PHRENOLOGY EXAMINED.
PHRENOLOGY EXAMINED.
BY P. FLOURENS,
MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY, PERPETUAL SECRETARY OF THE ROYAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (INSTITUTE OF FRANCE), MEMBER OF THE
ROYAL SOCIETIES OF LONDON AND EDINBURG, OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES OF STOCKHOLM, OF MUNICH, AND OF TURIN, ETC. ETC.
PROFESSOR OF COMPARATIVE PHYSIOLOGY AT THE NATURAL HISTORY
MUSEUM AT PARIS.
“J’ai un sentiment clair de ma liberté.”
BOSSUET, TRAITÉ DU LIBRE ARBITRE.
Translated from the Second Edition of 1845, by
CHARLES DE LUCENA MEIGS, M.D.
MEMB. AMER. PHIL. SOC. ETC. ETC.
PHILADELPHIA:
HOGAN & THOMPSON.
1846.
ENTERED ACCORDING TO ACT OF CONGRESS, IN THE YEAR 1845,
BY CHARLES D. MEIGS, M. D.
IN THE CLERK’S OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
TO DR. JAMES JACKSON, OF BOSTON.
MY DEAR SIR:
Perhaps I have taken too great a liberty in sending to you in this public
manner, and in praying you to accept a copy of M. Flourens’ ingenious
work. I have a very sincere desire that you should read the Inquiry;
for I feel sure, that if you approve of it, the studious portion of our
countrymen who may peruse it, will concur in the opinion of a gentleman
so justly distinguished as yourself in every good word and work, and
so capable of judging as to the salutary or evil tendency of the
productions of our teeming press.
Inasmuch as many of our countrymen have heretofore felt, and many do
now feel, desirous to know the truth as to the question of the multiple
nature of the human mind, I have here translated the Examination, in
order that they might have an opportunity to learn what is thought of
Gall’s doctrines by one of the best and most precise thinkers in Europe.
Professor Flourens, by his writings on the brain and nervous system, by
his courses of lectures at the Jardin des Plantes, by numerous writings
on various scientific subjects, by his position in the Institute, has
acquired a place among the literary and scientific celebrities of the
present age. The amiable and elegant manners, and the fine disposition of
this distinguished character, coincide with his acknowledged learning,
and exactness, and zeal, to accumulate upon him the public respect and
esteem. It is therefore with great confidence that I present to you this
copy of his criticism upon Phrenology, since I suppose that every writing
of so good a man might prove acceptable to you, and to the studious
portion of our countrymen generally.
I invoke your approbation of what I cannot but deem a masterly criticism
of the doctrines of Gall. So highly have I appreciated it, that I cannot
readily suppose it possible to rise from its perusal, without being
convinced that Gall was wholly mistaken in his views of the human mind;
and of course, that all the cranioscopists, mesmerizers, and diviners,
who have followed his track, or risen up on the basis of his opinions,
are equally in error.
In order to have a just view of human responsibility, it is indispensable
to entertain the justest notions of the nature of the human mind. If
Phrenology _be an unsubstantial hypothesis_, no phrenologist is fit
to be a juror, a judge, or a legislator: for since all human law—the
whole social compact—and indeed all divine law, as relative to human
propensities and actions—is founded on some real nature of the soul
and mind, there is risk that manifestly erroneous conceptions of the
freewill, of the conscience, of the judgment, and the perceptive powers,
&c. may mislead the juror, the judge, and the legislator, in their vote,
their opinion, and their notion of rights and wrongs.
If I am correct in entertaining these apprehensions as to the influence
of false metaphysics on the public characters I have enumerated, there is
abundant cause to rejoice when a blow is struck, like that pulverizing
blow which is given in this work, to so considerable an error. There are
thousands among the young and ardent and curious of our countrymen and
countrywomen, whose minds may be likewise led astray from the truth; but
if it be mischievous for the judge and the juror and the legislator
to entertain erroneous views upon the nature of the understanding, the
mind, or the soul, it is equally to be deprecated where the error is sown
broadcast in the land.
Tares, if not in themselves poisonous, serve at best to choke up the
useful or beautiful plants that ought to be cultivated in the fields of
science or morals; but you will find that M. Flourens regards them as
poisons.
Has not M. Flourens clearly refuted the phrenologists? and has he not, in
doing so, performed a useful and an acceptable service?
I pray you to believe that I am, with the most grateful respect and the
sincerest esteem,
Your obliged and faithful servant,
CHARLES D. MEIGS.
PHILADELPHIA, Dec. 10, 1845.
TO THE MEMORY OF DESCARTES.
AUTHOR’S PREFACE.
Having been a witness to the progress of phrenology, I was led to the
composition of the following treatise.
Each succeeding age has a philosophy of its own.
The seventeenth century recovered from the philosophy of Descartes; the
eighteenth recovered from that of Locke and Condillac: is the nineteenth
to recover from that of Gall?
This is a really important question.
I propose, in this work, to examine phrenology as it appears in the
writings of Gall, of Spurzheim, and of Broussais.
My wish is to be brief. There is, however, one great secret in the art of
being brief: it is to be clear.
I frequently quote Descartes: I even go further; for I dedicate my work
to his memory. I am writing in opposition to a bad philosophy, while I am
endeavouring to recall a sound one.
CONTENTS.
I. Of Gall.—Of his doctrine in general 17
II. Of Gall.—Of the faculties 47
III. Of Gall.—The organs 59
IV. Of Spurzheim 96
V. Of Broussais 115
VI. Broussais’s Psycology 121
VII. Broussais’s Physiology 125
VIII. Of Gall 127
Note I. Anatomical relations supposed by Gall to exist
between the organs of the external senses and
the organs of the intellectual faculties 131
II. Difference between instinct and understanding 133
III. Gall as an observer 137
IV. The animal spirits 139
V. Exaggeration of Broussais, even in phrenology 140
VI. Contractility of Broussais 142
VII. Real labours of Gall as to the brain 143
I.
OF GALL.
OF HIS DOCTRINE IN GENERAL.
The great work in which Gall sets forth his doctrine is well known.[1]
That work shall serve as the groundwork of my examination. I shall
examine in succession each of the questions studied by the author; merely
introducing some slight changes in the order in which they are arranged.
The entire doctrine of Gall is contained in two fundamental propositions,
of which the first is, that understanding resides exclusively in the
brain, and the second, that each particular faculty of the understanding
is provided in the brain with an organ proper to itself.
Now, of these two propositions, there is certainly nothing new in the
first one, and perhaps nothing true in the second one.
Let us commence our examination with the first proposition.
I say that in the first proposition, namely, that the brain is the
exclusive seat of the understanding, there is nothing new. Gall himself
admits this to be the case.
“For a long time,” says he, “both philosophers and physiologists, as
well as physicians, have contended that the brain is the organ of the
soul.”[2] The opinion that the brain, (as a whole, or such and such
parts of the brain considered separately,) is the seat of the soul,
is, in fact, as old as learning itself. Descartes placed the soul in
the _pineal gland_, Willis in the _corpora striata_, Lapeyronie in the
_corpus callosum_, &c. &c.
As to the more recent authorities, Gall quotes Sœmmerring, who says
precisely that, “the brain is the exclusive instrument of all sensation,
all thought, and all will,”[3] &c. He quotes Haller, who proves (proves
is the very expression made use of by Gall himself,) that “sensation does
not take place at the point where the object touches the nerve, the point
where the impression is made, but in the brain.”[4] He might have quoted
many other authorities to the same effect.
Were not Cabanis’s writings anterior to the time of Gall? and did not
he say, “In order to obtain a just idea of those operations whose result
is thought, the brain must be considered as a peculiar organ designed to
produce it, just as the stomach and the bowels are designed to produce
digestion, the liver to secrete the bile,” &c.?[5] a proposition so
extravagant as to become almost ridiculous, but which is in truth the
very proposition of Gall himself, except as to some exaggeration in the
terms employed.
Antecedently to the time of Gall, both Sœmmerring and Cuvier, in the
comparative anatomy of the various classes of animals, had investigated
the ratio existing between the development of the encephalon and that
of the intellectual power. The following remarkable phrase is from the
pen of Cuvier: “The proportion of the brain to the medulla oblongata, a
proportion which is greater in man than in all other animals, is a very
good index of the perfection of the creature’s intelligence, because
it is the best index of the preeminence of the organs of reflection
above the organs of the external senses.”[6] And this other still more
remarkable phrase: “In animals the intelligence appears to be greater in
proportion as the volume of the hemispheres is greater.”[7]
Gall, in an especial manner, contends against the assertion of Bichat,
who remarks that “The influence of the passions is exerted invariably
upon the organic life, and not upon the animal life; all the signs that
characterise them are referable to the former and not to the latter.
Gestures, which are the mute exponents of the sentiments and the
understanding, afford a remarkable proof of this truth. When we wish
to signify something relative to the memory, the imagination, to our
perception, to the judgment, &c. the hand moves involuntarily towards
the head: if we wish to express love, joy, grief, hatred, it is directed
towards the region of the heart, the stomach, or the bowels.”[8]
Doubtless, there is much that might be criticised in the foregoing words
of Bichat; nevertheless, to say that the passions expend their influences
upon the organic life, is not the same thing as to say that they reside
or exist there. Bichat had already remarked, that “Every species of
sensation has its centre in the brain, for sensation always supposes both
impression and perception.”[9] Furthermore, regarding this distinction,
(which as yet has not been drawn with sufficient clearness,) between the
parts that are the seats of the passions, and the parts that are affected
by their action, Gall might have found in Descartes the following
remark, which is not less judicious than acute.
“Although,” says he, writing to Leroy, “the spirits that move the
muscles come from the brain, we must, nevertheless, assign as seats of
the passions, the places that are most considerably affected by them;
hence, I say, the principal seat of the passions, as far as they relate
to the body, is the heart, because it is the heart that is most sensibly
affected by them; but their place is in the brain, in as far as they
affect the soul, for the soul cannot suffer immediately, otherwise than
through the brain.”[10]
As I am quoting Descartes, who, I ask, more clearly than Descartes has
perceived that the soul can have only a very circumscribed seat in the
economy, and that that circumscribed seat is the brain itself?
“We know,” says he, “that, properly speaking, it is not inasmuch as the
soul is in the members that serve as organs to the exterior senses, that
the soul feels, but inasmuch as she is in the brain, where she exercises
the faculty denominated common sense.”[11]
He elsewhere observes: “Surprise is expressed because I do not recognise
any other point of sensation except that which exists in the brain; but
all physicians and surgeons will, I hope, assist me in proving this
point, for they are aware of the common fact that a person who has been
subjected to amputation of a limb, continues to feel pain in a part that
he no longer possesses.”[12]
Here then, according to Descartes, we find that the soul is situated,
that is to say, _feels_ in the brain, and only in the brain. The
following passage shows with what precision he excluded even the
external senses from any participation with the functions of the soul.
“I have shown,” says he, “that size, distance, and form are perceived
only by the reason; and that, by deducing them the one from the
other.”[13]
“I cannot agree with the assertion that this error (the error caused
by the bent appearance of a stick partly plunged into water,) is not
corrected by the understanding but by the touch; for, although the sense
in question makes us judge that the stick is straight, yet that cannot
correct the error of vision; but furthermore, it is requisite that reason
should teach us to confide, in this case, rather to our judgment after
touching, than to the judgment that we come to after using our eyes; but
this reason cannot be attributed to the sense, but to the understanding
alone; and in this very example, it is the understanding that corrects
the error of the sense.”[14]
The brain, then, is the exclusive seat of the soul; and all sensation,
even those operations that appear to depend upon the simple external
sense, is function of the soul.
Gall falls back upon Condillac, who, much less rigorous in this
particular than Descartes, says, that “all our faculties proceed from
the senses.”[15] But when Condillac speaks thus, he evidently speaks
by ellipsis, for he immediately adds these words: “The senses are only
occasional causes. They do not feel; it is the soul that alone feels,
through the medium of the organs.”[16]
Now, if it be the _soul_ only that feels, _à fortiori_, it is the soul
only that _remembers_, that _judges_, that _imagines_, &c. _Memory_,
_judgment_, _imagination_, &c., in a word, all our faculties, are
therefore of the soul, and therefore come from the soul, and not from the
senses.
There is no philosopher who has exaggerated more than Helvetius the
influence of the senses upon the intelligence. But Helvetius says, “In
whatsoever manner we interrogate experience, she always answers that any
greater or lesser superiority of mind is independent of any greater or
lesser perfection of the senses.”[17]
But I leave Helvetius and Condillac, and I return to Descartes, to
Willis, to Lapeyronie, to Haller, Sœmmerring, Cuvier, &c. They all
perceived and all asserted that the brain is the seat of the soul,
and that it is so to the exclusion of the senses. Therefore, the
proposition that the brain is the exclusive seat of the soul is not a
new proposition, and hence does not originate with Gall. It belonged to
science before it appeared in his Doctrine. The merit of Gall, and it is
by no means a slender merit, consists in his having understood better
than any of his predecessors the whole of its importance, and in having
devoted himself to its demonstration. It existed in science before Gall
appeared—it may be said to reign there ever since his appearance. Taking
each particular sense, he excluded them all, one after another, from
all immediate participation in the functions of the understanding.[18]
Far from being developed in the direct ratio of the intellection, most
of them are developed in an inverse ratio. Taste and smell are more
developed in the quadruped than in man. Sight and hearing are more so
in the bird than in the quadruped. The brain alone is in all classes
developed in the ratio of the understanding. The loss of a sense does
not lead to the loss of the intelligence. The understanding survives the
loss of sight and hearing. It might survive the loss of all the senses.
To interrupt the communication between the sense and the brain, is enough
to insure the loss of the sense. The mere compression of the brain, which
abolishes the intellection, abolishes all the senses. Far, therefore,
from being organs of the intelligence, the organs of the senses are not
even organs of the senses, they do not even exercise their functions as
organs of the senses, except through the medium of the intelligence, and
this intelligence resides only in the brain.
The brain alone, therefore, is the organ of the soul;—is it the whole
brain—the brain taken _en masse_? Gall thought so, and Spurzheim followed
Gall’s opinion; and all the phrenologists who have come after them have
followed the examples of Gall and Spurzheim.
Yet, after all, it amounts to nothing. If we deprive an animal of its
cerebellum, it loses only its locomotive action. If we deprive it of
its tubercula quadrigemina, it loses its sight only; if we destroy its
medulla oblongata, it loses its respiratory movements, and in consequence
thereof, its life.[19] Neither of these parts, therefore, that is to say,
the cerebellum, the tubercula quadrigemina, and the medulla oblongata, is
the organ of the understanding.
The brain, properly so called, is so, and it alone. If we remove from an
animal the brain, properly so called, or the hemispheres, it immediately
loses its understanding, and loses nothing but its understanding.[20]
The brain, en masse, the _encephalon_, is then a multiple organ; and
this multiple organ consists of four particular organs: the cerebellum,
the seat of the principle that regulates the movements of locomotion; the
tubercula quadrigemina, seats of the principle that regulates the sense
of sight; the medulla oblongata, in which resides the principle that
determines the respiratory motions; and the brain proper, the seat, and
the exclusive seat of the intelligence.[21]
Therefore, when the phrenologists promiscuously place the intellectual
and moral faculties in the brain, considered en masse, they deceive
themselves. Neither the cerebellum, the quadrigeminal tubercles, nor
the medulla oblongata can be regarded as seats of these faculties. All
these faculties dwell solely in the brain, properly so called, or the
hemispheres.
The question as to the precise seat of the intelligence, has undergone a
great change since the time of Gall. Gall believed that the intelligence
was seated indifferently in the whole encephalon, and it has been proved
that it resides only in the hemispheres.
Further, it is not the encephalon taken en masse that is developed in
the ratio of the intelligence of the creature, but the hemispheres.
The mammifera are the animals most highly endowed with intelligence;
they have, other things being equal, the most voluminous hemispheres.
Birds are the animals most highly endowed with power of motion; their
cerebellum is, other things being equal, the largest. Reptiles are the
most torpid and apathetic of animals; they have the smallest brain, &c.
Every thing concurs then to prove, that the encephalon, in mass, is a
multiple organ with multiple functions, consisting of different parts, of
which some are destined to subserve the locomotive motions, others the
motions of the respiration, &c., while one single one, the brain proper,
is designed for the purposes of the intellection.
This being conceded, it is evident that the entire brain cannot be
divided, as the phrenologists divide it, into a number of small organs,
each of which is the seat of a distinct intellectual faculty; for
the entire brain does not serve the purposes of what is called the
intelligence. The hemispheres alone are the seats of the intellectual
power; and consequently, the question as to whether the organ, the seat
of the intelligence may be divided into several distinct organs, is a
question relative solely to the uses and powers of the hemispheres.
Gall avers, and this is the second fundamental proposition of his
doctrine, that the brain is divided into several organs, each one of
which lodges a particular faculty of the soul. By the word _brain_, he
understood the _whole brain_, and he thus deceived himself. Let us reduce
the application of his proposition to the hemispheres alone, and we
shall see that he has deceived himself again.
It has been shown by my late experiments, that we may cut away, either
in front, or behind, or above, or on one side, a very considerable slice
of the hemisphere of the brain, without destroying the intelligence.
Hence it appears, that quite a restricted portion of the hemispheres may
suffice for the purposes of intellection in an animal.[22]
On the other hand, in proportion as these reductions by slicing away the
hemispheres are continued, the intelligence becomes enfeebled, and grows
gradually less; and certain limits being passed, is wholly extinguished.
Hence it appears, that the cerebral hemispheres concur, by their whole
mass, in the full and entire exercise of the intelligence.[23]
In fine, as soon as one sensation is lost, all sensation is lost; when
one faculty disappears, all the faculties disappear. There are not,
therefore, different seats for the different faculties, nor for the
different sensations. The faculty of feeling, of judging, of willing any
thing, resides in the same place as the faculty of feeling, judging, or
willing any other thing, and consequently this faculty, essentially a
unit, resides essentially in a single organ.[24]
The understanding is, therefore, a unit.
According to Gall, there are as many particular kinds of intellect as
there are distinct faculties of the mind. According to him, each faculty
has its perception, its memory, its judgment, will, &c., that is to say,
all the attributes of the understanding, properly so called.[25]
“All the intellectual faculties,” says he, “are endowed with the
perceptive faculty, with attention, recollection, memory, judgment, and
imagination.”[26]
Thus each faculty perceives, remembers, judges, imagines, compares,
creates; but these are trifles—for each faculty _reasons_. “Whenever,”
says Gall, “a faculty compares and judges of the relations of analogous
or different ideas, there is an act of comparison, there is an act of
judgment: a sequence of comparisons and judgments constitutes reasoning,”
&c.[27]
Therefore, each and every faculty is an understanding by itself, and Gall
says so expressly. “There are,” says he, “as many different kinds of
intellect or understanding as there are distinct faculties.”[28] “Each
distinct faculty,” says he, further, “is intellect or understanding—each
_individual intelligence_ (the words are precise) has its proper
organ.”[29]
But, admitting all these _kinds of intellects_, all these _individual
understandings_, where are we to seek for the General Intelligence, the
understanding, properly so called? It must, as you may please, be either
an _attribute_ of each faculty,[30] or the _collective expression_ of
all the faculties, or even the mere simple _result_ of their common and
simultaneous action;[31] in one word, it cannot be that positive and
single faculty which we understand, conceive of, and feel in ourselves,
when we pronounce the word _soul_ or _understanding_.
Now here is the sum and the substance of Gall’s psycology. For the
understanding, essentially a unit faculty, he substitutes a multitude
of little understandings or faculties, distinct and isolate. And, as
these faculties, which perform just as he wills them to do—which he
multiplies according to his pleasure,[32] seem in his eyes to explain
certain phenomena which are not well explained by the lights of ordinary
philosophy, he triumphs!
He does not perceive that an explanation, which is words merely, adapts
itself to any and to every thing. In the time of Malebranche, every thing
was explained by _animal spirits_; Barthez explained every thing by his
_vital principle_, &c.
“This,” says Gall, “explains how the same man may possess a judgment
that is ready and sure as to certain objects, while it is imbecile
as to certain others; how he may have the liveliest and most fruitful
imagination upon some subjects, while it is cold and sterile upon
others.”[33]
“Grant,” says he, further, “to the animals certain fundamental faculties,
and you have the dog that follows the chase with _passion_; the weasel
that strangles the poultry with _rage_; the nightingale that sings with
_fervour_ beside his mate,”[34] &c.
No doubt of it. But what sort of philosophy is that, that thinks to
explain a fact by a word? You observe such or such a penchant in an
animal, such or such a taste or talent in a man; _presto_, a particular
faculty is produced for each one of these peculiarities, and you suppose
the whole matter to be settled. You deceive yourself; your _faculty_ is
only a _word_,—it is the name of the fact,—and all the difficulty remains
just where it was before.
Besides, you speak only of the facts that you suppose yourself able
to explain; you say nothing of those that you render by your system
wholly inexplicable. You say not one word as to the unity of the
understanding, the unity of the _me_, or you deny it. But the unity of
the understanding, the unity of the _me_, is a fact of the conscious
sense, and the conscious sense is more powerful than all the philosophies
together.
Gall is always talking about observation, and he was indeed, as an
observer, full of ingenuity. But, in order to follow out an observation,
it must be traced to the very end, and we must accept all that it yields
to our research; and observation every where gives, and shows every
where, and above all things else, the unity of the understanding, the
unity of the _me_.
Gall’s philosophy consists only in transmuting into a particular
understanding each separate _mode_[35] of the understanding, properly so
called.
Descartes had already said, “There are in us as many faculties as there
are truths to be known.... But I do not think that any useful application
can be made of this way of thinking; and it seems to me rather more
likely to be mischievous, by giving to the ignorant occasion for
imagining an equal number of little entities in the soul.”[36]
It may well be supposed that Gall, who in the word understanding sees
nothing but an abstract word, expressive of the sum of our intellectual
faculties, would also, in the word _will_, perceive nothing more than an
abstract word, expressing the sum of our moral faculties.
He had given a definition of _reason_: “The result of the simultaneous
action of all the intellectual faculties.”[37] In the same way he defined
_will_ to be “the result of the simultaneous action of the superior
intellectual faculties.”[38] But Gall always deceives himself; for reason
and will are not _results_—they are _powers_, and primary powers of
thought.
Gall, in a manner equally singular, defines _moral liberty_ or _free
will_.
“Moral liberty,” says he, “is nothing more than the faculty of _being
determined_, and of determining under motive.”[39] Not so: liberty is
precisely the power to determine against all motive. Locke well defined
liberty as _power_: to be determined, is to allow one’s self to be
determined—that is, to _obey_.
Gall says again, “Unlimited liberty supposes not only that man governs
himself independently of all law, but that he is the creator of his own
nature.”[40] Not at all; it supposes that he may have choice—and in fact
he does choose.
Lastly, Gall says, “A phenomenon such as that of absolute liberty, would
be a phenomenon occurring without any cause whatever.”[41] Why without
cause? The cause is in the power of choosing—and this power is a fact.
Gall’s whole doctrine is one series of errors, which press upon each
other cumulatively. He resolves that the part of the brain in which
the understanding resides shall be divided into many small organs,
distinct from each other; a physiological error. He decries the unity
of the understanding, and looks upon the will and the reason as mere
results—psycological errors. In the free will he perceives merely a
compulsory determination,[42] and consequently a mere result—this is a
moral error.
Man’s liberty is a positive faculty, and not the simple passive result of
the preponderance of one _motive_ over another _motive_, of one _organ_
over another _organ_.[43]
Reason, will, liberty, are therefore, not as in Gall’s doctrine,
_positive faculties_, _active powers_; or rather, they are
the understanding itself. Reason, will, liberty, are in fact
the understanding, as _conceiving_, _willing_, _choosing_, or
_deliberating_.[44]
The consciousness which feels itself to be one, feels itself free. And
you will remark, that these two great facts given out by the inward
sense, the consciousness, to wit, the unity of the understanding and the
positive power of the free will, are precisely the two first facts denied
by the philosophy of Gall.
And take good care to observe further, that if there be in us any thing
that belongs to the _consciousness_, it is evidently and par excellence
the sense of our personal unity; or what is more, the consciousness of
our moral liberty.
Man is a moral force, only inasmuch as he is a free force. Any philosophy
that attempts the liberty of man, attempts, without knowing it, morals
itself. Man then is free, and as he is a moral agent only in proportion
as he is free, it would seem that his liberty is the only attribute of
his soul from which Providence has designed to remove all the boundaries.
“What is here very remarkable,” says Descartes, “is that, of all within
me, there is not one thing so perfect or so great, but that I know it
might be greater and more perfect. Thus, for example, if I consider my
faculty of conceiving, I find it of very small extent, and very limited.
If, in the same manner, I examine the memory, the imagination, or any
other one of my faculties, I find not one that is not very limited and
very small. Within me there is only my will or my liberty of free will,
which I feel to be so great that I conceive not the idea of another more
full and of greater extent.”[45]
II.
OF GALL.
OF THE FACULTIES.
Gall’s philosophy consists wholly in the substitution of _multiplicity_
for _unity_. In place of one general and single brain,[46] he substitutes
a number of small brains: instead of one general sole understanding,
he substitutes several individual understandings.[47] These pretended
_individual understandings_ are the _faculties_.
Now, Gall admits the existence of twenty-seven of these faculties, each
one of them (since each one is a peculiar understanding) endowed with its
perceptive faculty, its memory, its judgment, its imagination; &c.[48]
Hence, there are twenty-seven perceptive faculties, twenty-seven
memories, twenty-seven judgments, twenty-seven imaginations, &c.
For, if we are to follow Gall, each attribute is not less distinct than
each faculty. The memory, the judgment, imagination, &c. of one faculty
are not the memory, judgment, or imagination of another faculty.
“The sense of numbers,” says he, “possesses a judgment for the relations
of numbers; the sense of the arts, a judgment for works of art; but where
the fundamental faculty is wanting, the judgment relative to objects of
that faculty must necessarily be wanting likewise.”[49]
He says further: “It is impossible for an individual to possess
imagination and judgment for any object with the fundamental faculty for
which he has not been gifted by nature.”[50]
Thus, beyond all doubt: there are twenty-seven faculties; and as there
are twenty-seven faculties, there must be twenty-seven memories,
judgments, imaginations, &c.
In one word, there is no such thing as a general understanding; but
there are twenty-seven special understandings, with three or four times
twenty-seven distinct attributes of each. Such is the entire psycology
of Gall.
To proceed. Gall’s twenty-seven faculties are: the instinct of
propagation, love of offspring, self-defence, the carnivorous
instinct, the sense of property, friendship, cunning, pride, vanity,
circumspection, memory for things, memory for words, sense of locality,
sense of persons, sense of language, of relations of colours, relations
of sounds, relations of numbers, of mechanics, of comparative sagacity,
the metaphysical genius, sarcasm, poetic talent, benevolence, imitation,
religion, firmness.
Gall says that these faculties are innate,[51] and this assertion
certainly will not be contested.
Locke, who so vigorously opposed the doctrine of innate ideas, never
decried the _innateness_ of our faculties. He always regarded them as
natural, that is to say, _innate_.[52]
Condillac himself, who charges Locke with having considered the faculties
of the soul as _innate_, in making these charges confounds the _faculties
of the soul_ with the _operations of the soul_.[53]
Now, that which is perfectly true as to the _operations of the soul_,
is by no means so as regards her _faculties_. All the faculties of the
soul are innate and contemporary, for they are nothing more than _modes_
of the soul; indeed, they are the soul itself, viewed under different
aspects. But the operations of the soul succeed each other, and beget
each other. There can be no memory without previous perception; there can
be no judgment without recollection. In order that there may be a will,
there must have been a judgment, &c.
After saying that the faculties are innate, Gall says also that they are
_independent_.[54]
And if, by the word _independent_, he means distinct, there is nothing
less contestible. But if, by this word _independent_, he understood (as
indeed he does understand) that each faculty is a real understanding, the
question is altered and the difficulty begins.
For, if each individual faculty is a proper understanding, it follows
that there are as many understandings as there are faculties, and the
understanding ceases to be _one_, and the _me_ is no longer _one_. I
am well aware that this is exactly what Gall means; he says it, and
reiterates it throughout his work. He says it, but does not prove it. And
how should he prove it? Can we prove any thing against our consciousness?
“I remark here, in the first place,” says Descartes, “that there is a
great difference between the mind and the body, in that the body is, by
its nature, always divisible, and the mind wholly indivisible. For, in
fact, when I contemplate it—that is, when I contemplate my own self—and
consider myself as a thing that thinks, I cannot discover in myself any
parts, but I clearly know and conceive that I am a thing absolutely one
and complete.”[55]
Gall reverses the common philosophy, and it is worthy of remark, that
the whole of his philosophy, which he thinks so novel,[56] is, to the
very letter, nothing more nor less than this very inversion. According to
common philosophy, there is one general understanding—a unit; and there
are faculties which are but modes of this understanding. Gall asserts
that there are as many kinds of peculiar intelligences as there are
faculties, and that the understanding in general is nothing more than a
mode or attribute of each faculty. He says so expressly.
His words are: “The intellectual faculty and all its subdivisions, such
as perception, recollection, memory, judgment, and imagination, are not
fundamental faculties, but merely their general attributes.”[57]
Gall first inverts the common philosophy, and then contends for the
existence of all the consequences of that common philosophy.
He suppresses the _me_, but insists that there is a soul. He abolishes
the freewill, and yet contends that there is such a thing as morals. He
makes of the idea of God an idea that is merely relative and conditional,
but yet asserts that there may be such a thing as religion.
I say he abolishes the _me_; for the _me_ is the soul. The soul is the
understanding, general and one; but if there be no understanding as
general, there can be no soul.
According to Gall, there is nothing real and positive except the
_faculties_.
And these faculties alone are possessed of organs. “None of my
predecessors,” says he, “had any knowledge of those forces which alone
are the functions of special cerebral organs.”[58]
By the contrary reasoning, neither the will, nor the reason, nor the
understanding, are possessed of any organs, for they are nothing but
forces; they are nothing but nouns collective—words.
“These observations may suffice,” says Gall, “to convince the reader that
there cannot exist any special organ of the will, or the freewill.”[59]
He adds: “It is equally impossible that there should be any peculiar
organ of the reason.”[60]
Finally he says: “From all that I have now said it follows, that the idea
of an organ of the intellect or understanding is quite as inadmissible as
the idea of an organ of the instinct.”[61]
Hence there can be nought but the faculties; and, according to Gall,
these faculties are so distinct, that he attributes to each particular
one a separate organ.[62] He divides the understanding into little
understandings.
Descartes expressed himself in the following words: “We do not conceive
of any body, except as divisible; whereas the human mind cannot conceive
of itself except as indivisible; for in fact we are incapable of
conceiving of half a soul.”[63] Gall, however, settles that point. He
makes half souls. He retrenches or adds as many faculties as suits his
plan. These faculties are separated by material limits. He goes so far
as to say that such or such a faculty acts with greater or less facility
upon such or such another faculty, according as one happens to be
situated nearer to or farther off from the other.
“As the organ of the arts,” says he, “is located far from that of the
sense of colour, the circumstance explains why historical painters have
rarely been colourists.”[64]
Thus, we find that the faculties alone are possessed of _forces_. These
forces alone are endowed with organs; and these organs, by which they are
kept separate from each other, separate them to distances sufficiently
great to hinder, in certain cases, one given faculty from exercising any
influence over another. Therefore, there is no such thing as unity; there
is no unit faculty, no unit understanding; there is no _me_; and if there
be no _me_, there can be no soul.
In the same way he abolishes the _freewill_. Will, liberty, reason, in
his view,[65] are nothing but _results_, as I have already stated.
“To the end,” says he, “that man may not be confined merely to the
ability to wish—in order that he may actually will—the concurrence of
several superior faculties is requisite. The motives must be weighed,
compared, and judged; the decision resulting from this operation is
denominated will.”[66]
“Reason,” he further adds, “supposes a concerted action of the superior
faculties. It is the judgment pronounced by the superior intellectual
faculties.”[67]
Hence, the will is nothing but a _decision_; reason is nothing but a
_judgment_. The faculties _concert together_. What a singular philosophy,
which always substitutes the fictions of language for the facts of the
conscious sense, and which is satisfied with those fictions!
Freewill is either a power, a force, or it is nothing. He resolves that
it is merely a _result_. Gall therefore abolishes the freewill.
Indeed, he makes of the idea of God nothing but a relative and
conditional idea, for he supposes that this idea comes from a particular
organ; and he supposes that that organ may possibly, in some case, be
wanting.
“It cannot be doubted,” says Gall, “that the human race are endowed with
an organ by means of which it recognises and admires the Author of the
universe.”[68]
“God exists,” adds he, “for there is an organ to know and adore him.”[69]
But he continues: “Climate and other circumstances may obstruct the
development of the cerebral part, by means of which the Creator designed
to reveal himself to his creature man.”[70]
Again: “If there were a people whose organization should be altogether
defective in this respect, they would be as little susceptible as any
other kinds of animal, of the religious idea or sentiment.”[71]
Further: “There is no God for beings whose organization does not bear the
original stamp of determinate faculties.”[72]
What! If I happen not to possess a little peculiar organ, (for it
may be wanting,) can I not feel that God exists! And how can I be an
intelligence, knowing myself, and yet not knowing that God is? I do not
more strongly feel that I am, than that God is. “This idea,” (the idea of
God) says Descartes, “is born and produced along with me, just as is the
idea of myself.”[73]
My understanding, which perceives itself and feels itself to be an
effect, necessarily perceives the intelligent Cause which produced it.
“It is a very evident thing,” says Descartes again, “that there must
be at least as much reality in a cause as in the effect it produces;
and since I am a thing that thinks, whatsoever be in fact the cause of
my being, I am compelled to confess, that _it also_ is something that
thinks.”[74]
Hitherto I have considered Gall’s philosophy only under its speculative
points of view; what would it be, if considered in a practical relation?
In one of his happy moments, Diderot wrote the following very remarkable
phrase: “The ruin of liberty overthrows all order and all government,
confounds vice and virtue together, sanctions every monstrous infamy,
extinguishes all shame and all remorse, and degrades and deforms without
recovery the whole human race.”[75]
Nothing astonishes a phrenologist.
“Let us imagine,” says Gall, “a woman in whom the love of offspring is
but little developed, ... if, unfortunately, the organ of murder be very
much developed in her, need we be surprised if her hand....”[76] &c.
Organization explains every thing.
“These last named facts show us,” says Gall, “that this detestable
inclination (the inclination to commit murder) has its source in a vice
of the organization.”[77]
“Let those haughty men,” says he again, “who cause nations to be
slaughtered by thousands, know that they do not act of their own
accord, but that Nature herself has filled their hearts with rage and
destructiveness.”[78]
No, indeed! This is not what they must know; for, thanks be to God, it is
not true. What they ought to know, what they ought to be told, is, that
although Providence has left to man the power to do evil, he has also
endowed him with the power to do good. That which man ought to know, that
which should be instilled into his mind and heart is, that he has a free
power, and that this power ought not to be misdirected; and that he who
in his own nature misdirects it, no matter under what form of philosophy
he takes refuge, is a being who degrades his nature.
Under the title of _fundamental faculties_, Gall confounds all things
together—the passions, the instinct, the intellectual faculties. These
faculties, which are at the basis of his whole philosophy, he knows not
even how to denominate them. He calls them instincts,[79] inclinations,
senses, memories, &c. There is a memory or sense of things, a memory
or sense of persons, &c. He confounds the instinct that leads certain
animals to live in elevated regions with pride, which is a moral
sentiment in man;[80] the carnivorous instinct with courage;[81] he
believes that conscience, (which is the soul judging itself,) is nothing
but a modification of a particular sense, the sense of benevolence,
&c.[82]
The hesitation of his mind is visible every where.
“I leave it to the reader,” says he, “to decide whether the fundamental
faculty to which this penchant relates, should be denominated sense of
elevation, self-esteem,” &c.[83]
“To speak correctly,” continues he, “firmness is neither a penchant nor
a faculty; it is a mode-of-being, which gives to a man a distinctive
quality, which is called character.”[84]
Finally, he writes the following paragraph, perhaps the most singular
one that he ever wrote, for it shows in the clearest manner how little
confidence he had in his own psycology.
“If we are materialists because we do not admit the existence of a
unit-faculty of the soul, but recognise several primitive faculties,
we ask whether the ordinary division of the faculties of the soul
into understanding, will, attention, memory, judgment, imagination,
and affections and passions, expresses nothing more than a primitive
unit-faculty? If it be asserted that all these faculties are merely
modifications of a sole and same faculty, what can hinder us from making
the same assertion as to the faculties whose existence we do admit.”[85]
To be sure, nothing prevents you. Or rather every thing constrains you
to do so. There is therefore one sole faculty, of which all the other
faculties are but moods. You return then to the common philosophy, and
consequently you no longer possess a peculiar philosophy.
The problem proposed by Gall is at the same time physiological,
psycological, and anatomical.
In our first article an account has been given of Gall’s _physiology_,
and it has been shown to be generally disproved by direct experiment.
In the present one his _psycology_ has been examined, and it is confuted
by the consciousness (_le sens intime_). It only remains for us now to
examine his _anatomy_.
III.
OF GALL.
THE ORGANS.
Of all Gall’s writings, his anatomy is that which has been most talked
of, and yet it is the part least known.
In the year 1808, Gall read to the first class of the Institute a memoir
on the anatomy of the brain;[86] and M. Cuvier made a report upon that
memoir. But neither in that memoir nor in the report do we find one
word of _special anatomy_, of _secret anatomy_, of what might be called
_anatomy of the Doctrine_; or, in other terms, and as it would be
expressed at the present day, of _phrenological anatomy_.
The anatomy of Gall’s memoir is nothing but a very ordinary anatomy.
He insists that the cerebral nerves, all of them without exception,
rise upwards from the medulla oblongata towards the encephalon; that
the cineritious matter produces the white matter: he divides the fibres
of the brain into _divergent_ and _convergent_; he supposes that each
convolution of this organ, instead of being a full and solid mass, as is
generally thought, is merely a fold[87] of nervous or medullary fibres,
&c. &c.
Such are the questions discussed by Gall; and it is sufficiently clear
that, whatever side we take upon these questions, his doctrine assuredly
would neither gain nor lose any thing.
Whether such or such a nerve ascends or descends; whether the white
matter is produced by the gray; or whether, which is, to say the least,
quite as probable, this be nonsense; whether this or that fibre goes out
or comes in, diverges or converges, &c. &c. the doctrine of the plurality
of brains, the doctrine of individual intelligences, will be neither more
nor less true, more nor less doubtful.[88]
M. Cuvier, in his report, observed: “It is essential to repeat, were it
merely for the information of the public, that the anatomical questions
we have been considering, have no immediate and necessary connexion with
the physiological doctrines taught by M. Gall, as to the functions and
relative volume of different parts of the brain; and that all that we
have inquired into as to the structure of the brain, might be either true
or false, without affording the least conclusion in favour of or against
the doctrine.”[89]
It is necessary not to make any mistake as to the real point of the
question. Gall’s doctrine goes to establish one and only one thing, to
wit, _the plurality of intelligences_ and _the plurality of brains_.[90]
That is what constitutes the special and peculiar doctrine; that
is to say, different from the common doctrine, which admits but one
understanding and a single brain. Whatever goes to prove the plurality
of understandings and brains belongs to Gall’s doctrine; and whatever
does not tend to prove the plurality of understandings and brains is in
opposition to that doctrine.