Prussian militarism has been explained upon the theory that it was a
development consequent upon a realization of the benefits which had
accrued to Prussia through war. As a matter of fact, however, it is not
possible to explain all militarism in this way. Certainly in Spain
neither wars nor the army have been of the slightest benefit to the
country.
If we consider the epoch which goes by the name of contemporary history,
that is to say from the French Revolution to the present time, we shall
perceive immediately that we have not been over fortunate.
The French Republic declared war upon us in 1793. A campaign of
astuteness, a tactical warfare was waged by us upon the frontiers, upon
occasion not without success, until finally the French army grew strong
enough to sweep us back, and to cross the Ebro.
We took part in the battle of Trafalgar in 1805. Spain presented a fine
appearance, she made a mighty gesture with her Gravinas, her Churrucas
and her Alavas, but the battle itself was a disaster.
In 1808 the War of Independence broke out, providing another splendid
exhibition of popular fervour. In this war, the regular Army was the
force which accomplished least. The war took its character from the
guerrillas, from the dwellers in the towns. The campaign was directed by
Englishmen. The Spanish army suffered more defeats than it won
victories, while its administrative and technical organization was
deplorable. The intervention of Angoulême followed in 1823. The Army was
composed of liberal officers, but it contained no troops, so that all
they ever did was to retire before the enemy, as he was more numerous
and more powerful.
The Spanish cause in America was hopeless before the fighting began. The
land was enormous, troops were few, and in large measure composed of
Indians. What the English were never able to do in the fulness of their
power, was not to be accomplished by Spaniards in their decadence. Our
First Civil War, which was fierce, terrible, and waged without quarter,
called into being a valorous liberal army, and soldiers sprang up of the
calibre of Espartero, Zurbano and Narváez, but simultaneously a powerful
Carlist army was organized under leaders of military genius, such as
Zumalacárregui and Cabrera. Victory for either side was impossible, and
the war ended in compromise.
The Second Civil War also resulted in a system of pacts and compromises
far more secret than the Convention of Vergara. The Cuban war and the
war in the Philippines, as afterwards the war with the United States,
were calamitous, while the present campaign in Morocco has not one
redeeming feature.
From the War of the French Revolution to this very day, the African War
has been the only one in which our forces have met with the slightest
success.
Nevertheless, our soldiers aspire to a position of dominance in the
country equal to that attained by the French soldiers subsequent to
Jena, and by the Germans after Sedan.