THE AMERICAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
THERE are few campaigns in English history which have been more
systematically misunderstood, and more deliberately ignored, than the
American War between 1775 and 1783. The disadvantages under which the
British troops laboured were many and great; they were not merely local,
as in most English wars, but were magnified and intensified by the
unpopularity of the campaign at home, by the positive hostility of a
large party, including some of the most eloquent politicians, and by the
inflated statements of the Government, which made the tale of disaster—
when it came to be known—more irritating and intolerable.
Soldiers will fight for a nation which is in earnest: British soldiers
will even fight when they are merely the police to execute the wishes of
a Government, instead of a people. But in the one case they are fired
with enthusiasm,—in the other, their prompter is the coldest duty.
The American War was at once unpopular and unsuccessful. When it was
over, the nation seemed inspired by a longing to forget it; it was
associated in their minds with everything that was unpleasant; and the
labour of searching for the points in it which were worthy of being
treasured was not appreciated. English historians have always been
reluctant to pen the pages of their country's disasters; and their
silence is at once characteristic of, and thoroughly understood by, the
English people. There has, however, been a species of self-denying
ordinance laid down by English writers, and spouted _ad nauseam_ by
English speakers, in which the whole blame of this war is accepted
almost greedily and its losses painted in heightened colours as the
legitimate consequences of national error. England _was_ to blame—
taxation without representation undoubtedly is unjust; but were American
motives at the outset pure? It may readily be granted that after the
first shedding of blood the resistance of the colonists was prompted by
a keen sense of injury such as might well animate a free and high-
spirited people; but, before the sword was drawn, the motives of the
Boston recusants no more deserve to be called worthy, than the policy of
England deserves to be called statesmanship.
England, with the name, had also the responsibilities of a mighty and
extended empire. Her colonies had the name and the advantages, without
the responsibilities. The parent was sorely pressed and heavily taxed,
to protect the children; the children were becoming so strong and rich
that they might well be expected to do something for themselves. The
question was "How?" It is only just to say that when the answer to the
question involved the defence of their own soil by their own right hand,
no more eager assistants to the Empire could be found than our American
colonists. But when they were asked to look beyond their own shores, to
contribute their share to the maintenance of the Empire elsewhere—
perhaps no bad way of ensuring increased security for themselves—the
answer was "No!" They would shed their blood in defence of their own
plot of ground; but they would not open their purses to assist the
general welfare of the Empire.
The colonial difficulty in more recent times has been met by presenting
to the colonies the liberty desired by the old American provinces, but
at the same time throwing on them to a great extent the duty of their
own defence. It is a mere suspension of the difficulty, well enough in
theory, but which must break down in practice. While the parent has the
sole power of declaring war, and of involving in its area distant
children, innocent and ignorant of the cause, she can no more throw off
the duty of their defence than she can bury herself beneath the waves
that chafe her coasts. But, for the present, it affords a tolerable
compromise. In the future, unless our rulers can spare time from the
discussion of such petty measures as the Ballot, for the consideration
of a question which involves the national existence, the Colonial
Question is as certain again to face us as a difficulty, as it did in
1775. Then, the system which seemed most natural to the rulers of
England was to accept the duty of the Empire's defence, but to insist on
the colonies contributing to the cost. Unwise as this step was, the
colonies being unrepresented in the Taxing Body, it might have been
borne, had it not interfered with certain vested, although ignoble
rights. The collection of the new revenue required imperial cruisers to
enforce it: and these vessels sorely interfered with the habits and
customs of the merchants of Massachusetts, who were the most systematic
smugglers. With what petty matters are the beginnings of great
revolutions entwined! The sensuality of Henry VIII. was a means to the
religious reformation of England: the selfishness of the Boston traders
was the note which raised in America the thirst for independence. It is
an easy thing to raise a cry which shall at once carry with it the
populace, and yet smother the real issues. And this was done in Boston.
Up to the commencement of military operations, it is difficult to say
which is the least enticing subject for contemplation, the blind,
unreasoning, unaccommodating temper of the English Government, or the
selfish, partisan, ignoble motives of those who were really the prime
movers of the Revolution, although soon dwarfed and put out of sight by
the Frankenstein which their cunning had called into existence. It is
almost a relief to the student, when the sword is drawn: he has then to
deal with men, not schemers; he has then pictures to gaze at of an
earnest people fighting for independence, or, on the other hand, an
outnumbered army fighting for duty; and he has then such figures to
worship as that purest and noblest in history, George Washington, for
the proper revelation of whose character the losses of that war's
continuance may be counted to all time as a clear gain. What a grim
satire it reads as one finds this god-like man a puppet in the hands of
those who were as incapable of understanding his greatness as of
wielding his sword! Wellington in Spain, worried by departmental idiocy
in England, was an object of pity, but his troubles are dwarfed by those
under which a weaker man than Washington would have resigned in disgust.
It is pleasant to read of the gallant way in which the Royal Artillery
acquitted itself in the American War: but no encomium from an English
General has greater value than that of Washington, who urged his own
Artillery to emulate that of his enemy: and in all the satisfaction
which such praise from Washington, as an enemy, must beget, there is
mingled a feeling of pride that it should have been in a school of war,
where Washington was a comrade, instead of an enemy, that he had taken
the first lessons in the science of which he proved so great a master.
It is to be regretted that the silence of the one country's historians
on the subject of the American War is not compensated by the undoubted
loquacity and grandiloquence of the other's. The student is equally
baffled by the former, and bewildered by the latter. Perhaps the pride
and boasting of the young country is natural: perhaps it was to be
expected that ere long the fact would be forgotten that without the
assistance of France and Spain to distract England, their independence
could never have been achieved; but when coupled with this
forgetfulness, comes an exaggeration of petty encounters into high-
sounding battles, and of defeats like that of Bunker's Hill into
something like victories, to be celebrated by national monuments, the
student may smile complacently at the enthusiasm of the conquerors, but
must regret the dust which is thrown in his eyes by their boasting and
party-feeling.
There are fortunately two comparatively temperate writers, who were
contemporary with the war, and took part in it on opposite sides,
Stedman and Lee,—the latter being the officer who commanded the
celebrated Partisan Legion (as it was called), on the American side; and
in endeavouring to arrive at the truth as to the war, the student cannot
do better than adhere to them.
The war, like the siege of Gibraltar, divides itself into epochs. The
first, and most northerly, embraces Massachusetts and Canada; the second
concentrates itself round New York, with the episode of Saratoga; and
the third and last, derives its main interest from the operations in the
South, culminating in the disastrous capitulation of Yorktown. In
tracing the services of the Artillery during the various stages, we
shall have a glimpse of nearly every operation of importance which
occurred during the war.
Although the 4th Battalion was not the only representative of the Royal
Artillery in America during the war—the 1st and 3rd Battalions also
being represented—its commanding officers, Colonels Cleaveland and
Pattison, who served on the Staff of the Army as Brigadiers, were in
command of the Artillery on the Continent; and, therefore, in tracing
the services of the corps, the records of the 4th Battalion form the
best groundwork. When hostilities commenced, in Massachusetts, the head-
quarters of the battalion were in Boston. General Gage, who commanded
the troops, had failed to conciliate the colonial representatives. On
the 25th February, 1775, he sent a party of infantry and marines to
seize some guns which he understood were in the town of Salem; but on
their arrival, they found that the guns had been removed. On the evening
of the 18th April, in the same year, he sent a similar body—about 900
strong—to the town of Concord on a like errand, and here the first blood
of the war was shed. Great mismanagement was displayed on the part of
the English commander, and a very decided hostility on the part of the
colonists, ultimately rendering a retreat necessary. The troops
commenced retiring on Lexington, under an incessant, although irregular
fire from the militia and peasantry; and luckily, on their arrival at
that town, they met a reinforcement under Lord Percy, sent to their
assistance, and accompanied by two field-guns. This was the first
appearance of the Royal Artillery in the war. Under the fire of the
guns, the troops were able to continue their retreat comparatively
unmolested; but before they reached Boston, they had sustained a loss of
no less than 273 killed, wounded, and prisoners. This number was
considered sufficient to justify the Americans in honouring the
conflicts which occurred, by the high-sounding titles of the "Battles of
Concord and Lexington." Effective as the fire of the English guns was,
complaints were made, probably in self-defence, by the commanding
officer of the troops, that the Artillery were inadequately supplied
with ammunition on the occasion. A strong remonstrance was immediately
addressed by Colonel Cleaveland to the Master-General of the Ordnance,
stating the true facts. "I find it has been said in England, that
ammunition was wanting for the two guns which went with the Brigade to
Lexington—that they had only 24 rounds per gun. I had a waggon with 140
rounds on the parade, and Lord Percy refused to take it, saying it might
retard their march, and that he did not imagine there would be any
occasion for more than was on the side boxes."[32]
On the 17th June, 1775, the Battle of Bunker's Hill, as it is called,
although Breed's Hill was the real scene of operations, (Bunker's Hill,
which was intended to be fortified, being considerably more distant from
Boston,) was fought; and in the batteries on Cop's Hill, and with the
guns actually on the field, five companies of the 4th Battalion were
present—Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 8. Eight field-guns were actually in
action; but twelve accompanied the attacking force—four light 12-
pounders, four 5½-inch howitzers, and four light 6-pounders. The attack
was made under the fire of the guns, "The troops advancing slowly, and
halting at intervals to give time for the Artillery to produce some
effect."[33] In these words, the recently exploded traditions are
apparent, which wedded the Artillery to the infantry during an
engagement, instead of allowing it independent action. One statement is
made by Stedman, generally a most accurate writer, which it is difficult
to reconcile with Colonel Cleaveland's official report. "During the
engagement," writes the former, "a supply of ball for the Artillery,
sent from the Ordnance Department in Boston, was found to be of larger
dimensions than fitted the calibres of the field-pieces that accompanied
the detachment; an oversight which prevented the further use of the
Artillery." In opposition to this statement, Colonel Cleaveland's report
to the Master-General may be quoted. "At Bunker's Hill, I sent sixty-six
rounds to each gun, and not more than half was fired."[34] Had the
reason been that given by Stedman, Colonel Cleaveland was too truthful a
man to omit mentioning it. The Battle of Bunker's Hill was the Inkermann
of the American War. The British lost 1054 killed and wounded; the enemy
admitted a loss of 449. The latter had the advantage of an elevated and
entrenched position; the former fought in heavy marching order—on a hot
summer day—and had to ascend a steep hill in the face of a heavy and
continuous fire. The loss fell most heavily on those who met hand to
hand; the Artillery met with but little casualty. According to the 4th
Battalion records, Captain-Lieutenant Lemoine, Lieutenant Shuttleworth,
and nine matrosses were wounded; according to Colonel Cleaveland's MSS.,
this number was increased by Captain Huddlestone, whom he includes among
the wounded.
The English plan of attack was faulty, and the defence of the Americans
was admirable; but these facts merely rendered the victory of the
English troops more creditable. It was a barren victory—perhaps, even,
an injurious one. It did not save Boston from the blockade, which from
this day became more thorough, and it certainly encouraged the American
militia, who found with what effect they could fight against those
regular troops from whom they had hitherto shrunk a little, with a
species of superstitious dread.
But it was not the less a complete victory, a soldiers' victory, by
sheer hard and close fighting; and, even more, an officers' victory—for
at one time nothing but the energy and gallantry of the officers would
have rallied the troops, reeling under a tremendous fire.
In the meantime, the rebels or patriots, as they were called
respectively by enemies and friends, resolved to invade Canada. Nos. 3
and 6 Companies of the 4th Battalion were scattered over the provinces,
and on the lakes, in detachments. On the 3rd May, 1775, a small body of
the Americans, (who had already possessed themselves of artillery,)
attacked with success Crown Point and Ticonderoga. In November, the
posts of Chambly and St. John were also taken, and with the exception of
one officer and eight men, the whole of No. 6 Company was now captive,
and remained so until exchanged on the 7th April, 1777. Two men
belonging to the company were killed at St. John. The capture of these
posts placed at the disposal of the Americans a quantity of guns,
ammunition, and stores, of which they had stood sorely in need: and the
supply was largely increased by the fortunate capture of an ordnance
transport from Woolwich, heavily laden with a valuable cargo.
On the 25th September, an ill-judged and unsuccessful attack was made on
Montreal by a small force of rebels, in which their commander was taken
prisoner; but later in the year—a more formidable demonstration being
made by a force under General Montgomery—the Commandant, General
Carleton, withdrew to Quebec: and Montreal fell into the enemy's hands.
Part of No. 3 Company was made prisoner on this occasion.
The siege of Quebec was the next episode in the Canadian part of the
war. It was totally unsuccessful; and the gallant commander of the
Americans—General Montgomery, who had fought under Wolfe at the same
place—was killed. The Artillery present in Quebec belonged to No. 3
Company, 4th Battalion; but they were very few in number. They were
under the command of Captain Jones, whose services on the occasion
received the highest praise. A sort of blockade of the town was kept up
by General Montgomery's successor—Arnold,—but it was indifferently
conducted; and as soon as a man-of-war was able to get up through the
ice, General Carleton sallied out and routed the American forces in a
most thorough manner. Very little more was done in Canada during the
war. The loyalty of the inhabitants was unmistakable; and it cannot fail
to surprise one who remembers for how very brief a time the French
Canadians had been under British rule. Even later in the war, when the
French fleet came to render active assistance to the Americans, and the
Admiral appealed to the French colonists to rise, his appeal was
unsuccessful. Either the British rule had already become popular,
because, on the whole, kind and just; or the sympathies of the French
Canadians—although, perhaps, not with the English—were still more averse
from the American cause, which was associated in their minds with the
old New England enemies who had waged with them such an incessant
border-warfare. The loyalty of Canada is one of the marvels of English
history. It seems unalienable, as it certainly is unselfish. Tested,
sixteen years after its conquest, by the great American War; and again
in the present century by the second American War; tried sorely by a too
paternal Colonial Office, which retarded its advancement, its hindrance
made all the more plain by the spectacle, across the frontier, of the
American Republic attaining a marvellous wealth and development; exposed
to risk from enemies whom it did not know, and in quarrels in which it
had no share, merely on account of its connection with England;
suffering, without indemnity, loss of life and of treasure by invasion
from lawless banditti, who thought to strike England through her
dependency; chilled by neglect, and depressed by words which, if they
had any meaning at all, insinuated that she was a burden to the parent,
and half suggested to her to take her leave, and to quit the Empire of
which she had been so staunch a member;—tested, tried, endangered,
suffering, and neglected, the loyalty of Canada remains undimmed. It is,
as has been said, a marvel! Let England take heed that she do not
underrate this treasure of a people's tried affection.
In the meantime, while Canada had been invaded by the rebels, their
army, under Washington, had gradually surrounded Boston, and established
a very thorough blockade—causing great hardship and suffering to the
troops. On the 2nd and 3rd of March, 1776, they established batteries to
the east and west of the town, which the Royal Artillery vainly
endeavoured for fourteen days to silence; and ultimately it was decided
to evacuate Boston, and retire to Halifax, Nova Scotia, to prepare for
an attack upon New York later in the year, and with large naval and
military reinforcements from England.
The evacuation of Boston was conducted in good order, and without loss.
Washington ceased firing on the troops, on receiving notice from the
English general—Howe—that if the bombardment continued, he would set
fire to the town, to cover his retreat; and the men, guns, and stores,
were placed on board the transports with regularity, and without
interruption—but not without great labour. Colonel Cleaveland reported
to the Board of Ordnance, that on the evening of the 6th March, 1776, he
had received orders to use every despatch to embark the Artillery and
stores. "The transports for the cannon, &c., which were ordered to the
wharf, were without a sailor on board, and half stowed with lumber. At
the same time, most of my heavy cannon, and all the Field Artillery,
with a great quantity of ammunition, was to be brought in from
Charleston, and other distant posts. I was also obliged to send iron
ordnance to supply their places, to keep up a fire on the enemy, and
prevent their breaking ground on Forster Hill. On the fifth day, most of
the stores were on board, with the exception of four iron mortars and
their beds, weighing near six tons each. With great difficulty I brought
three of them from the battery, but on getting them on board the
transport, the blocks gave way, and a mortar fell into the sea, where I
afterwards threw the other two.... Two of my transports were manned with
four marines, and a few Artillery, who understand something of sailing."
The guns which were left in the town were the oldest, and were left for
use, if necessary, in covering the final embarkation of the troops. One
hundred and fifty vessels were employed in transporting the army and its
stores to Halifax; and with the army were Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 8
Companies of the 4th Battalion, Royal Artillery, under Colonel
Cleaveland, who, having recently received the Army rank of Colonel,
received also now the local rank of Brigadier. During the last few
months of his stay in Boston, he had been much occupied in planning the
Artillery share in the coming summer campaign, and in making the
necessary demands on the authorities at home. He obtained permission to
purchase 700 horses at Halifax and Annapolis; and a remonstrance made by
him about the "wretches whom he had to hire as drivers" at two shillings
per day, succeeded in procuring for him a draft of trained drivers from
England. Four companies of the 3rd Battalion had joined before he left
Boston, but not before he was sorely in need of their services, for he
literally had not a relief for the men whom he had to keep constantly on
duty. Two more companies were ordered from England to the South; four
companies under Colonel Phillips were ordered to Canada, to take part
ultimately in Burgoyne's wild expedition; and two more were embarked for
service along the coast in bomb-vessels. A large number of 3-pounders,
mounted on wheel-carriages devised by Captain Congreve, had arrived, and
a larger number was promised. They were found infinitely more convenient
than those Colonel Cleaveland already had, and arranged so as to be
carried on the backs of horses and mules. Captain Congreve's ingenuity
displayed itself in many ways, and called forth repeated expressions and
letters of praise and commendation from Colonel Cleaveland. Doubtless
the favourable reports made by that officer did much to procure for him—
in 1778—from Lord Townsend, then Master-General of the Ordnance, the new
appointment of Founder and Commandant of the Royal Military Repository.
The grounds attached to that institution are now used solely for
instruction in the management of heavy ordnance, but when it was first
opened, the sharp turns and steep inclines in the roads of the
Repository Grounds were made use of in training the drivers to turn and
manage their horses. Captain Congreve—afterwards Sir William Congreve—
was a very distinguished and able Artillery officer, but it was not he,
but his son, who invented the well-known Congreve rocket.
The officer who went in command of the companies of Artillery ordered
for service in the South was Major Innes, an officer who commenced his
career as a matross, and ended it as Commandant of the Invalid Battalion
in 1783.
Colonel James commanded the detachments on board the bombs, and was much
praised for the accuracy of his fire at the unsuccessful attack on Fort
Sullivan, near Charlestown, South Carolina, in June, 1776. He also
commenced his career as a matross—in the year 1738—and died as a Colonel
Commandant, in 1782.
Several cadets were sent out to fill vacancies as they might occur,
instead of promoting non-commissioned officers. While doing duty,
awaiting these vacancies, they received pay as Second Lieutenants.
Among the guns sent out for the campaign of 1776 were some light 24-
pounders with travelling carriages, some 12-pounders, an immense number
of light 3-pounders with Congreve's carriages, and some mortars for
pound-shot. It was intended by the English Government, that this
campaign should be decisive; and the fleet, army, and Artillery were
very powerful. Lord Howe commanded the fleet, and his brother commanded
the army; and they had full powers to treat with the rebels with a view
to a cessation of hostilities, provided they should submit. The army
left Halifax in June, 1776, and landed on Staten Island on the 3rd July;
the whole of the Artillery being disembarked by the 7th of the month.
Here they were joined by Sir Henry Clinton's forces from the South, and
by Lord Howe and his fleet from England. A large force of Hessians and
Waldeckers also joined them; and on the 22nd August, the army crossed to
Long Island without molestation. The Americans were encamped at the
north end of the island, where the city of Brooklyn now stands—protected
behind by batteries, on the left by East River, and on the right by a
marsh. A range of wooded hills separated the two armies, the passes
being in the possession of the rebels. On the 27th, the Battle of Long
Island—or Battle of Brooklyn, as it is indifferently called—was fought.
The share taken by the Artillery in this victory, was—owing to the
nature of the ground, and the hurried retreat of the Americans within
their lines—but small. There were forty guns present: six with Lord
Cornwallis's brigade; fourteen with General Clinton in the van; ten with
the main body under Lord Percy; and four 12-pounders with the 49th
Regiment in rear. The loss consisted of but three killed—Lieutenant
Lovell, a sergeant, and a bombardier. So difficult were the 3-pounder
guns on truck carriages found either to be moved or carried, that
Brigadier Cleaveland sent them on board ship, and replaced them with
those mounted on Congreve's carriages. From the loyalist farmers on Long
Island, an additional hundred horses were bought for the Artillery, and
eighty two-horse waggons, with drivers, hired for the conveyance of
ammunition and stores.
One of the greatest blots on Sir William Howe's generalship was his
omission to follow up the victory he won on Long Island. Had he done so,
his troops being flushed with victory, and the enemy being disheartened
and disunited, it is possible that he might have put an end to the war.
By means of his apathy or neglect, Washington's troops were able to
cross over to New York unmolested. Before attacking New York, the
English commander considered it desirable to destroy a very strong
redoubt, at a place called Hell Gate, mounted with a considerable number
of guns to prevent communication, should it be attempted by the British
troops, from the East River into the Sound. Four batteries were
accordingly erected by the Royal Artillery on the opposite shore,
mounting three 24-pounders, three heavy and three medium 12-pounders,
and ten small mortars. As it eventually happened, the landing of the
British in New York was made at a spot where the Hell Gate redoubt would
have been useless; but it was satisfactory to find, on entering it
afterwards, the enemy's guns dismounted, and the works so shattered,
that the troops might have marched in with little or no impediment. In
the Brigadier's report on this occasion, he said, "The distance was near
700 yards, and though the enemy threw a number of shells from six
mortars, we had only on this occasion two men killed, and one lost an
arm. It is with infinite satisfaction that I can say, that whenever the
Artillery is employed, they have not only the approbation of the
Commander-in-Chief, but the whole army, for their behaviour."
The British landed on Manhattan Island, under the fire of the ships; and
in the precipitate retreat to the heights of Haarlem, the Americans lost
their artillery, and many stores, and Washington nearly despaired of
ever succeeding with such troops as he had under his command. But it was
not enough to obtain possession of New York, unless the rebel forces
could be dislodged from the powerful position they occupied in the north
of the island; and to do this, an engagement on no small scale was
necessary, and was commenced on the 27th October, 1776. Its opening was
called the Battle of the White Plains; and viewing it from the Artillery
point of view, it may be described as follows (bearing in mind that it
was only the opening scene of a series of engagements, all intimately
connected, and resulting in the scattering of Washington's forces, their
expulsion from New York Island, and almost from the Jerseys; the capture
of Forts Washington and Lee, and the complete command of the Lower
Hudson):—The attack of the 27th October on the White Plains commenced
with a cannonade on the enemy's left wing, with nearly thirty guns,
manned by the Royal Artillery. On the 28th, the attack of the Hessian
troops was covered by six light 12-pounders; and General Knyphausen
publicly thanked the officers and men who were attached to them. In the
attack on Fort Washington in the beginning of November, the Royal
Artillery had thirty-four guns in action to cover the troops. The Guards
and Light Infantry who were engaged in the attack crossed the East River
in boats under the protection of batteries erected for the purpose. The
hill they had to ascend from their landing was exceedingly rugged and
steep, and the boats in which they crossed were exposed to the fire of
two of the American batteries. To silence these, the batteries above-
mentioned were built, and armed with four medium 12-pounders, fourteen
light 6-pounders, four howitzers, and two mortars. With this armament,
the rebel fire was soon silenced, with the exception of one 3-pounder,
which was sheltered by a rock, and which did considerable damage. A
battalion of the rebel forces which was marching for the defence of the
hill was also entirely broken and dispersed by the well-directed fire of
the Royal Artillery, under which the Guards and Light Infantry landed,
and gained the hill without losing a man. The 42nd Regiment, which
landed at another place, was covered by four 6-pounders; and six guns
advanced with Lord Percy, from the lines at New York, and gained the
heights of Haarlem, every gun being engaged. In this attack, the
Artillery is described as having been powerful and well-served; officers
and men received public acknowledgment in General Orders, and from the
Master-General; and in answering the latter's commendations, Brigadier
Cleaveland felt justified in saying: "The officers and men under my
command have shown an unwearied application to the service, and deserve
everything I can say in their favour.... The good opinion your Lordship
is pleased to form of the conduct and superior abilities of the British
Artillery when engaged, does them the highest honour, and I have the
pleasure to inform your Lordship, that both officers and men have been
emulous during the course of the campaign in deserving it."
The attack on the fort was too powerful to be resisted; so it
capitulated. Lord Cornwallis, with a large body of men immediately
crossed the North River, to attack Fort Lee, but it was abandoned by its
garrison on the 18th November, and all the guns and stores fell into the
hands of the English.
The English now overran the Jerseys, and the following guns were present
with the Royal Artillery during the raid: four light 12-pounders,
fourteen 6-pounders, eight 3-pounders, and two 5½-inch howitzers. This
was a very critical period for the American cause, almost as much so as
after the Battle of Long Island. "During these operations, the New York
Convention was greatly alarmed lest the numerous forces (_i.e._
loyalists) of the State should rise in arms, and openly join the British
forces. Often obliged by the movements of the armies to change its
locality, that body sat successively at Haarlem, King's Bridge, Philip's
Manor, Croton River, and Fishkill; some of the time, to guard against
surprise, with arms in their hands. A committee was appointed for
inquiring into, detecting, and defeating conspiracies. That committee
had funds at its disposal, a special armed force, and unlimited powers.
Many Tories were seized by its orders and sent into Connecticut for
safe-keeping, their personal property being forfeited to the use of the
State.... Some of the New York Militia (in Washington's camp) refused to
do duty. They were offered—they said—peace, liberty, and safety, and
what more could they ask."[35] While not underrating the energy of a
people who could attain their end in spite of such difficulties, it is
healthy reading occasionally, in the midst of flabby orations as to the
uprising of a united people, to examine passages like that just quoted.
A large substratum of loyalty existed yet, which had to be kept down by
a sort of reign of terror; and although, as we shall see, the loyal
diminished greatly in numbers as the war went on, the fact remains that
the rebellion was not a national conception, but a party manœuvre, which
secured by dexterous management the assistance of many pure and noble
men, and ultimately—assisted by war—received the co-operation of the
mass of the people. The war bound the people together by an instinct of
self-defence, apart from the reasons which had brought it about; and
once committed to a cause, men are as ingenious in inventing, often
unconsciously, arguments in its favour, as they are enthusiastic in
defending their opinions.
The gloom of the American cause in the end of 1776 was brightened by a
surprise of some German troops at Trenton, by Washington, who took the
whole prisoners, to the number of about 1000. This success did much to
re-animate the rebels, and gave a new life to their prosecution of the
war.
The year 1777 was destined to be the most eventful year of the whole
campaign. The British had formed a plan, whose aim was as good as its
execution was foolish. Prior, however, to its commencement, Washington
made an attack on two regiments, the 17th and 55th, near Princeton,
which is described in Brigadier Cleaveland's despatch to the Board of
Ordnance in the following words:—"The most particular action that has
happened since Washington's recrossing the Delaware, was an attack made
by him with 4000 men, upon the Battalion of the 17th Regiment at
Princeton, in which action the 17th has gained great honour, and their
Lieutenant-Colonel, Mawhood, great reputation. The heavy fire of the
enemy at the first of the attack obliged the Regiment to retire, under
cover of four 6-pounders advantageously posted. Here the Regiment
formed, and made a general charge upon the enemy, whom they forced
wherever they advanced, leaving a piece of cannon behind them. Colonel
Mawhood observing the enemy increasing greatly in their numbers, thought
proper to march from Princeton, where we were obliged to leave two 6-
pounders, all the horses belonging to the guns being shot, and the
axletree of the other carriage broke by firing." At this affair,
Lieutenant Desaguliers, and nine men of the Royal Artillery were killed.
These active movements of Washington had the effect of making both
General Howe and Lord Cornwallis withdraw their forces from Trenton and
Princeton, and spend the rest of the winter near New York,—on Long
Island, and in the neighbouring parts of New Jersey.
The plan of operations formed by the British Commanders under
instructions from home is well and succinctly described by the American
writer, Lee: "It contemplated the annihilation of resistance in all the
country between the Lakes and Albany; undisturbed possession of the
Hudson River (thus severing the Union), and the conquest of
Pennsylvania, whose capital (Philadelphia) was the metropolis of the
American States." To carry out this plan, it was resolved that one
British army should march from Canada, and another from New York, whose
meeting would complete the separation of the Eastern from the Western
States, north of New York. Two blunders were committed in this scheme.
The first was the appointment of General Burgoyne to command the
northern force, instead of General Carleton, who was well acquainted
with the country; the second was the employment of a northern army at
all. New York was in English hands, and the mastery of the sea was as
yet undisputed. Had New York been made the base of operations, and an
army been sent up the Hudson, with its communications with New York
maintained by the navy, the separation of the States would have been
assured. But when General Burgoyne with his 7000 men left Canada, and
plunged into the American forest, he cut his communications with the
base of his operations, and his case became more hopeless every mile he
advanced. That it was not want of gallantry, but infamous strategy,
which brought on the Sedan-like Convention of Saratoga, may be seen by
the most cursory study, and is eloquently acknowledged in the following
words by Lee, who, though an enemy, was not blind to the courage of his
opponents:—"Where is the General who ever more prodigally risked his
life in his country's cause, than the unfortunate Burgoyne? Where the
army which more bravely executed its leader's will, than did that which
he conducted? What danger was avoided? What effort unessayed? What
privation not submitted to? What difficulties not encountered? But all
terminated in disaster; and the army, from whose prowess so much was
expected, yielded to its equal in courage, to its superior in number."
The American army, under General Gates, was a little over 13,000 strong;
Burgoyne's force did not exceed 5700|at the date of the capitulation.
The interest to the Artilleryman, in the details of this expedition, is
unaffected by its disastrous termination. From commencement to
termination, order-books,[36] despatches, and regimental records, speak
in terms of enthusiasm of the courage of the Artillery, and their
gallant commander—Major-General Phillips—who, although only a Regimental
Major, held the higher Army rank by brevet, and was second in command of
the whole force. Of the service of the Artillery at the Battle of
Stillwater, Cust, in his 'Annals of the Wars,' writes, "The Artillery
did wonders;"—and of the retreat of the 7th October, the same author
says, "Phillips and Riedesel were now ordered to cover the retreat, and
the troops retired, hard pressed, but in good order; the Artillery,
under Major Williams, doing good execution, but _all_ the horses having
been disabled, six of the guns were obliged to be abandoned." Stedman,
in his account of the Battle of Stillwater, says, "During the action,
Major-General Phillips contrived to convey through a thick part of the
wood, some British Artillery, which was of essential service. Captain
Jones of this corps, who fell in this action, was particularly
distinguished." But the most valuable comment is that made by General
Phillips himself, after the termination of the campaign; in a report
made by him from Albany on the 22nd October, 1777, to Lords Townsend and
Amherst. "I have to report to you, my Lords, that the Corps of Artillery
which I commanded has acted during the campaign with the greatest
spirit, and has received the entire approbation of General Burgoyne, and
the applause of the army. In the action of the 19th September, the
Artillery was of infinite use; and a brigade commanded by Captain Jones,
with Lieutenants Hadden and Reid, was particularly engaged, and
maintained their post to the last, although in doing of it _every man,
except five, was either killed or wounded_. Captain Jones was killed.
"In the affair of October 7th, Major Williams kept a battery in action,
until the Artillery horses were all destroyed, and his men either killed
or wounded; being unable to get off their guns, he was surrounded and
taken, with two officers, Lieutenants York and Howorth, the latter
wounded. Captain Blomefield, my Major of Brigade, was also wounded on
the 7th instant, at Major Williams' battery. I cannot sufficiently
commend the activity, zeal, and spirit of the officers. The same gallant
spirit remained to the last day, when the Convention was signed. I had
the honour to deliver a message to the Lieutenant-General from the Corps
of Artillery, that they were as ready as ever to undergo any hardships,
or to undertake any difficulties, for the King's service. Under this
description, allow me to recommend the corps to your Lordship's
protection, and humbly request that you will represent their conduct to
His Majesty." The men of the Irish Artillery, who were referred to in a
former chapter as having taken part in the American War, formed part of
the force under General Phillips, and it was to their conduct during
this expedition that allusion was made by the Master-General in the
despatch there quoted.
The story of this disastrous expedition is short and simple. Having left
his Canadian quarters in June, Burgoyne invested Ticonderoga on the 1st
July, captured it on the 6th, pursued the flying garrison with gunboats
on the lakes, as well as in forced marches by land, and utterly
scattered them. Leaving the lakes in the end of July, he marched for the
Hudson; but as he already felt the want of supplies, it was the 13th of
September before he crossed that river, and took up his position at
Saratoga. On the 19th September, the Battle of Stillwater was fought—in
which the English were left masters of the field—the 9th, 20th, 21st,
24th, 47th, and 62nd Regiments being engaged, and behaving with the
greatest valour. On the 7th of October, a forward movement made by
Burgoyne was defeated, and it was during his retreat on that day that—as
stated above—Major Williams' battery behaved so well. Affairs were now
desperate: the Indians were deserting, and the enemy increasing in
numbers every day; supplies of all sorts were short, nor was there any
means of obtaining them; the actually effective British troops did not
exceed 3500; and there was an opposing force, said to amount to 16,000
men: there was no appearance of the long-expected army from New York
under Sir Henry Clinton; and even if Burgoyne succeeded in retreating to
Canada, he might greatly embarrass Clinton, by enabling Gates' and
Washington's armies to unite; but retreat became soon impossible. At
last, with only three days' provisions left, he opened negotiations with
General Gates, and on the 17th the Convention was signed, and this wild,
baseless expedition met its natural and disastrous termination.
This was the signal in Europe for action among England's enemies. From
this day, France and Spain made no secret of their resolution to join
the Americans; and to this extraneous evil was added the indignation of
the English people with the Government. Even those who opposed the war
were indignant with the authorities: ready critics, although backward in
assistance. The affair at Trenton was more valuable, as far as the
Americans themselves were concerned: it came at a time of great
depression, and reanimated their drooping spirits: but as far as other
nations could judge, the surrender of Burgoyne was most important, and
decided two at least to take an active instead of a passive share in the
war.
But in the mean time what were the troops doing at New York? And in the
first place, what were Colonel Cleaveland, and the companies under his
command, doing? They were becoming sadly diminished in numbers, and the
theme of all Colonel Cleaveland's letters was the same—a cry for more
men from England. "The demand for Artillerymen," he wrote "is so great
that the smallest body of infantry wish not to move without them. I must
therefore entreat your Lordship to give us every possible addition to
our Corps.... From the small number of Artillerymen in quarters, and no
assistance to be had from the army, I am obliged to hire seamen to act
as labourers, and find they do more work than any other men I can
employ."
At the very time he was writing thus, he was being pressed by the
Commander-in-Chief to increase the number of guns for the field during
the summer campaign; to form batteries of iron 24-pounders and brass 12-
pounders on travelling carriages; and to buy as many horses as he could,
instead of trusting to those which were pressed for service as required.
His patience and the wants of the army being unable to wait for the
deliberate movements of the English Ordnance officials, he at last
obtained permission from the Commander-in-Chief to enlist three hundred
men in New York, "although," he wrote, "these will be very insufficient
to man the cannon for the field,—and we therefore most ardently wish for
more Artillery from England." He clothed the recruits with the last
year's clothing for the 4th Battalion, demanding an additional supply
from England in its room. By the correspondence of this time, it appears
that the men had no greatcoats except a few for use on sentry, which
were kept in the guard rooms. The severity of the winter made it
necessary to demand a supply, as the men were much exposed. This appeal
was made in the year 1777, and was granted in the year 1786—the matter
having taken nine years to penetrate the official brain. Even then it
was only granted in part—to the extent of ten per company, increased two
years later to fifteen, as the idea became more comprehended by the
authorities.
By the 1st of June, 1777, an extra supply of four hundred horses was
obtained; the batteries were all ready, and by the middle of the month
the campaign commenced. The object of Sir William Howe was to draw off
Washington from a strong position which he held, enabling him to prevent
his opponents from rendering assistance to Burgoyne, and also from
advancing on Philadelphia. Every feint was attempted without success;
and at last the British General resolved on a genuine invasion of some
part south of New York, which would compel Washington to move. During
the month of June, only one engagement of any importance took place, at
Westfield, between the British under Lord Cornwallis and 3000 Americans
under Lord Stirling, in which the latter were defeated with a loss of
three guns. At this action, the detachments of Artillery who were
present belonged to the 4th Battalion. By the way, a peculiar service
for the Royal Artillery to perform is mentioned by Stedman as having
been carried out on the 6th July in this year. "The American galleys
were destroyed near Skenesborough during Burgoyne's expedition by
Captain Carter, of the Artillery, who commanded a Brigade of _gunboats_.
He gave chase, and pursued them with such speed, that he captured
several of their largest galleys, and obliged them to set the remainder
on fire with a considerable number of their bateaux."
On the 23rd July 1777, Sir William Howe embarked his army—leaving Sir
Henry Clinton in command at New York—and sailed for the south. Until the
22nd August he kept his intended destination a secret, and baffled
Washington's speculations, but on that day news came that he had entered
Chesapeake Bay, so the American General marched to meet him. On the 25th
August Howe disembarked his troops, and marched inland. To prevent the
English reaching Philadelphia, the Americans who had been within a very
few miles of their enemies, fell back, and occupied the heights beyond
the Brandywine river. On the 11th, the English attacked the American
position, moving in two columns, one under Lord Cornwallis, the other
under General Knyphausen. The former column crossed the river at an
unexpected point, and mounting the hill under a heavy protecting fire of
Artillery drove the Americans into the woods. General Knyphausen had
some severe fighting also, and ultimately succeeded in getting across.
This was the Battle of Brandywine, in which the Americans admitted a
loss of 300 killed, 600 wounded, and 400 prisoners, besides 11 pieces of
Artillery. The English had 8 officers and 74 men killed, and a little
over 400 wounded. The Royal Artillery lost 5 killed—Lieutenant Shand, 2
sergeants, and 9 rank and file wounded. A small engagement, equally
favourable to the British, and in which the 42nd and 44th Regiments
greatly distinguished themselves, took place on the 18th September, and
on the 25th Lord Cornwallis took possession of Philadelphia. Writing
from that city on the 28th November to Lord Germaine, Sir William Howe
said, "Much credit is due to Brigadier-General Cleaveland and to the
officers and men of the Corps of Artillery."
While in Philadelphia, Brigadier Cleaveland heard that he was to be
superseded by Brigadier Pattison who had been appointed to the 4th
Battalion _vice_ Colonel Ord, who had died in the preceding April. The
first time that General Pattison is mentioned as having taken active
part in the war was on the 22nd October, 1777, when the British troops
took possession of the Fort of Red Back—on which occasion he commanded
the Artillery: but General Cleaveland had not ceased to do duty, for he
commanded the Artillery at the successful attack on Mud Island on the
16th November, an attack which succeeded in "removing all the obstacles
to the free navigation of the Delaware by the British fleet."[37]
After Lord Cornwallis had entered Philadelphia, and while the great body
of the British troops were encamped under Sir William Howe, at a village
called Germantown, about six miles from Philadelphia, Washington made a
sudden attack upon them early in the morning of the 4th October.
Although at first successful, it did not long continue so. Failure of
punctual co-operation, according to Lee's account, and the brave stand
made by the 40th Regiment, soon changed the current of events: and
Washington was ultimately obliged to retire with a loss of at least 1000
killed, wounded, and prisoners. In speculating on the causes of this
defeat, Lee uses language such as few other American writers would use,
and such as few living Americans would care to hear. But it is perhaps
all the more valuable. "The defeat must be attributed," he says, "to the
yet imperfect discipline of the American army: to the broken spirit of
the troops, who, from day to day, and from month to month, had been
subjected to the most trying and strength-wasting privations, through
the improvidence or inability of Government: to the inexperience of the
tribe of generals, and to the complication of the plan of assault—a
complication said to have been unavoidable."
It was before superior numbers that the British evacuated Boston: to
superior numbers Burgoyne surrendered at Saratoga: and now the
superiority of numbers being in the other direction, the Americans were
defeated in every action during this part of the campaign. Defeated,
but, it must be admitted, not disheartened, for the losses round
Philadelphia were forgotten in the blaze of triumph which accompanied
the capitulation of Burgoyne's force; and the growing intensity of the
American feeling will be realized from a letter, which will be quoted in
the next chapter, written in the very place where their losses must have
been most palpably real.
It was necessary to throw up field-works round the British camp, which
after the battle of Germantown was brought nearer Philadelphia, and also
to erect works to secure the command of the river. The Artillerymen were
largely employed in building and arming these; and one of them was the
scene of a gallant action on the part of a detachment, which is
mentioned both by Stedman and Lee, and also appears in the MS. Record
Book of the 4th Battalion. According to the last-mentioned authority,
some detachments of Nos. 4, 5, and 8 Companies were employed in
constructing batteries on Provence Island, in the Delaware, for the
reduction of an American post on Mud Island, when a party of the 10th
Regiment, under Major Vatap, which covered the works, abandoned them on
the advance of the enemy, and the whole of the guns fell into their
hands, but owing to the gallantry of the detachment of Artillery, the
enemy was obliged to retire, the guns were retaken, and the batteries
again occupied. Stedman in telling this circumstance mentions that the
Artillerymen were under the command of a subaltern, to whose gallantry
the recapture of the batteries was due: and Lee adds, "I believe this
conduct of Major Vatap (who abandoned most shamefully the Artillery) is
the single instance of dastardly conduct among the British officers
during the war."
Sir William Howe spent the winter at Philadelphia with his army—of which
eight companies of the Royal Artillery formed part. The same hesitation
or dilatory disposition which prevented him following up his successes
on Long Island induced him to spend many valuable months in idleness
now. France and America had now formed an alliance, and it was very
important that energetic action should be taken by the British troops in
America before the arrival of the French fleet. But the opportunity was
lost by the supineness of Sir William Howe; and although he was a man
who had endeared himself to his troops, there can be no doubt that when
he resigned the command in May, 1778, and was succeeded by Sir Henry
Clinton, he was replaced by one who was equal to him as a soldier, and
far superior in energy and activity. The first step taken by the new
commander was to evacuate Philadelphia, and withdraw the army to New
York. Every difficulty was thrown in his way by Washington, and a severe
and indecisive engagement was fought during his retreat, which is known
as the Battle of Monmouth or of Freehold Court-house. Both sides claimed
the victory, but as Clinton's movement towards New York was not
interrupted by it, it may be inferred that he had not the worst of the
encounter. Four companies of the Artillery were engaged, and their fire
was true and severe: one officer, Lieutenant T. L. Vaughan, was killed.
On the 30th June, the English army reached Sandyhook, where they found
Lord Howe's fleet; and early in July they passed over to New York. The
conduct of the Artillery during the return from Philadelphia to New York
may be learnt from the following order, issued by General Pattison:—"The
very handsome and obliging terms in which the General Officers and
others have repeatedly spoken of the appearance, discipline, and good
order of the Corps of Artillery, and particularly of the conduct, care
and attention of all the officers who have been detached with the
several Brigades and Battalion guns, cannot fail to be highly pleasing
and satisfactory to the Brigadier-General. He therefore takes this
occasion to give them his best thanks, and to express further his entire
approbation of the regularity and observance of duties that have been
shown by all ranks during the late march, and of the cheerfulness and
alacrity with which they have undergone the great fatigue of it."
During this retreat from Philadelphia, the Artillerymen were for the
first time relieved of carrying their knapsacks and ammunition pouches,
which were carried for them on the waggons. They carried their arms,
except when actually fighting their guns, and had six cartridges in a
small bag in their pockets.
A short summary of the occasions in 1778, after the evacuation of
Philadelphia, when individual Artillerymen distinguished themselves, may
be extracted from the pages of that most conscientiously and laboriously
written work, Browne's 'England's Artillerymen;' with any requisite
additions from other sources.
In July, 1778, Rhode Island was attacked by the American General
Sullivan, supported by the French fleet. The island was garrisoned by
5000 British troops under Sir Robert Pigott, including a company of the
Royal Artillery under the command of Lieut.-Colonel John Innes, an
officer who, as has already been mentioned, commenced his career as a
matross in 1736, and died in 1783, in command of the Invalid Battalion.
The severe labour and exposure cheerfully undergone by the Artillery on
this occasion were specially mentioned by Sir Robert in his despatches
announcing the total defeat of the American scheme. The loss of the
Artillery amounted to thirty-three killed and wounded. In September,
1778, General Grey sailed for Bedford, to destroy a nest of privateers,
and was accompanied by some Artillery under Captain Scott, who blew up
the American fort. In November a body of troops, with a detachment of
Artillery under Lieutenant Ralph Wilson, sailed for Savannah in Georgia,
a place which was speedily taken. From General Pattison's letter-books,
it is easy to see that this operation gave great satisfaction in New
York: considerable stores were taken; and the province of Georgia
reduced. An officer of the Royal Artillery bearing the same surname as
he who commanded at Rhode Island, Lieut.-Colonel Alexander Innes, was
made Governor of Savannah, and afterwards sent home to the King with
despatches. He had greatly distinguished himself during the attack.
This was the last operation of any consequence in 1778. The Army
remained concentrated at New York, and the prisoners of war who had been
taken by the Americans at Burgoyne's capitulation remained prisoners
still. A few of the officers had been exchanged for American officers;
and, in this way, General Phillips, of the Artillery, ultimately became
available for duty. General Pattison, who still commanded the Artillery,
and was with the head-quarters of the army, received a special mark of
favour from Sir Henry Clinton in July, 1779, being appointed Commandant
of the City and Garrison of New York. It may not be uninteresting to the
reader to learn what sort of place New York was in 1779, under a
gunner's government, and an attempt to describe it will now be made.
-----
Footnote 32:
MSS. R. A. Record Office.
Footnote 33:
Stedman.
Footnote 34:
MSS. R. A. Record Office.
Footnote 35:
Hildreth's 'History of the United States.'
Footnote 36:
During recent researches in America, the author found an old order-
book taken by the Americans when Burgoyne surrendered, containing the
most favourable notices of the Royal Artillery under his command.
Footnote 37:
Cust.