A STERNER SCHOOL.
THE same year which saw the foundation of the Royal Military Academy
witnessed the commencement of a seven years' schooling, which was to
leave an indelible mark on the Regiment. In the West Indies and in
Flanders, as well as in the disturbances at home in 1745, officers and
men learnt lessons, and acquired an _esprit de corps_, to which they had
hitherto been strangers. It is at once pleasing and amusing to read in
the old order-books, framed at Woolwich during the years between the
peace of Aix-la-Chapelle and the commencement of the Seven Years' War,
reminders of the school of war and discipline represented by the years
between 1741 and 1748. "The same as we wore in Flanders" was a favourite
way for describing a particular dress for parade. And the word "we" is
poetry to the student, who is searching for signs of an awakening
Regimental _esprit_.
No history of a Regiment like the Royal Artillery could be compressed
into any reasonable dimensions, if every campaign in which it was
engaged were described in detail. It must suffice to sketch the
campaigns, but to paint in body colours the Artillery's share. The
gradual increase of the proportion of this arm; the occasions on which
it more particularly distinguished itself; the changes in dress and
equipment; and the officers whose services in the successive campaigns
were most conspicuous; these are the details which will form the
foreground of the Regiment's History. But even these are so numerous
that most careful sifting will be required to prevent the story from
becoming wearisome.
The same year, then, which saw the warrant issued for the foundation of
the Royal Military Academy saw also the despatch to the West Indies of
one of the most formidable expeditions, both in a naval and a military
sense, which had ever left the shores of England. The squadron consisted
of 115 vessels, well armed and manned, and the troops were in number
over 12,000. The Royal Artillery was commanded by Colonel Jonas Watson—a
brave and experienced officer, who did not live to return to England,
being killed at the bombardment of Carthagena,—and was divided into
trains for service on shore, and detachments for service on board the
numerous bomb-vessels which formed part of the squadron.
The troops were to have been commanded by Lord Cathcart, but
unfortunately this officer died of fever, on the arrival of the
expedition at Dominica, and his successor, General Wentworth, was
totally unfit for the duties which devolved upon him. To this
circumstance, and the want of harmony between him and the naval
commander, Admiral Vernon, the ultimate failure of the expedition was
due. Notwithstanding additional reinforcements from England, so reduced
was this force in two years by disaster and disease, that not a tenth
part returned to England; "and thus ended in shame, disappointment, and
loss, the most important, most expensive, and the best concerted
expedition that Great Britain was ever engaged in, leaving this
melancholy proof, that if dissension is the misfortune of a State, it is
the ruin of any military undertaking."[11]
In reading the accounts of this expedition, more especially of the
attack on Carthagena, there is a positive relief in turning from the
passages relating to the quarrels between the naval and military
commanders to those painful but proud episodes, in which the obedience
and bravery of the troops and seamen were so gloriously manifested; and
although the first service of the Royal Artillery on the Western side of
the Atlantic was neither profitable nor pleasant, it can be studied with
satisfaction, as far as their performance of their duties and endurance
of hardship are concerned. As for the blunders which were committed by
the commanders, the blame must lie with them, not with the executive.
To return, however, to Europe. The war of the Austrian succession had
commenced, and England felt obliged to support Maria Theresa, which she
did partly by a grant of money, and partly by sending an expedition to
Flanders under the aged Earl of Stair. The force employed amounted to
16,000 men; and the Artillery comprised a considerable staff, three
companies, and thirty guns, 3-pounders.
At this time the Regiment was distributed as follows:—One company at
Minorca, one in Gibraltar, one at Newfoundland, two at Woolwich, and
three in Flanders.
Although the Artillery was at Ghent in July, 1742, no military
operations were carried on that year, owing to the backwardness of the
Dutch to fulfil their part of the contract; and the English lay in
Flanders, inactive until the following year.
The commanding officer of the Royal Artillery, at first, was Colonel
Thomas Pattison, and the following is a nominal list of the combatant
officers who served under him:—
Major GEORGE MICHELSON,
Captain WILLIAM SUMPTER,
Captain WITHERS BORGARD,
First Lieutenant JAMES PATTISON,
Captain THOMAS FLIGHT,
Second Lieutenant SAMUEL CLEAVELAND,
Lieutenant-Fireworker JOHN NORTHALL,
Lieutenant-Fireworker NATHANIEL MARSH,
Lieutenant-Fireworker THOMAS BROADBRIDGE,
Lieutenant-Fireworker EDWARD BULLOCK,
Adjutant JOSEPH BROOME.
In November, 1742, Captain James Deal was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel
to the train; Lieutenant Archibald Macbean was appointed Bridge-master;
and Lieutenant Charles Stranover joined as Lieutenant of Miners.
The number of non-combatants was very great, and the total strength of
the companies amounted to eighteen non-commissioned officers, sixty-four
gunners, 140 matrosses, four drummers, and twenty pioneers.
On the 10th February, 1743, the train left Ghent to join the Allied
Army, which was effected on the 16th May. King George met the army on
the 19th June, and on the 27th was fought the Battle of Dettingen. The
Artillery share in this engagement was small, the chief points of note
in the battle being the gallantry of King George and of the Duke of
Cumberland, and the obstinate bravery of the infantry, to which—coupled
with the blunder of the Duc de Grammont—the victory was due. The
hardships suffered by the Allies before the battle had been excessive,
nor were they removed by success; so it was considered advisable to fall
back on their supplies instead of following the enemy. The guns present
with the Royal Artillery at the battle were 3-pounders, twenty-four in
number.
In the following year, 1744, and also in 1745, considerable
augmentations to the officers with the train had been made, many having
become available by the return of the expedition from the West Indies.
Among others, Colonel Jonathan Lewis was appointed Second Colonel to the
train: and Captains Borgard, Michelson, and Desaguliers, Lieutenants
Charlton, Bennett, and Macbean, and, somewhat later, Major William
Belford, joined it. The last-named officer was appointed Major to the
train, in room of Michelson deceased.
In 1744, many of the British troops had been recalled, on account of an
expected invasion of England; and so greatly did the French Army in
Flanders outnumber that of the Allies, that no resistance could be made
to its advance, and nothing but a diversion on the part of the
Austrians, which made the French King hasten to the defence of his own
kingdom, prevented the complete subjugation of Holland.
In 1745, the Artillery marched with the army from Ghent, leaving on the
13th April. The Artillery marched in rear of the Army in the following
order:—First, a sergeant and six miners, two and two; a tumbril drawn by
three horses with miners' tools; two four-horse waggons, containing
Colonel Lewis's baggage; a front guard of twenty-four gunners and
matrosses; a sergeant and two drummers; Lieutenant Pattison marching in
front, and Lieutenant Macbean in rear; the kettledrum; Colonel Lewis and
Captain Michelson on horseback; the flag-gun, a heavy 6-pounder, on a
field-carriage and limber drawn by nine horses; nine more 6-pounders,
drawn as above, but by seven horses; one spare 6-pounder carriage and
limber, drawn by seven horses; twelve covered tumbrils with stores, each
drawn by three horses; four howitzers with five horses each; one spare
howitzer-carriage and limber, also with five horses; six covered
tumbrils with stores, with three horses each; ten 3-pounders on
"galloping carriages," with four horses each; a travelling forge cart
with three horses; twenty-three powder tumbrils; and three covered
waggons with officers' tents, baggage, &c., with three horses each. The
remaining officers and men marched on the flanks of the waggons and
guns, a gunner marching by every gun, with a match. A Regiment of
infantry formed the escort, the grenadier company marching in front, the
remainder in rear. It should have been mentioned that in 1744, an
increase to the armament of the train had been made, comprising ten
heavy 6-pounders and four 8-inch howitzers; and in 1745 another company
arrived from Woolwich.
Some of the orders issued by the Duke of Cumberland, who was in command
of the Army at this time, are curious: "It is strictly ordered by His
Royal Highness that none presume to shoot or hunt, whether officer or
private, officers' servants or huntsmen; this to be a standing order."
Again: "Besides the going out of the Provost, there are fifty Hussars
ordered to patrol in the front and rear of the camp, and to cut to
pieces every man that they may find beyond the limits of the camp."
At Fontenoy, such of the guns as were engaged did good service, more
especially those attached to Ligonier's column, which preceded its
advance, dragged along by ropes, and doing great execution. Had the
Dutch troops fought as well as the British, Fontenoy would have been a
victory for the Allies, instead of a defeat. The loss of the Royal
Artillery was small compared with that of the English infantry. It
comprised Lieutenant Bennett, one sergeant, one gunner, and four
matrosses killed; one conductor, two sergeants, one corporal, six
gunners, and thirteen matrosses wounded; two gunners and four matrosses
missing.
The guns actually present on the field comprehended ten 6-pounders,
twenty-seven 3-pounders, six 1½-pounders,—recently sent from England—and
four 8-inch howitzers.
The officers present at the Battle of Fontenoy were Colonel Pattison,
Lieut.-Colonel Lewis, Major Belford, Captains Michelson, Mace,
Desaguliers, Flight, Captains-Lieutenant Ord, Leith, Brome, and Johnson,
and Lieutenants Pattison, Campbell, Cleaveland, Tovey, Stranover, T.
Smith, McLeod, Macbean, Charlton, Strachey, Northall, Maitland, Hussey,
Pike, B. Smith, Bennett (killed), Mason, Durham, Knox, Farquharson,
Worth, and Lindsay. Many of these had joined the train just before the
battle.
The strength of the Allied Army did not exceed 53,000 men; that of the
French—under Marshal Saxe, and inspirited by the presence of the King
and the Dauphin—approached 80,000. Of the British troops 4000 were
killed and wounded, besides 2000 Hanoverians. Fontenoy was a defeat, but
hardly one which can be said to have tarnished in the slightest the
British Arms.
The Duke of Cumberland withdrew his forces in good order. On the march,
an order which is extant shows a novel means of confining prisoners:
"The sergeant of miners is to make a black hole _under ground_, and the
carpenter to make a door to it with a padlock; always to be clean straw
for the prisoners; and if any sergeant or corporal suffer anything to go
in to them, but bread and water, they shall be tried for disobedience of
orders."
In October, the rebellion in Scotland had created such an alarm that the
whole of the Artillery in Flanders, now amounting to four companies, was
recalled to England.
Prior to their return, however, news had reached the Allied Army, near
Brussels, of the successful result of the Siege of Louisbourg by the New
England troops, and, as a symptom of rejoicing, a review of the Army was
ordered by the Duke of Cumberland, which is mentioned by General Forbes
Macbean in his MS. diary, on account of a circumstance which can best be
described in his own words: "The Army was drawn up in order of battle,
and reviewed by the Duke: the Park of Artillery was formed in great
order on a fine extensive plain near Vilvorden: the four companies of
Artillery under arms, drawn up, two on the right, and two on the left of
the park: Colonel Pattison, Lieut.-Colonel Lewis, and Major Belford,
posted themselves on horseback in front of the park, when they saluted
His Royal Highness as he passed, by dropping their swords. The other
officers, carrying fusees, only took off their hats as he passed them."
At this time—in 1745—a company was sent to garrison Louisbourg, and
another was sent to Newfoundland, the Regiment at this date having been
increased to ten companies.
The interlude of the Scotch rebellion, which involved the recall of the
companies from Flanders, does not require detailed mention. There was a
good deal of what Albert Borgard would have called useless marching and
counter-marching in England. The Artillery was successful at Carlisle
and Culloden; very unsuccessful at Falkirk. At Prestonpans, the guns
were not served by the Royal Artillery, but by seamen. At Falkirk, the
guns were hard and fast in a bog, and were not once in action. As soon
as the peasant drivers, who had been engaged with the horses, saw the
Royal Army waver, they promptly fled; and of the eight guns which had
accompanied the King's troops, seven fell into the hands of the enemy.
At Culloden, the victory may be said to have been won by the Artillery.
In the words of Sir Edward Cust, "the guns were so exceedingly well
plied that they made dreadful lanes through some of the clan regiments.
It was with extreme difficulty that the men could be kept in their
places to stand this murderous fire." The Artillery was under the
command of Colonel Belford. Only one company of the Regiment was at
Culloden, the remaining five on home service being at Woolwich, whence
in the preceding winter they had furnished detachments for service in
England at Chester, Carlisle, and Newcastle. The guns employed during
the rebellion were 6-pounders, 3-pounders, and howitzers.
It is with pleasure that one turns from the story of civil war, always
painful, rarely glorious, to Flanders again, where two companies were
ordered immediately after the suppression of the rebellion. But before
doing so, it is impossible to avoid mentioning a coincidence which is
somewhat singular. As in the Scotch rebellion of 1715, the disastrous
unwieldiness, and the indifferent equipment of the Artillery trains on
the old spasmodic principle, forced upon the country the idea of a
permanent force of Artillery, so in the Scotch rebellion of 1745, the
disaster of Falkirk forced upon the public attention the folly of a
Field Artillery with no assured mobility. In a contemporary article in
the 'Gentleman's Magazine,' quoted by the author of 'England's
Artillerymen,' this feeling found expression; and as to one Scotch
rebellion the Regiment may be said to owe its birth, so to another it
may date the first step in advance made by that portion of it intended
for service in the field. This coincidence suggests many questions to
the student. Is public opinion necessary to bring about military reform?
And is English public opinion on military questions only awakened when
civil or other war thrusts military blunders in a very prominent and
personal way before public attention? These questions may be answered
partly in the affirmative, and partly in the negative.
It is undoubtedly a consequence of military training, to produce, in a
man's mind, more of an inclination to make the best of what is, than to
suggest change and improvement. And, further, as change for the better
generally implies expense; and as the heads of military, as of other
public departments, have a particular horror of anything involving
increased outlay, it follows that suggestions in that direction, made by
their own subordinates, are received with scant favour, and the would-be
reformers are deterred in every way from pursuing their inclinations.
But the public owes no allegiance to its officials; and the wildest
schemes from an outsider receive an attention denied to the most
practical suggestions from those in the employment of a department.
Although, therefore, the public is often the father of military
advances, it must not hastily be assumed that this is owing to a want of
originality in military men.
Again, although civil war in England demonstrated military defects in a
very special way, it must not be assumed either that these defects had
not been apparent to soldiers before, or that so strong a measure as
civil war was necessary to enlist public opinion. Apart from the cause
above mentioned, which would deter an officer from recommending change,
it must not be inferred that the same delicacy was shown to the
peasantry of other countries, where transport was required for the
Artillery, as to those who were called upon in England for assistance.
Martial law, which would have been rarely, if ever, enforced upon
English peasantry by English commanders, was freely exercised abroad;
and, with this exercise, the want of mobility was not so frequently
allowed to appear. And with regard to the necessity of an actual, bitter
home-experience being required to awaken public opinion, the recent
Franco-German war proves the contrary. The reports of the value of
Artillery in that campaign were sufficient, without actual and personal
observation, to awaken in the public mind a strong and unanimous
resolution to perfect that arm in England, such as no government could
have dared to thwart. When backed by public opinion in England, a
Government will gladly make changes involving expense, and in fact, to
refuse to do so would be folly; but when that public opinion, even if
foolish and ignorant, is against change or expense, or even indifferent
on the subject, the military reformer within the ranks of the Army may
as well beat the air as urge his suggestions. All these considerations
have to be borne in mind when studying the history of Army reforms.
The two companies which went to Flanders in 1746, were under the command
of Colonel Lewis; Captain Borgard, Michelson acting as Major; Lieutenant
Brome as Adjutant, and Lieutenant Stranover as Quartermaster. The number
of subaltern officers with the companies seems excessive, being no less
than ten, besides three Captain-Lieutenants; but a means of employing
them was adopted this year, by distributing the fourteen 3-pounder guns,
which were with the companies, among the seven battalions; two to each
battalion under a Lieutenant. This arrangement was ordered on the 20th
July, 1746; but it is soothing to the student to find on the 23rd of the
following month this pernicious custom suspended, and the battalion guns
ordered to join the reserve.
In 1747, there were five companies in Flanders, three having been added
to the Regiment; and the following was the armament in their charge: six
heavy 12-pounders; six heavy 9-pounders; fourteen heavy and twelve light
6-pounders: fourteen heavy 3-pounders: two 8-inch howitzers; and six
Royal mortars.
In 1748, in addition to the above, thirty-two light 6-pounders were sent
for use with the battalions.
At the battle of Roncoux, the want of Artillery was sorely felt by the
British, the more so, as the enemy was in this arm particularly strong;
and doubtless this led to the great increase made in 1747, both in men
and guns.
The arrival of Colonel Belford to command the Artillery in the winter of
1746, and during the rest of the campaign, produced a marked and
beneficial effect. Colonel Pattison and Major Lewis were allowed to
retire on full-pay, in January 1748, on account of old age and
infirmities: and their younger successors devoted themselves to giving a
military appearance to the companies under their command. In this they
were greatly assisted, not merely by the improved and better educated
class of officers, now joining from the Academy; but also by an
accidental circumstance which swelled the ranks with many well-trained
soldiers. It is mentioned as follows by old General Macbean: "About this
time, three Regiments of Cavalry being reduced to Dragoons, and the
troopers having it in their option to remain as Dragoons or be
discharged, many of them chose the latter; and above two hundred of them
enlisted into the Artillery. From this period, the Regiment improved
much in appearance, and in the size of the men, neither of which had
been hitherto much attended to; but receiving at once so many tall men
in the corps may be said to have given rise to the change that has taken
place in regard to the height, strength, and figure of the men which now
compose it." Among other means of training and disciplining the men
under his command during the tedious months when the Army was in winter
quarters, Colonel Belford devoted much time to practising them in the
use of small-arms, and in infantry manœuvres, never yet practised in the
Regiment. So successful was he, that the Duke of Cumberland reviewed the
companies; on which occasion the gunners of the companies, with their
field staffs, formed upon the right as a company of grenadiers; and the
matrosses, with their muskets, as a battalion. There are not wanting, in
the nineteenth century, men who wish that Colonel Belford's zeal had
taken some other direction; who think the use of Artillerymen, even on
field-days, as infantry, is a misuse; and who would remove the carbines
from the Garrison Artillery, in order that more time might be allowed
for their own special and varied drills. There are even scoffers, who
say that the presence of a body of men in the garrison under his
command, armed and equipped like infantry, is more than a General
Officer can bear; that he is never at rest until he sees this body
swelling his Brigade by another battalion; and that he inspects it in
infantry details more minutely than in those of its own special arm.
Whatever ground there may be for these complaints, there can be no doubt
that Colonel Belford was innocent of any desire to divert his men from
their own work: and merely availed himself of this, as of other means of
disciplining and training them into habits of smartness and obedience.
And among other things which he borrowed from the infantry, besides
their drill, was that of an Officer's Regimental Guard over the
Artillery Park, in addition to the guard furnished by the Line
Regiments, a more important item than it would at first sight appear to
be.
Two Courts-martial, one upon an officer, and one upon a gunner, are
mentioned here, as probably interesting to the reader. Lieutenant
McCulloch, having been tried and found guilty by a General Court-
martial, of disobedience to Colonel Belford's orders, was suspended for
the space of three months, and ordered to make the following submission:
"I am very sorry I am guilty of a neglect of my duty, and I do
particularly ask Colonel Belford's pardon, and will, for the future,
avoid being guilty of a thing of the like nature." Having complied with
the submission, and Colonel Belford having requested that the remaining
part of the sentence might be remitted, the Duke of Cumberland, being
highly pleased with the conduct of the Artillery at the recent battle of
Val, was pleased to accede to the request.
The gunner, who was tried, had been guilty of insubordination towards a
sergeant, and being formally convicted by a Regimental Court-martial,
was sentenced to be "reduced in pay and duty for one month to matross,
ride the gun, ask the sergeant's pardon at the head of the Regiment, and
that the difference of his pay be employed for the use of the sick."
In reading the accounts of this war between the Allies and the French,
one feels how just was the remark of Louis XV. after Val, that the
"British not only paid all, but fought all." On them fell all the brunt
of every engagement, and the discussion and misunderstanding which so
often prevailed among the Allied commanders had no effect upon the
bravery of the British troops. At Val, the Artillery had thirty men
killed, Major Michelson, Lieutenants McLeod, Farrington, Dexter,
Stephens, Pedley, and nineteen men wounded; and twenty-five taken
prisoners. They received the special thanks of the Duke for their
conduct during this obstinate and bloody engagement.
The next thing that strikes one is the cool and able generalship of
Marshal Saxe. He had superior numbers under his command; nor did he
suffer from divided counsels, but these advantages do not conceal his
military talent.
Next, to the student's mind, the absurdly luxurious way of making war
then prevalent suggests itself, if the term can be applied to any
contest where loss of life was so great. It was, indeed, a game at which
the leaders played; and in the quiet of their systematic winter-quarters
they devised and matured new moves for the coming season. How changed is
modern warfare! What a different system is to be read in the stories of
the trenches before Sebastopol, or the winter encampment of the Germans
round Paris!
The war gradually filtered itself away into the peace of Aix-la-
Chapelle. After Val came the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom, where fourteen men
of the Royal Artillery were killed; then came winter quarters at Breda;
then came preparations for a new campaign in 1748; although peace was in
every one's mind, and the plenipotentiaries to conclude it had already
met; then came the siege of Maestricht, with its Quixotic ending; and at
last came peace itself. A peace which brought profit neither to England
nor to France; which could not obliterate the long list on the rolls of
each nation which war had entered in the books of death; which, if
possible, only made the folly of the contest more apparent; and which,
while it ceased the actual roll of cannon, and crossing of bayonets, did
not stop the pulsation of hatred in each nation's breast, which was to
throb with increasing vigour, until a new and more bitter war should
gratify the unsmothered longings of each. A peace which—with the
solitary exception of Prussia—seemed to do good, or bring rest to none
but unhappy Flanders, the battleground of Europe, the victim in every
international contest.
But a peace, also, which closed for a time that sterner school of
discipline in which the Royal Artillery had now for years been studying;
in which there had been officers such as Macbean, Desaguliers, Phillips,
and Pattison, learning lessons, which were to bear fruit in yet grimmer
warfare, both in Europe and America; and on whose black-boards—blank in
this respect, when the war commenced—there had now been indelibly
inscribed the words, that "an Army without Artillery is no Army at all!"
Before closing this chapter, there are one or two points connected with
the Artillery in the field, which deserve mention. First; the amount of
ammunition which was carried in the field with each gun was as follows:—
100 round-shot, and 30 rounds of grape; with the exception of the long
6-pounder guns, which carried 80 round-shot, and 40 grape. Second; the
stores and ammunition were issued direct by the Commissaries to the
officers commanding Brigades of guns, _i.e._ Batteries—on requisition—
who had, however, to make their own cartridges, and fix the wooden
bottoms to the round-shot and grape, after receipt. The wooden bottoms
were made by the artificer, called the turner; and were fastened by the
tinman. Another of the tinman's duties was the manufacture of the tubes—
and of boxes to contain them. Third; luxurious in one sense, as the war
was, it had its hardships, as the following extract will show:—August
27th, 1746.—"Arrived at camp after a most difficult march, the Artillery
constantly moving for four days and three nights without encamping—
nearly starved; through woods, over mountainous country, with the
bottoms full of rapid little rivers and deep marshes. Almost all the
horses lost their shoes, and men and horses nearly starved. 3rd
September.—Marched from the camp at 3 A.M., and crossed the Maise, 170
yards broad, over the pontoon bridges, near Maistricht. The bridges were
commenced laying at one o'clock in the morning, and were completed by
seven, when the heads of the column made their appearance. The French
army was in order of battle on the heights of Hautain, opposite to
Visel, where he supposed we were to pass, with a design to fall upon us
when we were partly crossed the river. 5th September.—The enemy attacked
our light troops posted opposite to Visel, on the Maise, and handled
them very roughly; those that were not killed, being forced into the
river, where they were drowned." Lastly, it is to be noted that, as in
all our later wars before they have lasted any time, the ranks were
thinned by disease and death, and there was a difficulty in replenishing
them, even with _recruits_. It is to be hoped that the system of
reserves recently organized in the English Army will in future mitigate
this evil.
On the return of the Army to England in 1748, three companies of
Artillery were reduced; the officers being gradually brought in, as
vacancies occurred. Among other customs brought by the companies from
Flanders was that of employing fifers as well as drummers: "the first
fifers in the British Army having been established in the Royal Regiment
of Artillery at the end of this war, being taught by John Ulrich, a
Hanoverian fifer, brought from Flanders by Colonel Belford, when the
Allied Army separated."[12]
So much for the school of discipline in Europe. But there had been a
class-room opened in the East, to which the Regiment sent some pupils.
Admiral Boscawen had been ordered to the East Indies, in command of a
mixed naval and military force, including a company of the Royal
Artillery, under Major Goodyear. The force of the enemy, and the
strength of his defences, had been underrated; and it cannot be said
that the expedition was very successful. The ordnance which accompanied
the Artillery consisted of twelve 6-pounders, six 3-pounders, two 10-
inch, three 8-inch, fifteen 5½ inch, and twenty-five 4⅖-inch mortars,
all of brass. It was at the siege of Pondicherry that these guns were
used, a siege which lasted from the 11th of August to the 6th of
October, 1748, when Admiral Boscawen was compelled to raise it after a
loss of over 1000 men. The Royal Artillery lost, out of a total of 148
of all ranks, no less than forty-three, including Major Goodyear, who
fell, mortally wounded, during the siege, his leg being carried away by
a round-shot.
A stop was put to the hostilities by the declaration of peace, but the
presence of Admiral Boscawen enabled him to ratify, in a prompt manner,
that part of the treaty which restored Madras to the English. Many men
of Major Goodyear's company were allowed, in 1749, to volunteer for the
East India Company's service.
But this expedition has an interest to the Artilleryman beyond the
military operations. Before sailing, Admiral Boscawen asserted his
intention, in spite of Major Goodyear's remonstrances, of filling up, as
Commander-in-Chief, any vacancies which might occur in the company of
Artillery.
The Board of Ordnance was appealed to, and most warmly protested against
such an interference with its prerogative,—declaring that none of the
appointments made by the Admiral would be recognized by the present or
any succeeding Master-General. Doubtless, the Board was right; and
Admiral Boscawen, being anxious to retain the favour of all under his
command, let the matter drop. With a seniority corps, essentially
detached when on service, it was absolutely necessary that promotion
should be general, not local. At the same time, the restraint of the
Board was irksome—not the less so because just; and the feeling could
never be agreeable to a commander, that serving under him were those who
owed a special allegiance to another. As time went on, and the military
department of the Ordnance increased, this irritation would become more
general, and the points of difference between Generals and the Board
would multiply.
The wisdom of the change which put Generals and the Ordnance Corps under
one head might have been proved by _à priori_, as it has been by _à
posteriori_ reasoning; and this trifling episode between Admiral
Boscawen and the Board is interesting, as showing that, thirty years
after the Regiment had been called into existence, the Dual Government
of the Artillery was already producing natural consequences. But it is
also interesting, as manifesting the affection which the Board already
evinced for the child they had begotten—an interest sometimes too
paternal, but never unlovely.
An excellent letter from the principal officers of the Ordnance is
extant, urging the claims to Army Rank of the officers of the Artillery,
which had been again questioned by some belonging to the other arms of
the service. The difficulty was, in a very few years, settled by the
King, in place of the Master-General, signing the commissions of
Artillery officers; but this letter from the Board is interesting, as
pleading, on grounds of justice and in language far warmer than could
have been expected, the claims of the corps which they had created. The
letter bears date 24th February, 1744, and, after quoting the decision
in favour of Artillery officers arrived at by the King in 1724, and
confirmed in 1735, and mentioning two Courts-martial held in 1737 and
1742, at which officers of Artillery sat with those of the other arms,
according to date of Commission, goes on to say that, notwithstanding
these facts, there are not wanting those who deny any military status to
Artillery officers in the field. The writers then state a case, to show
the absurdity of the view objected to:—"If a Captain of Artillery, with
a number of guns and Artillery people, should happen to be escorted by a
Lieutenant of a Regiment on Foot, with a number of men belonging
thereto, the Captain (according to the sentiments of those with whom we
differ) must take his orders from the Lieutenant, which he would, with
reason, think a great hardship; for the Lieutenant would not obey one
whom he deems to be no more than a titular Captain, and who, he is
taught to believe, has no rank in the Army. And if the said Lieutenant
should be killed, and the command devolve to the eldest sergeant,
according to the notion before mentioned, the Captain of Artillery must
take his orders from the said Sergeant of Foot,—the consequence of which
is so obvious, that we need not enlarge upon it."
"But further, my Lord, should this opinion prevail, it would be a total
discouragement to the officers of Artillery, as well as highly
prejudicial to His Majesty's Service."
"The ordinary duty and discipline of the officers and private men of the
Artillery is, in every respect, the same with that of every other
Regiment of the Army. The qualifications of Artillery officers are not
acquired by practice only, but are the result of long study and
application. They must be proficients in several sciences, and Masters
of several arts, which is not required from other officers. They are
subjected to the Articles of War, and all the penalties of the Act for
Mutiny and Desertion, and are equally a part of His Majesty's Forces
with any other Regiment of the Army. The service of the Artillery is
generally understood to be more dangerous and severe than any other; and
although they are an essential part of one and the same Army, yet if
they bear no rank in it, but at Courts-martial only, they are in a worse
situation and under greater difficulties and discouragements than any
part of the Army; for, let their service have been ever so long,—their
conduct and bravery ever so conspicuous and meritorious,—they can only
rise gradually and slowly in their own little corps, if they have no
rank in the Army, and can never be promoted in any other, which is the
usual and almost only reward of distinguished merit in other officers."
While sympathizing with the spirit which animated the writers of the
above, one may differ as to the nature of the reward they sought for
meritorious officers of Artillery, in promotion into the other arms. For
more than forty years after this letter was written this reward was one
which was coveted by the senior officers of the corps for the younger
members. Doubtless, the intention was to obtain a promotion for them
which could not be found in the stagnation of a seniority corps. But, to
the modern Artilleryman, the promotion which involved separation from
the Regiment for whose duties he had been specially trained would be but
a doubtful reward.
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Footnote 11:
Cust.
Footnote 12:
Macbean's MSS.