CHAPTER XVIII

RAILWAY POLICY AND AMALGAMATION

[Illustration: SCENE ON THE SOUTHERN NIGERIA (EXTENSION) RAILWAY.]

[Illustration: PLATE-LAYING ON THE NORTHERN NIGERIA RAILWAY.]

To all these incongruities must be added the series of events which have

led to the creation of two competing railway systems, and, consequently,

to open rivalry between the two Administrations in the effort to secure

the traffic from the interior, a rivalry which is certainly not lessened

by the circumstance that the method of railway construction followed in

one Protectorate differs radically from that pursued in the other. This

rivalry, needless to say, is perfectly honourable to both sides, but it

is deplorable, nevertheless, and not in the public interest, and were

the two systems placed under one management before the amalgamation of

the Protectorates, _i.e._ if Southern Nigeria took over the Northern

line, which it very naturally wishes to do, having lent the money for

its construction, and not appreciating the _rôle_ of milch cow without

adequate return, friction between the railway management and the

Political Staff would be inevitable owing to the fundamental divergence

of method already referred to. Moreover, the results achieved by Mr.

Eaglesome and his staff in laying the Baro-Kano railway have been of so

revolutionary a character as to suggest the advisability of reconsidering

the whole policy of railway construction in British West Africa, such

as has been pursued hitherto. I will refer briefly to this method in a

moment. Meanwhile the position of the competing lines is roughly this.

Southern Nigeria has built—or rather is building, for the last section

is not quite finished—a railway from Lagos which crosses the Niger at

Jebba, proceeds therefrom to Zungeru, the capital of Northern Nigeria,

and onwards to a place called Minna.[13] Northern Nigeria has built

a railway from Baro, a spot 407 miles up the Niger to Minna, where

the junction is effected, and thence to Kano. Southern Nigeria, which

looks upon the Northern Protectorate as its natural hinterland, wishes

to attract the trade of the north over its line to Lagos, and desires

that the through rates it has drawn up should be accepted by Northern

Nigeria, and claims the right of fixing the rates on the section of its

railway from the point where it enters Northern Nigeria territory (Offa)

to the point of junction. The Northern Nigeria Administration, which

does not in the least regard itself as the natural appanage of Southern

Nigeria, desires to feed the Baro-Kano railway in conjunction with the

Niger, and declares that the through rates proposed by Southern Nigeria

are so manipulated as to ensure the deflection of the northern trade to

Lagos and thus to starve the Baro-Kano line, which would tend to reduce

a considerable section of it, apart from its very definite strategical

importance, to scrap iron. That was the position when I left the country,

and I do not gather that it has greatly advanced since. There has been a

conference, but it has not resulted, and could not result, in agreement

as to the question of what line is to get preferential treatment; and

that, of course, is the main question which should be decided by an

impartial authority, having regard to the interests of Nigeria as a

whole. Now a word as to the two systems. So far as governing principles

are concerned, it would probably be regarded as a fair description to

state that the Southern Nigerian method is less concerned with capital

expenditure and with rapidity of construction, as with the advisability

of securing permanently good construction and putting in permanent

work throughout, including stone ballast, fine stations and so on.

The Northern Nigerian method, on the other hand, aims at keeping down

initial capital expenditure and interest, exercising strict economy in

the matter of buildings, both for the public and for the staff, combined

with rapidity of construction and improving the line as the traffic

grows. These ideas represent two schools of thought, and beyond the

general remark that a rich Administration may be able to afford what a

poor one certainly cannot, the non-expert had best not venture upon an

expression of opinion lest peradventure he be ground between the upper

and the nether millstone. But as regards the respective systems under

which these principles are carried out, it is impossible to resist the

conclusion that Northern Nigeria has demonstrably proved its superiority

so far as actual construction is concerned. The Southern Nigeria line has

been, and is being, constructed on the old model. Consulting engineers

in London are employed by the Colonial Office, and appoint the staff in

Africa. They are unchecked, for the Colonial Office has no independent

railway adviser for tropical Africa, no railway board, or department,

or anything of that kind. Thus there are two distinct staffs concerned,

a staff appointed by and responsible to the Consulting Engineers in

London, and the General Manager’s Staff in the Dependency. Where the

responsibility of one begins and the other ends, both would probably

find it difficult to define; and no one who knows West Africa can fail

to appreciate the divided counsels, the friction, the waste of time and

money which such a system must inevitably entail, even though every human

rivet in the machine were endowed with superlative qualities. It is very

difficult to arrive at a clear idea as to what the average expenditure of

the Southern Nigerian railway has been per mile, but it does not appear

to be disputed that the cost of construction of the first section of 120

miles to Ibadan, plus the capital expenditure incurred on the open line

and the working capital for stores, was enormous, viz. £11,000 per mile.

The expenditure upon the remaining sections will probably be found to

work out at an average of between £5000 and £6000 per mile, exclusive of

railway stock and maintenance. Contract labour has been employed except

in the later stages, when the line entering Northern Nigeria territory

has come under the system of political recruiting which will now be

described.

[Illustration: LANDING-PLACE AT BARO.]

[Illustration: GROUP OF RAILWAY LABOURERS—BARO.]

The great advantage which the Northern Nigerian system possesses

over that of Southern Nigeria is unity of direction. But the vital

difference between the two systems is this: Northern Nigeria has shown

that it is possible to construct a railway without the services of

Consulting Engineers in England at all. Now this is a fact which cannot

be too pointedly emphasized; because Consulting Engineers are most

expensive luxuries if they are not necessities. The logical deduction

is, either that Consulting Engineers can be, and if they can be should

be, dispensed with for any future railways in West Africa; or that the

Baro-Kano railway, without them, is a failure. It appears to me that the

Baro-Kano railway has been a marvellous success from the point of view of

construction. What are the facts? The Administration, _i.e._ its Public

Works Department, with the help of a few Royal Engineer officers lent

by the Home Government, has been its own builder. The absence of any

foreign body has reduced friction to a minimum. In fact, there has been

no friction whatever, because the Railway Staff has co-operated in every

way with the Political Staff, and the exercise of the Political Officers’

legitimate duties in protecting the interests of the natives has not

been resented or looked upon in the light of vexatious interference by

the railway management. I should be the last to wish to minimize the

excellence of the individual work performed by the engineers in charge

of the Southern Nigeria line, which I was able to admire, and from whom

I received the greatest hospitality and kindness at various stages

in my journey; but the nature of the system there followed precludes

that enthusiastic co-operation of all the elements concerned which is

the predominating characteristic of Northern Nigerian methods. And,

as already stated, there is a very considerable item of expense to be

considered through the employment of Consulting Engineers in London. In

the Northern Protectorate every one, from the Governor—the Baro-Kano

railway owes, of course, its inception to Sir Percy Girouard—down to the

foreman, has been, as it were, a member of a single family. In fact,

one might almost say that the line has been built on the communistic

principle. In no direction does the system show better results than in

the organization of labour. It has proved to demonstration what is the

right way of dealing with native labour in West Africa, viz.: that the

labourer on public works shall be drawn from the neighbourhood where

the public works are situate, that he shall proceed to the scene of his

labours accompanied by his own Village or District Headman, the native

authority to whom he owes allegiance, and whom he knows and trusts; that

he shall perform his duties in the presence and under the supervision of

that Headman, and that for the conduct of the Headman himself, and for

the whole proceedings under which recruitment is carried on and labour

performed, the Political Officer shall be responsible. In other words,

it shows the right procedure to be that of recruiting through and with

the co-operation of, and by the orders of, the natural authorities of the

people under the supreme control of the Resident, combined with a form of

payment which shall ensure the wage being placed in the wage-earner’s own

hand, not in somebody else’s hand. By this system alone can the labour of

the country employed in agricultural and industrial pursuits be capable

of bearing an additional burden for public purposes, without injustice,

without ferment, without dislocating the whole labour system of the

region. Persuaded of this truth, the Political Officers of Northern

Nigeria, aided by the ready willingness of the Railway Staff, have

achieved a veritable triumph of organization which should ever remain

a model to follow. And in that triumph can be read a deep political

lesson. That such organization has been possible in Northern Nigeria

is due, primarily, to the existence of a native political organization

to which we could appeal and upon which we could rely. The principle

adopted on the works themselves has been to give to each foreman his own

set of Headmen, with their own gangs to look after, and to so regulate

the labour that no individual should work more than eight hours _per

diem_. Built under conditions such as these, the Northern Nigeria

railway, constructed under great difficulties with wonderful rapidity

and at a cost of well under £4000 per mile, rolling-stock and stores

included, is not only in itself a striking performance—with, I believe,

if free conditions of development are assured to it, a bright economic

future—but a political and educational work of permanent value. It has

helped to bring the Political Officers into closer personal touch with

the population. It has increased the confidence of the people in the

honesty of their alien overlords, and has imbued them with a personal

interest and friendly curiosity in the railway. It has taught them many

things which they did not know before, things which will be useful to

themselves in their own social life. It has brought previously hostile

tribes together into the same trench, effacing tribal barriers and

burying old feuds. It has largely increased the use of silver coinage,

and stimulated commercial activity. The same system is being followed

in the construction, now proceeding, of the branch line towards the

tin-fields; but many more railways will be required to develop the

commercial potentialities of Northern Nigeria, and the fact constitutes

one more argument to those already given in favour of an amalgamation of

the two Protectorates, and the evolution of one set of governing ideas.

[Illustration: VILLAGE HEAD-MEN.]

[Illustration: VILLAGE HEAD-MEN.]

I cannot leave the question of railway construction in the Nigerias

without expressing regret that in authorizing the construction of the

new line, the Colonial Office should have been led to break the gauge,

and to decide upon a 2 feet 6 inch line instead of the 3 feet 6 inch

standard. Apart from other objections, which can be urged more fittingly

by experts, it is obvious that this departure necessitates a complete

equipment of new rolling stock, and the erection of special engineering

shops to deal with it. Every freshly constructed line is bound to have

a surplus of rolling stock. The Baro-Kano railway is no exception to

the rule, and its surplus stock could have been utilized on the new

branch line. It is a penny wise and pound foolish policy, and, in all

probability, the ultimate result will be that this 2 feet 6 inch line

will cost very little, if at all, less than a 3 feet 6 inch would have

done.

Nigeria · 第 18 / 20 章