RUMORS OF WAR
BROCK, in 1805, was made full colonel. After the incident of the mutiny
he had taken over the active command at Fort George as well as at York,
and at the former, as at the latter, a new and kindlier order of
discipline was worked out. In this, Lieutenant-Colonel Sheaffe seems to
have helped. No doubt he was influenced by reflecting on the trouble he
had helped to cause. Later on, in reporting the excellent discipline of
the 49th, Brock gave a good deal of the credit to Sheaffe. Desertions
were in bad odor, for the commanding officer gave his men no reason for
leaving him.
In October Brock went to England on leave. While he was glad to see his
old friends again, he made business his first consideration and
discussed with the British commander-in-chief, the Duke of York, the
military situation in the Canadas. He proposed the establishment of
veteran battalions. He instanced the attractiveness of desertion to the
soldier quartered near the United States border and pointed out that the
immigration from the United States to Canada of undesirable
settlers—undesirable since they owed no allegiance to the British
flag—might possibly counterbalance the devotion of the United Empire
Loyalists. He suggested that these veterans should serve a certain time
and that they should then be given an opportunity to settle on the land.
The Duke warmly thanked Brock, and later on the plan was adopted.
Brock turned his steps Guernsey-wards, but after a few days there news
of real trouble with the United States made it imperative that he should
return to his command. Shortening his leave, he set sail on June 26th,
1806, and never returned to England.
When he arrived in Quebec he found himself the senior officer of
military rank in the Canadas and, as such, at once assumed the command
of all the forces.
The war cloud was gathering. Although Nelson’s victory at Trafalgar had
finally shattered Napoleon’s dream of invading England, he still hoped
to cripple her by destroying her commerce and cutting off her food
supply. Rapidly he subjugated Austria and Prussia, and when these two
countries were at his feet, from the capital of Prussia he issued the
famous Berlin Decree. This decree forbade France or any of her allies to
trade with Britain and declared that _any_ ship engaged in such trade
might be lawfully seized as a prize of war. Britain did not meekly
submit, but by various orders in council forbade the ships of any nation
to trade with France or any of her allies. Both the Berlin Decree and
the orders in council were very high handed proceedings and bore with
special severity on the neutral nations.
At this time the relations between the United States and Great Britain
were very strained. In order to maintain her navy at its full strength,
Britain had revived her ancient “right of search.” She claimed and
exercised the right to search the ships of neutral nations to find if
they were carrying British subjects who were deserters from the British
navy. The United States protested strongly against this action of Great
Britain, holding that once a British seaman had crossed the decks of an
American ship he was an American, and, moreover, she declined to
acknowledge any right of Great Britain to hold up and to search her
ships on the chance of finding deserters. And now came the British
orders in council as a further source of irritation.
It is true that the commerce of the United States with foreign nations
had practically ceased as a result of the actions of the warring powers
in Europe, but for this the Berlin Decrees were as much to blame as the
orders in council. In fact at this time the United States suffered
innumerable humiliations at the hands of the French. But in spite of
this the whole anger of the United States seemed to be directed against
Great Britain. The bitterness produced by the Revolutionary War had not
yet died down, and there was a strong party in the country who made it
its business to increase the flame of hatred. This party looked with
covetous eyes on Canada, and desired to incorporate it into the United
States. Without question that was the underlying reason for the War of
1812-14.
President Jefferson was a bitter enemy of Great Britain. While Brock was
still in England, the president addressed Congress and said that “the
impressment of American seamen by British cruisers, not at all checked
by the remonstrances of the American Government, was a growing source of
irritation and complaint.... She [Britain] plainly showed a disposition
to narrow the limits of the commerce of neutrals by denying to them the
right of carrying on a trade with belligerents which she did not
interdict with her own subjects.” Britain’s view was that as she was
trying to beat the man who was doing his best to conquer Europe, the
United States should see that if extreme measures were necessary they
must be borne with, even though they hurt for the moment.
At the end of 1805 President Jefferson went further. He came out flatly
and said that “the foreign relations of the United States had been
materially changed since the preceding session.” He charged Britain with
piracy and infesting the American coast with private armed vessels,
“which had perpetrated acts beyond their commission.” And he said: “It
is due to ourselves to provide effective opposition to a doctrine which
is as infamous as it is unwarranted.”
Brock recognized the veiled threat in the words “effective opposition”
and was convinced that Jefferson and that section of the United States
for which he stood wanted war. Hence his quick return to Canada. He knew
that Jefferson’s first act in the event of war would be to try and get
control of the lakes and rivers and to capture the fortified posts.
Brock realized better than any man how weak was the resistance that
could be offered unless the defences of the Canadas were immediately
strengthened. As soon as he had taken up his new command he set about
preparing the defence Canada was to offer. In this he was hampered
rather than helped by the civil authorities. The governor-general of the
Canadas at this time, Sir Robert Prescott, does not seem to have taken
his position very seriously, and Thomas Dunn, president of the Executive
Council, the man with whom Brock had directly to deal, appears to have
been of one mind with Prescott.
Early in 1807, Brock was greatly heartened by proposals from Colonel
John Macdonell, who was lieutenant of the county of Glengarry and had
been for four years commanding officer of the Glengarry Militia
Regiment, for forming a company of Highland Fencibles. Brock forwarded
the scheme to the war office in London and backed it up. It would be, he
said, “essentially useful in checking any seditious disposition which
the wavering sentiments of a large population in the Montreal district
might at any time manifest.” This is an indication that Brock was by no
means sure which way the _habitant_ would go in case of war.
Brock thought he had ground for his suspicions, and he decided to get to
know the folk of Lower Canada better. When Sir James Craig arrived in
Quebec, Brock’s tenure of the office of commander-in-chief ended. Sir
James became that and governor-general in one, but he appointed Brock as
acting brigadier-general. This was confirmed in London. Brock was sent
to Montreal in command of the troops there and quartered in the old
Chateau de Ramesay at Montreal, then a rich centre and the only city of
pleasure and gaiety in Canada.
In Montreal he managed to see a good deal of the fur lords and great
business men of the place. He entered into their social life, and the
French-Canadian then, as now, knew how to be hospitable. This gave the
brigadier a chance to judge somewhat as to where French-Canada stood,
and he had even better facilities when, in September, 1808, he was
superseded in the Montreal command by General Drummond and was moved
back to Quebec. Here he had many friends and he entertained and was
entertained. All sorts of regattas and land sports were held by the
officers of the garrison and, here, as in Montreal, he found a good deal
of pleasure in social affairs. He writes of “a vast assemblage of all
descriptions”—an occasion when he entertained Lieutenant-Governor Gore,
of Upper Canada, and his wife at a dinner and ball. During these days he
unquestionably became reassured as to the loyalty of the people of Lower
Canada.
He had perhaps been unduly suspicious. The people of Lower Canada, of
course, were almost entirely of French descent. They spoke French, and
Brock feared that in a Franco-America alliance, French Canada would
remember its descent and support Napoleon. There were signs of leaning
France-wards. The French Canadians publicly rejoiced when news of a
fresh victory for Napoleon reached them, and Brock at first certainly
deemed them disloyal. He so expressed himself in his letters again and
again. He could not understand why they should be, for they were much
freer and happier under British rule than they had been when Bigot and
others, during the French regime, had governed them. Yet even in the
early days, Brock was in two minds about them for he wrote: “It may
appear surprising that men petted as they have been and indulged in
everything they could desire should wish for a change, but so it is, and
I am inclined to think that were Englishmen placed in the same situation
they would show even more impatience to escape from French rule.”
But, on the whole, Brock need not have feared. The French Canadians did
not want another rule. Their priests and men in high authority were
loyal to Britain, and they represented the mass of opinion more than the
Napoleonic or American agent who was to be found here and there in Lower
Canada.
In these days, Brock was not particularly happy. He was worried by the
possibility of war, and taking it on the whole he was not in love with
Canada. Perhaps he was homesick. He heard of former comrades winning
their spurs on the battlefields of Europe, and he compared their lot to
his in a “remote, inactive corner” as he dubbed Canada in a letter to
England. And we know that he had enlisted his brother Savery’s efforts
to have him transferred. It was natural. He was a man of action and had
as keen a desire as any soldier for risk and fame.
Brock’s first measure in strengthening the defences of Canada was to
make Quebec attack-proof. Sir Guy Carleton, in 1775-1776, had defended
Quebec against American forces under General Montgomery. There might
soon be another attack, and Brock wanted to have Quebec in such shape
that it could repel invasion. He appealed to the council for a thousand
men and sufficient carts for six months to strengthen the walls. But the
civil government of Lower Canada thought his move was a political one
and gave little or no aid. They told him he must do the work himself,
and he did. In a letter to the president of the council he scouts the
suspicions of the civil government and states that his “sole object was
to state the assistance required by the military to remedy a glaring
defect in the fortifications of Quebec, should his Honor conceive that
preparatory measures were necessary to be adopted in consequence ... of
the ... aggressive proceedings in the proclamation of the American
Government.”
He went ahead and erected a battery mounting eight thirty-six pounders
in the centre of the citadel at Quebec, commanding the heights opposite.
This was first christened “Brock’s Battery,” but when the newly-arrived
governor-general, Sir James Craig, saw it, he thought, says Brock, “that
anything so pre-eminent should be distinguished by the most exalted
name.” It was therefore called “The King’s Battery,” and, wrote Brock,
“this is the greatest compliment that he could pay to my judgment.”
Altogether, at great expense, the fortifications of Quebec were greatly
improved. Proper drill grounds were made and a good hospital created.
Quartermasters at Amherstburg and Kingston were appointed to take charge
of new fleets of schooners and military batteaux which he had
constructed.
He was not a moment too soon with his work. The international situation
was rapidly complicating. Mention has been made of Britain’s stopping
and searching American vessels for British deserters. This continued and
became more general, and there does not seem to be room for doubt that,
in some cases, British commanders were very autocratic. They gave the
United States legitimate cause for complaint by sometimes carrying off
seamen whom they pretended were British, but who were really American
citizens. The case of the _Chesapeake_ brought matters to a head. It was
suspected by Admiral Berkeley, stationed at Halifax, that some sailors,
whose offence was particularly flagrant, had deserted from the British
sloop _Halifax_ and had found refuge on the _Chesapeake_. The Admiral
ordered Captain Humphreys of the frigate _Leopard_ to insist on the
return of these deserters. Commodore Barron commanding the _Chesapeake_
refused point blank to surrender the men in question, and Humphreys
fired on the United States frigate, which did not return the fire. She
was seized, and the deserters secured by the British commander.
Naturally the United States threatened war. This was answered by an
honorable apology from Britain, however, and the war cloud passed for
the moment. But Brock thought it could not long be delayed. The heart of
the trouble was still there, and sooner or later the irritation which
each nation felt at the other was bound to find outlet in actual
conflict. Hence Brock’s rush to make preparations for adequate defence.