a very unhappy situation; and if the
Doge, the nobility, and _all_ the subjects, are rendered unhappy, I
should imagine, with all submission, that the glory and security of the
rest of the republic must be of very small importance.
In the same letter which I have quoted above, his Lordship, speaking of
the State Inquisitors, has these words: “When they find any fault, they
are so inexorable, and so quick as well as severe in their justice, that
the very fear of this is so effectual a restraint, that, perhaps, the
only preservation of Venice, and of its liberty, is owing to this single
piece of their constitution.”
How would you, my good friend, relish that kind of liberty in England,
which could not be preserved without the assistance of a despotic court?
Such an idea of liberty might have been announced from the throne, as
one of the mysteries of Government, by James the First, or the Second;
but we are amazed to find it published by a counsellor, and admirer of
William the Third. It may, indeed, be said, that the smallness of the
Venetian State, and its republican form of government, render it liable
to be overturned by sudden tumults, or popular insurrections: this
renders it the more necessary to keep a watchful eye over the conduct
of individuals, and guard against every thing that may be the source of
public commotion or disorder. The institution of State Inquisitors may
be thought to admit of some apology in this view, like the extraordinary
and irregular punishment of the Ostracism established at Athens, which
had a similar foundation. In a large State, or in a less popular form of
government, the same dangers from civil commotions cannot be apprehended;
similar precautions for preventing them are therefore superfluous; but,
notwithstanding every apology that can be made, I am at a loss to account
for the existence of this terrible Tribunal for so long a time in the
Venetian republic, because all ranks seem to have an interest in its
destruction; and I do not see on what principle any one man, or any set
of men, should wish for its preservation. It cannot be the Doge, for the
State Inquisitors keep him in absolute bondage; nor would one naturally
imagine that the nobles would relish this court, for the nobles are more
exposed to the jealousy of the State Inquisitors than the citizens,
or inferior people; and least of all ought the citizens to support a
Tribunal, to which none of them can ever be admitted. As, however, the
body of the nobility alone can remove this Tribunal from being part of
the constitution, and yet, we find, they have always supported it; we
must conclude, that a junto of that body which has sufficient influence
to command a majority of their brethren, has always retained the power
in their own hands, and found means of having the majority at least of
the Council of Ten, chosen from their own members; so that this arbitrary
court is, perhaps, always composed, by a kind of rotation, of the
individuals of a junto. But if the possibility of this is denied, because
of the precaution used in the form of electing by ballot, the only other
way I can account for a Tribunal of such a nature being permitted to
exist, is, by supposing that a majority of the Venetian nobles have so
great a relish for unlimited power, that, to have a chance of enjoying it
for a short period, they are willing to bear all the miseries of slavery
for the rest of their lives.
The encouragement given by this Government to anonymous accusers,
and secret informations, is attended with consequences which greatly
outweigh any benefit that can arise from them. They must destroy mutual
confidence, and promote suspicions and jealousies among neighbours; and,
while they render all ranks of men fearful, they encourage them to be
malicious. The laws ought to be able to protect every man who openly and
boldly accuses another.
If any set of men, in a State, are so powerful, that it is dangerous for
an individual to charge them with their crimes openly, there must be a
weakness in that government which requires a speedy remedy; but let not
that be a remedy worse than the disease.
It is no proof of the boasted wisdom of this Government; that, in the
use of the torture, it imitates many European States, whose judicial
regulations it has avoided where they seem far less censurable. The
practice of forcing confession, and procuring evidence by this means,
always appeared to me a complication of cruelty and absurdity. To make a
man suffer more than the pains of death, that you may discover whether
he deserves death, or not, is a manner of distributing justice which I
cannot reconcile to my idea of equity.
If it is the intention of the Legislature, that every crime shall be
expiated by the sufferings of somebody, and is regardless whether this
expiation is made by the agonies of an innocent person, or a guilty,
then there is no more to be said; but, if the intention be to discover
the truth, this horrid device of the torture will very often fail; for
nineteen people out of twenty will declare whatever they imagine will
soonest put an end to their sufferings, whether it be truth or falsehood.