THE GENERAL THEORY OF POETRY IN THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE
IN the first book of his _Geography_ Strabo defines poetry as "a kind of
elementary philosophy, which introduces us early to life, and gives us
pleasurable instruction in reference to character, emotion, action."
This passage sounds the keynote of the Renaissance theory of poetry.
Poetry is therein stated to be a form of philosophy, and, moreover, a
philosophy whose subject is life, and its object is said to be
pleasurable instruction.
I. _Poetry as a Form of Scholastic Philosophy_
In the first place, poetry is a form of philosophy. Savonarola had
classed poetry with logic and grammar, and had asserted that a knowledge
of logic is essential to the composing of poetry. The division of the
sciences and the relative importance of each were a source of infinite
scholastic discussion during the Middle Ages. Aristotle had first placed
dialectic or logic, rhetoric, and poetics in the same category of
efficient philosophy. But Averroes was probably the first to confuse the
function of poetics with that of logic, and to make the former a
subdivision, or form, of the latter; and this classification appears to
have been accepted by the scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages.
This conception of the position of poetry in the body of human knowledge
may be found, however, throughout the Renaissance. Thus, Robortelli, in
his commentary on Aristotle's _Poetics_ (1548), gives the usual
scholastic distinctions between the various forms of the written or
spoken word (_oratio_): the demonstrative, which deals with the true;
the dialectic, which deals with the probable; the rhetorical, with the
persuasive; and the poetic, with the false or fabulous.[40] By the term
"false" or "fabulous" is meant merely that the subject of poetry is not
actual fact, but that it deals with things as they ought to be, rather
than as they are. Varchi, in his public lectures on poetry (1553),
divides philosophy into two forms, real and rational. Real philosophy
deals with things, and includes metaphysics, ethics, physics, geometry,
and the like; while rational philosophy, which includes logic,
dialectic, rhetoric, history, poetry, and grammar, deals not with
things, but with words, and is not philosophy proper, but the instrument
of philosophy. Poetry is therefore, strictly speaking, neither an art
nor a science, but an instrument or faculty; and it is only an art in
the sense that it has been reduced to rules and precepts. It is, in
fact, a form of logic, and no man, according to Varchi, can be a poet
unless he is a logician; the better logician he is, the better poet he
will be. Logic and poetry differ, however, in their matter and their
instruments; for the subject of logic is truth, arrived at by means of
the demonstrative syllogism, while the subject of poetry is fiction or
invention, arrived at by means of that form of the syllogism known as
the example. Here the enthymeme, or example, which Aristotle has made
the instrument of rhetoric, becomes the instrument of poetry.
This classification survived in the Aristotelian schools at Padua and
elsewhere as late as Zabarella and Campanella. Zabarella, a professor of
logic and later of philosophy at Padua from 1564 to 1589, explains at
length Averroes's theory that poetics is a form of logic, in a treatise
on the nature of logic, published in 1578.[41] He concludes that the two
faculties, logic and poetics, are not instruments of philosophy in
general, but only of a part of it, for they refer rather to action than
to knowledge; that is, they come under Aristotle's category of efficient
philosophy. They are not the instruments of useful art or of moral
philosophy, the end of which is to make one's self good; but of civil
philosophy, the end of which is to make others good. If it be objected
that they are [Greek: ton enantion], that is, of both good and evil, it
may be answered that their proper end is good. Thus, in the _Symposium_,
the true poet is praised; while in the _Republic_ the poets who aim at
pleasure and who corrupt their audiences are censured; and Aristotle in
his definition of tragedy says that the end of tragedy is to purge the
passions and to correct the morals of men (_affectiones animi purgare et
mores corrigere_).
Even later than Zabarella, we find in the _Poetica_ of Campanella a
division of the sciences very similar to that of Savonarola and Varchi.
Theology is there placed at the head of all knowledge, in accordance
with the mediaeval tradition, while poetics, with dialectic, grammar, and
rhetoric, is placed among the logical sciences. Considering _poetica_ as
a form of philosophy, another commentator on Aristotle, Maggi (1550),
takes great pains to distinguish its various manifestations. _Poetica_
is the art of composing poetry, _poesis_, the poetry composed according
to this art, _poeta_, the composer of poetry, and _poema_, a single
specimen of poetry.[42] This distinction is an elaboration of two
passages in Plutarch and Aphthonius.
II. _Poetry as an Imitation of Life_
In the second place, according to the passage from Strabo cited at the
beginning of this chapter, poetry introduces us early to life, or, in
other words, its subject is human action, and it is what Aristotle calls
it, an imitation of human life. This raises two distinct problems.
First, what is the meaning of imitation? and what in life is the
subject-matter of this imitation?
The conception of imitation held by the critics of the Renaissance was
that expressed by Aristotle in the ninth chapter of the _Poetics_. The
passage is as follows:--
"It is evident from what has been said that it is not the
function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may
happen,--what is possible according to the law of probability
or necessity. The poet and the historian differ not by writing
in verse or in prose. The work of Herodotus might be put into
verse, and it would still be a species of history, with metre
no less than without it. The true difference is that one
relates what has happened, the other what may happen. Poetry,
therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than
history; for poetry tends to express the universal, history the
particular. The universal tells us how a person of given
character will on occasion speak or act, according to the law
of probability or necessity; and it is this universality at
which poetry aims in giving expressive names to the
characters."
In this passage Aristotle has briefly formulated a conception of ideal
imitation which may be regarded as universally valid, and which,
repeated over and over again, became the basis of Renaissance criticism.
In the _Poetica_ of Daniello (1536), occurs the first allusion in modern
literary criticism to the Aristotelian notion of ideal imitation.
According to Daniello, the poet, unlike the historian, can mingle
fictions with facts, because he is not obliged, as is the historian, to
describe things as they actually are or have been, but rather as they
ought to be; and it is in this that the poet most differs from the
historian, and not in the writing of verses; for even if Livy's works
were versified, they would still be histories as before.[43] This is of
course almost a paraphrase of the passage in Aristotle; but that
Daniello did not completely understand the ideal element in Aristotle's
conception is shown by the further distinction which he draws between
the historian and the poet. For he adds that the poet and the historian
have much in common; in both there are descriptions of places, peoples,
laws; both contain the representation of vices and virtues; in both,
amplification, variety, and digressions are proper; and both teach,
delight, and profit at the same time. They differ, however, in that the
historian, in telling his story, recounts it exactly as it happened, and
adds nothing; whereas the poet is permitted to add whatever he desires,
so long as the fictitious events have all the appearance of truth.
Somewhat later, Robortelli treats the question of aesthetic imitation
from another point of view. The poet deals with things as they ought to
be, but he can either appropriate actual fact, or he can invent his
material. If he does the former, he narrates the truth not as it really
happened, but as it might or ought to happen; while if he invents his
material, he must do so in accordance with the law of possibility, or
necessity, or probability and verisimilitude.[44] Thus Xenophon, in
describing Cyrus, does not depict him as he actually was, but as the
best and noblest king can be and ought to be; and Cicero, in describing
the orator, follows the same method. From this it is evident that the
poet can invent things transcending the order of nature; but if he does
so, he should describe what might or ought to have been.
Here Robortelli answers a possible objection to Aristotle's statement
that poets deal only with what is possible and verisimilar. Is it
possible and verisimilar that the gods should eat ambrosia and drink
nectar, as Homer describes, and that such a being as Cerberus should
have several heads, as we find in Virgil, not to mention various
improbable things that occur in many other poets? The answer to such an
objection is that poets can invent in two ways. They can invent either
things according to nature or things transcending nature. In the former
case, these things must be in keeping with the laws of probability and
necessity; but in the latter case, the things are treated according to a
process described by Aristotle himself, and called paralogism, which
means, not necessarily false reasoning, but the natural, if quite
inconclusive, logical inference that the things we know not of are
subject to the same laws as the things we know. The poets accept the
existence of the gods from the common notion of men, and then treat all
that relates to these deities in accordance with this system of
paralogism. In tragedy and comedy men are described as acting in
accordance with the ordinary occurrences of nature; but in epic poetry
this is not entirely the case, and the marvellous is therefore admitted.
Accordingly, this marvellous element has the widest scope in epic
poetry; while in comedy, which treats of things nearest to our own time,
it ought not to be admitted at all.
But there is another problem suggested by the passage from the _Poetics_
which has been cited. Aristotle says that imitation, and not metre, is
the test of poetry; that even if a history were versified, it would
still remain history. The question then arises whether a writer who
imitates in prose, that is, without verse, would be worthy of the title
of poet. Robortelli answers this question by pointing out that metre
does not constitute the nature, force, or essence of poetry, which
depends entirely on the fact of imitation; but at the same time, while
one who imitates without verse is a poet, in the best and truest poetry
imitation and metre are combined.[45]
In Fracastoro's _Naugerius, sive de Poetica Dialogus_ (1555), there is
the completest explanation of the ideal element in the Aristotelian
conception of imitation. The poet, according to Aristotle, differs from
other writers in that the latter consider merely the particular, while
the poet aims at the universal. He is, in other words, attempting to
describe the simple and essential truth of things, not by depicting the
nude thing as it is, but the idea of things clothed in all their
beauties.[46] Here Fracastoro attempts to explain the Aristotelian
conception of the type with the aid of the Platonic notion of beauty.
There were, in fact, in the Renaissance, three conceptions of beauty in
general vogue. First, the purely objective conception that poetry is
fixed or formal, that it consists in approximating to a certain
mechanical or geometrical form, such as roundness, squareness, or
straightness; secondly, the Platonic conception, ethical rather than
aesthetic, connecting the beautiful with the good, and regarding both as
the manifestation of divine power; and, thirdly, a more purely aesthetic
conception of beauty, connecting it either with grace or conformity, or
in a higher sense with whatever is proper or fitting to an object. This
last idea, which at times approaches the modern conception that beauty
consists in the realization of the objective character of any particular
thing and in the fulfilment of the law of its own being, seems to have
been derived from the _Idea_ of the Greek rhetorician Hermogenes, whose
influence during the sixteenth century was considerable, even as early
as the time of Filelfo. It was the celebrated rhetorician Giulio
Cammillo, however, who appears to have popularized Hermogenes in the
sixteenth century, by translating the _Idea_ into Italian, and by
expounding it in a discourse published posthumously in 1544.
As will be seen, Fracastoro's conception of beauty approximates both to
the Platonic and to the more purely aesthetic doctrines which we have
mentioned; and he expounds and elaborates this aesthetic notion in the
following manner. Each art has its own rules of proper expression. The
historian or the philosopher does not aim at all the beauties or
elegancies of expression, but only such as are proper to history or
philosophy. But to the poet no grace, no embellishment, no ornament, is
ever alien; he does not consider the particular beauty of any one
field,--that is, the singular, or particular, of Aristotle,--but all
that pertains to the simple idea of beauty and of beautiful speech. Yet
this universalized beauty is no extraneous thing; it cannot be added to
objects in which it has no place, as a golden coat on a rustic; all the
essential beauty of each species is to be the especial regard of the
poet. For in imitating persons and things, he neglects no beauty or
elegance which he can attribute to them; he strives only after the most
beautiful and most excellent, and in this way affects the minds of men
in the direction of excellence and beauty.
This suggests a problem which is at the very root of Aristotle's
conception of ideal imitation; and it is Fracastoro's high merit that he
was one of the first writers of the Renaissance to explain away the
objection, and to formulate in the most perfect manner what Aristotle
really meant. For, even granting that the poet teaches more than others,
may it not be urged that it is not what pertains to the thing itself,
but the beauties which he adds to them,--that it is ornament, extraneous
to the thing itself (_extra rem_), and not the thing itself,--which
seems to be the chief regard of the poet? But after all, what is _extra
rem_? Are beautiful columns, domes, peristyles _extra rem_, because a
thatched roof will protect us from rain and frost; or is noble raiment
_extra rem_, because a rustic garment would suffice? The poet, so far
from adding anything extraneous to the things he imitates, depicts them
in their very essence; and it is because he alone finds the true beauty
in things, because he attributes to them their true nobility and
perfection, that he is more useful than any other writer. The poet does
not, as some think, deal with the false and the unreal.[47] He assumes
nothing openly alien to truth, though he may permit himself to treat of
old and obscure legends which cannot be verified, or of things which are
regarded as true on account of their appearance, their allegorical
signification (such as the ancient myths and fables), or their common
acceptance by men. So we may conclude that not every one who uses verse
is a poet, but only he who is moved by the true beauty of things--by
their simple and essential beauties, not merely apparent ones. This is
Fracastoro's conclusion, and it contains that mingling of Platonism and
Aristotelianism which may be found somewhat later in Tasso and Sir
Philip Sidney. It is the chief merit of Fracastoro's dialogue, that even
while emphasizing this Platonic element, he clearly distinguishes and
defines the ideal element in aesthetic imitation.
About the same time, in the public lectures of Varchi (1553), there was
an attempt to formulate a more explicit definition of poetry on the
basis of Aristotle's definition[48] of tragedy. Poetry, according to
Varchi, is an imitation of certain actions, passions, habits of mind,
with song, diction, and harmony, together or separately, for the purpose
of removing the vices of men and inciting them to virtue, in order that
they may attain their true happiness and beatitude.[49] In the first
place, poetry is an imitation. Every poet imitates, and any one who does
not imitate cannot be called a poet. Accordingly, Varchi follows Maggi
in distinguishing three classes of poets,--the poets _par excellence_,
who imitate in verse; the poets who imitate without using verse, such as
Lucian, Boccaccio in the _Decameron_, and Sannazaro in the _Arcadia_;
and the poets, commonly but less properly so called, who use verse, but
who do not imitate. Verse, while not an essential attribute of poetry,
is generally required; for men's innate love of harmony, according to
Aristotle, was one of the causes that gave rise to poetic composition.
Certain forms of poetry however, such as tragedy, cannot be written
without verse; for "embellished language," that is, verse, is included
in the very definition of tragedy as given by Aristotle.
The question whether poetry could be written in prose was a source of
much discussion in the Renaissance; but the consensus of opinion was
overwhelmingly against the prose drama. Comedy in prose was the usual
Italian practice of this period, and various scholars[50] even sanction
the practice on theoretical grounds. But the controversy was not
brought to a head until the publication of Agostino Michele's _Discorso
in cui si dimostra come si possono scrivere le Commedie e le Tragedie in
Prosa_ in 1592; and eight years later, in 1600, Paolo Beni published his
Latin dissertation, _Disputatio in qua ostenditur praestare Comoediam
atque Tragoediam metrorum vinculis solvere_.[51] The language of Beni's
treatise was strong--its very title speaks of liberating the drama from
the shackles of verse; and for a heresy of this sort, couched as it was
in language that might even have been revolutionary enough for the
French romanticists of 1830, the sixteenth century was not yet fully
prepared. Faustino Summo, answering Beni in the same year, asserts that
not only is it improper for tragedy and comedy to be written in prose,
but that no form of poetry whatever can properly be composed without the
accompaniment of verse.[52] The result of the whole controversy was to
fix the metrical form of the drama throughout the period of classicism.
But it need not be said that the same conclusion was not accepted by all
for every form of poetry. The remark of Cervantes in _Don Quixote_, that
epics can be written in prose as well as in verse, is well known; and
Julius Caesar Scaliger[53] speaks of Heliodorus's romance as a model
epic.
Scaliger, however, regards verse as a fundamental part of poetry. For
him, poetry and history have the forms of narration and ornament in
common, but differ in that poetry adds fictions to the things that are
true, or imitates actual things with fictitious ones,--_majore sane
apparatu_, that is, among other things, with verse. As a result of this
notion, Scaliger asserts that if the history of Herodotus were
versified, it would no longer be history, but historical poetry. Under
no circumstances, theoretically, will he permit the separation of poetry
from mere versification. He accordingly dismisses with contempt the
usual argument of the period that Lucan was an historian rather than a
poet. "Take an actual history," says Scaliger; "how does Lucan differ,
for example, from Livy? He differs in using verse. Well, then he is a
poet." Poetry, then, is imitation in verse;[54] but in imitating what
ought to be rather than what is, the poet creates another nature and
other fortunes, as if he were another God.[55]
It will be seen from these discussions that the Renaissance always
conceived of aesthetic imitation in this ideal sense. There are scarcely
any traces of realism, in anything like its modern sense, in the
literary criticism of this period. Torquato Tasso does indeed say that
art becomes most perfect as it approaches most closely to nature;[56]
and Scaliger declares that the dramatic poet must beyond all things aim
at reproducing the actual conditions of life.[57] But it is the
appearance of reality, and not the mere actuality itself, that the
critics are speaking of here. With the vast body of mediaeval literature
before them, in which impossibilities follow upon impossibilities, and
the sense of reality is continually obscured, the critical writers of
the Renaissance were forced to lay particular stress on the element of
probability, the element of close approach to the seeming realities of
life; but the imitation of life is for them, nevertheless, an imitation
of things as they ought to be--in other words, the imitation is ideal.
Muzio says that nature is adorned by art:--
"Suol far l' opere sue roze, e tra le mani
Lasciarle a l' arte, che le adorni e limi;"[58]
and he distinctly affirms that the poet cannot remain content with exact
portraiture, with the mere actuality of life:--
"Lascia 'l vero a l' historia, e ne' tuoi versi
Sotto i nomi privati a l' universo
Mostra che fare e che non far si debbia."
In keeping with this idealized conception of art, Muzio asserts that
everything obscene or immoral must be excluded from poetry; and this
puristic notion of art is everywhere emphasized in Renaissance
criticism. It was the _verisimile_, as has been said, that the writers
of this period especially insisted upon. Poetry must have the appearance
of truth, that is, it must be probable; for unless the reader believes
what he reads, his spirit cannot be moved by the poem.[59] This
anticipates Boileau's famous line:--
"L'esprit n'est point emu de ce qu'il ne croit pas."[60]
But beyond and above the _verisimile_, the poet must pay special regard
to the ethical element (_il lodevole e l' onesto_). A poet of the
sixteenth century, Palingenius, says that there are three qualities
required of every poem:--
"Atqui scire opus est, triplex genus esse bonorum,
Utile, delectans, majusque ambobus honestum."[61]
Poetry, then, is an ideal representation of life; but should it be still
further limited, and made an imitation of only human life? In other
words, are the actions of men the only possible themes of poetry, or may
it deal, as in the _Georgics_ and the _De Rerum Natura_, with the
various facts of external nature and of science, which are only
indirectly connected with human life? May poetry treat of the life of
the world as well as of the life of men; and if only of the latter, is
it to be restricted to the actions of men, or may it also depict their
passions, emotions, and character? In short, how far may external nature
on the one hand, and the internal working of the human soul on the other
hand, be regarded as the subject-matter of poetry? Aristotle says that
poetry deals with the actions of men, but he uses the word "actions" in
a larger sense than many of the Renaissance critics appear to have
believed. His real meaning is thus explained by a modern writer:--
"Everything that expresses the mental life, that reveals a
rational personality, will fall within this larger sense of
action.... The phrase is virtually an equivalent for [Greek:
ethe] (character), [Greek: pathe] (emotion), [Greek: praxeis]
(action).... The common original from which all the arts draw
is human life,--its mental processes, its spiritual movements,
its outward acts issuing from deeper sources; in a word, all
that constitutes the inward and essential activity of the soul.
On this principle landscape and animals are not ranked among
the objects of aesthetic imitation. The whole universe is not
conceived of as the raw material of art. Aristotle's theory is
in agreement with the practice of the Greek poets and artists
of the classical period, who introduce the external world only
so far as it forms a background of action, and enters as an
emotional element into man's life and heightens the human
interest."[62]
Aristotle distinctly says that "even if a treatise on medicine or
natural philosophy be brought out in verse, the name of poet is by
custom given to the author; and yet Homer and Empedocles have nothing in
common except the material; the former, therefore, is properly styled
poet, the latter, physicist rather than poet."[63]
The Aristotelian doctrine was variously conceived during the
Renaissance. Fracastoro, for example, asserts that the imitation of
human life alone is not of itself a test of poetry, for such a test
would exclude Empedocles and Lucretius; it would make Virgil a poet in
the _AEneid_, and not a poet in the _Georgics_. All matters are proper
material for the poet, as Horace says, if they are treated poetically;
and although the imitation of men and women may seem to be of higher
importance for us who are men and women, the imitation of human life is
no more the poet's end than the imitation of anything else.[64] This
portion of Fracastoro's argument may be called apologetic, for the
imitation of human actions as a test of poetry would exclude most of his
own poems,[65] such as his famous _De Morbo Gallico_ (1529), written
before the influence of Aristotle was felt in anything but the mere
external forms of creative literature. For Fracastoro, all things
poetically treated become poetry, and Aristotle himself[66] says that
everything becomes pleasant when correctly imitated. So that not the
mere composition of verse, but the Platonic rapture, the delight in the
true and essential beauty of things, is for Fracastoro the test of
poetic power.
Varchi, on the other hand, is more in accord with Aristotle, in
conceiving of "action," the subject-matter of poetry, as including the
passions and habits of mind as well as the merely external actions of
mankind. By passions Varchi means those mental perturbations which impel
us to an action at any particular time ([Greek: pathe]); while by
manners, or habits of mind, he means those mental qualities which
distinguish one man or one class of men from another ([Greek: ethe]).
The exclusion of the emotional or introspective side of human life
would leave all lyric and, in fact, all subjective verse out of the
realms of poetry; and it was therefore essential, in an age in which
Petrarch was worshipped, that the subjective side of poetry should
receive its justification.[67] There is also in Varchi a most
interesting comparison between the arts of poetry and painting.[68] The
basis of his distinction is Horace's _ut pictura poesis_, doubtless
founded on the parallel of Simonides preserved for us by Plutarch; and
this distinction, which regarded painting as silent poetry, and poetry
as painting in language, may be considered almost the keynote of
Renaissance criticism, continuing even up to the time of Lessing.
In Capriano's _Della Vera Poetica_ (1555) poetry is given a preeminent
place among all the arts, because it does not merely deal with actions
or with the objects of any single sense. For Capriano, poetry is an
ideal representation of life, and as such "vere nutrice e amatrice del
nostro bene."[69] All sensuous or comprehensible objects are capable of
being imitated by various arts. The nobler of the imitative arts are
concerned with the objects of the nobler senses, while the ignobler arts
are concerned with the objects of the senses of taste, touch, and smell.
Poetry is the finest of all the arts, because it comprehends in itself
all the faculties and powers of the other arts, and can in fact imitate
anything, as, for example, the form of a lion, its color, its ferocity,
its roar, and the like. It is also the highest form of art because it
makes use of the most efficacious means of imitation, namely, words,
and especially since these receive the additional beauty and power of
rhythm. Accordingly, Capriano divides poets into two classes: natural
poets, who describe the things of nature, and moral poets (such as epic
and tragic poets), who aim at presenting moral lessons and indicating
the uses of life; and of these two classes the moral poets are to be
rated above the natural poets.
But if all things are the objects of poetic imitation, the poet must
know everything; he must have studied nature as well as life; and,
accordingly, Lionardi, in his dialogues on poetic imitation (1554), says
that to be a good poet, one must be a good historian, a good orator, and
a good natural and moral philosopher as well;[70] and Bernardo Tasso
asserts that a thorough acquaintance with the art of poetry is only to
be gained from the study of Aristotle's _Poetics_, combined with a
knowledge of philosophy and the various arts and sciences, and vast
experience of the world.[71] The Renaissance, with its humanistic
tendencies, never quite succeeded in discriminating between erudition
and genius. Scaliger says that nothing which proceeds from solid
learning can ever be out of place in poetry, and Fracastoro (1555) and
Tomitano (1545) both affirm that the good poet and the good orator must
essentially be learned scholars and philosophers. Scaliger therefore
distinguishes three classes of poets,--first, the theological poets,
such as Orpheus and Amphion; secondly, the philosophical poets, of two
sorts, natural poets, such as Empedocles and Lucretius, and moral
poets, who again are either political, as Solon and Tyrtaeus, economic,
as Hesiod, or common, as Phocyllides; and, thirdly, the ordinary poets
who imitate human life.[72] The last are divided according to the usual
Renaissance classification into dramatic, narrative, and common or
mixed. Scaliger's classification is employed by Sir Philip Sidney;[73]
and a very similar subdivision is given by Minturno.[74]
The treatment of Castelvetro, in his commentary on the _Poetics_ (1570),
is at times much more in accord with the true Aristotelian conception
than most of the other Renaissance writers. While following Aristotle in
asserting that verse is not of the essence of poetry, he shows that
Aristotle himself by no means intended to class as poetry works that
imitated in prose, for this was not the custom of Hellenic art. Prose is
not suited to imitative or imaginative subjects, for we expect themes
treated in prose to be actual facts.[75] "Verse does not distinguish
poetry," says Castelvetro, "but clothes and adorns it; and it is as
improper for poetry to be written in prose, or history in verse, as it
is for women to use the garments of men, and for men to wear the
garments of women."[76] The test of poetry therefore is not the metre
but the material. This approximates to Aristotle's own view; since while
imitation is what distinguishes the poetic art, Aristotle, by limiting
it to the imitation of human life, was, after all, making the matter the
test of poetry.
Castelvetro, however, arrives at this conclusion on different grounds.
Science he regards as not suitable material for poetry, and accordingly
such writers as Lucretius and Fracastoro are not poets. They are good
artists, perhaps, or good philosophers, but not poets; for the poet does
not attempt to discover the truth of nature, but to imitate the deeds of
men, and to bring delight to his audience by means of this imitation.
Moreover, poetry, as will be seen later, is intended to give delight to
the populace, the untrained multitude, to whom the sciences and the arts
are dead letters;[77] if we concede these to be fit themes for poetry,
then poetry is either not meant to delight, or not meant for the
ordinary people, but is intended for instruction and for those only who
are versed in sciences and arts. Moreover, comparing poetry with
history, Castelvetro finds that they resemble each other in many points,
but are not identical. Poetry follows, as it were, in the footsteps of
history, but differs from it in that history deals with what has
happened, poetry with what is probable; and things that have happened,
though probable, are never considered in poetry as probable, but always
as things that have happened. History, accordingly, does not regard
verisimilitude or necessity, but only truth; poetry must take care to
establish the probability of its subject in verisimilitude and
necessity, since it cannot regard truth. Castelvetro in common with
most of the critics of the Renaissance seems to misconceive the full
meaning of ideal truth; for to the Renaissance--nay, even to
Shakespeare, if we are to consider as his own various phrases which he
has put into the mouths of his dramatic characters--truth was regarded
as coincident with fact; and nothing that was not actual fact, however
subordinated to the laws of probability and necessity, was ever called
truth.
It is in keeping with this conception of the relations between history
and poetry, that Castelvetro should differ not only from Aristotle, but
from most of the critics of his own time, in asserting that the order of
the poetic narrative may be the same as that of historical narrative.
"In telling a story," he says, "we need not trouble ourselves whether it
has beginning, middle, and end, but only whether it is fitted to its
true purpose, that is, to delight its auditors by the narration of
certain circumstances which could possibly happen but have not actually
happened."[78] Here the only vital distinction between history and
poetry is that the incidents recounted in history have once happened,
while those recounted in poetry have never actually happened, or the
matter will not be regarded as poetry. Aristotle's fundamental
requirement of the unity of the fable is regarded as unessential, and is
simply observed in order to show the poet's ingenuity. This notion of
poetic ingenuity is constant throughout Castelvetro's commentary. Thus
he explains Aristotle's statement that poetry is more philosophic than
history--more philosophic, according to Castelvetro, in the sense of
requiring more thought, more speculation in its composition--by showing
that it is a more difficult and more ingenious labor to invent things
that could possibly happen, than merely to repeat things that have
actually happened.[79]
III. _The Function of Poetry_
According to Strabo, it will be remembered, the object or function of
poetry is pleasurable instruction in reference to character, emotion,
action. This occasions the inquiry as to what is the function of the
poetic art, and, furthermore, what are its relations to morality. The
starting-point of all discussions on this subject in the Renaissance was
the famous verse of Horace:--
"Aut prodesse volunt aut delectare poetae."[80]
This line suggests that the function of poetry may be to please, or to
instruct, or both to please and instruct; and every one of the writers
of the Renaissance takes one or other of these three positions.
Aristotle, as we know, regarded poetry as an imitation of human life,
for the purpose of giving a certain refined pleasure to the reader or
hearer. "The end of the fine arts is to give pleasure ([Greek: pros
hedonen]), or rational enjoyment ([Greek: pros diagogen])."[81] It has
already been said that poetry, in so far as it is an imitation of human
life, and attempts to be true to human life in its ideal aspects, must
fundamentally be moral; but to give moral or scientific instruction is
in no way the end or function of poetry. It will be seen that the
Renaissance was in closer accord with Horace than with Aristotle, in
requiring for the most part the _utile_ as well as the _dulce_ in
poetry.
For Daniello, one of the earliest critical writers of the century, the
function of the poet is to teach and delight. As the aim of the orator
is to persuade, and the aim of the physician to cure, so the aim of the
poet is equally to teach and delight; and unless he teaches and delights
he cannot be called a poet, even as one who does not persuade cannot be
called an orator, or one who does not cure, a physician.[82] But beyond
profitableness and beauty, the poet must carry with him a certain
persuasion, which is one of the highest functions of poetry, and which
consists in moving and affecting the reader or hearer with the very
passions depicted; but the poet must be moved first, before he can move
others.[83] Here Daniello is renewing Horace's
"Si vis me flere, dolendum est
Primum ipsi tibi,"--
a sentiment echoed by poets as different as Vauquelin, Boileau, and
Lamartine.
Fracastoro, however, attempts a deeper analysis of the proper function
of the poetic art. What is the aim of the poet? Not merely to give
delight, for the fields, the stars, men and women, the objects of
poetic imitation themselves do that; and poetry, if it did no more,
could not be said to have any reason for existing. Nor is it merely to
teach and delight, as Horace says; for the descriptions of countries,
peoples, and armies, the scientific digressions and the historical
events, which constitute the instructive side of poetry, are derived
from cosmographers, scientists, and historians, who teach and delight as
much as poets do. What, then, is the function of the poet? It is, as has
already been pointed out, to describe the essential beauty of things, to
aim at the universal and ideal, and to perform this function with every
possible accompaniment of beautiful speech, thus affecting the minds of
men in the direction of excellence and beauty. Portions of Fracastoro's
argument have been alluded to before, and it will suffice here to state
his own summing up of the aim of the poet, which is this, "Delectare et
prodesse imitando in unoquoque maxima et pulcherrima per genus dicendi
simpliciter pulchrum ex convenientibus."[84] This is a mingling of the
Horatian and Platonic conceptions of poetic art.
By other critics a more practical function was given to poetry. Giraldi
Cintio asserts that it is the poet's aim to condemn vice and to praise
virtue, and Maggi says that poets aim almost exclusively at benefiting
the mind. Poets who, on the contrary, treat of obscene matters for the
corruption of youth, may be compared with infamous physicians who give
their patients deadly poison in the guise of wholesome medicine. Horace
and Aristotle, according to Maggi, are at one on this point, for in the
definition of tragedy Aristotle ascribes to it a distinctly useful
purpose, and whatever delight is obtainable is to be regarded as a
result of this moral function; for Maggi and the Renaissance critics in
general would follow the Elizabethan poet who speaks of "delight, the
fruit of virtue dearly loved." Muzio, in his versified _Arte Poetica_
(1555), regards the end of poetry as pleasure and profit, and the
pleasurable aim of poetry as attained by variety, for the greatest poems
contain every phase of life and art.
It has been seen that Varchi classed poetry with rational philosophy.
The end of all arts and sciences is to make human life perfect and
happy; but they differ in their modes of producing this result.
Philosophy attains its end by teaching; rhetoric, by persuasion;
history, by narration; poetry, by imitation or representation. The aim
of the poet, therefore, is to make the human soul perfect and happy, and
it is his office to imitate, that is, to invent and represent, things
which render men virtuous, and consequently happy. Poetry attains this
end more perfectly than any of the other arts or sciences, because it
does so, not by means of precept, but by means of example. There are
various ways of making men virtuous,--by teaching them what vice is and
what virtue is, which is the province of ethics; by actually chastising
vices and rewarding virtues, which is the province of law; or by
example, that is, by the representation of virtuous men receiving
suitable rewards for their virtue, and of vicious men receiving suitable
punishments, which is the province of poetry. This last method is the
most efficacious, because it is accompanied by delight. For men either
can not or will not take the trouble to study sciences and virtues--nay,
do not even like to be told what they should or should not do; but in
hearing or reading poetic examples, not only is there no trouble, but
there is the greatest delight, and no one can help being moved by the
representation of characters who are rewarded or punished according to
an ideal justice.
For Varchi, then, as for Sir Philip Sidney later, the high importance of
poetry is to be found in the fact that it teaches morality better than
any other art, and the reason is that its instrument is not precept but
example, which is the most delightful and hence the most efficacious of
all means. The function of poetry is, therefore, a moral one, and it
consists in removing the vices of men and inciting them to virtue. This
twofold moral object of poetry--the removal of vices, which is passive,
and the incitement to virtue, which is active--is admirably attained,
for example, by Dante in his _Divina Commedia_; for in the _Inferno_
evil men are so fearfully punished that we resolve to flee from every
form of vice, and in the _Paradiso_ virtuous men are so gloriously
rewarded that we resolve to imitate every one of their perfections. This
is the expression of the extreme view of poetic justice; and while it is
in keeping with the common sentiment of the Renaissance, it is of
course entirely un-Aristotelian.
Scaliger's point of view is in accord with the common Renaissance
tradition. Poetry is imitation, but imitation is not the end of poetry.
Imitation for its own sake--that is, art for art's sake--receives no
encouragement from Scaliger. The purpose of poetry is to teach
delightfully (_docere cum delectatione_); and, therefore, not imitation,
as Aristotle says, but delightful instruction, is the test of
poetry.[85] Minturno (1559) adds a third element to that of instruction
and of delight.[86] The function of poetry is not only to teach and
delight, but also to move, that is, beyond instruction and delight the
poet must impel certain passions in the reader or hearer, and incite the
mind to admiration of what is described.[87] An ideal hero may be
represented in a poem, but the poem is futile unless it excites the
reader to admiration of the hero depicted. Accordingly, it is the
peculiar office of the poet to move admiration for great men; for the
orator, the philosopher, and the historian need not necessarily do so,
but no one who does not incite this admiration can really be called a
poet.
This new element of admiration is the logical consequence of the
Renaissance position that philosophy teaches by precept, but poetry by
example, and that in this consists its superior ethical efficacy. In
Seneca's phrase, "longum iter per praecepta, breve per exempla." If
poetry, therefore, attains its end by means of example, it follows that
to arrive at this end the poet must incite in the reader an admiration
of the example, or the ethical aim of poetry will not be accomplished.
Poetry is more than a mere passive expression of truth in the most
pleasurable manner; it becomes like oratory an active exhortation to
virtue, by attempting to create in the reader's mind a strong desire to
be like the heroes he is reading about. The poet does not tell what
vices are to be avoided and what virtues are to be imitated, but sets
before the reader or hearer the most perfect types of the various
virtues and vices. It is, in Sidney's phrase (a phrase apparently
borrowed from Minturno), "that feigning notable images of virtues,
vices, or what else, with that delightful instruction, which must be the
right describing note to know a poet by." Dryden, a century later, seems
to be insisting upon this same principle of admiration when he says that
it is the work of the poet "to affect the soul, and excite the passions,
and above all to move admiration, which is the delight of serious
plays."[88]
But Minturno goes even further than this. If the poet is fundamentally a
teacher of virtue, it follows that he must be a virtuous man himself;
and in pointing this out, Minturno has given the first complete
expression in modern times of the consecrated conception of the poet's
office. As no form of knowledge and no moral excellence is foreign to
the poet, so at bottom he is the truly wise and good man. The poet may,
in fact, be defined as a good man skilled in language and imitation; not
only ought he to be a good man, but no one will be a good poet unless he
is so.[89] This conception of the moral nature of the poet may be traced
henceforth throughout modern times. It is to be found in Ronsard[90] and
other French and Italian writers; it is especially noticeable in English
literature, and is insisted on by Ben Jonson,[91] Milton,[92]
Shaftesbury,[93] Coleridge,[94] and Shelley.[95] In this idea Plato's
praise of the philosopher, as well as Cicero's and Quintilian's praise
of the orator, was by the Renaissance transferred to the poet;[96] but
the conception itself goes back to a passage in Strabo's _Geography_, a
work well known to sixteenth-century scholars. This passage is as
follows:--
"Can we possibly imagine that the genius, power, and excellence
of a real poet consist in aught else than the just imitation of
life in formed discourse and numbers? But how should he be that
just imitator of life, whilst he himself knows not its
measures, nor how to guide himself by judgment and
understanding? For we have not surely the same notion of the
poet's excellence as of the ordinary craftsman's, the subject
of whose art is senseless stone or timber, without life,
dignity, or beauty; whilst the poet's art turning principally
on men and manners, he has his virtues and excellence as poet
naturally annexed to human excellence, and to the worth and
dignity of man, insomuch that it is impossible he should be a
great and worthy poet who is not first a worthy and good
man."[97]
Another writer of the sixteenth century, Bernardo Tasso, tells us that
in his poem of the _Amadigi_ he has aimed at delight rather than
profitable instruction.[98] "I have spent most of my efforts," he says,
"in attempting to please, as it seems to me that this is more necessary,
and also more difficult to attain; for we find by experience that many
poets may instruct and benefit us very much, but certainly give us very
little delight." This agrees with what one of the sanest of English
critics, John Dryden (1668), has said of verse, "I am satisfied if it
caused delight, for delight is the chief if not the only end of poesie;
instruction can be admitted but in the second place, for poesie only
instructs as it delights."[99]
It is this same end which Castelvetro (1570) ascribes to poetic art. For
Castelvetro, as in a lesser degree for Robortelli also, the end of
poetry is delight, and delight alone.[100] This, he asserts, is the
position of Aristotle, and if utility is to be conceded to poetry at
all, it is merely as an accident, as in the tragic purgation of terror
and compassion.[101] But he goes further than Aristotle would have been
willing to go; for poetry, according to Castelvetro, is intended not
merely to please, but to please the populace, in fact everybody, even
the vulgar mob.[102] On this he insists throughout his commentary;
indeed, as will be seen later, it is on this conception that his theory
of the drama is primarily based. But it may be confidently asserted that
Aristotle would have willingly echoed the conclusion of Shakespeare, as
expressed in _Hamlet_, that the censure of one of the judicious must
o'erweigh a whole theatre of others. At the same time, Castelvetro's
conception is in keeping with a certain modern feeling in regard to the
meaning of poetic art. Thus a recent writer regards literature as aiming
"at the pleasure of the greatest possible number of the nation rather
than instruction and practical effects," and as applying "to general
rather than specialized knowledge."[103] There is, then, in
Castelvetro's argument this modicum of truth, that poetry appeals to no
specialized knowledge, but that its function is, as Coleridge says, to
give a definite and immediate pleasure.
Torquato Tasso, as might be expected, regards poetry in a more highly
ideal sense. His conception of the function of poets and of the poetic
art may be explained as follows: The universe is beautiful in itself,
because beauty is a ray from the Divine splendor; and hence art should
seek to approach as closely as possible to nature, and to catch and
express this natural beauty of the world.[104] Real beauty, however, is
not so called because of any usefulness it may possess, but is primarily
beautiful in itself; for the beautiful is what pleases every one, just
as the good is what every one desires.[105] Beauty is therefore the
flower of the good (_quasi un fiore del buono_); it is the circumference
of the circle of which the good is the centre, and accordingly, poetry,
as an expression of this beauty, imitates the outward show of life in
its general aspects. Poetry is therefore an imitation of human actions,
made for the guidance of life; and its end is delight, _ordinato al
giovamento_.[106] It must essentially delight, either because delight is
its aim, or because delight is the necessary means of effecting the
ethical end of art.[107] Thus, for example, heroic poetry consists of
imitation and allegory, the function of the former being to cause
delight, and that of the latter to give instruction and guidance in
life. But since difficult or obscure conceits rarely delight, and since
the poet does not appeal to the learned only, but to the people, just as
the orator does, the poet's idea must be, if not popular in the ordinary
sense of the word, at least intelligible to the people. Now the people
will not study difficult problems; but poetry, by appealing to them on
the side of pleasure, teaches them whether they will or no; and this
constitutes the true effectiveness of poetry, for it is the most
delightful, and hence the most valuable, of teachers.[108]
Such, then, are the various conceptions of the function of poetry, as
held by the critics of the Renaissance. On the whole, it may be said
that at bottom the conception was an ethical one, for, with the
exception of such a revolutionary spirit as Castelvetro, by most
theorists it was as an effective guide to life that poetry was chiefly
valued. Even when delight was admitted as an end, it was simply because
of its usefulness in effecting the ethical aim.
In concluding this chapter, it may be well to say a few words, and only
a few, upon the classification of poetic forms. There were during the
Renaissance numerous attempts at distinguishing these forms, but on the
whole all of them are fundamentally equivalent to that of Minturno, who
recognizes three _genres_,--the lyric or melic, the dramatic or scenic,
and the epic or narrative. This classification is essentially that of
the Greeks, and it has lasted down to this very day. With lyric poetry
this essay is scarcely concerned, for during the Renaissance there was
no systematic lyric theory. Those who discussed it at all gave most of
their attention to its formal structure, its style, and especially the
conceit it contained. The model of all lyrical poetry was Petrarch, and
it was in accordance with the lyrical poet's agreement or disagreement
with the Petrarchan method that he was regarded as a success or a
failure. Muzio's critical poem (1551) deals almost entirely with lyrical
verse, and there are discussions on this subject in the works of
Trissino, Equicola, Ruscelli, Scaliger, and Minturno. But the real
question at issue in all these discussions is merely that of external
form, and it is with the question of principles, in so far as they
regard literary criticism, that this essay is primarily concerned. The
theory of dramatic and epic poetry, being fundamental, will therefore
receive almost exclusive attention.
FOOT-NOTES:
[40] Robortelli, p. 1 _sq._
[41] This analysis of Zabarella, _Opera Logica, De Natura Logicae_, ii.
13-23, I owe to the kindness of Professor Butcher of Edinburgh.
Zabarella probably derived his knowledge of Aristotle's _Poetics_ from
Robortelli, under whom he studied Greek. _Cf._ Bayle, _Dict._ s. v.
Zabarella.
[42] Maggi, p. 28 _sq._ _Cf._ B. Tasso, _Lettere_, ii. 514; Scaliger,
_Poet._ i. 2; Castelvetro, _Poetica_, p. 7; Salviati, Cod. Magliabech.
ii. ii. 11, fol. 384 v.; B. Jonson, _Timber_, p. 74.
[43] Daniello, p. 41 _sq._
[44] Robortelli, p. 86 _sq._
[45] Robortelli, p. 90 _sq._
[46] Fracastoro, i. 340.
[47] Fracastoro, i. 357 _sq._
[48] _Poet._ vi. 2.
[49] Varchi, p. 578.
[50] _E.g._ Piccolomini, p. 27 _sq._
[51] Tiraboschi, vii. 1331.
[52] Summo, pp. 61-69.
[53] _Poet._ iii. 95.
[54] _Poet._ i. 1.
[55] Another critic of the time, Vettori, 1560, pp. 14, 93, attacks
poetic prose on the ground that in Aristotle's definition of the various
poetic forms, verse is always spoken of as an essential part. It is
interesting to note that the phrase "poetic prose" is used, perhaps for
the first time, in Minturno, _Arte Poetica_, 1564, p. 3, etc.
[56] _Opere_, x. 254. _Cf._ Minturno, _Arte Poetica_, p. 33.
[57] _Poet._ iii. 96.
[58] Muzio, p. 69.
[59] Giraldi Cintio, i. 61.
[60] _Art Poet._ iii. 50. _Cf._ Horace, _Ars Poet._ 188.
[61] _Zodiac. Vitae_, i. 143.
[62] Butcher, pp. 117, 118.
[63] _Poet._ i. 8.
[64] Fracastoro, i. 335 _sq._
[65] _Cf._ Castelvetro, _Poetica_, p. 27 _sq._
[66] _Rhet._ i. 11.
[67] _Cf._ A. Segni, 1581, cap. i.
[68] Varchi, p. 227 _sq._
[69] Capriano, cap. ii.
[70] Lionardi, p. 43 _sq._
[71] _Lettere_, ii. 525.
[72] Scaliger, _Poet._ i. 2.
[73] _Defense_, pp. 10, 11.
[74] _De Poeta_, p. 53 _sq._
[75] Castelvetro, _Poetica_, p. 23 _sq._
[76] _Ibid._ p. 190.
[77] _Cf._ T. Tasso, xi. 51.
[78] _Poetica_, p. 158.
[79] _Poetica_, p. 191.
[80] _Ars Poet._ 333.
[81] Butcher, p. 185.
[82] Daniello, p. 25.
[83] _Ibid._ p. 40.
[84] Fracastoro, i. 363.
[85] Scaliger, _Poet._ vi. ii. 2.
[86] _De Poeta_, p. 102. _Cf._ Scaliger, _Poet._ iii. 96.
[87] _De Poeta_, p. 11.
[88] _Essay of Dramatic Poesy_, p. 104.
[89] _De Poeta_, p. 79.
[90] _Oeuvres_, vii. 318.
[91] _Works_, i. 333.
[92] _Prose Works_, iii. 118.
[93] _Characteristicks_, 1711, i. 207.
[94] H. C. Robinson, _Diary_, May 29, 1812, "Coleridge talked of the
impossibility of being a good poet without being a good man."
[95] _Defence of Poetry_, p. 42.
[96] Minturno plainly says as much, _De Poeta_, p. 105.
[97] _Geog._ i. ii. 5, as cited by Shaftesbury.
[98] _Lettere_, ii. 195.
[99] _Essay of Dramatic Poesy_, p. 104.
[100] _Cf._ Piccolomini, p. 369.
[101] Castelvetro, _Poetica_, p. 505. _Cf._ Twining, ii. 449, 450.
[102] _Poetica_, p. 29.
[103] Posnett, cited by Cook, p. 247.
[104] _Opere_, viii. 26 _sq._
[105] _Ibid._ ix. 123.
[106] _Ibid._ xii. 13.
[107] _Ibid._ xi. 50.
[108] _Ibid._ xii. 212.