THE DEATH OF "KING CAUCUS"
On a bracing November afternoon in 1821 Jackson rode up with his family
to the Hermitage free for the first time in thirty-two years from all
responsibility of civil and military office. He was now fifty-four
years old and much broken by exposure and disease; the prospect of
spending the remainder of his days among his hospitable neighbors on
the banks of the Cumberland yielded deep satisfaction. The home-loving
Mrs. Jackson, too, earnestly desired that he should not again be drawn
into the swirl of public life. "I do hope," she wrote plaintively to a
niece soon after her return to the Hermitage, "they will leave Mr.
Jackson alone. He is not a well man and never will be unless they allow
him to rest. He has done his share for the country. How little time has
he had to himself or for his own interests in the thirty years of our
wedded life. In all that time he has not spent one-fourth of his days
under his own roof. The rest of the time away, traveling, holding
court, or at the capital of the country, or in camp, or fighting its
battles, or treating with the Indians; mercy knows what not."
The intent to retire was honest enough but not so easy to carry out.
The conqueror of the Creeks and Seminoles belonged not merely to
Tennessee but to the entire Southwest; the victor of New Orleans
belonged to the Nation. Already there was talk--"talk everlastingly,"
Mrs. Jackson tells us in the letter just quoted--of making the hero
President. Jackson, furthermore, was not the type of man to sit idly by
while great scenes were enacted on the political stage. When he
returned from Florida, he faced the future with the weary vision of a
sick man. Rest and reviving strength, however, put the old vim into his
words and acts. In two years he was a second time taking a seat in the
United States Senate, in three he was contesting for the presidency,
and in seven he was moving into the White House.
The glimpses which one gets of the General's surroundings and habits
during his brief interval of repose create a pleasing impression.
Following the winding turnpike westward from Nashville a distance of
nine or ten miles and rumbling across the old wooden bridge over Stone
River, a visitor would find himself at Hermitage Farm. The estate
contained at that time somewhat more than a thousand acres, of which
four hundred were under cultivation and the remainder luxuriant forest.
Negro cabins stood here and there, and in one corner was a little brick
church which the proprietor had built for the solace of his wife. In
the center of a well-kept lawn, flanked with cedars and oaks, stood the
family mansion, the Hermitage, whose construction had been begun at the
close of the Seminole War in 1819. The building was of brick, two
stories high, with a double wooden piazza in both front and rear. The
rooms were small and simply furnished, the chief adornment being
portraits of the General and his friends, though later was added the
familiar painting of Mrs. Jackson. Lavasseur, who as private secretary
of La Fayette visited the place in 1825, was greatly surprised to find
a person of Jackson's renown living in a structure which in France
would hardly suffice for the porter's lodge at the ch‚teau of a man of
similar standing. But western Tennessee afforded nothing finer, and
Jackson considered himself palatially housed.
Life on the Hermitage estate had its full share of the charm of the old
South. After breakfasting at eight or nine, the proprietor spent the
day riding over his broad acres, giving instructions to his workmen,
keeping up his accounts, chatting with neighbors and passers-by, and
devouring the newspapers with a zeal born of unremitting interest in
public affairs. After the evening meal the family gathered on the cool
piazza in summer, or around the blazing hearth of the great living room
in winter, and spent the hours until the early bedtime in telling
stories, discussing local and national happenings, or listening to the
news of distant localities as retailed by the casual visitor. The
hospitality of the Jackson home was proverbial. The General's army
friends came often to see him. Political leaders and advisers flocked
to the place. Clergymen of all denominations were received with special
warmth by Mrs. Jackson. Eastern men of distinction, when traveling to
the West, came to pay their respects. No foreigner who penetrated as
far as the Mississippi Valley would think of returning to his native
land without calling upon the picturesque figure at the Hermitage.
Chief among visitors from abroad was La Fayette. The two men met in
Washington in 1824 and formed an instant attachment for each other. The
great French patriot was greeted at Nashville the following year with a
public reception and banquet at which Jackson, as the first citizen of
the State, did the honors. Afterwards he spent some days in the Jackson
home, and one can imagine the avidity with which the two men discussed
the American and French revolutions, Napoleon, and the late New Orleans
campaign.
Jackson was first and last a democrat. He never lost touch with the
commonest people. Nevertheless there was always something of the grand
manner about him. On formal and ceremonial occasions he bore himself
with becoming dignity and even grace; in dress he was, as a rule,
punctilious. During his years at the Hermitage he was accustomed to
ride about in a carriage drawn by four spirited iron-gray horses,
attended by servants in blue livery with brass buttons, glazed hats,
and silver bands. "A very big man, sir," declared an old hotel waiter
to the visiting biographer Parton long afterwards. "We had many big
men, sir, in Nashville at that time, but General Jackson was the
biggest man of them all. I knew the General, sir; but he always had so
many people around him when he came to town that it was not often I
could get a chance to say anything to him."
The question as to who first proposed Jackson for the presidency will
probably never be answered. The victory at New Orleans evidently
brought the idea into many minds. As the campaign of 1816 was
beginning, Aaron Burr wrote to his son-in-law that, if the country
wanted a President of firmness and decision, "that man is Andrew
Jackson." Not apparently until 1821 was the suggestion put forward in
such a way as to lead Jackson himself to take note of it. Even then he
scoffed at it. To a friend who assured him that he was not "safe from
the presidency" in 1824, he replied: "I really hope you don't think
that I am d------ fool enough to believe that. No sir; I may be pretty
well satisfied with myself in some things, but am not vain enough for
that." On another occasion he declared: "No sir; I know what I am fit
for. I can command a body of men in a rough way; but I am not fit to be
President."
It really mattered little what the General himself thought. His
Tennessee friends had conceived the idea that he could be elected, and
already they were at work to realize this vision. One of the most
active was John H. Eaton, who had lately written the hero's biography
down to the return from New Orleans. Another of his friends was
Governor Blount. John Rhea, Felix Grundy, and half a dozen more helped.
But the man who really made Jackson President was his near neighbor and
his inseparable companion of later years, William B. Lewis.
In a day of astute politicians Major Lewis was one of the cleverest. He
knew Jackson more intimately than did any other man and could sway him
readily to his purposes in all matters upon which the General's mind
was not absolutely made up. He had a wide acquaintance over the
country; he was possessed of ample means and leisure; he was an adept
at pulling judiciously laid and well-concealed political wires; he
fully understood the ideas, aspirations, and feelings of the classes
whose support was necessary to the success of his plans. In the present
juncture he worked on two main lines: first, to arouse Jackson's own
State to a feverish enthusiasm for the candidacy of its "favorite son,"
and, second, to start apparently spontaneous Jackson movements in
various sections of the country, in such a manner that their cumulative
effect would be to create an impression of a nation-wide and
irresistible demand for the victor of New Orleans as a candidate.
Tennessee was easily stirred. That the General merited the highest
honor within the gift of the people required no argument among his
fellow citizens. The first open steps were taken in January, 1822, when
the Gazette and other Nashville papers sounded the clarion call. The
response was overwhelming; and when Jackson himself, in reply to a
letter from Grundy, diplomatically declared that he would "neither seek
nor shun" the presidency, his candidacy was regarded as an established
fact. On the 20th of July, the Legislature of the State placed him
formally in nomination. Meanwhile Lewis had gone to North Carolina to
work up sentiment there, and by the close of the year assurances of
support were coming in satisfactorily. From being skeptical or at best
indifferent, Jackson himself had come to share the enthusiasm of his
assiduous friends.
The Jackson managers banked from the first upon two main assets: one
was the exceptional popularity of their candidate, especially in the
South and West; the other was a political situation so muddled that at
the coming election it might be made to yield almost any result. For
upwards of a generation the presidency and vice presidency had been at
the disposal of a working alliance of Virginia and New York, buttressed
by such support as was needed from other controllable States. Virginia
regularly got the presidency, New York (except at the time of the
Clinton defection of 1812) the vice presidency. After the second
election of Monroe, in 1820, however, there were multiplying signs that
this affiliation of interests had reached the end of its tether. In the
first place, the Virginia dynasty had run out; at all events Virginia
had no candidate to offer and was preparing to turn its support to a
Georgian of Virginian birth, William H. Crawford. In the second place,
party lines had totally disappeared, and the unifying and stabilizing
influences of party names and affiliations could not be counted on to
keep down the number of independent candidacies. Already, indeed, by
the end of 1822 there were a half-dozen avowed candidates, three of
whom had seats at Monroe's Cabinet table. Each was the representative
of a section or of a distinct interest, rather than of a party, and no
one was likely to feel under any compulsion to withdraw from the race
at a preliminary stage.
New England offered John Quincy Adams. She did so with reluctance, for
the old Federalist elements had never forgiven him for his desertion to
the Republican camp in the days of the embargo, while the back country
democracy had always looked upon him as an alien. But he was the
section's only available man--indeed, the only promising candidate from
any Northern State. His frigid manner was against him. But he had had a
long and honorable diplomatic career; he was winning new distinction as
Secretary of State; and he could expect to profit both by the feeling
that the North was entitled to the presidency and by the fact that he
was the only candidate from a non-slave State.
Crawford, Secretary of the Treasury, was the heir apparent of the
Virginia dynasty. Formerly this would have meant a clear road to the
White House. Even now it was supposed to be a tremendous asset; and
notwithstanding the Georgian's personal unpopularity in most parts of
the country, his advantages as the "regular candidate," coupled with
the long and careful campaign carried on in his behalf, were expected
by many keen observers to pull him through.
A third candidate within the Cabinet circle was Calhoun, Secretary of
War. Like Crawford, he could expect to reach the presidency only by
winning the support of one or more of the greater Northern States. For
a while he had hopes of Pennsylvania. When it appeared that he had
nothing to look for in this direction, he resigned himself to the
conclusion that, since he was yet hardly forty years of age, his time
had not yet come.
For the first time, the West now put forward candidates--two of them,
Clay and Jackson. Clay was a Kentuckian, of Virginian birth and
breeding, in whom were mingled the leading characteristics of both his
native and his adopted section. He was "impetuous, wilful,
high-spirited, daring, jealous, but, withal, a lovable man." For a
decade he had been the most conspicuous figure in the national House of
Representatives. He had raised the speakership to a high level of
importance and through its power had fashioned a set of issues,
reflective of western and middle-state ideas, upon which the politics
of the country turned for more than a quarter of a century. As befitted
a "great conciliator," he had admirers in every corner of the land.
Whether his strength could be sufficiently massed to yield electoral
results remained to be discovered.
But what of Jackson? If, as one writer has said, Clay was one of the
favorites of the West, Jackson was the West itself. "While Clay was
able to voice, with statesmanlike ability, the demand for economic
legislation to promote her interests, and while he exercised an
extraordinary fascination by his personal magnetism and his eloquence,
he never became the hero of the great masses of the West; he appealed
rather to the more intelligent--to the men of business and of
property." π Jackson, however, was the very personification of the
contentious, self-confident, nationalistic democracy of the interior.
He could make no claim to statesmanship. He had held no important
legislative or administrative position in his State, and his brief
career in Congress was entirely without distinction. He was a man of
action, not a theorist, and his views on public questions were, even as
late as 1820, not clear cut or widely known. In a general way he
represented the school of Randolph and Monroe, rather than that of
Jefferson and Madison. He was a moderate protectionist, because he
believed that domestic manufactures would make the United States
independent of European countries in time of war. On the Bank and
internal improvements his mind was not made up, although he was
inclined to regard both as unconstitutional.
π Turner, Rise of the New West, p. 188.
Jackson's attitude toward the leading political personalities of the
time left no room for doubt. He supported Monroe in 1816 and in 1820
and continued on friendly terms with him notwithstanding the
President's failure on certain occasions to follow his advice. Among
the new contenders for the presidency the one he disliked most was
Crawford. "As to Wm. H. Crawford," he wrote to a friend in 1821, "you
know my opinion. I would support the Devil first." Clay, also, he
disliked--partly out of recollection of the Kentuckian's censorious
attitude during the Seminole debates, partly because of the natural
rivalry between the two men for the favor of the western people. Clay
fully reciprocated by refusing to believe that "killing 2500 Englishmen
at New Orleans" qualified Jackson for the "various difficult and
complicated duties of the chief magistracy." Toward Adams, Jackson was
not ill disposed; before he decided to permit his own name to be used,
he said that he would give his support in 1824 to the New
Englander--unless one other person should be brought forward. That
person was Calhoun, for whom, among all the candidates of the day, he
thus far had the warmest regard.
Among so many aspirants--and not all have been mentioned--how should
the people make up their minds? In earlier days the party caucuses in
Congress would have eliminated various candidates, and the voters would
have found themselves called upon to make a choice between probably but
two opponents. The caucus was an informal, voluntary gathering of the
party members in the two houses to canvass the political situation and
decide upon the men to be supported by the rank and file of the party
for the presidency and vice presidency. In the lack of other nominating
machinery it served a useful purpose, and nominations had been commonly
made in this manner from 1796 onwards. There were obvious objections to
the plan--chiefly that the authority exercised was assumed rather than
delegated--and, as the campaign of 1824 approached, opposition flared
up in a very impressive manner.
Crawford, as the "regular" candidate, wanted a caucus, and his
adherents supported him in the wish. But all his rivals were opposed to
it, partly because they felt that they could not gain a caucus
nomination, partly because their followers generally objected to the
system. "King Caucus" became the target of general criticism.
Newspapers, except those for Crawford, denounced the old system;
legislatures passed resolutions against it; public meetings condemned
it; ponderous pamphlets were hurled at it; the campaigns of Jackson and
Clay, in particular, found their keynote in hostility toward it.
Failing to perceive that under the changed circumstances a caucus
nomination might become a liability rather than an asset, the Crawford
element pushed its plans, and on February 14, 1824, a caucus--destined
to be the last of the kind in the country--was duly held. It proved a
fiasco, for it was attended by only sixty-six persons. Crawford was
"recommended to the people of the United States" by an almost unanimous
vote, but the only effect was to infuse fresh energy into the campaigns
of his leading competitors. "The caucus," wrote Daniel Webster to his
brother Ezekiel, "has hurt nobody but its friends."
For the first time in eight years the country witnessed a real
presidential contest. The campaign, none the less, was one in which the
candidates themselves took but little active part. The days of
"swinging around the circle" had not yet dawned in our national
politics, nor had even those of the "front-porch" campaign. Adams made
no effort either to be nominated or to be elected, retaining throughout
the contest that austere reserve in public manner which contrasted so
singularly with his amiability and good humor in private life. Jackson
remained quietly at the Hermitage, replying to correspondents and
acknowledging expressions of support, but leaving to his managers the
work of winning the voters. Clay, whose oratorical gifts would have
made him an invincible twentieth century campaigner, contented himself
with a few interviews and speeches. The candidate who normally would
have taken most active personal part in the campaign was Crawford. But
in August, 1823--six months before the caucus nomination--he was
stricken with paralysis and rendered speechless, almost blind, and
practically helpless. For months he hovered between life and death in a
"mansion" on the outskirts of Washington, while his friends labored to
conceal the seriousness of his condition and to keep his canvass going.
Gradually he rallied; but his powerful frame was shattered, and even
when the caucus discharged its appointed task of nominating him, the
politicians were cold-heartedly speculating upon who would receive the
"old republican" support if he should die. He recovered and lived ten
years; but his chances of the presidency were much diminished by his
ill fortune. "He had fallen with his face toward the goal, with his
eyes and his heart fixed upon it."
As the canvass progressed, Jackson steadily gained. His election to the
United States Senate, in the autumn of 1823, over a stanch supporter of
Crawford showed that his own State was acting in good faith when it
proposed him for the higher position. Clever propaganda turned
Pennsylvania "Jackson mad"; whereupon Calhoun, with an eye to the
future, sought an alliance with his competitor. The upshot was that a
convention held at Harrisburg in March, 1824, nominated Jackson almost
unanimously and named Calhoun for the vice presidency. Hostility to the
caucus became also a great asset. Tariff, internal improvements, and
foreign policy were discussed in the campaign, but the real issue was
the manner of selecting the President. Should he continue to be chosen
by a combination of Congressmen, or should the people take matters into
their own hands? Impatience with the caucus system showed itself in
numerous nominations of Clay, Adams, and Jackson by sundry state
conventions, legislatures, and other more or less official bodies. The
supporters of Jackson, in particular, made "down with the caucus" their
rallying cry and found it tremendously effective. In the earlier stages
of the campaign the politicians, aside from Lewis and his coworkers,
were unwilling to believe that Jackson could be elected. Later,
however, they were forced to acknowledge his strength, and at the end
the fight was really between Jackson and the field, rather than between
Crawford and the field as had been anticipated.
At the beginning of November, Jackson, accompanied by his wife and
traveling in a handsome coach drawn by four of the finest Hermitage
thoroughbreds, set out for Washington. Hostile scribblers lost no time
in contrasting this display of grandeur with the republican simplicity
of Jefferson, who rode from Monticello to the capital on the back of a
plantation nag without pedigree. But Jackson was not perturbed. At
various points on the road he received returns from the elections, and
when after four or five weeks the equipage drew up in the capital
Jackson knew the general result. Calhoun had been elected vice
president with little opposition. But no one of the presidential
candidates had obtained an electoral majority, and the task of choosing
among the highest three would, under the terms of the Constitution,
devolve upon the House of Representatives. When, by the middle of
December, the returns were all in, it was found that Jackson would have
99 votes in the electoral college, Adams 84, Crawford 41, and Clay 37.
The country awaited the 9th of February--the day of the official
count--with great interest. Clay was, of course, eliminated. Crawford
likewise, by reason of his poor showing and the precarious state of his
health, could not expect to do more than hold his own. The contest had
narrowed to Jackson and Adams, with Clay holding the balance. There
were twenty-four States in the Union; the successful candidate must
command the votes of thirteen.
The choice that Clay now had to make was distasteful, although not
really difficult. Jackson had obtained a substantial plurality of the
electoral votes; he probably had a plurality of the popular vote,
although in the six States in which the electors were chosen by the
Legislature the popular vote could not be computed; the Legislature of
Clay's own State called upon the Congressmen from the State to give the
Tenneseean its support. But Clay had felt very bitterly about the
candidacy of "this military chieftain." Furthermore, he knew that if
Jackson were to be elected, the country would not be disposed to take
his successor from the West. Besides, Calhoun had put himself in line
for the Jacksonian succession. On the other hand, Clay was not without
grievances against Adams. The New Englander had captured the coveted
Secretaryship of State in Monroe's Cabinet; he had taken no pains to
conceal his dislike of the Kentucky "gamester in politics"; his foreign
policy had been the target of many of Clay's keenest oratorical
thrusts. But the country would be safe in his hands; and a popular
westerner might well hope to become his successor. The decision in
favor of Adams was reached with little delay and was confided to
intimates almost two months before the House balloted. Though Clay's
choice did not insure the election of Adams, it made that outcome
extremely probable.
As the weeks passed, the situation became more tense. All the
principals in the drama were at the capital--Adams as Secretary of
State, Crawford as Secretary of the Treasury, Clay as Speaker of the
House, Jackson as Senator--and the city was filled with followers who
busied themselves in proposing combinations and making promises which,
for the greater part, could not be traced to the candidates themselves.
O'Neil's Tavern--graced by the vivacious "Peggy," who, as Mrs. John H.
Eaton, was later to upset the equilibrium of the Jackson
Administration--and other favorite lodging houses were the scenes of
midnight conferences, intimate conversations, and mysterious comings
and goings which kept their oldest and most sophisticated frequenters
on the alert. "Incedo super ignes--I walk over fires," confided the
straitlaced Adams to his diary, and not without reason. A group of
Clay's friends came to the New Englander's room to urge in somewhat
veiled language that their chief be promised, in return for his
support, a place in the Cabinet. A Missouri representative who held the
balance of power in his delegation plainly offered to swing the State
for Adams if the latter would agree to retain a brother on the federal
bench and be "reasonable" in the matter of patronage.
By the last week of January it was rather generally understood that
Clay's strength would be thrown to Adams. Up to this time the Jackson
men had refused to believe that such a thing could happen. But evidence
had been piled mountain-high; adherents of both allies were openly
boasting of the arrangements that had been made. The Jacksonians were
furious, and the air was filled with recriminations. On January 28,
1825, an anonymous letter in the Columbian Observer of Philadelphia
made the direct charge that the agents of Clay had offered the
Kentuckian's support to both Jackson and Adams in return for an
appointment as Secretary of State, and that, while the friends of
Jackson would not descend to "such mean barter and sale," a bargain
with the Adams forces had been duly closed. Clay's rage was
ungovernable. Through the columns of the National Intelligencer he
pronounced his unknown antagonist "a base and infamous calumniator, a
dastard and a liar," called upon him to "unveil himself," and declared
that he would hold him responsible "to all the laws which govern and
regulate men of honor."
Two days later an obscure Pennsylvania Congressman by the name of
George Kremer tendered his respects to "the Honorable H. Clay," avowed
his authorship of the communication in question, offered to prove the
truth of his charges, and closed sententiously by affirming that as a
representative of the people he would "not fear to 'cry aloud and spare
not' when their rights and privileges are at stake." The matter was
serious, but official Washington could hardly repress a smile. Kremer
was a thoroughly honest but grossly illiterate rustic busybody who thus
far had attracted the capital's attention mainly by reason of his
curiously cut leopard-skin overcoat. The real author of the charge
seems to have been James Buchanan, and Kremer was simple-minded and
credulous enough to be made the catspaw in the business. Clay was taken
aback. Kremer significantly made no reference to the "code of honor";
and since a duel with such a personage would be an absurdity, Clay
substituted a request that the House make an immediate investigation of
the charges. A committee of seven was appointed. But when it summoned
Kremer to give his testimony, he refused to appear, on the
ground--which in the present instance was a mere pretext--that the
House had no jurisdiction over the conduct of its members outside the
chamber.
The truth of the matter is that Kremer was only a tool in the hands of
the Jackson managers. He admitted privately to members of the committee
that he did not write the letter in the Observer, and it was plain
enough that he did not understand its purport. His promise to
substantiate its contents was made in a moment of surprise, because
somebody had neglected to coach him on the point. Finding that it could
make no headway, the committee reported the fact, on the 9th of
February, and the investigation was dropped. This was precisely what
the Jackson managers wanted. Whatever happened, Jackson would be the
gainer. "If Clay transferred his following to Adams, the charge would
gain credence with the masses; if he were not made Secretary of State,
it would be alleged that honest George Kremer (an ardent Jacksonian)
had exposed the bargain and prevented its consummation." π
π Turner, Rise of the New West, p. 208.
Was this charge of a "corrupt bargain" well founded? For a generation
every public man had views on that subject for which he was ready to
fight; mid-century and later historians came to conclusions of the most
contradictory nature. The pros and cons are too complicated to be
presented here, but certain things are fairly clear. In two elaborate
speeches Clay marshaled evidence that before leaving Kentucky he
decided to support Adams in preference to Jackson and Crawford. This
evidence did not convince the Jacksonians; but it could hardly have
been expected to do so, and nowadays it looks to be unimpeachable. It
is certain that the friends of Clay approached the Adams managers with
a view to a working agreement involving the Secretaryship of State; but
it is equally clear that the Jackson and Crawford men solicited Clay's
support "by even more unblushing offers of political reward than those
alleged against Adams." Finally it is known that Adams gave some
explicit preÎlection pledges, and that by doing so he drew some votes;
but on the subject of an alliance with Clay he is not known to have
gone further than to say to a delegation of Clay supporters that if
elected by western votes he would naturally look to the West for much
of the support which his Administration would need.
At noon, on the 9th of February, the Senate and House met in joint
session to witness the count of the electoral vote. Spectators packed
the galleries and overflowed into every available space. The first acts
were of a purely formal nature. Then the envelopes were opened; the
votes were counted; Calhoun was declared elected to the vice
presidency; and it was announced that no candidate for the presidency
had received a majority. Then the senators withdrew, and the
representatives addressed themselves to the task which the Constitution
devolved upon them. The members of each delegation took their seats
together; the vote of each State was placed in a separate box on a
table; and Daniel Webster and John Randolph, acting as tellers, opened
the boxes and tabulated the results. No one expected the first ballot
to be decisive; indeed the friends of Crawford, who were present in
large numbers, were pinning their hopes to the possibility that after
repeated ballotings the House would break the deadlock between Jackson
and Adams by turning to their candidate. A hush fell upon the expectant
assemblage as Webster rose to announce the result; and seasoned
politicians could hardly trust their ears when they heard: Adams,
thirteen votes; Jackson, seven; Crawford, four. An eleventh-hour change
of mind by a New York representative had thrown the vote of that State
into the Adams column and had thereby assured the triumph of the New
Englander.
That evening Jackson and Adams came face to face at a presidential
levee, Jackson with a lady on his right arm. Each man hesitated an
instant, and spectators wondered what was going to happen. But those
who were looking for a sensation were disappointed. Reaching out his
long arm, the General said in his most cordial manner: "How do you do,
Mr. Adams? I give you my left hand, for the right, as you see, is
devoted to the fair: I hope you are very well, sir." The reply came in
clear but icy tones: "Very well, sir; I hope General Jackson is well."
It is the testimony of an unprejudiced observer that of the two, the
defeated Tenneseean bore himself more graciously than the victorious
New Englander.
Two days later Adams, following a conference with Monroe, invited upon
his head the fires of heaven by announcing that he had decided to
appoint Clay Secretary of State, "considering it due to his talents and
services to the western section of the United States, whence he comes,
and to the confidence in me manifested by their delegations."